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# To the Reader.

*Gentle Reader, when I first saw this Book in French divided into three parts, and all three carying the title of Wisdome, and having read the Preface, I conceived some excellencie in it beyond the reach of common endeavours; The first part teaching us the knowledg of our selves, and our humane condition, with the inward and outward parts of man, his thoughts, words, actions, and all his motions, as a preparative unto Wisdome; The second part instructing a civil life, and forming a man for the world; shewing the privileges and proper qualities of a wise man, and how every man ought to live, and how to dye; The third part teaching the way how to attain to wisdom, and instructing man universally in*

*all things, and that by a discourse of the four moral virtues; and finding the matter penned with so great gravity and wisdom (as a great and learned Doctor said unto me, after I had shewed him some part thereof in English) that it was a work (as he thought) beyond the capacity of man; He gave me incouragement to go forward in the translation of it, both for the great worth thereof, and the general good; In which I must acknowledg, that not without advise I have partly omitted, and partly altered the discourse upon some points which I conceived not fit to passe the Presse. For the main work I think it needlesse to say much in commendation of it, for it hath already sufficiently commended it self to the world by four former impressions; And for this fifth, though it be last, I hope this new labour will not make it lesse esteemed.*

SAMSON LENNARD.

# A Table of the Chapters of these three Books of Wisdome.

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*The first Book of knowledge of our selves and humane condition.*

*An exhortation to study and knowledge of our selves.*

*The Preface of the first Book.*

*The first Consideration of man, which is naturall, by all the parts whereof he is composed.*


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OF

# OF VVISDOME three Books:

## The Preface.

*Where the Name, Subject, Purpose, and Method of this Work is set down, with an Advertisement to the Reader.*

IT is required at the first entry into this Work, that we know what this wisdome is; and since it beareth that name and title, how we purpose to speak thereof. All men in generall at the first view of the simple word it self, do easily conceive and imagine it to be some quality, sufficiencie, or habit, not common or vulgar, but excellent, singular, and elevated above that which is common and ordinary, be it good or evil: For it is taken and used (though perhaps improperly) in both kinds: *Sapientes sunt ut faciant mala: They are wise to do evil:* and signifieth not properly a good and laudable quality, but exquisite, singular, excellent in whatsoever it be. And therefore we do as well say a wise Tyrant, Pirat, Theif, as a wise King, Pilot, Captain: that is to say, Sufficient, prudent, advised; not simply and vulgarly, but excellently: For there is opposite,

1 Of the word Wisdome.

*Hierom. Arist. lib. 5. Metaphy.*

posite unto Wisdome not onely folly, which is an irregularity or looseness of life, and Wisdome a regularity or moderation, well measured and proportioned; but also common baseness and vulgar Simplicity: For Wisdome his high, strong, and excellent; yea, whether it be in good or evill, it containeth two things: Sufficiencie, that is, Provision or furniture for whatsoever is required and necessary; and that it be in some high degree of excellencie. So that you see what the simpler sort imagine Wisdome to be at the first view and the simple sound of the word; whereby they conclude, that there are few wise men, that they are rare as every excellency is; and that to them by right it appertaineth to command and govern others; that they are as Oracles: from whence is that saying, *Believe others, and referre thy self to the wise.* But well to define this thing, and according to truth, and to distinguish it into his true parts, all men know not, neither are they of one accord, nor is it easie, for otherwise do the common people, otherwise the Philosophers, otherwise the Divines speake thereof. These are the three floores and degrees of the world. The two latter proceed by order, and rules, and precepts, the former confusedly and very imperfectly.

2 The division of Wisdome.

Now then we may say, That there are three sorts and degrees of Wisdome, Divine, Humane, Mundane, which correspond unto God; Nature pure and entire; Nature vitiated and corrupted. Of all these sorts and every of them do all these three orders of the world, which before we speak of, write and discourse, every one according to his own manner add fashion; but properly and formerly the common sort, that is to say, the world of worldly wisdome, the Philosopher of humane, the Divine of divine Wisdome.

3 Worldly wisdome, and of the three the more base, which

(which is divers according to the three great Captains and Leaders of this inferiour world, Opulency, Pleasure, Glory, or rather Avarice, Luxury, Ambition: *Quicquid est in mundo est concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, superbia vitæ*; *All that is in the world is the lust of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life*: For which cause it is called by S. Iames, *Terrena, Animalis, Diabolica*; *Earthly, Sensuall, Devillish*,) is proved by Philosophy and Divinity, which pronounceth its folly before God; *Stultam fecit Deus sapientiam hujus mundi*: *God hath made the wisdome of this world foolishness*. Of this wisdome therefore we speake not in this Book, except it be to dispraise and condemn it.

Worldly wisdome. 1 Iohn

Iames 3.

1 Cor. 1.

4 Divine wisdome.

Divine Wisdome, and of the three the highest, is defined and handled by Philosophers and Divines, but somewhat diversly. As for the common or worldly Wisdome, I disdain it, and pass by whatsoever may be spoken thereof as prophane, and too unworthy in this Treatise to be read. The Philosophers make it altogether Speculative, saying, That it is the knowledg of the principles, first causes, and highest power to judg of all things, even of the most Soveraign, which is God himself: and this Wisdome is Metaphysicall, and resideth wholly in the understanding, as being the chief good and perfection thereof: it is the first and highest of the five intellectuall virtues, which may be without either honesty, action, or other morall virtue. The Divines make it not altogether so speculative, but that it is likewise in some sort Practick; for they say, That it is the knowledg of divine things, from which there ariseth a judgment and rule of humane actions; and they make it two-fold, The one acquired by study, and comes neer to that of the Philosophers; which I am to speak of: The other infused and given by God, *De sursum descendens*, *Comming from above*. This is the first of

*Thom. 1. 2. quæst. 57. 2. 2. p. 19.*

of the seven gifts of the holy Ghost, *Spiritus Domini, Spiritus ſapientiæ, The ſpirit of God is the ſpirit of wiſdome.* Which is not found but only in thoſe that are juſt and free from ſin, *In malevolam animam non introibit ſapientia: Wiſdome cannot enter into a wicked heart.* Of this Divine wiſdome likewiſe our purpoſe is not here to ſpeake, it is, after ſome ſort and meaſure handled in my firſt Verity, and in my Diſcourſes of Divinity.

*Sap.* 1.

5 Humane.

It followeth therefore, that it is Humane Wiſdome which in this book we are to deliver unto you, and whereof it takes the name, and of which in this place we muſt muſt give ſome brief and generall view, which may be as an Argument and Summary of this whole Work. The common deſcriptions are divers and inſufficient; Some and the greateſt part think that it is only a wiſdome, diſcretion, and adviſed cariage in a mans affaires and converſation. This may well be called common, as reſpecting nothing but that which is outward and in action, and conſidereth not at all any other thing then that which outward appeareth. It is altogether in the eies and eares of men, without any reſpect or very little of the inward motions of the mind: ſo that according to their opinion wiſdome may be without eſſentiall piety or probity, that is, a beautifull cunning, a ſweet and modeſt ſubtilty. Others think that it is a rude, unreaſonable, rough ſingularity, a kind of ſullen frowning and frampole auſterity in opinions, manners, words, actions and faſhion of life; and therefore they call them that are wounded and touched with that humour, Philoſophers, that is to ſay, in their counterfeit language, fantaſticall, divers, different and declining from the cuſtomes of other men.

Wiſdome according to the common ſort.

Now this kind of wiſdome according to the doctrine of our book, is rather a folly and extravagancie. You muſt therefore know, that this wiſdome whereof we ſpeake,

is

is not that of the common people, but of Philosophers and Divines, whereof both have written in their Morall learnings. The Philosophers more at large, and more professedly, as being their true and proper dish they feed on, and formall subject they write of, because they apply themselves to that which concerneth Nature and Action. Divinity mounteth much higher, and is occupied about virtues infused, Contemplative and Divine, that is to say, about Divine wisdome and Belief. So that Philosophers are more stayed, dispersed more certain, and more common, ruling and instructing not onely the particular knowledg or actions of men, but the common and publike, teaching that which is good and profitable to Families, Corporations, Common-weales, Empires. Divinity is more sparing and silent in this point, looking principally into the eternall good and salvation of every one. Again, the Philosopher handleth this subject more sweetly and pleasingly, the Divine more austerely and drily. Again, Philosophy which is the elder (for Nature is more ancient then Grace, and the Naturall then the Supernaturall) seemeth to perswade gratiously, as being willing to please in profiting, as the Poet speaketh:

According to Philosophers and Divines

A comparison betwixt Divinity and Philosophy.

*Simul & jucunda & idonea dicere vitæ,*
*Lectorem delectando, paritérque monendo:* Horac.

It is enriched with discourses, reasons, inventions, examples, similitudes, decked with speeches, Apothegmes, sententious mots, adorned with Eloquence and Art. Theologie, which came after, altogether austere, it seemeth to command, and imperiously like a Master to to enjoyn. And to conclude, the virtue and honesty of Divines is too auxious, scrupulous, deject, sad, fearfull and vulgar. Philosophy, such as this Book teacheth, is altogether pleasant, free, bucksome, and if I may so say, wanton

wanton too; and yet notwithstanding, puissant, noble, generous, and rare, Doubtless the Philosophers have herein been excellent, not onely in writing and teaching, but in the rich aud lively representation thereof in their honourable and heroicall lives. I understand here by Philosophers and Wise men, not onely those that have carried the name of Wise men, such as *Thales*, *Solon*, and the rest of that ranke, that lived in the time of *Cyrus*, *Cræsus*, *Pisistratus*; nor those that came afterwards, and have publikely taught it, as *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Aristippus*, *Zenon*, *Antisthenes*, all chief Professours apart, and many other their Disciples different and divided in sects; but also all those great men who have made singular and exemplary profession of virtue and wisdome, as *Phocion*, *Aristides*, *Pericles*, *Alexander*, whom *Plutarch* called as well a Philosopher as a King, *Epaminondas*, and divers other Greeks: The *Fabricij*, *Fabij*, *Camilli*, *Catones*, *Torquati*, *Reguli*, *Lelij*, *Scipiones*, Romans, who for the most part have been Generals in Armies. And these are the reasons why in this my Book I do more willingly and ordinarily follow the advice and sayings of Philosophers, not in the mean time omitting or rejecting those of the Divines: For both in substance they do all agree, and are very seldome different, and Divinity doth nothing disdain to employ, and to make good use of these wise sayings of Philosophy. If I had undertaken to instruct the cloister, and the retired life, that is, that profession which attendeth the secrets Evangelicall, I must necessarily have followed *ad amussim* the advice of the Divines: but our Book instructeth a civill life, formeth a man for the world, that is to say, to humane wisdome, not divine.

6

A general description of humane wisdome.

We say then naturally and generally both with the Philosopher and the Divine, and this humane wisdome is a kind of law or reason, a beautifull and noble composition of

of the entire man, both in his inward part of his outward, his thoughts, his words, his actions, and all his motions. It is the excellency and perfection of man as he is a man, that is to say, according to that which the first fundamentall and naturall law doth require; as we say, That that work is well wrought and excellent, that is compleat and perfect in all the parts thereof, and wherein all the rules of Art have been observed; that man is accounted a wise man, that best knoweth after the best and most excellent manner to play the man, that is to say, (to give a more particular picture thereof) that knowing himself and the condition of men, doth keep and preserve himself from all vices, errours, passions and defects as well inward and proper to himself, as outward and common to other men, maintaining his spirit pure, free, universall, considering and judging of all things without band or affection, alwayes ruling and directing himself in all things according to nature, that is to say, that first reason and universall law and light inspired by God, and which shineth in us, unto which he doth apply and accommodate his own proper and particular light, living in the outward view of the world, and with all men according to their laws, customes, and ceremonies of the countrey where he is, without the offence of any, carrying himself wisely and discreetly in all affaires, walking always uprightly, constant, comfortable, and content in himself, attending peaceably whatsoever may happen, and at the last death it self. All these parts or qualities, which are many, for our better ease and facility may be drawn to four principall heads; Knowledge of our selves, Liberty of spirit pure and generous, Imitation of Nature, (this hath a very large field, and alone might almost suffice) True contentment. These can no where be found but in him that is wise: and he that wanteth any of these cannot be wise.

He

He that hath an erroneous knowledge of himself, that subjecteth his mind to any kind of servitude, either of passions or popular opinions, makes himself partiall; and by enthralling himself to some particular opinion, is deprived of the liberty and jurisdiction of discerning, judging and examining all things. He that striveth against Nature, under what pretence soever it be, following rather opinion or passion, then reason; he that carrieth himself troubledly, disquietly, malecontent, fearing death, is not wise. Behold here in a few words the picture of humane Wisdome and folly, and the summe of that which I purpose to handle in this Work, especially in the Second Book, which expresly containeth the rules, treatise, and offices of Wisdome, which is more mine then the other two, and which I once thought to have published by it self. This verball description of Wisdome is represented unto the eye even at the entrance or threshold of this Book by a woman all naked, in a place void and empty, resting her self upon nothing, in her pure and simple nature, beholding her self in a glasse, her countenance cheerfull, merry, and manly, upright, her feet close joynted, upon a square pillar, and imbracing her self, having under her feet inchained four other women as slaves unto her, that is to say, *Passion*, with a changed and hideous countenance; *Opinion* with wandring eyes, inconstant, giddy, born upon the heads of the people; *Superstition* astonished and in a trance, and her hands fastned the one to the other; *Virtue* or Honesty and Pedanticall Science with a sullen visage, her eye-lids elevated reading in a Book, where was written, *Yea, No.* All this needs no other application, then that which hereafter followeth: but hereof more at large in the second Book.

To

To attain unto this wisdome, there are two means: the first is in the originall forming and first temper, that is to say; in the temperature of the seed of the Parents, the milk of the Nurse, and the first education; whereby a man is said to be either well born, or ill born, that is to say, either well or ill formed and disposed unto wisdome. A man would little think of what power and importance this beginning is; for if men did know it, there would be more care taken, and diligence used therein then there is. It is a strange and lamentable thing, that so wretchless a carelesnes should be in us, of the life and good life of those whom we desire to make our other selves; when in matters of less importance we take more care, use more diligence, more counsel then we should, never thinking of our greatest affairs and most honourable, but by hazard and peradventure. Who is he that taketh counsel with himself, or endeavoureth to do that which is required for the preserving and preparing of himself as he ought to the generation of male-children, healthfull of spirit, and apt for wisdome? For that which serveth for the one, serveth for the other, and Nature after one manner attendeth them all. This is that which men think of least, yea little or not at all (in the act of generation) doth it enter into their thoughts to frame a new creature like themselves, but only like beasts to satisfie their lustfull pleasures. This is one of the most important faults and of greatest note in a Common-weal, whereof there is not one that thinketh or complaineth, neither is there concerning it either law, or rule, or publike advice. It is most certain, that if men did herein carry themselves as they ought, we should have other men, of more excellent spirit and condition, then we have amongst us. What is required herein, and to the first nourshment and education, is briefly set down in our Third Book, *Chap.* 14.

7 *Two wayes to attain this wisdome.*

8 *Acquired.* The second means to attain wisdome is the study of Philosophy, I mean not of all the parts thereof, but Moral (yet not forgetting the Natural) which is the light, the guide, the rule of our life, which explaineth and representeth unto us the law of Nature, instructeth man universally in all things, both publick and private, alone and in company, in all domesticall and civil conversation, taketh away all that savage nature that is in us, sweetneth and tameth our naturall rudeness, cruelty and wildeness, and worketh and fashioneth it to wisdome. To be brief, it is the true science of man; all the rest in respect of it, is but vanity, or at least wise not necessary, or little profitable: for it giveth instructions to live and die well, which is all in all, it teacheth us perfect wisdome, an apt, judicious, well-advised honesty. But this second mean is almost as little practised, and as ill employed as the first: for no man careth greatly for this wisdome, so much are all given to that which is worldly. Thus you see the two principall means to attain to wisdome, the Naturall, and Acquired. He that hath been fortunate in the first, that is to say, that hath been favourably formed by Nature, that is, of a good and sweet temperature, which bringeth forth a great goodness in nature, and sweetness in manners, hath made a fair march without great pain to the second: But that man with whom it is otherwise, must, with great and painfull study of the second, beautifie and supply that which is wanting; as *Socrates* one of the wisest said of himself, That by the study of Philosophy he had corrected and reformed his naturall infirmities.

9 *The lets to Wisdome, and means to folly, are two.* There are contrariwise two formall lets or hinderances to wisdome, and two counter-means or powerfull wayes unto folly, Naturall, and Acquired. The first, which is naturall, proceedeth from the originall temper and temperature, which maketh the brain either too soft, moist,

1 *Naturall.*

and

and the parts thereof groſs and materiall, whereby the ſpirits remain ſottiſh, feeble, leſs capable, plain diminiſhed, obſcure, ſuch as that is, for the moſt part, of the common ſort of people; or too hot, ardent, and dry, which maketh the ſpirits fooliſh, audacious, vitious. Theſe are the two extreams, *Sottiſhneſs* and *Folly*: Water and Fire, Lead and Mercury, altogether improper or unapt to wiſdome, which requireth a ſpirit full of vigour and generous, and yet ſweet, pliant, and modeſt: but the ſecond is more eaſily amended by diſcipline then the former.

The ſecond, which is Acquired, proceedeth either from no culture or inſtruction, or from that which is evil, which amongſt other things conſiſteth in an obſtinate and ſworn prejudicate prevention of opinions, wherewith the mind is made drunken, and taketh ſo ſtrong a tincture, that it is made unapt and uncapable to ſee or to find better whereby to raiſe and inrich it ſelf. It is ſaid of theſe kind of men, That they are wounded and ſtricken, that they have a hurt or blow in the head: unto which wound if likewiſe learning be joyned, becauſe that puffeth up, it bringeth with it preſumption and temerity, and ſometimes arms to mãitain and defend thoſe anticipated opinions: it altogether perfecteth the form and frame of folly, and maketh it incurable. So that naturall weakneſs, and acquired prevention, are two great hinderances; but ſcience, if it do not wholly cure them, which ſeldome it doth ſtrengtheneth them and maketh them invincible, which turneth not any way to the diſhonour of learning (as a man may well think) but to the greater honour thereof. 2 *Acquired.*

Scienoe or Learning is a very good and profitable ſtaff or waſter, but which will not be handled with all hands; and he that knows not wel how to rule it, receiveth thereby more hurt then profit. It beſotteth and maketh fooliſh (ſaith a great learned Writer) the weak and ſick ſpirit; it 10 *Of Learning.*

poliſheth and perfecteth the naturally ſtrong and good. The feeble ſpirit knows not how to poſſeſs ſcience, how to handle it, and how to make uſe thereof as he ſhould: but contrariwiſe is poſſeſſed and ruled by it, whereby he ſubmits himſelf, and remains a ſlave to it, like a weak ſtomack overcharged with more victuals then it can digeſt. A weak arm wanting power and skill well to wield a waſter or ſtaff that is ſomewhat too heavy for it, wearieth it ſelf and fainteth. A wiſe and couragious ſpirit overmaſtereth his wiſdome, enjoyeth it, uſeth it, and employeth it to his beſt advantage, enformeth his own judgement, rectifieth his will, helpeth and fortifieth his naturall light, and maketh himſelf more quick and active, whereas the other is made thereby more ſottiſh, more unapt, and therewithall more preſumptuous; ſo that the fault or reproach is not in learning, no more then that Wine or other good drug is faulty which a man knoweth not how to apply and accommodate to his own needs: *Non eſt culpa vini, ſed culpa bibentis. The fault is not in the Wine, but in the infirmity of him that drinks it.* Now then againſt ſuch ſpirits, weak by nature, preoccupated, puffed up, and hindered by acquired wiſdome, I make open warre in this Book, and that oftentimes under the word *Pedante*, not finding any other more proper, and which by many good Authours is uſed in this ſenſe. In its own Greek Original it was taken in the better ſenſe, but in other later Languages, by reaſon of the abuſe, and bad carriage of ſuch men in the profeſſion of their learning, it is accounted baſe, vile, queſtuous, contentious, opinative, vain-glorious and preſumptuous, by too many practiſed, and uſed but by way of injury and deriſion, and is in the number of thoſe words that by continuance of time have changed their ſignification, as *Tyrant*, *Sophiſter*, and divers other. *Le ſieur de Bellay*, after the rehearſall of many notorious vices, concludeth

*Of the word* Pedante, *or School-maſter.*

cludeth as with the greateſt, *But of all the reſt, Knowledge pedanticall I deteſt.* And in anothet place.

*Said I thou didſt live but to eat and drink,*
*Then poor were my revenge, thy faults ſcanty:*
*But that which moſt doth make thy name to ſtink,*
*Is, to be ſhort, thou art a Pedanty.*

It may be, ſome will take offence at this word, thinking it likewiſe toucheth them, and that I thereby have a will to tax or ſcoff the Profeſſours and Teachers of learning; but let them be pleaſed to content themſelves with this free and open declaration which here I make; That it is no part of my meaning to note by this word any gown-men or learned profeſſion whatſoever: yea I am ſo farre from it, that Philoſophers are in ſo high eſteem with me, that I ſhould oppoſe my ſelf againſt my ſelf, becauſe I account my ſelf one of them, and profeſs the ſame learning: onely I touch a certain degree and quality of ſpirits, before deciphered, that is, ſuch as have naturall capacity and ſufficiency after a common and indifferent manner, but afterwards not well tilled, preoccupated, poſſeſſed with certain opinions: and theſe are men of all fortunes, all conditions, and go as wel in ſhort garments as in long gowns: *Vulgum tam chlamidatos, quàm coronam voco: I reckon amongſt the vulgar ſort, as well Kings and Crowns, as Pedants and Clowns.* If any man can furniſh me with any other word as ſignificant as this to expreſs theſe kind of ſpirits, I will willingly forgo this. After this my declaration, he that findeth himſelf agrieved, ſhall but accuſe and ſhew himſelf too ſcrupulous. It is true that a man may find other oppoſites to a wiſe man beſides a *Pedante*, but it is in ſome particular ſenſe, as the common, profane, vulgar ſort of people; and oftentimes I uſe theſe oppoſites; but this is, as the low is oppoſite to the high, the weak to the ſtrong, the valley to the hill, the common to the rare, the

*An advertiſement.*

ſervant to the maſter, the profane to the holy, as alſo a fool, which indeed according to the true ſound of the word, is his trueſt oppoſite: but this is a moderate man to an immoderate, a glorious opinative man to a modeſt, the part to the whole, the prejudicate and tainted to the neat and free, the ſick to the ſound: but this word *Pedant* in that ſenſe we take it, comprehendeth all theſe and more too, for it noteth and ſignifieth him that is not onely unlike and contrary to a wiſe man, as thoſe before mentioned, but ſuch a one as arrogantly and inſolently reſiſteth it to the face, and as being armed on all ſides, raiſeth himſelf againſt it, ſpeaking out of reſolution and authority. And foraſmuch as after a ſort he feareth it, by reaſon that he ſeeth himſelf diſcovered even from the top to the bottome, and his ſport troubled by it, he proſecuteth it with a certain inteſtine hatred, he taketh upon him to cenſure it, to defame it, to condemn it, accounting and carrying himſelf as the truly wiſe, though he be a fool without peer and an ignorant ſelf-conceited Gull.

11 *The method of this Book.*

After the purpoſe and argument of this Work, we come to the order and method thereof. There are three Books: The firſt is wholly in the knowledge of our ſelves and humane condition, as a preparative unto wiſdome, which is handled at large by five main and principall conſiderations, each one including in it divers others. The ſecond Book containeth in it the treatiſes, offices, and generall and principall rules of wiſdome. The third, the particular rules and inſtructions of wiſdome, and that by the order and diſcourſe of four principall and morall virrues, *Prudence*, *Juſtice*, *Fortitude*, *Temperance*; under which four is compriſed the whole inſtruction of the life of man, and all the parts of duty and honeſty. Finally, I here handle this matter, not Scholarlike or Pedantically, not with enlarged diſcourſe, and furniture of Eloquence

or

or other Art; ( For wisdome ( *quæ si oculis ipsis cerneretur mirabiles excitaret amores sui, If it could be seen with our corporall eyes, would stirre up in us an admirable desire thereof* ) needs no such helps to commend it self, being of it self so noble and glorious) but rudely, openly, and ingenuously, which perhaps will not please all. The propositions and verities are compact, but many times dry and sowr, like Aphorisms, overtures, and seeds of discourse.

Some think this Book too fool-hardy and free to contract and wound the common opinions, and are offended therewith, whom in four or five words I thus answer: First, that wisdome which is neither common nor vulgar hath properly this liberty and authority, *Jure suo singulari*, to judge of all, ( it is the priviledge of a wise and spirituall man, *spiritualis omnia dijudicat, & à nemine judicatur, The spirituall man judgeth all, and is judged of none* ) and in judging to censure and condemn ( as for the most part erroneous) common and vulgar opinions. What then should she do? for the case standing thus, it cannot be, but she must incurre the disgrace and envie of the world. In another place I complain of these kind of men, and reprove their popular weakness and feminine daintiness, as unworthy, being over tender and delicate, to understand any thing of worth, and altogether uncapable of wisdome. The hardest & hardiest propositions are best befitting an hardy and elevated spirit, and there can nothing seem strange unto him that doth but know what the world is. It is weakness to be astonished at any thing; we must rouze up our hearts, confirm and strengthen our minds, harden & inure our selves to hear, to know, to understand, to judge of all things, seem they never so strange. All things are agreeing and well befitting the palate of the spirit, so a man be not wanting to himself, and neither do any thing, or yield his consent to whatsoever is not good and

truly fair, no, though the whole world perſwade him unto it. A wiſe man ſheweth equally in them both his courage, his delicates are not capable of the one or the other, there being a weakneſs in them both.

3 Thirdly, in all that I ſhall propoſe, my meaning is not to bind any man unto it, I onely preſent things, and lay them out as it were upon a ſtall, I grow not into choler with any man that gives me no credit, or diſlikes my ware, that were to play the *Pedant*. *Paſsion* witneſſeth that it is not reaſon ſo to do, and he that out of paſſion doth any thing, out of reaſon cannot do it. But why are they angry with me? Is it becauſe I am not altogether of their opinion? Why, I am not angry with them becauſe they are not of mine. Is it becauſe I ſpeak ſomething which is not pleaſing to their taſte, or to the palate of the vulgar ſort? Why therefore I ſpeak it. I ſpeak nothing without reaſon, if they knew how to underſtand it, how to reliſh it. If they can bring better reaſon to diſprove mine, I will hearken unto it with delight and thanks to him that ſhall ſhew it me. But yet let them not think to beat me down with authorities, multitudes, and allegations of other men, for theſe have but ſmall credit in my juriſdiction, ſave in matter of Religion, where onely authority prevails without reaſon: This is authorities true Empire, reaſon onely bearing ſway in all other Arts without it, as S^t *Auguſtine* doth very well acknowledge. For it is an unjuſt tyrannie and an inraged folly to ſubject and enthrall our ſpirits to believe and to follow whatſoever our Anceſtours have ſaid, and what the vulgar ſort hold to be true, who know neither what they ſay, nor what they do. There are none but fools that ſuffer themſelves to be thus led by the noſes: and this Book is not for ſuch, which if it ſhould popularly be received and accepted of the common ſort of people, it ſhould fail much in its firſt purpoſe

and

and designment. We must hear, consider, make account of our ancient Writers; not captivate our selves unto them but with reason. And if a man would follow them, what should he do? for they agree not among themselves. *Aristotle* who would seem to be the most sufficient amongst them, and hath adventured to challenge and to censure all that went before him, hath uttered more grosse absurdities then them all, and is at no agreement with himself, neither doth he know many times where he is; witness his Treatises of the Soul of man, of the Eternitie of the world, of the Generation of the winds and waters, and so forth. It is no cause of wonder or astonishment, that all men are not of one opinion; but it were rather strange and wonderfull that all men were of one opinion: for there is nothing more befitting nature and the spirit of man then variety. That wise Divine Saint *Paul* giveth us this liberty, in that he willeth every man to abound in his own understanding, not judging or condemning that man that doth otherwise, or think otherwise. And he speaketh it in a matter of greater moment and more tickliſh, not in that which consisteth in outward action and observation, wherein we say we are to conform our selves to the common sort, and to that which is prescribed and accustomed to be done, but also in that which concerneth Religion, that is, the religious observance of viands and dayes: whereas all that liberty and boldness of speech which I challenge to my self, is but in thoughts, judgements opinions, in which no man is quarter-master, but he that hath them, every man about himself. *Rom.* 14.

Notwithstanding all this, many things which may seem too harsh and brief, too rude and difficult for the simpler sort (for the stronger and wiser have stomacks warm enough to concoct and digest all) I have for the love them explicated, enlightned and sweetned in this third

third Edition, reviewed, and much augmented.

I would willingly advertiſe the Reader that ſhall undertake to judge of this Work, to take heed that he fall not into any of theſe ſeven over-ſights, as ſome others have done; that is: To referre that unto law and duty, which is proper unto action; that unto action, which is onely to be cenſured; that to reſolution and determination, which is onely propoſed, conſulted of, and problematically and Academically diſputed; that to me and mine opinions, which I deliver from report, and is the opinion of another man; that to the outward ſtate, profeſſion, and condition, which is proper to the ſpirit and inward ſufficiencie; that to Religion and Faith, which is but the opinion of man; that to grace and ſupernaturall inſpiration, which is proper to naturall and morall virtue and action. All paſſion and preoccupation being taken away, he ſhall find in theſe ſeven points well underſtood how to reſolve himſelf in his doubts, how to anſwer all objections, made by himſelf or by others, and inform himſelf touching my intention in this Work. And if nevertheleſs after all this, he will neither reſt ſatisfied and contented, nor approve what I have written, let him boldly and ſpeedily diſprove it (for onely to ſpeak ill, to bite, to ſlander the name of another man, though it be eaſie enough, yet it is baſe and pedanticall) and he ſhall as ſpeedily receive either a free confeſſion and aſſent (for this Book doth glory and feaſt it ſelf in the truth and ingenuity thereof) or an examination of the impertinences and follies thereof.

*FINIS.*

## The ſubject and order of theſe three Books.

*THe firſt Book teacheth the knowledge of our ſelves and our humane condition, which is the foundation of Wiſdome, by five great and principall conſiderations of man, and containeth 62. Chapters.*

*The ſecond containeth the principall rules of Wiſdome, the priviledges and proper qualities of a wiſe-man, and hath 12. Chapters.*

*The third, in a Diſcourſe of the four morall virtues, Prudence, Juſtice, Fortitude, Temperance, ſetteth down the particular inſtructions of Wiſdome, in 43. Chapters.*

# OF VVISDOME

## the first Book:

### Which is

*The knowledge of our selves, and our humane condition.*

An Exhortation to the study and knowledge of our *SELVES*.

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*The Preface to the first Book.*

THE most excellent and divine counsel, the best and most profitable advertisement of all others, but least practised, is to studie and learn how to know our selves: This is the foundation of Wisdome, and the high way to whatsoever is good; and there is no folly comparable to this; To be painfull and diligent, to know all things else whatsoever, rather then our selves: For the true science and study of man, is man himself. 1. *The knowledge of our selves the first thing.*

GOD, Nature, the wise, the world preach man, and exhort him both by word and deed to the studie and knowledge of himself. GOD eternally and without intermission beholdeth, considereth, knoweth Himself. The World hath all the lights thereof con- 2. *Enjoyned to all by all reason.*

contracted and united within it ſelf, and the eyes open to ſee and behold it ſelf. It is as neceſſary for Man to learn how to know himſelf, as it is naturall unto him to think, or to be near unto himſelf: Nature hath enjoyned this work unto all. To meditate and to entertain our thoughts therein, is a thing above all things eaſie, ordinary, naturall; it is the food, ſuſtentation, life of the ſpirit, *cujus vivere eſt cogitare: Whoſe life is cogitation.* Now where can a man begin or continue his meditation more truly, more naturally then with himſelf? Is there any thing that toucheth him more nearly? Doubtleſs, to ſtudy other learnings, and to forget our ſelves, is a thing both unnaturall and unjuſt. The true and principal vocation of every man, is to employ his thoughts upon himſelf, and to tie himſelf unto himſelf: for ſo doth every thing elſe, ſetting bounds and limits to their other buſineſs and deſires. And thou man, which wilt ſeem to contain the whole univerſe, to know all things, to controll, to judge, neither knoweſt nor endeavoureſt the knowledge of thy ſelf; and ſo going about to make thy ſelf skilfull, and a Judge of Nature, thou proveſt the onely fool of the world: thou art of all other the moſt beggerly, the moſt vain and miſerable; and yet moſt proud and arrogant. Look therefore into thy ſelf, know thy ſelf, hold thy ſelf to thy ſelf; thy ſpirit and will which is elſewhere employed, reduce it unto thy ſelf. Thou forgetteſt thy ſelf and looſeſt thy ſelf about outward things; thou betrayeſt and diſ-robeſt thy ſelf; thou lookeſt alwayes before thee; gather thy ſelf to thy ſelf, and ſhut up thy ſelf within thy ſelf: examine, ſearch, know thy ſelf.

*Noſce teipſum; nec te quæſiveris extra;*
*Reſpice quod non es.*
*Tecum habita, & noris quám ſit tibi curta ſupellex,*
*Tu te conſule.*
*Teipſum concute, nunquid vitiorum*
*Inſeverit olim natura, aut etiam conſuetudo mala.*
*Know well thy ſelf, and ſeek to know no more;*
*And what thou art not, ſhame the ſame therefore:*
*Look truly to thy ſelf, then ſhalt thou ſee*
*How ſhort abode thou haſt, adviſed therefore be.*
*Examine ſtill thy conſcience, which doth witneſs bear,*
*What vice or evil is (by nature) ſowed there.*

By the knowledg of himſelf man arriveth ſooner and better to the knowledg of God, then by any other means, both becauſe he findeth

findeth in himself better helps, more marks and footsteps of the divine nature, then in whatsoever besides he can any way know, and because he can better understand and know that which is in himself then in another thing. *Formasti me & posuisti super me manum tuam, ideo mirabilis facta est scientia tua, id est tui ex me: Thou hast formed me, and put thy hands upon me, therefore thy science is become marvellous in mee, that is, scientia tui, ex me: the science of thee in me.* And therefore there was engraven in letters of gold over the porch of the Temple of *Apollo* the god (according to the *Panims*) of Knowledg and Light, this sentence, KNOW THY SELFE, as a salutation and advertisement of God unto all; signifying unto them, that he that would have access unto that *Divinity*, and entrance into that Temple, must first know himself, and could not otherwise be admitted. *Si te ignoras, o pulcherrima, egredere & abi post hœdos tuos. If thou know not who thou art, O thou the faireſt among women get thee forth, and follow thy kids.*

3. *The ladder to the knowledge of the divine noture.* Psalm. Cantic.

To become truly wise, and to leade a life more regular and pleasant, there needs no other instruction but from our selves: and doubtless, if we were good Scholers there are no books could better instruct us, then we teach our selves. He that shall call to minde, and consider the excess of his passed choler, even how far this fever and frensie hath carried him, shall better be perswaded of the foul deformity of this passion, then by all the reason that *Aristotle* or *Plato* can alledg against it: and so of all other passions and motions of the soul whatsoever. He that shall call to minde how often he hath miscarried in his judgment, and been deceived by his memory, shall learn thereby to trust it no more. He that shall note how often he hath held an opinion, and in such sort understood a thing even to the engaging of his own credit, and the satisfying of himself and any other therein, and that afterwards time hath made him see the truth, even the contrary to that he formerly held, may learn to distrust his own judgment, and to shake off that importunate arrogancy and querulous presumption; a capitall enemy to discipline and truth. He that shall well note and consider all those evills that he hath run into, that have threatned him; the light occasions that have altered his courses and turned him from one estate to another: how often repentances and mislikes have come into his head; will prepare himself against future changes, learn to know his own condition; will preserve his modesty,

4. *Disposition unto wisdom.*

modeſty, contain himſelf within his own rank, offend no man, trouble nothing, nor enterpriſe any thing that may paſs his own forces: And what were this, but to ſee *juſtice* and *peace* in every thing? To be briefe, we have no cleerer looking glaſs, no better book then our ſelves, if as we ought we do ſtudy our ſelves, alwayes keeping our eyes open over us, and prying more narrowly into our ſelves.

5. *Againſt ſuch as mis-know themſelves.*

But this is that which we think leaſt of, *Nemo in ſe tentat deſcendere*: *No man endeavours to deſcend directly into himſelf*: whereby it commeth to paſs that we fall many times to the ground, and tumble headlong into the ſame fault, neither perceiving it, nor knowing to what courſe to betake us: we make our ſelves fools at our own charges. Difficulties in every thing are not diſcerned, but by thoſe that know them: and ſome degree of underſtanding is neceſſary, even in the marking of our own ignorance. We muſt knock at the door to know whether the door be ſhut: for when men ſee themſelves reſolved and ſatisfied of a thing, and think they ſufficiently underſtand it, it is a token they underſtand nothing at all: for if we knew our ſelves well, we would provide far better for our ſelves and our affaires; nay, we ſhould be aſhamed of our ſelves and our eſtate, and frame our ſelves to be others then we are. He that knows not his own infirmities, takes no care to amend them; he that is ignorant of his own wants, takes as little care to provide for them; he that feels not his own evills and miſeries, adviſeth not with himſelf of helps, nor ſeeks for remedy. *Deprehendas te oportet, priuſquam emendes: ſanitatis initium ſentire ſibi opus eſſe remedio.* *Thou muſt of neceſſity know thy ſelf, before thou amend thy ſelf: it is the very firſt beginning of health, to acknowledg the ſickneſs, and that thou haſt need of remedy.* And here behold our unhappineſs: for we think all thing goe wells with us, and we are in ſafety, and we live in content with our ſelves, and ſo double our miſeries. *Socrates* was accounted the wiſeſt man of the world, not becauſe his knowledg was more compleat, or his ſufficiency greater then others, but becauſe his knowledg of himſelf was better then others; in that he held himſelf within his own rank, and knew better how to play the man. He was the King of men, as it is ſaid, that he that hath but one eye is a king in reſpect of him that hath never an eye, that is to ſay, doubly deprived of his ſenſe: for they are by nature weak and miſerable, and therewithall proud, and feel not their miſery. *Socrates* was but purblind

blind ; for being a man as others were, weak and miſerable, he knew it, and ingeniouſly acknowledged his condition, and lived, and governed himſelf according unto it. This is that which the Truth it ſelf ſpake unto thoſe which were full of preſumption, and by way of mockery ſaid unto him, Are we blind alſo ? If ye were blind, ſaith he, that is, if you thought your ſelves blind, you ſhould ſee, but becauſe ye think ye ſee, therefore you are blinde ; therefore your ſin remaineth. For they that in their own opinion ſee much, are in truth ſtark blind ; and they that are blind in their own opinion, ſee beſt. It is a miſerable thing in a man, to make himſelf a beaſt by forgetting himſelf to be a man. *Homo enim cum ſis, id fac ſemper intelligas* : *Seeing thou art a man, ſee thou alwayes remember it.* Many great perſonages, as a rule or bridle to themſelves, have odained that one or other ſhould ever buz into their eares That they were men. O what an excellent thing was this, if it entred as well into their hearts, as is founded in their eares ? That Mot of the *Athenians* to *Pompey* the Great, Thou art ſo much a God, as thou acknowledgeſt thy ſelf to be a man, was no ill ſaying : for at the leaſt to be an excellent man, is to confeſs himſelf to be a man. John 9.

The knowledg of our ſelves (a thing as difficult and rare, as to miſdeem and deceive our ſelves eaſie) is not obtained by any other, that is to ſay, by the compariſon, rule, or example of another. 6. *Falſe means to know our ſelves.*

*Plus alijs de te quam tu tibi credere noli* : *Do not believe others more of thy ſelf, then thou thy ſelf knoweſt of thy ſelf.* Much leſs alſo by our ſpeech and judgment, which oftentimes commeth ſhort to diſcern, and we diſloyall and fearfull to ſpeake : not by any ſingular act, which ſometimes unawares hath eſcaped a man, pricked forward by ſome new, rare and accidentall occaſion, and is rather a trick of *Fortune*, or an eruption of ſome extraordinary lunacy, then any production of fruit truely ours. A man judgeth not of the greatneſs or depth of a River, by that water which by reaſon of ſome ſudden inundation of neighbour rivers overfloweth the banks. One valiant act makes not a valiant man ; nor one juſt, a juſt man. The circumſtances and ſource of occaſions doth import much and alter us, and oftentimes a man is provoked to do good by vice it ſelf : So hard a thing is it, for man to know man. Nor likewiſe by all thoſe outward things, that are outwardly adjacent unto us, as offices, dignities riches, nobility, grace, and applauſe of the greateſt peers and common people. Nor by the

cariages of a man in publike places is a man known ; for as a king at Cheſſe, ſo he ſtandeth upon his guard, he bridleth and contracteth himſelf ; fear, and ſhame, and ambition, and other paſſions, make him play that part that you ſee : But truly to know him, we muſt look into his inward part, his privy chamber, and there not how to day, but every day he carrieth himſelf. He is many times a different man in his houſe, from that he is in the Country, in the Palace, in the Market place ; another man amongſt his domeſticall friends, from that he is amongſt ſtrangers : when he goeth forth of his houſe into ſome publike place, he goeth to play a Comedy, and therefore ſtay not thou there, for it is not himſelf that playeth, but another man, and thou knoweſt him not.

7. *True means.* The knowledg of a mans ſelf, is not acquired by all theſe four means, neither muſt we truſt them, but by a true, long and daily ſtudy of himſelf, a ſerious and attentive examination, not onely of his words, and actions, but of his moſt ſecret thoughts (their birth, progreſſe, continuance, repetition) and whatſoever is in him, even his nightly dreams prying narrowly into him, trying him often and at all houres, preſſing and pinching him even to the quick. For there are many vices hid in us, and are not felt for want of force and means ; ſo that the venemous ſerpent that is benummed with cold, ſuffereth himſelf to be handled without danger : neither doth it ſuffice afterwards to acknowledg the fault by tale or peece-meale and ſo think to mend it by marring it ; but he muſt in generall re-acknowledg his weakneſs, his miſery, and come to an univerſall amendment and reformation.

8. *The propoſition and diviſion of this Book.* Now if we will know man, we muſt take more then ordinary pains in this firſt book, taking him in all ſenſes, beholding him with all viſages feeling his pulſe, ſounding him to the quick, entring into him with a candle and a ſnuffer, ſearching and creeping into every hole, corner, turning, cloſet, and ſecret place : and not without cauſe ; for this is the moſt ſubtile and hypocriticall covert and counterfeit of all the reſt, and almoſt not to be known. Let us then conſider him, after five manners ſet down in this table, which is the ſumme of the book :

*There are five considerations of man & humane condition:*

- *The first, Naturall, of all the parts whereof he is composed, and their appurtenances.*
- *The second, Naturall and Morall, by comparison of man with beasts.*
- *The third, of his life in declining state.*
- *The fourth, Morall of his manners, humours, conditions, which are referred to five things:*
  1. *Vanitie.*
  2. *Weakness.*
  3. *Inconstancy.*
  4. *Misery,*
  5. *Presumption.*
- *The fift, Naturall and Morall, of the differences that are betweene men in their*
  1. *Natures.*
  2. *Spirits and sufficiencies.*
  3. *Charges and degrees of superiority, inferiority.*
  4. *Profession and conditions of life, advantages and disadvantages*
     - *Naturall.*
     - *Acquired.*
     - *Casuall.*

# The first consideration of Man, *which is naturall, by all the parts and members whereof he is composed.*

## CHAPTER I.

### *Of the frame or formation of Man.*

IT is two fold, and to be considered after a twofold manner: the first and originall, once immediately by God in his supernaturall creation; the second and ordinary in his naturall generation. According to that discretion which *Moses* setteth down touching the workmanship and creation of the world (the boldest and richest peece of work, that ever man brought unto light: I mean the History of the nine first Chapters of *Genesis*, which is of the world newly born and reborn) man was made of GOD, not onely after all creatures, as the most perfect, but the master and superintendent of all, *Ut præsit piscibus maris, volatilibus cœli, bestijs*

I. *Man made last* Gen. 1. 2. &c.

*terræ*: *That he might rule over the fish of the Sea, the Fowles of the aire, and the beasts of the earth.* And in the self same day, wherein the fourfooted beasts of the earth that come neareſt unto him were created (although thoſe two that reſemble him moſt are, for the inward parts the Swine, for the outward the Ape) but alſo after all was done and ended, as the cloſing up, ſeal, and ſign of his works, he hath alſo there imprinted his armes, and his pourtrait, *Exemplumque Dei quiſque eſt in imagine parva. Signatum eſt ſuper nos lumen vultus tui. Every man is a ſhort compendious image of God. The light of his countenance is ſealed upon us*, as a ſummary recapitulation of all things, and an epitome of the world, which is all in man, but gathered into a ſmall volume, whereby he is called, The little world; as the whole univerſe may be called, The great man: as the tie and ligament of Angels and beaſts, things heavenly and earthly, ſpirituall and corporall: and in one word, as the laſt hand, the accompliſhment, the perfection of the work, the honour and miracle of Nature. The reaſon is, becauſe God having made him with deliberation, counſell, and preparation, *& dixit, Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & ſimilitudinem noſtram: and he ſaid, Let us make man in our Image, according to our likeneſs* he reſted. And this reſt alſo was made for man: *Sabbathum propter hominem, non contra. The Sabboth is for man, not man for it.* And afterwards he had nothing to make new, but make himſelf man; and that he did likewiſe for the love of man: *Propter nos homines & propter noſtram ſalutem: For us men, and our ſalvation.* Whereby we ſee, that in all things God hath aimed at man, finally in him, and by him, *brevi manu*; *In a ſhort ſumme, or ſummarily*, to accommodate all unto himſelf, the beginning and end of all.

2. *Naked.* Secondly, he was created all naked, becauſe more beautifull then the reſt, being pure, neat, and delicate, by reaſon of his thin humours well tempered and ſeaſoned.

3. *Vpright.* Thirdly, upright, but little touching the earth, his head directly tending unto heaven, whereon he gazeth and ſees and knows himſelf as in a glaſs; quite oppoſite unto the plant, which hath its head and root within the earth: ſo that man is a divine plant, that flouriſheth and grows up unto heaven: a beaſt as in the middle betwixt a man and a plant, goes as it were athwart, having his two extreams towards the bounds or extremities of the *Horizon* more or leſs. The cauſe of this uprightneſs in man, beſides the will of his Maſter-workman, is not properly the reaſonable ſoul, as we ſee in thoſe

thoſe that are crook-backed, crump-ſhouldred, lame; nor in the ſtraight line of the backbone, which is likewiſe in ſerpents, nor in the naturall or vitall heat, which is equalled, or rather greater in divers beaſts, although all theſe may (perhaps) ſerve to ſome purpoſe; but this upright gate is due and belonging to man, both as he is man, the holieſt and divineſt creature.

*Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ:*
*Apoſtrophe from theſe, in making man*
*He made a ſacred Creature, beaſts profane,*
*Who (though they were not made enough to ſee't)*
*Was made the means, where they and God do meet.*
*Dumbe works for man; but God made man we find*
*To contemplate theſe works, and know his mind:*

and as king in this lower region. To ſmall and particular royalties, there belong certain marks of Majeſtie, as we ſee in the crowned Dolphin, the Crocodile, the Lion with his collar, the colour of his hair, and his eyes; in the Eagle; the King of the Bees: ſo man the univerſall king of theſe lower parts walketh with an upright countenance, as a Maſter in his houſe ruling, and by love or force taming every thing.

His body was firſt framed of virgin-earth, and red, from whence he took his proper name *Adam*, for the appellative was *Iſh*: and that being not yet moiſtened with rain, but with the water of the fountain. 4. *How framed.* Geneſis 2.

——*Mixtam fluvialibus undis*
*Finxit in effigiem.*
*Of running water and of ſettled earth*
*Did God build man, (the Poet knew not breath)*
*Grace ran away, or rather he from that,*
*Yet man ſtood ſtill, or rather nature ſate,*
*But not in Paradiſe; Globe of earth and ſeas,*
*Now onely earth, paſt over Euphrates.*

By reaſon the body is the firſt born, or elder then the ſoul, as the matter then the form; the houſe muſt be made and trimmed before it be inhabited, the ſhop before the workman can uſe it. Afterwards the *Soul* was by divine inſpiration infuſed, and ſo the body by the ſoul made a living creature, *Inſpiravit in faciem ejus ſpiraculum vitæ*, &c. *He breathed in his face breath of life.*

In that ordinary and naturall generation and formation, which is made of the ſeed in the wombe of the woman, the ſelf-ſame 5. *He is made in the matrix.*

order is obſerved: The body is firſt formed as well by the elementary force of the *Energie*, and forming virtue which is in the ſeed, aiding in ſome ſort the heat of the matrix, as the celeſtiall, which is the influence and virtue of the Sun; *Sol & homo generant hominem, The Sun and Man do engender man.* In ſuch order, that the ſeven firſt dayes the ſeed of the father and mother do mingle, unite and curdle together like cream and are made one body, which is the conception. *Nónne ſicut lac mulſiſti me, & ſicut caſeum me coagulaſti? Haſt thou not milked me like milk, and haſt thou not coagulated, and curdled me as cheeſe?* The next ſeven dayes this ſeed is concocted, thickned, and changed into a maſs of fleſh and indigeſted formleſs bloud which is the proper matter of an humane bodie. The third ſeven dayes following, of this maſs or lump is made and faſhioned the body in groſs; ſo that about the twentieth day are brought forth the three noble and heroicall parts, the *Liver*, *Heart*, *Brain*, diſtant an ovall length, or, as the *Hebrews* ſay, holding themſelves by thin *commiſſures* or joynts, which afterwards fill themſelves with fleſh, after the faſhion of an ant, where there are three groſſer parts joyned by two thin. The fourth ſeven dayes which end near thirty, the whole bodie is ended, perfected, joynted, organized; and ſo it begins to be more an *Embrion*, that is, unperfect in ſhape, but capable, as a matter prepared to its form, to receive the ſoul; which faileth not to inſinuate and inveſt it ſelf into the body, towards the ſeven and thirtieth or fortieth day after the five weeks ended. Doubling this term, that is to ſay, at the third moneth this infant endowed with a ſoul, hath motion and ſenſe, the hair and nayls begin to come. Tripling this term, which is at the ninth moneth, he cometh forth, and is brought into the light. Theſe terms or times are not ſo juſtly prefixed, but that they may either be haſtened, or prolonged, according to the force or feebleneſs of the heat both of the ſeed and of the matrix: for being ſtrong it haſteneth, being weak it ſloweth; whereby that ſeed that hath leſs heat and more moiſture, whereof women for the moſt part are conceived, requireth longer time, and is not endowed with a ſoul, untill the fortieth day or after, and moveth not till the fourth moneth, which is near by a quarter more late then that of the male children.

*Conceived of coagulated ſeed.*

*Changed.*

*Formed in groſſe.*

*Joynted, organized.*

*Firſt furniſhed with fit inſtruments for ſenſe*

*Indowed with ſoul motion.*

*Brought forth.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

### *The first and generall distinction of Man.*

MAn, as a prodigious creature, is made of parts quite contrary, and enemies to themselves. The soul is a little GOD the bodie as a beast, as a dunghill. Nevertheless, these two parts are in such sort coupled together, have such need the one of the other to perform their functions, *Alterius sic altera poscit opem res, & conjurat amicé : So one thing doth ask the fellowship and help of another : and doth as it were friendly conjure it* ; and do so with all their complaints embrace each other, that they neither can continue together without wars, nor separate themselves without grief and torment; & as holding the Wolf by the ears, each may say to other, *I can neither live with thee nor without thee, Nec tecum, nec sine te.* 1. *The division of man in two parts.*

But again, forasmuch as there are in this soul two parts very different, the high, pure, intellectuall, and divine, wherein the beast hath no part; and the base, sensitive, and brutish, which hath bodie and matter, and is as an indifferent mean betwixt the intellectuall part and bodie; a man may by a distinction more morall and politick, note three parts and degrees in man: The *Spirit* the *Soul*, the *Flesh*: where the *Spirit* and *Flesh*, hold the place of the two extreams, as heaven and earth; the *Soul* the middle region, where are ingendred the Meteors, tumults, and tempests. The *Spirit* the highest and most heroicall part, a diminutive, a spark, an image, and dew of the Divinity, is in a man as a King in his Commonweal, it breatheth nothing but good, and heaven to which it tendeth; the *Flesh* (contrariwise) as the dregs of a people besotted, and common sink of man, tendeth alwayes to the matter, and to the earth; the *Soul* in the middle, as the principall of the people, betwixt the best and the worst, good and evil is continually solicited by the *Spirit* and the *Flesh*, and according unto that part towards which it applyeth it self, it is either spirituall and good, or carnal and evil. Here are lodged all those naturall affections, which are neither virtuous nor vicious, as the love of our Parents and friends, fear of shame, compassion towards the afflicted, desire of good reputation. 2. *Into three parts.*

This distinction will help much to the knowledge of man, and to discern his actions, that he mistake not himself, as it is the manner to do, judging by the bark and outward appearance, thinking that to be of the Spirit which is of the Soul, nay, of the Flesh; 3. *The utility thereof.*

attributing unto virtue that which is due unto nature, nay unto vice. How many good and excellent actions have been produced by passion, or at least by a naturall inclination, *Ut serviant genio, & suo indulgeant animo? That they may serve their humour, and satisfie their pleasure?*

## CHAP. III.

### *Of the Body, and first of all the parts thereof, and their places.*

1. *The division of the body.*

THe Bodie of man consisteth of a number of parts, inward and outward, which are all for the most part round and orbicular, or coming near unto that figure.

2. *Inward and many.*

The inward are of two sorts: The one in number and quantitie spread through the whole body, as the *bones*, which are as the basis and upholding pillers of the whole building, and within them (for their nourishment) the *marrow*, the *muscles* for motion and strength; the *veins* issuing from the *liver*, as chanels of the first and naturall bloud; the *arteries* coming from the *heart*, as conduits of the second bloud, more subtil and vitall. These two mounting higher then the *liver* and the *heart*, their originall sources are more strait then those that go downwards; to the end they should help to mount the bloud; for that narrowness more straitned, serves to raise the *humours*, the *sinews* proceeding by couples, as instruments of sense, motion, and strength of body and conduits of the animall spirits, whereof some are soft, of which there are seven pairs which serve the senses of the head, *Sight, Hearing, Taste, Speech*, the other are hard, wherof there are thirty couples proceeding from the reins of the back to the muscles; the *Tendrels*, *Ligaments*, *Gristles*; the fourth *Humours*, *Bloud*, *Choler*, which worketh, provoketh penetrateth, hindereth obstructions casteth forth the excrements, bringeth cheerfulness; *Melancholy*, which provoketh an appetite to every thing, moderateth sudden motions; *Phlegme*, which sweetneth the force of the two *Cholers*, and all other heats: The *Spirits* which are as it were the fumigations that arise from the naturall heat and radicall humour, and they are in three degrees of excellency, the *Naturall*, *Vitall*, *Animal*; The *Fat*, which is the thickest and grossest part of bloud.

3. *Singular, four regions of the body.*

The other are singular (save the kidneys and stones, which are double) and assigned to a certain place. Now there are four places

or

or regions, as degrees of the body, shops of nature, where she exerciseth her faculties and powers. The first and lowest is for generation, in which are the privy parts serving thereunto. 1.
The second neer unto that, in which are the intralls, *viscera*, that is to say the *stomack*, yielding more to the left side, round, straiter in bottome then at top, having two orifices or mouthes, the one above to receive, the other beneath, which answereth the bowels, to cast forth and discharge it self. It receiveth, gathereth together, mingleth, concocteth the victuals and turns them into *Chyle*, that is to say, a kinds of white *Suc*, fit for the nourishment of the body, which is likewise wrought within the *Meseraique* veines by which it passeth unto the Liver. The *Liver* hot and moist inclining toward the right side, the store house of blood, the chiefe or rather fountain of the veines, the seat of the naturall nourishing faculty, or vegetative soul, made and ingendered of the blood of that *Chyle*, which it draweth from the *Meseraique* veines, and receiveth into it lap by the *vena portæ*, which entreth into the concavities thereof, and afterwards is sent and distributed thorow the whole body by the help of the great *Vena cava*, which ariseth from the bunch and branches thereof, which are in great number as the rivers of a fountain. The *Splene* towards the left side, which receiveth the discharge and excrements of the Liver: The *Reines*, the *Entralles*, which though they are all in one yet are distinguished by sixe differences and names, equalling seven times the length of a man as the length of a man is equalled by seven foot. In these two first parts or degrees, which some take to be but one (although there are two faculties very different, the one generative for the continuance of the kinde, the other nutritive for every particular person, and they make it to answer to the lowest and elementary part of the world, the place of generation and corruption) is the concupiscible soul. 2.

The third degree compared to the *Ætherian* region, separated from the former by the *Diaphragma* or *Midrife*, and from that above by the narrownes of the throat; in which is the irascible soul, and the pectorall parts *Præcordia*, that is to say, the *Heart*, very hot, placed about the fift rib, having his point under the left pap or dugge, the originall fountain of *Arteries*, which are always moved and cause the *Pulse* to beat, by which at by chanels it sendeth and distributeth thorow the whole body the vitall bloud which it hath concocted, and by it the spirit and vertue vitall. 3.

The

The *Lungs*, of ſubſtance very ſoft and ſpongeous, ſupple to draw to and inforce forth like a pair of bellowes, inſtruments both of reſpiration whereby the heart is refreſhed, drawing unto it the bloud, the ſpirits, the air, and disburthening it ſelf of thoſe fumes and excrements which oppreſs it, and of the voyce by mean of the rough *Arterie*.

4. The fourth and higheſt, which anſwereth to the celeſtiall region, is the head, which containeth the *Brain*, cold and ſpongeous, wrapped within two skins, the one more hard and thick, which toucheth the brain-pan, *Dura mater*; the other more eaſie and thin, which includeth the Brain, *Pia mater*: from it do iſſue and are derived the *Sinews* and marrow that deſcendeth and falleth down into the reines of the back. This *Brain* is the ſeat of the reaſonable ſoul, the ſourſe of ſenſe and motion, and of the moſt noble animall ſpirits, compoſed of the vitall, which being raiſed from the heart by the *Arteries* unto the brain are concocted and reconcocted, elaborated and made ſubtile by the help of the multiplicity of ſmall *Arteries*, as fillets diverſly woven and enterlaced, by many turnings and windings, like a labyrinth or double net, *Rete mirabile*; within which this vitall ſpirit being retained and ſojourning, oftentimes paſſing and repaſſing, is refined and perfected, and becomes a creature, ſpirituall in an excellent degree.

3. *Outward parts ſingular.* The outward and viſible parts, if they be ſingle, are in the middle; as the *Noſe*, which ſerveth for reſpiration, ſmell, and the comfort of the brain, and the disburthening thereof, in ſuch ſort, that by it the air entreth, and iſſueth both down into the lungs, and up into the brain. The *Mouth*, which ſerveth to eate and to ſpeake, and therefore hath many parts ſerviceable thereunto; without, the lippes; within the tongue, ſoft and very ſubtile, which judgeth of ſavours; the *Teeth*, which bruiſe and grind the victuals; the *Navel*, the two ſinks or wayes to eaſe and disburden the body.

4. *Double and equall.* If they be double and alike, they are all collaterals and equall, as the two *eyes*, planted in the higheſt ſtage, as ſentinells, compoſed of many and divers parts; three *humours*, ſeven *tunicles*, ſeven *muſcles*, divers colours, of many faſhions, and much art. Theſe are the firſt, and moſt noble outward parts of the body in beauty, utilitie, mobility, activity, yea in the action of love ὡς ἴδον ὡς ἐμανην, they are to the viſage, that which the viſage is to the body, they are the face of the face: and becauſe they are tender, delicate and precious, they are fenced and rampaired on all parts, with *skins*,

*lids*,

*lids, browes, haire.* The *eares*, in the self same height that the eyes are, as the scouts of the body, Porters of the spirit, the Receivers, and Iudgers of sounds which alwayes ascend; they have their entrance oblique and crooked, to the end the aire and the sound should not enter at once, whereby the sense of hearing might be hindred and judg the worse. The *armes* and *hands*, the work-masters of all things, and universall instruments. The *legs* and *feet*, the props and pillars of the whole building,

## CHAP. IIII.

### *Of the singular properties of the body of man.*

THe body of man hath many singularities, and some peculiar and proper unto themselves, not common with other creatures. The first and principall are speech, upright stature, the form or feature, the port or cariage, whereof the wise, yea the Stoickes themselves made such account, that they were wont to say, That it was better to be a fool in a humane shape, then wise in the form of a beast. The hand is a miracle (that of the Ape is not to be termed a hand) His naturall nakednes, laughter, crying. The *Sense* of tickling, haire one the lower lid of the eye, a visible navell, the point of the heart on the left side. The toes of the feet not so long as the fingers of the hand. Bleeding at Nose, a strange thing, considering that he carrieth his head upright, and a beast downwards: To blush for shame, wax pale for fear. To be an ambidexter; disposed at all times to the sports of *Venus*. Not to move the eares, which bewrayeth in beasts the inward affections, but man doth sufficiently make them known, by his blushing, paleness, motion of the eyes, and nose. 1. *Peculiar properties in the body of man.*

The other properties are likewise peculiar unto man, but not wholly but by way of excellency; for they are also in beasts, but in a less degree, that is to say, multitude of muscles and haire in the head. The pliant facility of the body, and the parts thereof to all motion and every sense. The elevation of the breasts. The great abundance of the brain. The greatness of the bladder. The form of the foot, long forward, short backward. The quantity and pure subtility of the bloud. The mobility and agility of the tongue. The multitude and variety of dreames, insomuch that he seemeth the onely dreamer. Sneesing. And to be short; the many motions of the eyes, the nose, the lips. 2. *Peculiar properties by way of excellency.*

There

3. *Divers habits.* There are also habits proper and peculiar, but different; some are gestures, motions, and artificiall and affected countenances; others are so proper and naturall, that they that have them, neither feel them nor know them in themselves; as to go stooping: but all have that which proceedeth not so much from reason, as a pure, naturall and ready impulsion, that is, to put forth a mans hand before him when he falleth.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of the goods of the body: Health, Beauty, &c.*

1. *The praise of health.* THe goods of the body are Health, Beauty, Cheerfulness, Strength, Vigour, a prompt readiness and disposition: but of all these Health is the first, and passeth all the rest. Health is the most beautifull and rich present that Nature can bestow upon us, and above all other things to be preferred, not onely Science, Nobility, Riches but Wisdome it self, which the austerest among the wise do affirm. It is the onely thing that deserveth our whole employment yea, our life it self to attain unto it: for without it life is no life, but a death, virtue and wisdome grow weak and faint. What comfort can all the wisdome of the world bring to the greatest man that is, if he be throughly stricken with an *Apoplexie*? Doubtless, there is nothing to be preferred before this bodily health but *Honesty*, which is the health of the *Soul*. Now it is common unto us with beasts, yea, many times it is greater, and far more excellent in them then in us: and notwithstanding it be a gift of nature *Gaudeant bene nati.*

*He that is gently born may well rejoyce,*
*To have by nature what he would by choise:*

given in the first formation, yet that which afterward followeth, The milk, Good government, which consisteth in sobriety and moderate exercises, lightness of heart, and a continuall avoidance of all passions, do preserve it much. Grief and sickness are the contraries unto it; which are the greatest if not the onely evils that follow man, whereof we shall speak hereafter. But in the preservation hereof, beasts likewise simply following nature, which hath given them health, do far exceed men; they oftentimes forgetting themselves, though afterwards they pay dearly for it.

2. *Beauty.* Next followeth *Beauty*, a good of great account in the society of men. It is the first mean of reconciling or uniting one to another,

ther, and it is very likely, that the first distinction that hath been of one man from another; and the first consideration that giveth preheminence to one above another, hath been the advantage of beauty. It is likewise a powerfull qualitie, there is none that surmounteth it in credit, or that hath so great a part in the society of men; for there are none so barbarous none so resolute, that hath not been beaten by it. It presenteth it self unto the view, it seduceth and preoccupateth the judgement, it makes deep impressions, and presseth a man with great authority; and therefore *Socrates* called it, *A short tyrannie*; and *Plato*, *The priviledge of Nature*: for it seemeth that he that carrieth in his countenance the favours of Nature, imprinted in a rare and excellent beauty, hath a kind of lawfull power over us, and that we turning our eyes towards him, he likewise turneth our affections, and enthralleth them in despight of our selves. *Aristotle* saith, that it appertaineth to those that are beautifull, to command; that they are venerable next to the Gods themselves; that they are none, but such as are blind, but are touched with it. *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cæsar*, these great Commanders, have made great use thereof in their greatest affairs; yea, *Scipio*, the best of them all. *Fair* and *Good* are near neighbours, and are expressed by the self same words, both in *Greek*, and in the Scriptures. Many great Philosophers have attained to their wisdome, by the assistance of their beauty. It is likewise considerable, and much required in beasts themselves.

There are in Beauty divers things to be considered: That of men is properly the form and feature of the body; as for other beauties, they belong unto women. There are two sorts of beauties, the one settled which moveth not at all, and it consisteth in the due proportion, and colour of the members, a body that is not swoln or puffed up, wherein the sinews and veins appear not from far, nor the bones presse not the skin, but full of blood and spirit, and in good state, having the muscles elevated, the skin smooth, the colour vermillion: The other moveable, which is called a good grace, and is the true guiding, or carriage of the motion of the members, and above all, the eyes. The former beauty of it self is as it were dead, this active and full of life. There are beauties that are rude, fierce, sowr; others that are sweet, yea though they be fading. 3. *The distinction of Beauty.*

Beauty is properly to be considered in the visage. There is nothing more beautifull in man, then his soul; and in the body of man then 4. *Of the Visage.*

then his visage, which is as it were the soul abbreviated, that is, the pattern and image of the soul; that is, her Escuchion, with many quarters, representing the collection of all her titles of honour, painted and placed in the gate and forefront, to the end that men may know, that here is her abode and her palace. By the countenance it is that we know the person of a man; and therefore Art, which imitateth Nature, takes no care to represent the person of a man but onely to paint or carve the visage.

3. *Seven singularities in the visage of man.*

There are many speciall singularities in the visage of man, which are not in beasts, (for to say the truth, they have no visage) nor in the rest of the body of man: As the number and diversitie of the parts and forms of them, in beasts there is neither chin, nor cheeks,

1. nor forehead, much lesse any form or fashion of them. Variety of

2. colours, as in the eye onely there is black, white, green, blue, red,

3. chrystaline. Proportion, for the senses are there double, answering the one to the other, and in such a manner, that the greatnes of the eye, is the greatnes of the mouth, the largenes of the forehead, the length of the nose; the length of the nose, that of the

4. chin and lips. An admirable diversitie of countenances; and such, that there are hardly found two faces, in all respects, like one another: this is a chief point of workmanship, which in no other thing can be found. This variety is very profitable, yea necessary for humane society; first, to know one another: for infinite evils, yea, the dissipation of humane kind must needs follow, if a man should mistake himself by the semblance and similitude of divers visages; yea, it would be a confusion worse then that of *Babel*. A man would take his daughter for his sister, for a stranger his enemy for his friend. If our faces were alike, we should not discern a man from a beast; and if they were not all unlike one another, we could not know how to discern a man from a man. Besides, it was an excellent art of Nature, to place in this part some secret that might give contentment to one another, through the whole world: for by reason of this variety of faces, there is not a person that in some

5. part is not beautifull. The dignitie and honour of it, round figure, form upright and elevated on high, naked and uncovered, without hair, feathers, scales, as in other creatures, looking up unto heaven.

6. Grace, sweetnes, a pleasant and decent comelines, even to the giving up of a mans *Soul*, and the ravishing of his will, as hath been shewed before. To be brief, the visage is the throne of beauty and love; the seat of laughter and kissing, two things very proper and

agreeable

agreeable unto man, the true and most significant symboles of amity and good discretion. Finally, it is apt for all alterations, to declare the inward motions and passions of the Soul, as Joy, Heavinesse, Love, Hatred, Envie, Malice, Shame, Choler, Iealousie, and so forth. It is as the hand of a Diall which noteth the hours and moments of time, the wheeles and motions themselves being hid within. And as the aire which receiveth all the colours and changes of the time, sheweth what the weather is, so saith one, the aire of a mans countenance. *Corpus animum tegit & detegit, in facie legitur homo. The Body covereth and discovereth the soul, and man is known even by his face.*

6. *A description of the beauty of the face.*

The beauty of the face consisteth in a large, square, well extended and cleer front, eye-browes well ranged, thin and subtile, the eye well divided, cheerfull, sparkling; as for the colour, I leave it doubtfull: the nose lean, the mouth little, the lipps coraline, the chin short and dimpled, the cheekes somewhat rising, and in the middle the pleasant *gelasin*, the eares round and well compact, the whole countenance with a lively tincture white and vermilion. Nevertheless, this description of Beauty is not generally received; the opinions of Beanty are different, according to the diversity of nations. With the Indians the greatest Beauty consisteth in that, which we account the greatest deformity, that is, in a tawny colour, thick and swollen lipps, a flat and large nose, teeth spotted with black or red, great eares and hanging, a little low forehead, dugs great and pendent, to the end, they may give their little ones suck over their souldiers: and to attain to this forme of beauty, they use all manner of Art. But not to wander so far, in *Spain* the chiefest beauty is leane and neatly compt; in *Italy* fat, corpulent and solid: the soft, and delicate, and flattering please the one; the strong, vigorous, fierce, and commanding, the other.

7. *The beauty of the soul and body.*

The beauty of the Body, especially the visage should in all reason demonstrate and witnes the beauty of the soul, (which is a quality and rule of opinions and judgments, with a certain stedfastnes and constancy) for there is nothing that hath a truer resemblance, then the conformity and relation of the body to the spirit: and when this is not, we must needs think, that there is some accident that hath interrupted the ordinary course, as it comes to pass, that we oftentimes see it: for the milke of the Nurse, the first institution, conversation, bring great alterations to the originall nature of the soul, whether in good or evill. *Socrates*

*crates* confeſſed that the deformity of his body, did juſtly accuſe the naturall deformity of his ſoul, but that by induſtry and inſtitution he had corrected that of the ſoul. This outward countenance is a weak and dangerous ſurety; but they that belye their own phyſiognomy, are rather to be puniſhed then others, becauſe they falſifie and betray that good promiſe, that nature hath planted in their front, and deceive the world.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of the veſtments of the body.*

*Nakedneſs is naturall.*

THere is great likelihood that the cuſtome or faſhion of going naked, as yet continued in a great part of the world, was the firſt and originall amongſt men, and that of covering and adorning the body with garments was artificiall, and invented to help and enlarge Nature, as they which by artificiall light go about to increaſe the light of the day: for Nature having ſufficiently provided for all other creatures a covering, it is not to be believed, that ſhe hath handled man worſe then the reſt, and left him onely indigent, and in ſuch a ſtate, that he could not help himſelf without forreign ſuccours, and therefore thoſe reproaches that are made againſt Nature as a ſtepmother, are unjuſt. If men from the beginning had been cloathed, it is not unlikely that they would ever have diſrobed themſelves, and gone naked, both in regard of their health, which could not but be much offended with that change, and ſhame it ſelf: and nevertheleſs, it is done and obſerved amongſt many nations. Neither can it be alledged that we cloathe our ſelves either to cover our nakedneſs or privy parts, or to defend us againſt cold (for theſe are the two reaſons pretended; for againſt heat, there is no appearance of reaſon) becauſe Nature hath not taught us, that there is any thing in our nakedneſs, that we ſhould be aſhamed of: it is we that by our own fault and fall, have told it our ſelves: *Quis indicavit tibi quod nudus eſſes, niſi quod ex ligno quod præceperam tibi ne comederes comediſti? Who told thee that thou waſt naked, unleſs thou haſt eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou ſhouldeſt not eate?* And Nature hath already ſufficiently hid them, put them far from our eyes, and covered them. And therefore it is leſs needfull to cover thoſe parts onely, as ſome do in thoſe Countries where they go all naked, and ordinarily are not covered: for why ſhould he that is the Lord of all other

other creatures. not daring to shew himself naked unto the world, hide himself under the spoils of another, nay adorn himsef ? As for cold, and other particular and locall necessities, we know that under the self same air, the self same heaven, one goes naked, another apparelled; and we have all the most delicate part uncovered: and therefore a wandring person being asked, How he could go so naked in winter, answered, That our faces are alwayes naked, and he was all face: Yea many great personages have ever gone with their heads uncovered, *Massinissa, Cæsar, Hannibal, Severus*; and many nations there are, which goe to the warrs and fight all naked: and the counsell that *Plato* giveth for the continuance of health is, never to cover either head or feet. And *Varro* saith, that when it was first ordained, that men should uncover the heads in the presence of the gods, and of the magistrate, that it was rather for healths sake, and to harden themselves against the injuries of the times, then for reverence. Lastly, the invention of covers and houses against the injuries of heaven, and men, is more ancient, more naturall, more universall, then of garments, and common with many creatures, but an industrious search for victuall more naturall then either. Of the use of garments, and aliments hereafter. Lib. 3. c. 43.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Soul in generall.*

BEhold here a matter of all others most difficult, handled and discourse by the wisest of all Nations, especially *Egyptians, Greeks, Arabians*, and *Latines*: by our later Writers more shallowly as all other Philosophy, but with great diversity of opinions, according to the diversity of Nations, Religions, professions, without any certain accord or resolution: the generall knowledg and discourse thereof, may be referred to these ten points: The definition, Essence or Nature, Faculties and Actions, Vnity or Plurality, Source, Entrance into the body, Residence therein, Seat, Sufficiency to exercise her functions, the End, and Separation from the body. *The preface.*

1. *The definition very difficult.*

It is first very hard to define, or truly to say what the soul is, as generally all other forms, because they are things relative which subsist not in themselves, but are parts of a whole, and this is the reason, why there is such and so great diversity of definitions of them, whereof there is not any received without contradiction. *Aristotle*

*ſtotle* hath confuted twelve that were before him, and could hardly made good his own.

2. *Eaſie to ſay what it is not.* It is eaſie to ſay what it is not: That it is not *Fire*, *Aire*, *Water*; Nor the temperature of the four Elements, or qualities, or humours, which is alwayes changeable, without which a creature is and lives; and beſides that, this is an accident, the *Soul* a ſubſtance. Again, Metals and things inanimate, have likewiſe a temperature of the four Elements, and firſt qualities. Neither is it blood, (for there are many things animate and living without bloud, and many creatures dye without the ſhedding of a drop of bloud.) Nor the beginning and cauſe of motion (for divers things inanimate move, as the adamant moves the iron; amber or jet, ſtraw; medicines and roots of trees being cut and dried, draw and move,) Neither is it the act, or life, or *Energie*, or perfection, (for that word *Entelechia* is diverſly taken and interpreted) of a living body: for all this is but the effect or action of the *Soul*, and not the *Soul* it ſelf, as to live, to ſee, to underſtand is the action of the *Soul*. And it would likewiſe follow, that the *Soul* ſhould be an accident, not a ſubſtance, and could not ſubſiſt without that body whereof it is the act and perfection, no more then the cover of an houſe may be without the houſe, and a relative without his correlative, To be briefe, it is to ſay what the ſoul doth and is to another, not what it is in it ſelf.

3. *Hard to ſay what it is.* But to ſay what the *Soul* is, is very difficult: A man may ſimply ſay That it is an eſſentiall quickning form, which giveth to the plant the vegetative or growing life; to a beaſt, a ſenſible life, which comprehendeth the vegetative; to a man, an intellectuall life, which comprehendeth the other two, as in number the greater contains the leſs, and in figures the *Pentagone* contains the *Tetragone*, and this the *Trigone*, I call it the intellectuall ſoul, rather then the reaſonable, which is comprehended in the intellective as the leſs in the great: for the reaſonable in ſome ſenſe and meaſure, according to the opinion of the greateſt Philoſophers and experience it ſelf, is likewiſe in beaſts, but not the intellective, as being more high. *Sicut equus & mulus in quibus non eſt intellectus*: *Like a horſe and mule in whom there is no underſtanding*. The *Soul* then is not the beginning or ſource, that word doth properly belong to the ſoveraign firſt author, but an inward cauſe of life, motion, ſenſe, underſtanding. It moveth the body, and

and it self is not moved; as contrarily, the body is moved, and moveth not at all: it moveth I say the body, and not it self, for nothing but God moveth it self; and whatsoever moveth it self, is eternall and Lord of it self: and that it moveth the body, it hath it not of it self, but from an higher cause.

4. *The nature and essence of the soul.*

Concerning the nature and essence of the *Soul*, I mean an humane *Soul* (for the *Soul* of a beast is without all doubt corporall, materiall, bred and born with the matter, and with it corruptible) there is a question of greater importance then it seemeth: for some affirm it to be corporall, some incorporall: and this is very agreeable to reason, if a man be not opinative. That it is corporall, see what the grounds are; *Spirits* and Devils, good an ill, which are wholly separated from all matter, are corporall, according to the opinion of all Philosophers, and our greatest Divines, *Tertullian*, *Origen*, S. *Basil*, *Gregory*, *Augustine*, *Damascene*; how much more the *Soul* of man, which hath society, and is united to a matter? Their resolution is, that whatsoever is created, being compared unto God, is grosse, corporall, materiall, and onely God is incorporall; that every spirit is a body, and hath a bodily nature. Next unto authority almost universall, the reason is irrefragable. Whatsoever is included in this finite world, is finite, limited both in virtue and substance, bounded with a superficies, inclosed and circumscribed in a place, which are the true and naturall conditions of a body: for there is nothing but a body which hath a superficiall part, and is barred and fastened in a place. God onely is wholly infinite, incorporall; the ordinary distinctions, *circumscriptivè*, *definitivè*, *effectivè*, are but verball, and in nothing either help or hurt the cause: for it alwayes stands good that spirits are in such sort in a place, that at the self same time that they are in a place, they cannot be else where; and they are not in a place either infinite; or very great, or very little, but equall to their limited and finited substance and superficies. And if it were not so, spirits could not change their place, nor ascend or descend, as the Scripture affirmeth that they do: and so they should be immoveable, indivisible, indifferently in all. Now if they appear that they change their place, the change convicteth that they are moveable, divisible, subject unto time, and to the succession thereof, required in the motion and passage from one place to another, which are all the qualities of a body. But because many simple men under this word corporall, do imagine visible, palpable, and think not that the

In homil. 1. de spir. l. 3. de lib. arb. Hom. de Epiph.

Pure air, or fire without the flame or coal are bodies, have therefore likewise affirmed, That spirits both separated and humane are not corporall, as in truth they are not in that sense: for they are of an invisible substance, whether airie, as the greatest part of Philosophers and Divines affirm; or celestiall, as some *Hebrews* and *Arabicks* teach, calling by the self same name both the heaven and the spirit, an essence proper to immortality; or whether (if they will have it so) of a substance more subtile and delicate, yet they are alwayes corporall, since limited by place, moveable, subject to motion and to times. Finally if they were not corporall, they should not be passible and capable of suffering as they are: the humane receiveth from his body pleasure and displeasure, sorrow and delight in his turn; as the body from the spirit, and his passions, many good qualities, many bad, virtues, vices, affections, which are all accidents: and all as well the spirits separated and Devils as humane, are subject to punishment and torments. They are therefore corporall: for there is nothing passible, that is not corporall, and it is onely proper unto bodies to be subject to accidents.

3. *The faculties and actions of the Soul.*

Now the *Soul* hath a great number of virtues and faculties, as many almost as the body hath members: There are some in plants, more in beasts; most in man, to know, to live, to feel, to move, to desire, to allure, to assemble to retain, to concoct, to digest, to nourish, to grow, to reject, to see, to hear, to taste, to smell, to speak, to breathe, to ingender, to think, to reason, to contemplate, to consent, dissent, to remember, judge; all which are no parts of the *Soul:* for so it should be divisible, and should consist upon accidents but they are her naturall qualities. The actions come after and follow the faculties, and so there are three degrees, according to to the doctrine of Great S. *Dennis* followed of all, that is, we must consider in spirituall creatures three things; *Essence, Facultie, Operation:* By the latter which is the action, we know the faculty, and by it the essence. The actions may be hindred and wholly cease without any prejudice at all unto the soul, and her faculties as the *Science* and faculty of Painting remaineth entire in the Painter, although his hands be bound, and so be made unable to Paint: But if the faculties themselves perish, the *Soul* must needs be gone, no otherwise then *Fire* is no longer fire having lost the faculty of warming.

4. *The unity of the soul.*

The essence and nature of the *Soul* being after a sort explicated, one of the busiest questions that belongeth unto the *Soul* offereth

offereth it self to our consideration, that is, whether there be in a creature, especially in man, one soul or many ? Touching which point, there are divers opinions, but may be reduced into three. Some of the *Greekes*, and almost all the *Arabiques* imitating them, have thought (not only in every particular man, but generally in all men) that there was but one immortall *Soul*. The *Ægyptians* for the most part held an opinion quite contrary, that there was a plurality of souls in every creature, all divers and distinct, two in every beast, and three in man; two mortall, the vegetative and sensible, and the third intellective, immortall. The third opinion, as the mean betwixt the two former, and most followed, being held by many of all nations, is, that there is but one *Soul* in every creature, not more. In every of these opinions there is some difficulty. I leave the first, as being already sufficiently confuted and rejected. The plurality of souls in every creature and man, on the one side seemeth very strange and absurd in Philosophy, for that were to give many formes to one and the same thing, and to say that there are many substances and subjects in one, two beasts in one, three men in one; on the other side it giveth credit and helpeth much our beliefe, touching the immortality of the intellectuall *Soul*, for their being three souls there can follow no inconvenience, that two of them should dye, and the third continue immortall. The unity of the *Soul* seemeth to resist the immortality thereof; for how can one and the same indivisible, be in a mortall part and an immortall ? as nevertheless *Aristotle* would have it. Doubtless it seemed that of necessity the *Soul* must be either altogether mortall, or altogether immortall, which are two very foul absurdities. The first aboliſheth all religion and sound Philosophy: the second maketh beasts likewise immortall. Nevertheless it seems to be more true, that there is but one *Soul* in every creature, for the plurality and diversity of faculties, instruments, actions, neither derogateth any thing at all, nor multiplyeth in any thing this unity, no more then the diversity of rivers, the unity of one spring or fountain, nor the diversity of effects in the Sun, to heat, to enlighten, to melt to drie, to whiten, to make black, to dissipate the unity and simplicity of the Sun; for should they, there should be a great number of souls in one man, and Suns in one world. Neither doth this essentiall unity of the *Soul* any thing hinder the immortality of the humane *Soul* in her essence, notwithstanding the vegetative and sensitive faculties, which are but acci-

accidents, die, that is to say, cannot be exercised without the body, the *Soul* not having a subject or instrument whereby to do it, but the third intellectuall *Soul* is alwayes well, because for it there is no need of the body, though whileſt it is within it, it make use thereof to exercise it self; insomuch that if it did return unto the body, it were onely again to exercise her vegetative and sensitive faculties, as we see in those that are raised unto life to live here below, not in those that are raised to live elsewhere, for such bodies need not to live by the exercise of such faculties: Even as there is no want nor decay in the Sunne, but it continueth in it self wholly the same, though during a whole eclips it neither shine nor warm, nor perform his other effects in those places that are subject to it.

*The source of the soul.*

Having shewed the unity of the soul in every subject, let us see from whence it cometh, and how it entreth into the body. The originall beginning of souls is not held to be the same of all, I mean of humane souls; for the vegetative and sensitive, of plants and beasts, is by the opinion of all altogether materiall, and in the seed, for which cause it is likewise mortall. But concerning the *Soul* of man there are four celebrated opinions. According to the first, which it of the *Stoicks*, held by *Philo Judeus*, and afterward by the *Maniches*, *Priscilianists*, and others, it is transferred and brought forth as a part or parcell of the substance of God, who inspireth it into the body, alledging to their best advantage the words of *Moses*, *Inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ: He breathed in his face breath of life.* The second opinion, held by *Tertullian*, *Apollinaris*, the *Luciferians*, and other Christians, affirmeth that the *Soul* proceedeth and is derived from the souls of our Parents with the seed, as the *Soul* of a beast. The third opinion which is that of the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, held by many *Rabbins* and Doctours of the Jews, and afterwards by *Origen*, and other Doctours, teacheth that the souls of men have been from the beginning, all created of God, made of nothing, and reserved in heaven, afterwards to be sent into the lower parts, as need should require, and that the bodies of men are formed and disposed to receive them: and from hence did spring the opinion of those that thought that the souls of men here below, were ether well or ill handled, and lodged in bodies either sound or sick, according to that life which they had lead above in heaven, before they were incorporate. And truly the master of Wisdome himself, sheweth, that the *Soul*, of the two, was the elder, and before the body, *Eram puer, bonam indolem sortitus,*

*ſortitus, imo bonus cùm eſſem, corpus incontaminatum reperi. I was a Boy, who by lot obtained a good diſpoſition and nature, yea even being good, I obtained alſo an undefiled body.* The fourth opinion received and held through all Chriſtendome is, that they are all created of God, and infuſed into bodies prepared, in ſuch manner that the Creation and infuſion is done at one and the ſame inſtant. Theſe four opinions are all affirmative, but there is a fift much retained, which determineth nothing, and is content to ſay, that it is a ſecret unknown unto men: of which opinion was Saint *Auguſtine, Gregory* and others, who, nevertheleſs thought the two latter affirmative opinions more like to be true then the former. *De orig. Epiſt. 28. 157.*

6. *The entrance of the ſoul into the body.*

Let us now ſee when and how the *Soul* entreth into the body, whether altogether at one inſtant, or ſucceſſively; I mean the humane *Soul:* for of that of a beaſt there is no doubt ſince it is naturall in the ſeed, according to *Ariſtotle* (whom moſt do follow) that is, by ſucceſſion of times, and by degrees, as an artificiall form, which a man maketh by pieces, the one after the other; the head, afterwards the throat, the belly, the legs, inſomuch that the vegetative and ſenſitive *Soul*, altogether materiall and corporeall, is in the ſeed, and with the deſcent of the Parents, which faſhioneth the body in the matrix: and that done, the reaſonable *Soul* arriveth from without. And therefore there are neither two nor three ſouls, neither together, nor ſucceſſively, neither is the vegetative corrupted by the arrivall of the ſenſitive, nor the ſenſitive by the arrival of the intellectual; but it is but one *Soul* which is made, finiſhed, & perfected in that time which nature hath preſcribed. Others are of opinion, that the ſoul entreth with all her faculties at one inſtant, that is to ſay then, when all the body is furniſhed with Organs, formed, & wholly finiſhed, and that untill then there was no *Soul*, but onely a naturall virtue and *Energy*, an eſſentiall form of the ſeed, which working by the ſpirits which are in the ſaid ſeed, with the heat of the matrix and materiall bloud, as with inſtruments, do form and build up the body, prepare all the members, nouriſh, move and increaſe them; which being done this *Energie* and ſeminall form vaniſheth and is qnite loſt, ſo that the ſeed ceaſeth to be ſeed, loſing its form, by the arrivall of another more noble, which is the humane *Soul*, which cauſeth that which was ſeed, or an *Embryon*, that is a ſubſtance without ſhape to be no longer ſeed, but a man.

7. *The reſidence of the Soul in the body.*

The *Soul* being entred into the body, we are likewiſe to know what kind of exiſtence therein it hath, and how it is there reſident.

Some Philosophers not knowing what to say, or how to joyn and unite the *Soul* with the body, make it to abide and reside therein, as a Master in his house, a Pilot in his ship, a Coach-man in his Coach: but this were to destroy all, for so the *Soul* should not be the form nor inward and essentiall part of a creature, or of a man, it should have no need of the members of the body to abide there, nor any feeling at all of the contagion of the body, but it should be a substance wholly distinct from the body, of it self subsisting, which at its pleasure might come and go, and separate it self from the body, without the destinction and diminution of all the functions thereof, which are all absurdities. The *Soul* is in the body, as the form in the matter, extended and spread throughout the body, giving life, motion, sense, to all the parts thereof, and both of them together make but one *Hypostasis*, one intire subject, which is the creature, and there is no mean or middle that doth unite and knit them together: for betwixt the matter and the form there is no middle, according to all Philosophy. The *Soul* then is all, in all the body; I add not (though it be commonly said) and all in every part of the body; for that implyeth a contradiction, and divideth the *Soul*.

8. *The seat and instruments of the Soul.*

Now notwithstanding the *Soul*, as it is said, be diffused and spread thorow the whole body, yet nevertheless, to excite and exercise its faculties, it is more specially and expresly in some parts of the body, then in others; in which it is said to have place, yet not to be wholly there, lest the rest should be without *Soul* without form. And as it hath four principle and chief faculties, so men give it four seats, that is, those four regions, which we have noted before in the composition of the body, the four first principall instruments of the Soul, the rest referre themselves unto them, as also all the faculties to these, that is to say, the ingendring faculty to the ingendring parts, the naturall to the liver, the vitall to the heart, the animall and intellectuall to the brain.

9. *The sufficiency of the Soul for the exercise of her faculties.*

We are now to speak in generall of the exercise of the faculties of the *Soul*, whereunto the soul of it self is wise and sufficient, insomuch that it faileth not to produce that which it knoweth, and to exercise its functions as it ought, if it be not hindred, and that the instruments thereof be well disposed. And therefore it was well and truly said of the wise, That nature is wise, discreet, industrious, a sufficient mistress, which maketh a man apt to all things: *Insita sunt nobis omnium artium ac virtutum semina, magistérque ex occulto*

*Deus*

*Deus producit ingenium. We have, as it were, sown in us the seed of all arts and virtues, and God, as a good Master, doth produce, extend, and teach our wit:* which is easily shewed by induction. The vegetative soul without instruction, formeth the body in the matrix with excellent Art, afterwards it nourisheth it, and makes it grow, drawing the victuall unto it, retaining and concocting it, afterwards casting out the excrements, it ingendreth and reformeth the parts that fail; these are things that are seen in plants, beasts, and men. The sensitive *Soul* of it self, without instruction, maketh both beasts and men to move their feet, their hands, and other members; to stretch, to rub, to shake, to move the lips, to presse the dug, to cry, to laugh. The reasonable, of it self, not according to the opinion of *Plato*, by the remembrance of that which it knew before it entred into the body; nor according to *Aristotle*, by reception and acquisition, coming from without by the senses, being of it self as a white paper, void of impression, although that serve to good purpose; but of it self without instruction, imagineth, understandeth, retaineth, reasoneth, discourseth. But because this of the reasonable *Soul*, seemeth to be more difficult then the other, and woundeth in some sort *Aristotle* himself, it shall be handled again in his place, in the discourse of the intellectuall *Soul*.

It remaineth that we speak of the last point, that is, of the separation of the *Soul* from the Body, which is after a divers sort and manner; the one, and the ordinary is naturall by death, and this not the same in beasts and men: for by the death of beasts, the *Soul* dieth, and is annihilated, according unto that rule, By the corruption of the subject, the form perisheth, the matter remaineth: by the death of man the *Soul* is separated from the body, but is not lost, but remaineth, inasmuch as it is immortall. 10. *The separation of the body twofold.* 1. *Naturall and ordinary.*

The immortality of the *Soul* is a thing universally, religiously, (for it is the principall foundation of all religion) and peaceably received and concluded upon throughout the world, I mean by an outward and publick profession: seriously and inwardly, not so: witness so many Epicures, Libertines, and mockers in the world: yea, the *Saduces*, the greatest Lords of the Jews, did not stick with open mouth to deny it; though a thing profitable to be believed, and in some sort proved by many naturall and humane reasons, but properly and better established by the authority of Religion, then any other way. It seemeth that there is in a man a kind of inclination, and disposition of nature to believe it; for man desi- 2. *The immortality of the Soul.*

reth

reth naturally to continue and perpetuate his being, from whence likewise proceedeth that great, yea, furious care and love of our posterity and succession. Again, two things there are that give strength thereunto, and make it more plausible; the one is the hope of glory and reputation, and the desire of the immortalitie of our name, which how vain soever it be, carrieth a great credit in the world: the other is an impression, that vice which robbeth a man of the view and knowledge of humane justice, remaining alwayes opposite to the Divine Justice, must thereby be chastised, yea after death: so that besides that, a man is altogether carried and disposed by nature to desire it, and consequently to believe it, the Justice of God doth conclude it.

3. *The Proof.* From hence we are to learn, that there are three differences and degrees of *Souls*, an order required even to the perfection of the Universe. Two extreams, the one is that which being altogether materiall, is plunged, and overwhelmed in the matter, and inseparable from it, and therewithall corruptible, which is the *Soul* of a beast: the other quite contrary, is that which hath not any commerce, or society with the matter or body, as the soul of immortall Angels or Devils. In the middle as the mean betwixt these two, is the humane soul, which is neither wholly tied to the matter, nor altogether without it, but is joyned with it, and may likewise subsist and live without it. This order and distinction is an excellent argument of immortality; for it were a *vacuum*, a defect, a deformity too absurd in nature, dishonourable to the Author, and a kind of ruine to the world, that betwixt two extreams, the corruptible and incorruptible, there should be no middle; that is partly the one and partly the other: there must needs be one that ties and joyns the two ends or extreams together, and that can be none but man. Below the lowest and wholly materiall, is that which hath no *soul* at all, as stones; above the highest and immortall, is the eternall onely God.

4. *2 Not naturall.* The other separation not naturall nor ordinary, and which is done by strange impulsions, and at times, is very difficult to understand, and perplex. It is that which is done by ecstasies and ravishments, which is divers, and done by different means: for there is a separation that is Divine, such as the Scripture reporteth unto us, of *Daniel*, *Zachary*, *Esdras*, *Ezechiel*, S. *Paul*. There is another that is Demoniacal, procured by devils, and good spirits and bad, as we read of many, as of *John D' vns*, called *Lescot*, who being

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in his ecstasie, a long time held for dead, was carried into the aire, and cast down upon the earth; but so soon as he felt the blow that he received by the fall, he came to himself; but by reason of the great store of bloud which he lost, his head being broken, he died outright. *Cardan* telleth it of himself, and of his father, and it continueth authentickly verified in many and divers parts of the world of many, and those for the most part of the vulgar sort, weak and women possessed, whose bodies remain not onely without motion, and the beating of the heart and arteries; but also without any sense or feeling of the greatest blows, either with iron or fire, that could be given them, and afterwards (their souls being returned) they have felt great pain in their limbs, and recounted that which they have seen and done in places far distant. Thirdly, there is an humane separation, which proceedeth either from that maladie, which *Hippocrates* calleth *Sacer*, commonly called, *The falling sickneſſe*, *Morbus comitialis*, the signe whereof is a foaming at the mouth, which is not in those that are possessed; but in stead thereof they have a stinking savour, or it is occasioned by stipticks, stupifying and benumming medicines; or ariseth from the force of imagination, which enforcing and bending it self with too deep an attention about a thing, carrieth away the whole strength and power of the *Soul*. Now in these three kinds of ecstasies or ravishments, *Divine*, *Diabolical*, *Humane*, the question is, Whether the *Soul* be truly and really separated from the body; or if remaining in it, it be in such sort imployed and busied about some outward thing, which is forth of the body, that it forgetteth its own body, whereby followeth a kind of intermission and vacation of the actions, and exercise of the functions thereof. Touching the Divine ecstasie, the Apostle speaking of himself, and his own act, dares not define any thing, *Si in corpore vel extra corpus neſcio. Deus ſcit: Whether in the body, or without, I know not, God knoweth.* An instruction that may serve for all others, and for other separations of less quality. Touching the *Demoniacall* ecstasie, as not to feel a blow be it never so great, to report what hath been done two or three hundred leagues off, are two great and violent conjectures of a true separation from the body, but not altogether necessary: for the devil can so alienate and occupy the soul within the body, that it shall not seem to have any action or commerce with the body for some certain time; and in that time so besotteth the soul by presenting things unto the imagination, that have been done a far

off

off, that a man may speake and discourse thereof: for to affirm that certainly the *Soul* doth wholly depart and abandon the body, Nature is too bold and fool-hardy: to say that it doth not wholly depart, but that the imaginative or intellectuall is caried out, and that the vegetative soul remaineth, were more to entangle our selves; for the *Soul* in its essence should be divided, or the accident onely should be carried out, and not the substance. Touching the humane ecstasie, doubtless there is no separation of the *Soul*, but onely a suspension of the patent and outward actions thereof.

II. *The state of the Soul after death.*

What becomes of the *Soul*, and what the state thereof is, after the naturall separation by death, divers men think diversly: and this point belongeth not to the subject of this book. The *Metempsychose* and transanimation of *Pythagoras*, hath in some sort been embraced by the *Academicks*, *Stoicks*, *Ægyptians*, and others; but yet not of all in the same sense: for some do admit it onely for the punishment of the wicked, as we read of *Nebuchadnezzar*, who was changed into a beast by the judgment of God. Others, and some great, have thought that good souls, being separated, become Angels; the wicked, Devils. It had been more pleasing to have said, Like unto them; *Non nubent, sed erunt sicut Angeli. They marry not, but shall be as the Angels of God.* Some have affirmed, that the souls of the wicked, at the end of a certain time, were reduced to nothing. But, the truth of all this, we must learn from Religion, and Divines, who speake hereof more cleerly.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of the Soul in particular; and first of the vegetative faculty.*

I. *The faculties of the Soul.*

After this generall description of the *Soul*, in theseten points we must speake thereof more particularly, according to the order of the faculties therof, beginning at the basest, that is, the Vegetative, Sensitive, Apprehensible or Imaginative, Appetible Intellective, which is the soveraign *Soul* and truly humane. Vnder every one of these three are divers others which are subject unto them, and as parts of them, as we shall see, handling them in their rank.

2. *Of the vegetable and her subalternats.*

Of the vegetable and basest *Soul*, which is even in plants, I will not speak much; it is the proper subject of Physitians, of health and sickness. Let me onely say, that under this there are contained other three great faculties, which follow on the other: for the first

firſt ſerveth the ſecond, and the ſecond the third; but the third neither of the former. The firſt then is the nouriſhing faculty, for the conſervation of the *Individuum* or particular perſon, which divers others do ſerve, as the *Attractive* of the victuall, the *Concoctive*, the *Digeſtive*, ſeparating the good and proper, from the naught and hurtfull, the *Retentive*, and the *Expulſive* of ſuperfluities: The ſecond, the increaſing and growing faculty, for the perfection and due quantity of the *Individuum*: The third, is the *Generative*, for the conſervation of the kind. Whereby we ſee, that the two firſt are for the *Individuum*, and work within in the body; the third is for the kind, and hath its effect and operation without in another body, and therefore is more worthy then the other, and cometh nearer to a faculty more high, which is the *Senſitive*. This is a great height of perfection, to make another thing like it ſelf.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of the Senſitive faculty.*

IN the exerciſe of this faculty and function of the Senſes theſe ſix things do concurre, whereof four are within and two without. That is to ſay, the *Soul*, as the firſt efficient cauſe. The faculty of *Senſe* (which is a quality of the *Soul*, and not the *Soul* it ſelf) that is, of perceiving and apprehending outward things; which is done after a five fold manner, which we call *The five ſenſes* (of this number we ſhall ſpeak hereafter) that is to ſay, *Hearing*, *Seeing*, *Smelling*, *Taſting*, *Touching*. The corporall inſtrument of the *Senſe*, whereof there are five, according to the number of the *Senſes*; the Eye, the Ear, the high concavity of the Noſe; (which is the entrance to the firſt ventricles of the brain) the Tongue, the whole Skin of the body. The *Spirit* which ariſeth from the brain the fountain of the ſenſitive *Soul*, by certain ſinews in the ſaid inſtruments, by which ſpirit and inſtrument the ſoul exerciſeth her faculty. The ſenſible *Species*, or object offered unto the inſtruments, which is different according to the diverſity of the ſenſe. The object of the eye or ſight, according to the common opinion, is colour, which is an adherent quality in bodies, whereof there are ſix ſimple, as White, Yellow, Red, Purple, Green and Blew; ſome add a ſeventh, which is Black; But to ſay the truth, that is no colour, but a privation, being like unto darkneſs, as the other colours more or leſs unto the light. Of compound colours the number is infinite:

*Six things required to the exerciſe of this faculty.*

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

infinite: but to speak more truly, the true object is light which is never without colour, and without which the colours are invisible. Now the light is a quality which cometh forth of a luminous body, which makes both it self visible and all things else; and if it be terminated and limited by some solid body, it reboundeth and redoubleth its beams: otherwise if it pass without any stop or termination, it cannot be seen except it be in the root of that light or luminous body from whence it came, nor make any thing else to be seen. Of the Ear or Hearing, the object is a sound, which is a noise proceeding from the encounter of two bodies, and it is divers: the pleasant and melodious sweetneth and appeaseth the spirit, and for its sake the body too, and drives away maladies from them both: the sharp and penetrant, doth contrariwise trouble and wound the spirit. Of Tasting the object is a savour or smack, whereof there are six divers simple kinds, *Sweet, Sowr, Sharp, Tart, Salt, Bitter*; but there are many compounds. Of smell, the object is an odour or sent, which is a fume rising from an odoriferous object ascending by the Nose to the first ventricles of the brain: the strong and violent hurteth the brain, as an ill sound the ear: the temperate and good doth contrariwise rejoyce, delight and comfort. Of the sense of Touching, the object is heat, cold, drouth, moisture either pleasant and polite, or sharp & smarting, motion, rest, tickling.

6. The middle or space betwixt the object and the instrument, which is the Air neither altered nor corrupted, but such as it ought to be.

2. So that sense is made, when the sensible species presenteth it self by the middle to an instrument sound and well disposed, and that therein the spirit assisting, receiveth it and apprehendeth it in such sort, that there is there both action and passion; and the senses are not purely passive: for notwithstanding they receive, and are stricken by the object, yet nevertheless in some sense and measure they do work or react in apprehending the species and image of the object proposed.

3. In former times and before *Aristotle*, they did make a difference betwixt the sense of *Seeing*, and the rest of the senses, and they all held, that the sight was active, and was made by emitting or sending forth of the eye the beams thereof unto the outward objects, and that the other senses were passive, receiving the sensible object; but after *Aristotle*, they are made all alike, and all passive, receiving in the organ or instrument, the kinds and images of things, and the reasons of the Ancients to the contrary are easily answered.

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There is more and more excellent matter to be delivered of the senses hereafter.

Now besides these five particular senses which are without, there is within the common sense; where all the diverse objects apprehended by it, are assembled and gathered together to the end they may afterward be compared, distinguished, and discerned the one from the other, which the particular senses could not do being every one attentive to his proper object, and not able to take knowledge thereof, of his companion.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of the senses of Nature.*

ALL knowledge is begun in us by the senses; so say our Schoolmen: but it not altogether true, as we shall see hereafter. They are our first masters: it beginneth by them, and endeth with them: they are the beginning and end of all. It is not possible to recoyl further back: every one of them is a Captain and Sovereigne lord in his order, and hath a great command, carrying with it infinite knowledges. The one dependeth not, or hath need of the other, so are they equally great, although the one have a farre greater extent, and train, and affairs then the other; as a little King is as well a Sovereigne in his little narrow command, as a great in his great estate. 1. *The importance of the natural senses.*

It is an opinion amongst us, that there are but five senses of nature, because we mark but five in us; but yet there may very well be more, and it is greatly to be doubted that there are; but it is impossible for us to know them, to affirm them, or to deny them, because a man shall never know the want of that sense which he hath never had. There are many beasts which live a full and perfect life, which want some one of our five senses; and a creature may live without the five senses, save the sense of *Feeling*, which is onely necessarie unto life. We live very commodiously with five, and yet (perhaps) we do want one, or two, or three, and yet it cannot be known. One sense cannot discover another: and if a man want one by nature, yet he knows not which way to affirm it. A man born blind can never conceive that he seeth not, nor desire to see, nor delight in his sight: it may be he will say, that he would see, but that is because he hath heard say, and learned of others, that it is to be desired: the reason is, because the senses are the first gates, and entrances 2. *The number.*

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to knowledge. So man not being able to imagine more then the five that he hath, he cannot know how to judge whether there be more in Nature; yet he may have more. Who knoweth whether the difficulties that we find in many of the works of Nature, and the effects of creatures, which we cannot underſtand, do proceed from the want of ſome ſenſe that we have not? Of the hidden properties which we ſee in many things, a man may ſay that there are ſenſible faculties in Nature, proper to judge and apprehend them; but yet he muſt confeſs that we have them not, and that the ignorance of ſuch things proceedeth from our own fault. Who knoweth whether it be ſome particular ſenſe, that diſcovereth in the Cock the houre of mid-night and morning, and that moves him to crow? Who taught ſome beaſts to chooſe certain herbs for their cure, and many ſuch like wonders as theſe are? No man can affirm or deny, ſay this it is, or that it is.

3. *Their ſufficiency.*

Some have aſſayed to give a reaſon of this number of the five ſenſes, and to prove the ſufficiency of them by diſtinguiſhing and diverſly comparing their outward objects; which are, either all near the body, or diſtant from it; if near, but yet remaining without, it is the ſenſe of Touching; if they enter, it is Taſte; if they be more diſtant and preſent by a right line, it is the Sight; if oblique and by reflexion, it is the Hearing. A man might better have ſaid thus, That theſe five ſenſes being appointed for the ſervice of an entire man, ſome are entirely for the body, that is to ſay, *Taſte* and *Touching*; that in that it entreth; this, in that it remains without. Others firſt and principall for the ſoul, as *Sight* and *Hearing*; the *ſight* for invention, the *hearing* for acquiſition and communication; and one in the middle, for the middle ſpirits, and ties of the ſoul and body, which is the *Smell*. Again they anſwer to the four Elements, and their qualities: The ſenſe of *Feeling* to the earth; of *Hearing* to the air; of *Taſte*, to the water and moyſture; the *Smell* to the fire. The *Sight* is a compound, and partakes both of water and fire, by reaſon of the bright ſplendour of the eye. Again, they ſay that there are ſo many ſenſes, as there are kinds of ſenſible things; which are colour, ſound, odour, taſte or ſavour, and the fifth, which hath no proper name, the object of *Feeling*, which is heat, cold, rough, plain, and ſo forth. But men deceive themſelves, for the number of the ſenſes is not to be judged by the number of ſenſible things, which are no cauſe that there are ſo many. By this reaſon there ſhould be many more, and one and the ſame

ſenſe

sense should receive many divers heads of objects, and one and the same object be apprehended by divers senses: so that the tickling of a feather, and the pleasures of *Venus*, are distinguished from the five Senses, and by some comprehended in the sense of *Feeling*: But the cause is rather, for that the spirit hath no power to attain to the knowledge of things, but by the five Senses, and that Nature hath given it so many, because it was necessary for its end and benefit.

Their comparisons are divers in dignity and nobility. The Sense of *Seeing* excelleth all the rest in five things: It apprehendeth farther off, and extendeth it self even to the fixed starrs. It hath more variety of objects: for to all things, and generally in all, there is light and colour, the objects of the eie. It is more exquisite, exact, and particular, even in the least and finest things that are. It is more prompt and sudden, apprehending even in a moment, and without motion, even the heavens themselves: in the other senses there is a motion that requireth time. It is more divine, and the marks of Divinity are many. Liberty incomparable above others, whereby the eie seeth, or seeth not, and therefore it hath lids ready to open and to shut: power not to turmoil it self, and not to suffer it self to be seen: Activity and abilitie to please or displease, to signifie and insinuate our thoughts, wills, and affections: for the eie speaketh and striketh, it serveth for a tongue and a hand; the other senses are purely passive. But that which is most noble in this Sense is, that the privation of the object thereof, which is darkness, brings fear and that naturally; and the reason is, because a man findeth himself robbed of so excellent a guide: and therefore whereas a man desireth company for his solace, the Sight in the light is in place of company. The sense of Hearing hath many excellent singularities, it is more spirituall, and the service thereof more inward. But the particular comparison of these two, which are of the rest the more noble, & of Speech, shall be spoken in the Chapter following. As for pleasure or displeasure, though all the Senses are capable thereof, yet the Sense of Feeling receiveth greater grief, and almost no pleasure; and contrarily, the Taste great delight, & almost no grief. In the organ and instrument, the Touch is universal, spread through the whole body, to the end the body should feel heat and cold: The organs of the rest are assigned to a certain place and member.

4. *Comparison.*

5. *The weakness and uncertainness of the Senses.*

From the weakness and incertitude of our senses comes ignorance, errour, and mistakings: for sithence that by their means and

mixture we attain to all knowledge, if they deceive us in their report, we have no other help to ſtick unto. But who can ſay, or accuſe them, that they do deceive us, conſidering that by them we begin to learn and to know? Some have affirmed that they do never deceive us; and when they ſeem to do it, the fault proceedeth from ſomething elſe; and that we muſt rather attribute it to any other thing, then to the ſenſes, Others have ſaid clean contrary, that they are all falſe, and can teach us nothing that is certain. But the middle opinion is the more true.

6. *The mutuall deceit of the ſpirit & ſenſes*

Now whether the Senſes be falſe or not, at the leaſt it is certain that they deceive, yea, ordinarily enforce the diſcourſe, the reaſon, and in exchange are again mocked by it. Do then but conſider what kind of knowledge and certainty a man may have, when that within, and that without is full of deceit and weakneſs, and that the principall parts thereof, the eſſentiall inſtruments of ſcience, do deceive one another. That the Senſes do deceive and enforce the underſtanding, it is plain in thoſe ſenſes whereof ſome do kindle with furie, others delight and ſweeten, others tickle the *Soul*. And why do they that cauſe themſelves to be let bloud, launced cauterized, and burnt turn away their eyes; but that they do well know that great authority that the Senſes have over their reaſon? The ſight of ſome bottomleſs depth or precipitate downfall, aſtoniſheth even him that is ſettled in a firm and ſure place: and to conclude, doth not the Senſe vanquiſh, and quite overcome all the beautifull reſolutions of virtue and patience? So on the other ſide, the ſenſes are likewiſe deceived by the underſtanding; which appeareth by this, that the *Soul* being ſtirred with Choler, Love, Hatred, or any other paſſion, our ſenſes do ſee and heare every thing otherwiſe then they are; yea, ſometimes our ſenſes are altogether dulled by the paſſions of the *Soul*, and it ſeemeth that the *Soul* retireth and ſhutteth up the operation of the Senſes, and that the ſpirit being otherwiſe employed, the eie diſcerneth not that which is before it, and which it ſeeth, yea, the ſight and the reaſon judge diverſly of the greatneſs of the Sun, the Starrs, nay of the figure of a ſtaff any thing diſtant.

7. *The ſenſes common to man and beaſt, but diverſly.*

In the Senſes of Nature, the beaſts have as well part as we, and ſometimes excell us: for ſome have their hearing more quick then man, ſome their ſight, others their ſmel, others their taſte: and it is held, that in the ſenſe of Hearing, the Hart excelleth all others; of Sight, the Eagle; of Smel, the Dog; of Taſts, the Ape; of Feeling, the

the Tortuis: nevertheleſs, the preheminence of that ſenſe of Touch is given unto man, which of all the reſt is the moſt brutiſh. Now if the Senſes are the means to attain unto knowledge, and that beaſts have a part therein, yea ſometimes the better part; why ſhould not they have knowledge?

But the Senſes are not the onely inſtruments of knowledge, neither are our Senſes alone to be conſulted or believed: for if beaſts by their Senſes judge otherwiſe of things then we by ours, as doubtleſs they do; who muſt be believed? Our ſpittle cleanſeth and drieth our wounds, it killeth the ſerpent; What then is the true quality of our ſpittle? To drie and to cleanſe, or to kill? To judge well of the operation of the ſenſes, we muſt be at ſome agreement with the beaſts, nay, with our ſelves: for the eie preſſed down and ſhut, ſeeth otherwiſe then in its ordinary ſtate; the ear ſtopt, receiveth the objects otherwiſe then when it is open: an infant ſees, hears, taſts, otherwiſe then a man; a man, then an old man; a ſound then a ſick; a wiſe then a fool. In this great diverſity and contrariety, what ſhall we hold for certain? Seeing that one ſenſe belieth another, a picture ſeems to be held up to the view, and the hands are folded together. 8. *The judgement of the ſenſes hard and dangerous.*

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.*

THeſe are the three moſt rich and excellent jewels of all thoſe that are in this muſter, and of whoſe preheminency it is diſputed. Touching their Organs, that of the Sight in its compoſiti- and form is admirable, and of a lively and ſhining beauty, by reaſon of the great variety and ſubtiltie of ſo many ſmall parts or pieces; and therefore it is ſaid, That the eie is one of thoſe parts of the body, which do firſt begin to be formed, and the laſt that is finiſhed: and for this very cauſe it is ſo delicate, and ſaid to be ſubject to ſixſcore maladies. Afterwards comes that of Speech, which helpeth the ſenſe of Hearing to many great advantages. For the ſervice of the body the Sight is moſt neceſſary, and therefore doth more import a beaſt, then Hearing. But for the ſpirit, the Hearing challengeth the upper place, The ſight ſerveth well for the invention of things, which by it have almoſt all been diſcovered, but it bringeth nothing to perfection. Again, the Sight is not capable but of corporall things and particular, and that onely of their cruſt or ſuperficiall part; it is the inſtrument of ignorant men and unlearned, 1. *A compariſon of the three.*

*qui moventur ad id quod adeſt, quódque præſens eſt : Who are moved with the preſent object.*

2. *The prehemi-nency of hear-ing.*

The Eare, is a ſpirituall Senſe it is the Intermedler and Agent of the underſtanding, the inſtrument of wiſe and ſpirituall men, capable not onely of the ſecrets and inward parts of particular bodies, whereunto the Sight arriveth not; but alſo of the generall kinds, and of all ſpirituall things and divine, in which the ſight ſerveth rather to diſturb then to help: and therefore we ſee not onely many blind, great and wiſe, but ſome alſo that are deprived of their ſight, to become great Philoſophers; but of ſuch as are deaf, we never heard of any. This is the way by which a man entreth the fortreſs, and makes himſelf maſter of the place, and employeth his ſpirit in good or ill; witneſs the wife of King *Agamemnon*, who was contained in her duty of chaſtity by the ſound of a Harp: and *David* by the ſelf-ſame means chaſed away the evil ſpirit from *Saul* and reſtored him to health: and that skilfull player of the Flute, that ſweetened the voice of that great Oratour *Gracchus*. To be brief, Science, Truth, and Virtue have no other entrance into the Soul, but by the Eare. Chriſtianity it ſelf teacheth, that faith and ſalvation cometh by Hearing, and that the Sight doth rather hurt, then help thereunto: that faith is the belief of thoſe things that are not ſeen, which belief is acquired by hearing; and it calleth ſuch as are apprentices or novices therein, Auditors; κατηχεμένους; *catechiſed*. Let me adde this one word, that the Hearing giveth ſuccour and comfort in darkneſs, & to ſuch as are aſleep, that by the ſound they may be awaked, and ſo provide for their preſervation. For all theſe reaſons have the wiſeſt ſo much commended Hearing, the pure and virgin-guardian from all corruption, for the health of the inward man; as for the ſafety of a citie, the gates and walls are guarded that the enemy enter not.

3. *The force and authoritie of Speech.*

Speech is peculiarly given unto man, an excellent preſent and very neceſſary, in regard of him from whom it proceedeth: it is the interpreter and image of the Soul, *animi index & ſpeculum*, the meſſenger of the heart, the gate by which all that is within iſſueth forth, and committeth it ſelf to the view, all things come forth of darkneſs and ſecret corners into the light, and the ſpirit it ſelf makes it ſelf viſible: and therefore an ancient Philoſopher ſaid once to a child; *Speak, that I may ſee thee*, that is to ſay, the inſide of thee. As veſſels are known whether they be broken or whole, full or emptie, by the ſound, and metals by the touch; ſo man by his

his speech. Of all the visible parts of the body which shew themselves outward, that which is nearest the heart, is the tongue, by the root thereof; so that which comes nearest unto our thought, is our speech: for from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. In regard of him which receiveth it, it is a powerfull master, an imperious commander, which entreth the fortress, possesseth it self of the possessour, stirreth him up, animateth, exasperateth, appeaseth him, maketh him sad, merry, imprinteth in him whatsoever passion it handleth, and feedeth the Soul of the hearer, and makes it pliable to every sense: it makes him blush, wax pale, laugh, cry, tremble for fear, mad with choler, to leap for joy, and peirceth him through with passion. In regard of all, Speech is the hand of the spirit, wherewith, as the body by his, it taketh and giveth, it asketh counsel and succour and giveth it. It is the great Intermedler and Huckster: by it we traffick, *Merx à Mercurio*, peace is handled, affairs are managed, Sciences and the good of the spirit are distributed, it is the band and cement of humane society (so that it be understood: For, saith one, A man were better to be in the company of a dog that he knoweth, then in the company of a man whose language he knoweth not, *Ut externus alieno, non sit hominis vice.*) *As a stranger unto a stranger, and not in place of a man.* To be brief, it is the instrument of whatsoever is good or ill, *Vita & mors in manibus linguæ: life and death is in the power of the tongue:* There is nothing better, nothing worse then the tongue. *Of the good & evil tongue.* The tongue of a wise man is the door of a royall Cabinet, which is no sooner opened, but incontinently a thousand diversities present themselves to the eye, every one more beautifull then other, come from the *Indies*, *Peru*, *Arabia*; So a wise man produceth and rangeth them in good order, sentences, and Aphorisms of Philosophie, similitudes, examples, histories, wise sayings drawn from all the mines, and treasuries old and new, *Qui profert de thesauro suo nova & vetera. Who brings forth of his treasury old and new things*, which serve for a rule of good manners, of policy, and all the parts both of life and of death, which being applied in their times and to good purpose, bring with it great delight, great beauty and utility, *Mala aurea in lectis argenteis, verba in tempore suo. Like golden ap-* Proverb. *ples in beds of silver, so were Words spoken in due season.* The mouth of a wicked man is a stinking & contagious pit, a slanderous tongue murdereth the honour of another, it is a sea and university of evils, worse then fetters, fire, poyson, death, hell, *Universitas iniquitis,*

*malum inquietum, venenum mortiferum, ignis incendens omnia, mors illius nequissima, utilis potiùs infernus quàm illa. The generality of iniquity, an unquiet evil, a deadly poyson, a fire consuming all, whose death is most wicked, and more unprofitable then hell it self.*

4. *The correspondency of Hearing & Speech.*

Now these two, *Hearing* and *Speech*, answer, and are accommodated the one to the other; there is great alliance betwixt them, the one is nothing without the other, as also by nature in one and the same subject, the one is not without the other. They are the two great gates, by which the soul doth traffick, and hath her intelligence. By these two, the souls are poured the one into the othe, as vessels when the mouth of the one is applyed to the entry of the other: So that if these two gates be shut, as in those that are deaf and dumb, the spirit remaineth solitary and miserable: Hearing is the gate to enter, by it the spirit receiveth all things from without, and conceiveth as the female: Speech is the gate to go forth, by it the spirit acteth & bringeth forth as the male. From the communication of these two, as from the stroke of two flints, or irons together, there comes forth the sacred fire of truth: for they rubbing and polishing the one the other, they shake off their rust, purifie and cleanse themselves, and all manner of knowledge comes to perfection. But Hearing is the first; for there can nothing come forth of the soul, but that which first entreth: and therefore he that by nature is altogether deaf, is likewise dumb. It is necessary that first the spirit be furnished with moveables, and utensills, by the sense of Hearing, to the end it may by speech distribute them; so that the good and ill of the tongue, and almost of the whole man, dependeth upon the eare. He that heares well, speaks well; and he that heares ill, speaks ill. Of the use and government of the tongue, hereafter, *Lib.*3. *Chap.*43.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of the other faculties, Imaginative, Memorative, Appetitive.*

THe phantastick or imaginative facultie, having recollected, and with-drawn the kinds and images apprehended by the senses, retaineth and reserveth them: in such sort that the objects being absent and far distant, yea, a man sleeping, and his senses being bound and shut up, it presenteth them to the spirit and thought; *Phantasmata idola, seu imagines dicuntur; The Phan-*

*Phantasmaes are called idols, images and representations of things,* and do almost work that within in the understanding, which the object doth without in the sense.

The Memorative faculty is the Guardian and Register of all the species or kinds and images, apprehended by the sense, retired, and sealed up by the imagination. 2.

The Appetitive facultie seeketh and pursueth those things, which seem good and convenient. 3.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of the intellective facultie and truely humane.*

TWo things are to be known, before we enter into this discourse, the seat or instrument of this intellective facultie, and the action. The seat of the reasonable soul, *ubi sedet pro tribunali, where he sitteth as in his throne or tribunall seat,* is the brain, and not the heart, as, before *Plato* and *Hippocrates*, it was commonly thought: for the heart having feeling and motion, is not capable of wisdome. 1. *The seat and instrument of the reasonable Soul.*

Now the brain which is farre greater in man, then in all other creatures, if it be well and in such manner made and disposed, that the reasonable soul may work and exercise its powers, it must come near unto the form of a ship, and must not be round nor too great, nor too little, although the greater be lesse vitious. It must be composed of a substance and parts subtile, delicate, and delicious, well joyned and united without separation, having four little chambers or ventricles, whereof three are in the middle, ranged in front, and collaterals between and behind them, drawing towards the hinder part of the head; the fourth is alone, wherein is framed the preparation and conjunction or the vitall spirits, afterwards to be made animal, and carried to the three ventricles before, wherein the reasonable soul doth exercise its faculties, which are three, *Understanding, Memory, Imagination,* which do not exercise their powers apart and distinctly, each one in each ventricle, as some have commonly thought; but in common all three together in all three, and in every of them, according to the manner of the outward senses, which are double, and have two ventricles, in each of which the senses do wholly work, whereby it comes to pass, that he that is wounded in one or two of these ventricles (as he that hath the

palsie) ceaseth not nevertheless to exercise all the three; though more weakly, which he could not do, if every facultie had his chamber or ventricle apart.

2. *The reasonable Soul is Organicall.*

Some have thought that the reasonable *Soul* was not organicall, that is, had no need of any corporall instrument to exercise its functions, thinking thereby the better to prove the immortality of the *Soul*. But not to enter into a labyrinth of discourse, ocular and ordinary experience disproveth this opinion, and convinceth the contrary: For it is well known that all men understand not, nor reason not alike and after one manner, but with great diversitie; yea, one and the same man may be so changed, that at one time he may reason better then at another; in one age, one estate and disposition, better then in another, such an one better in health then in sickness; and another better in sickness then in health; one the same man, at one and the same time, may be strong in judgement, and weak in imagination. From whence can these diversities and alterations proceed, but from the change and alteration of the state of the organ or instrument? From whence cometh it, that drunkenness, the bite of a mad dog, a burning feaver, a blow on the head, a fume rising from the stomack, and other accidents, pervert and turn topsie-turvey the judgement, intellectuall spirit, and all the wisdome of *Greece*, yea, constrain the *Soul* to dislodge from the bodie? These accidents being purely corporall, cannot touch nor arrive to this high spirituall faculty of the reasonable soul, but onely to the organs or instruments, which being corrupted, the *Soul* cannot well and regularly act and exercise its functions, and being violently inforced, is constrained either to absent it self or depart from the bodie. Again, that the reasonable *Soul* should have need of the service of the instruments, doth no way prejudice the immortalitie thereof: for God maketh use thereof, and accommodates his actions; and as according to the diversity of the air, region, and climate, God brings forth men verie divers in spirit and naturall sufficiency, as in *Greece* and *Italie* men more ingenious, then in *Muscovie* and *Tartarie*: So the spirit according to the diversity of the organicall dispositions, and corporall instruments discourseth better or worse. Now the instrument of the reasonable *Soul*, is the Brain, and the temperature thereof, whereof we are to speak.

3. Temperature is the mixture and proportion of the four first quali-

qualities, Hot, Cold, Dry, Moist, and it may be a fift besides, which is the harmony of these four. Now from the Temperature of the brain, proceedeth all the state and action of the reasonable Soul, but that which is the cause of great misery unto man, is, that the three faculties of the reasonable Soul, Vnderstanding, Memory, Imagination, do require and exercise themselves by contrary Temperatures. The temperature which serveth, and is proper to the understanding is dry, whereby it comes to pass that they that are stricken in years, do excell those in their understanding that are young, because in the brain as yeers increase, so moysture decreaseth. So likewise melancholick men, such as are afflicted with want, and fast much (for heavines and fasting are driers) are wise and ingenious, *Splendor siccus, animus sapientissimus, vexatio dat intellectum : Heat and drieth refines the wit affliction gives understanding* : And beasts that are of a dry temperature, as *Ants, Bees, Elephants*, are wise and ingenious, as they that are of a moyst temperature are stupid and without spirit, as swine : And the Southerne people of the world are dry, and moderate in the inward heat of the brain, by reason of their violent outward heat.

*Of the temperature of the brain, and the faculties thereof.*

*The understanding dry.*

*Old age.*

*Southerns.*

The temperature of the memory is moyst, whereof it is that infants have better memory then old men, and the morning after that humidity that is gotten by sleep in the night, is more apt for memory, which is likewise more vigorous in Northern people. I hear understand a moysture that is not wateriſh or distilling, wherein no impression made be made, but airie, viscous, fat and oily, which easily receiveth, and strongly retaineth, as it is seen in pictures wrought in oyl.

2.

*The memory moyst.*

*Infancy.*

*Septentrionals.*

The temperature of the imagination it hot, from whence it commeth that frantick men, and such as are sick of burning maladies, are excellent in that that belongs to imagination, as *Poetry, Divination*, and that it hath greatest force in young men, and of middle years (Poets and Prophets have flouriſhed in this age) and in the middle parts betwixt North and South.

3.

*The imagination hot.*

*Youth.*

*The middle region.*

By this diversity of temperatures it commeth to pass, that a man may be indifferent in all the three faculties, but not excellent; and that he that is excellent in any one of the three, is but weak in the rest : that the temperatures of the memory and understanding are very different and contrary, it is cleer, as dry and moyst; as for the imagination, it seemeth not to be so contrary from the others, because heat is not incompatible with drought and moisture :

4.

*A comparison of the temperatures.*

moysture: and yet notwithstanding experience sheweth, that they that excell in imagination, are sick in understanding and memory, and held for fools and mad men; but the reason thereof is, because the great heat that serveth the imagination, consumeth both the moysture which serveth the memory, and the subtility of the spirits and figures which should be in that drineſs, which serveth the understanding, and so it is contrary, and destroyeth the other two.

5. *Three only temperatures.* By that which hath been spoken it appeareth, that there are but three principall temperatures, which serve and cause the reasonable Soul to work, and distinguish the spirits, that is to say, Heat, Drineſs, Moisture: Cold, is not active, nor serveth to an purpose, but to hinder all the motions and functions of the Soul; and when we finde in some authors, that Cold serveth the understanding, and that they that have cold brains, as Melancholick men and the Southerne, are wise and ingenious; there Cold is taken, not simply, but for a great moderation of heat: for there is nothing more contrary to the understanding, and to wisdome, then great heat, which contrariwise serveth the imagination. According to the three temperatures, there are three faculties of the reasonable Soul; but as the temperatures, so the faculties receive divers degrees, subdivisions, and distinctions.

6. *Subdivision of the faculties.* There are three principall offices and differences of understanding, to Infer, to Distinguish, to Chase: these Sciences which appertain to the understanding, are School Divinity, the Theorick of Physick, Logick, Philosophy naturall and morall. There are three kinds of differences of memory; easily to receive and lose the figures; easily to receive, and hardly to lose; hardly to receive, and easily to lose. The Sciences of the memory are Grammer, the Theorick of the Law, Positive Divinity, Cosmography, Arithmetick. Of the imagination there are many differences, and a far greater number then either of the memory or understanding: to it do properly appertain, Inventions, Merry-conceits, and Iests, Tricks of subtility, Fictions and Lies, Figures and comparisons, Neatneſs, Elegancie, Gentility: because to it appertain, Poetry, Eloquence, Musick, and generally whatsoever consisteth in Figure, Correspondency, Harmony, and Proportion.

7. *The propriety of the faculties and their order.* Hereby it appeareth that the vivacity, subtility, promptitude and that which the common sort call wit, belongs to a hot imagination; solidity, maturity, varity, to a drie understanding. The imagination

tion is active and stirring, it is it that undertaketh all, and sets all the rest a work: the understanding is dull and cloudy: the memory is purely passive, and see how; The imagination first gathereth the kindes and figures of things both present, by the service of the five senses, and absent by the benefit of the common sense: afterwards it presenteth them, if it will, to the understanding, which considereth of them, examineth, ruminateth, and judgeth; afterwards it putteth them to the safe custody of the memory, as a Scrivener to his book, to the end he may again, if need shall require, draw them forth (which men commonly call *Reminiscentia*, Remembrance) or else, if it will, it commits them to the memory before it presents them to the understanding: for to recollect, represent to the understanding, commit unto memory, and to draw them forth again, are all works of the imagination; so that to it are referred the common Sense, the Fantasie, the Remembrance, and they are not powers separated from it, as some would have it, to the end they may make more then three faculties of the reasonable Soul.

8. *Their comparison in dignity.*

The common sort of people, who never judg aright, do more esteem of memory, and delight more in it, then in the other two, because they have much use of counting, and it makes greater shew and stir in the world, and they think, that to have a good memory is to be wise; esteeming more of Science, then of Wisdome; but yet of the three is is the least, being such as may be even in fools themselves: for very seldome is an excellent memory, joyned with understanding and wisdome, because their temperatures are contrary. From this error of the common people, comes that ill course, which every where we see, in the instruction of our youth, who are always taught to learn by heart, (so they term it) that which they read in their books, to the end they may afterwards be able to repeat it; and so they fill and charge the memory with the good of another, and take no care to awaken and direct the understanding, and to forme the judgment, whereby he may be made able to make use of his own proper good, and his naturall faculties, which may make him wise and apt to all things: so that we see that the greatest scholars that have all *Aristotle* and *Cicero* in their heads, are the veriest sots, and most unskilfull in publike affaires, and the world is governed by those that know nothing. It is the opinion of all the wisest, that the understanding is the first, the most excellent and principall peece of harness: If that speed well, all goes well,

*See of this lib. 3. cap. 14.*

well, and a man is wise; and contrariwise, if that miscarry, all goes a cross. In the second place is the imagination: the memory is the last.

9. *An Image of the three faculties of the soul.*

All these differences, it may be, will be better understood by this similitude, which is a picture or imitation of the reasonable soul. In every Court of justice, there are three orders or degrees; the highest are the Judges, with whom there is little stir, but great action, for without the moving or stirring of themselves, they judg, decide, order, determine of all things: this is the image of judgment, the highest part of the soul. The second are the advocates and Proctors, in whom there is great stir and much adoe, without action, for it lies not in their power to dispatch or order any thing, only they hatch and prepare the business: this is the picture of the imagination an undertaking unquiet faculty which never resteth, no not in the profoundest sleep; and it makes a noise in the brain, like a pot that seetheth, but never setleth. The third and last degree is the Scribe or Register of the Court, with whom there is no stir nor action, but pure passion, as the Gardian or Custos of all things: and this representeth the memory.

10. *The action of the reasonable Soul.*

The action of the reasonable Soul, is the knowledg and understanding of all things: The spirit of man is capable of understanding all things, visible, invisible, universall, particular, sensible, insensible, *Intellectus est omnia*: *Understanding is all*: but it self either understands it not at all, as some are of opinion (witness so great and almost infinite opinions thereof, as we have seen before by those doubts and objections that have always crosed it) or very darkly, imperfectly, and indirectly, by reflexion of the knowledg of things upon themselves, by which it perceiveth and knoweth that it understandeth, and hath power and faculty to understand: this is the manner whereby the spirit knows it self. The first soveraign Spirit, God, doth first know himself, and afterwards in himself all things; the latter spirit, Man, quite contrary, all other things rather then himself, and is in them as the eye in a glass: how then should it act or work in it self without mean, and by a straight line?

11. *The mean whereby it worketh.*

But the question is concerning the mean whereby it knoweth and understandeth things. The common received opinion that came from *Aristotle* himself is, that the *Spirit* knoweth and understandeth by the help and service of the Senses, that it is of it self as a white empty paper, that nothing commeth to the understanding,

ding, which doth not first pass the senses : *Nil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu. There is nothing in the understanding, which is not first in the sense.* But this opinion is false : first because (as all the wisest have affirmed, and hath been before touched) the seeds of all sciences and virtues are naturally dispersed and insinuated into our spirits, so that they may be rich and merry with their own ; and though they want that tillage that is fit, yet then they sufficiently abound. Besides, it is injurious both to God and nature : for this were to make the state of the reasonable Soul worse, then that of other things, then that of the vegetative and sensitive, which of themselves are wise enough to exercise their functions, as hath been said ; for beasts without the discipline of the senses know many things, the universals by the particulars, by the sight of one man they know all men, and are taught to avoid the danger of things hurtfull, and to seek and to follow after that which is fit for them and their little ones. And it were a thing shamefull and absurd, that this so high and so divine a faculty should begg its good of things so vile and corruptible as the senses, which do apprehend onely the simple accidents, and not the forms, natures, essence of things, much less things universall, the secrets of Nature, and all things insensible. Again, if the Soul were made wise, by the aid of the senses, it would follow, that they that have their senses most perfect and quick, should be most witty, most wise ; whereas many times we see the clean contrary, that their spirits are more dull, and more unapt, and that many have of purpose deprived themselves of the use of some of them, to the end the soul might better, and more freely execute its own affaires. And if any man shall object that the soul being wise by nature, and without the help of the senses, all men must necessarily be wise, and alwayes understand and reason alike : which being so, how commeth it about that there are so many dull pates in the world, and that they that understand, exercise the functions more weakly at one time then at another the vegetative soul far more strongly in youth, the reasonable soul more weakly then in old age, and in a certain state of health or sickness, then at another time ? I may answer, that the argument is not good : for as touching the first, that is, That all men must be wise : I say that the faculty and virtue of understanding is not given alike unto all, but with great inequality, and therefore it is a saying, as ancient as honourable, even of the wisest ; that the acting understanding was given but to few;

and

and this inequality proveth that Science comes not of ſenſe: for as it hath been ſaid they that excell others in their ſenſes, come ſhort of others in their underſtanding and Science. Touching the ſecond; The reaſon why a man doth not exerciſe his functions alwayes after one manner, is becauſe the inſtruments whereby the Soul muſt neceſſarily work, cannot alwayes be diſpoſed as they ſhould; and if they be for ſome ſpeciall kind of faculties or functions, yet not for others. The temperature of the brain, by which the Soul worketh, is divers and changeable; being hot and moiſt, in youth, it is good for the vegetative, naught for the reaſonable; and contrarily, being cold and dry, in old age, it is good for the reaſonable, ill for the vegetative. The brain by a hot burning malady being heated and purified, is more fit for invention and divination, unfit for maturity and ſoundneſs of judgement and wiſdome. By that which hath been ſpoken let no man think, that I affirm that the ſpirit hath no ſervice from the ſenſes, which I confeſs to be great, eſpecially in the beginning in the diſcovery and invention of things: but I ſay in the defence of the honour of the ſpirit, that it is falſe that it dependeth upon the ſenſes, and that we cannot know any thing, underſtand, reaſon, diſcourſe, without the ſenſe: for contrariwiſe all knowledg comes from it, and the ſenſes can do nothing without it.

12. The ſpirit in this underſtanding faculty proceedeth diverſly, and by order: It underſtandeth at the firſt inſtant, ſimply and directly a Lion to be a Lion, afterwards by conſequents that he is ſtrong: for ſeeing the effects of his ſtrength, it concludeth that he is ſtrong. By diviſion or negative, it underſtandeth a Hare to be fearfull; for ſeeing it flie and hide it ſelf, it concludeth that a Hare is not ſtrong, becauſe fearfull. It knoweth ſome by ſimilitude, others by a collection of many things together.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities, reaſons, invention, verity thereof.*

THis humane Spirit, and *Oeconomy* of this great and high intellectuall part of the ſoul, is a depth of obſcurity, full of creeks and hidden corners, a confuſed and involved labyrinth, and bottomleſs pit, conſiſting of many parts, faculties, actions, divers motions, having many names, doubts and difficulties.

1. The firſt office thereof is ſimply to receive and apprehend the images

images and kinds of things, which is a kind of passion and impression of the Soul, occasioned by the objects and the presence of them; this is imagination and apprehension.

1.

The force and power thereof, to feed, to handle, to stirre, to concoct, to digest, the things received by the imagination: this is reason, λόγος.

2.

The action and office, or exercise of this force and power, which is to assemble, conjoyn, separate, divide the things received, and to add likewise others: this is discourse, reasoning, λόγισμος, διανοία, *quasi* διανέν.

3.

The subtile facility, and chearfull readiness to do all these things, and to penetrate into them, is called Spirit, *Ingenium*; and therefore to be ingenious, sharp, subtile, piercing, is all one.

4.

The repetition and action of ruminating, reconcocting, trying by the whetstone of reason, and rewarding of it, to frame a resolution more solid: this is judgement.

5.

The effect in the end of the understanding: this is knowledge, intelligence, resolution.

6.

The action that followeth this knowledge and resolution, which is to extend it self, to put forward, and to advance the thing known: this is will. *Intellectus extensus & promotus.*

7.

Wherefore all these things, *Understanding, Imagination, Reason, Discourse, Spirit, Judgement, Intelligence, Will*, are one and the same essence, but all divers in force, virtue and action: for a man may be excellent in one of them, and weak in another: and many times he that excelleth in Spirit and subtilty, may be weak in judgement and solidity.

8.

I let no man to sing, and set forth the praises and greatness of the spirit of man, the capacity, vivacity, quickness thereof: let it be called the image of the living God, a taste of the immortall substance, a stream of the Divinity, a celestiall ray, whereunto God hath given reason, as an animated stern to move it by rule and measure, and that it is an instrument of a compleat harmony; that by it there is a kind of kindred betwixt God and man: and that he might often remember him, he hath turned the root towards the the heavens, to the end he should alwayes look towards the place of his nativity: to be brief, that there is nothing great upon the earth but man, nothing great in man but his spirit; if a man ascend to it, he ascendeth above the heavens. These are all pleasing and plausible words, whereof the Schools do ring.

2. *The generall description and commendation of the Spirit.*

But

3. *The dispraise.* But I desire, that after all this we come to sound and to study how to know this spirit: for we shall find after all this, that it is both to it self and to another a dangerous instrument, a ferret that is to be feared, a little trouble-feast, a tedious and importunate parasite, and which, as a juggler and player at fast and loose, under the shadow of some gentle motion, subtile and smiling, forgeth, inventeth, and causeth all the mischiefs in the world: and the truth is, without it there are none.

4. *Diversities of distinctions of the spirit. See hereof more chap. 39.* There is farre greater diversity of spirits then of bodies, so is there likewise a larger field to enter into, more parts and more forms or fashions to be spoken of: we may make three classes or forms, whereof each one hath many degrees: The first which is the lowest, are those weak, base and almost brutish spirits, near neighbours to beasts themselves, whether by reason of the first temper, that is to say, of the seed and temperature of the brain, either too cold, or too moist, as amongst other creatures, fishes are the lowest; or by reason that they have not been, in some sort removed, and reviewed but suffered to rust, and grow dull and stupid. Of these we make no great account, as being unfit to be ordered and setled into any certain and constant society, because both for their own particular they cannot possibly endure it, and it were necessary they should alwayes be under the tuition of another, this is the common and base people, *qui vigilans stertit; mortua cui vita est; prope jam vivo atque videnti; Who waking snorteth, whose life is dead, or rather almost alive, and seeing,* which understandeth not, judgeth not it self. The second which is the highest, are those great and high spirits, rather devils then ordinary men, spirits well born, strong and vigorous. Of these kind of people, there was never age yet could tell how to build a common weal. The third which is the middle, are all those indifferent spirits, whereof there are infinite degrees: of these almost is the whole world composed. Of this distinction and others, hereafter more at large. But we are to touch more particularly the conditions and nature of this spirit, as hard to be known, as a countenance to be counterfeited to the life, which is alwayes in motion.

5. *The particular description. Agent perpetuall.* First therefore it is a perpetuall agent, for the spirit cannot be without action, but rather then it will, it forgeth false and phantasticall subjects, in earnest deceiving it self, even to its own discredit. As idle and unmanured grounds, if they be fat and fertile, abound with a thousand kinds of wild and unprofitable hearbs, untill

until they be sowed with other seeds, and women alone without the company of men, bring forth sometimes great abundance of unformed, indigested lumps of flesh: so the *Spirit*, if it be not busied about some certain object, it runs riot into a world of imaginations, and there is no folly nor vanity that it produceth not, and if it have not a settled limit, it wandreth and loseth it self. For, to be every where, is to be no where. Motion and agitation is the true life and grace of the *Spirit*; but yet it must proceed from elsewhere, then from it self. If it be solitary, and wanteth a subject to work on, it creepeth along, and languisheth; but yet it must not be enforced, For too great a contention and intention of the *Spirit* overbent, and strained, deceiveth and troubleth the *Spirit*.

It is likewise universall, it meddleth and mingleth it self with all, it hath no limitted subject or jurisdiction. There is not any thing wherewith it playeth not his part, as well to vain subjects and of no account, as high and weighty; as well to those we can understand, as those we understand not: For to know that we cannot understand or pierce into the marrow or pith of a thing, but that we must stick in the bone & bark thereof, is an excellent signe of judgment; for science, yea truth it self, may lodge near us without judgment and judgement without them, yea, to know our own ignorance, is a fair testimony of judgement. 6. *Universall.*

Thirdly, it is prompt and speedy, running in a moment from the one end of the world to the other, without stay or rest stirring it, self, and penetrating through every thing; *Nobilis & inquieta sudden.* *mens homini data est, nunquam se tenet; spargitur vaga, quietis impatiens novitate rerum lætissima. Non mirum ex illo cœlesti spiritu descendit, cœlestium autem natura semper in motu est: A noble and unquiet mind is given unto man, who never with-holdeth her motion, inconstant, every where dispersed, impatient of rest, delighted most with novelties: No marvell if she descend of celestiall spirit; for that the nature of celestiall things, is to be in perpetuall motion.* This great speed and quickness this agility, this twinkling of the eie, as it is admirable and one of the greatest wonders that are in the spirit, so it is a thing very dangerous, a great disposition and propension unto folly and madness, as presently you shall hear. 7. *Prompt and*

By reason of these three conditions of the spirit, that is, a perpetuall agent without repose, universall promp, and sudden, it hath been accounted immortall, and to have in it self some mark and sparkle of Divinity.

8. *The action of the Spirit.* The action of the spirit is alwayes to search, ferret, contrive without intermission, like one famished for want of knowledge, to enquire and seek, and therefore *Homer* calls men ἀλητὰς. There is no end of our inquisitions: the pursuits of the spirit of man are without limits, without form: the food thereof is double ambiguity; it is a perpetuall motion without rest, without bound. The world is a school of inquisition; agitation and hunting is its proper dish: to take, or to fail of the prey, is another thing.

9. *It worketh rashly.* But it worketh and pursueth its enterprises, rashly, and irregularly, without order and without measure: it is a wandring instrument, moveable, diversly turning; it is an instrument of lead and of wax, it boweth and straitneth, applieth it self to all more supple and facil then the water, the air, *Flexibilis, omni humore obsequentior: & ut spiritus, qui omni materiâ facilior & tenuior: It is flexible, and more yeilding to every humour, and as the spirit, which is more facil and easie to every matter or substance:* It is the shoe of *Theramenes*, fit for all.

10. *Reason hath divers faces.* The cunning is to find where it is; for it goes alwayes athwart, and crosse, as well with a lie as with a truth: it sporteth it self and findeth a seeming reason for every thing; for it maketh that which is impious, unjust, abominable in one place; piety, justice, and honour in another: neither can we name any law, or custome, or condition, that is, either generally received of all, or rejected; the marriage of those that are near of bloud, the murder of infants, parents, is condemned in one place, lawfull in another. *Plato* refused an embroydered and perfumed robe offered him by *Dionysius*, saying, That he was a man, and therefore would not adorn himself like a woman. *Aristippus* accepted of that robe, saying, The outward acoutrement cannot corrupt a chaste mind. *Diogenes* washing his coleworts, and seing *Aristippus* passe by, answered him, If thou kneweſt how to live with coleworts, thou wouldst never follow the court of a Tyrant. *Aristippus* answered him, if thou kneweſt how to live with Kings, thou wouldst never wash coleworts. One perswaded *Solon* to cease from the bewailing the death of his sons, because his tears did neither profit nor help them. Yea, therefore (saith he) are my tears just, and I have reason to weep. The wife of *Socrates* redoubled her grief, because the Judges put her husband to death unjustly: What, saith he, wouldst thou rather I were justly condemned? There is no good, saith a wiseman, but that, to the loss whereof a man is alwayes prepared, *In æquo enim est dolor amissæ*

*missæ rei, & timor amittendæ: A like troublesome is the grief of a thing already lost, and the fear lest it should be lost.* Quite contrary, saith another, we embrace and lock up that good a great deal the more carefully, which we see less sure, and alwayes fear will be taken from us. A Cynick Philosopher demanded of *Antigonus* the King, a dram of silver; That, saith he, is no gift fit for a King. Why then give me a Talent, saith the Philosopher. And that, saith the King is no gift for a Cynick. One said of a King of *Sparta* that was gentle and debonair, He is a good man even to the wicked. How should he be good unto the wicked, saith another, if he be not wicked with the wicked? So that we see that the reason of man hath many visages: it is a two-edged sword, a staff with two pikes. *Ognime daglia ha il suo riverso:* there is no reason but hath a contrary reason, saith the soundest and surest Philosopher.

Now this volubility and flexibility proceedeth from many causes; from the perpetual alteration and motion of the body, which is never twice in a mans life in one and the same estate; from the objects which are infinite, the air it self, and the serenity of the heaven, 11.

*Tales sunt hominum mentes quali pater ipse*
*Jupiter auctiferas lustravit lampade terras:*
*Mens minds on earth, the self-same course do run,*
*Being fair or foul as is th' Olympick Sun.*

and all outward things: inwardly from those shakings and tremlings which the Soul gives unto it self by the agitation, and stirreth up by the passions thereof: insomuch that it beholdeth things with divers countenances; for whatsoever is in the world hath divers lustres, divers considerations. *Epictetus* said, it was a pot with two hands. He might better have said with many. Semel.

The reason hereof is, because it entangleth it self in its own work, like the Silk-worm; for as it thinketh to note from far, I know not what appearance of light, and imaginary truth, and flies unto it; there are many difficulties that crosse the way, new sents that inebriate and bring it forth of the way. 12. *The reason of this entanglement.*

The end at which it aimeth is two-fold, the one more common and naturall, which is Truth, which it searcheth and pursueth; for there is no desire more naturall then to know the truth: we assay all the means we can to attain unto it, but in the end all our endeavours come short; for truth is not an ordinary booty, or thing that will suffer it self to be gotten and handled, much lesse to be 13. *The end is verity, which it canneither attain nor find.*

*Reade before Chap. 9.*

possessed by any humane Spirit. It lodgeth within the bosome of God, that is her chamber, her retiring place. Man knoweth not, understandeth not any thing aright, in purity and in truth as he ought: appearances do alwayes compass him on every side, which are as well in those things that are false, as true. We are born to search the truth, but to possesse it, belongeth to a higher and greater power. Truth is not his that thrusts himself into it, but his that runs the faireſt course towards the mark. When it falls out that he hits upon a truth, it is by chance and hazzard; he knows not how to hold it, to possesse it, to distinguish it from a lie. Errours are received into our soul, by the self-same way and conduit that the truth is: the spirit hath no means either to distinguish or to choose: and as wel may he play the sot, that tels a truth, as a lie. The means that it useth for the discovery of truth, are reason and experience, both of them very weak, uncertain, divers, wavering. The greatest argument of truth, is the generall consent of the word. Now the number of fools doth far exceed the number of the wise, and therefore how should that generall consent be agreed upon, but by corruption, and an applause given without judgement and knowledge of the cause, and by the imitation of some one that first began the dance.

14. *The second end invention.*

The other end less naturall, but more ambitious, is Invention, unto which it tendeth as to the highest point of honour, to the end it may raise it self, and prevail the more: this is that which is in so high account, that it seemeth to be an Image of the Divinity. From the sufficiency of this invention, have proceeded all those works, which have ravished the whole world with admiration; which if they be such as are for the publick benefit, they have deified their Authours. Those works that shew rather fineness of wit, then bring profit with them, are painting, carving architecture, the art perspective; as the Vine of *Zeuxis* the *Venus* of *Apelles*, the Image of *Memnon*, the Horse of *Airain*, the wodden Pigeon of *Architas*, the Crow of *Myron*, the Flie and Eagle of *Montroyall*, the Sphear of *Sapor* King of the Persians, and that of *Archimedes*, with his other engins. Now Art and Invention seem not onely to imitate Nature, but to excell it, and that not onely in the *Individuum* or particular (for there is not any body either of man or beast so universally well made, as by art may be shewed) but also many things are done by art, which are not done by nature, I mean besides those compositions and mixtures, which are the true diet, & proper

*The praise of Invention.*

subject of Art, those distillations of waters and oyls, made of simples, which Nature framed not. But in all this there is no such cause of admiration as we think; and to speak properly and truly, there is no invention but that which God revealeth: for such as we account and call so, are but observations of naturall things, arguments and conclusions drawn from them, as Painting and the Art Optick from shadows, Sun-dials from the shadows of trees, the graving of Seals from precious stones.

15. *The Spirit very dangerous.*

By all this that hath before been spoken, it is easie to see how rash and dangerous the spirit of man is, especially if it be quick and vigorous: for being so industrious, so free and universall, making its motions so irregularly, using its liberty so boldly in all things, not tying it self to any thing; it easily shaketh the common opinions, and all those rules whereby it should be bridled and restrained as an unjust tyranny: it will undertake to examine all things, to judge the greatest part of things plausibly received into the world, to be ridiculous and absurd, and finding for all an appearance of reason, will defend it self against all, whereby it is to be feared that it wandreth out of the way, and loseth it self: and we cannot but see, that they that have any extraordinary vivacity and rare excellency (as they that are in the highest roof of that middle *classis* before spoken of) are, for the most part, lawless both in opinions and manners. There are very few of whose guide and conduct a man may trust, and in the libertie of whose judgements a man may wade without temerity, beyond the common opinion. It is a miracle to find a great and lively spirit, well ruled and governed: it is a dangerous sword which a man knows not well how to guide; for from whence come all those disorders, revolts, heresies and troubles in the world, but from this? *Magni errores non nisi ex magnis ingeniis: nihil sapientiæ odiosius acumine nimio. Great errours proceed not but from great wits: nothing is more prejudiciall to wisdome, then too much sharpness of wit.* Doubtless that man lives a better time, and a longer life, is more happy and farre more fit for the government of a Common-wealth, saith *Thucidides*, that hath an indifferent spirit, or somewhat beneath a mediocrity, then he that hath a spirit so elevated and transcendent, that it serves not for any thing but the torment of himself and others. From the firmest friendships do spring the greatest enmities, and from the soundest health the deadliest maladies: and even so, from the rarest and quickest agitation of our souls the most desperate resolutions

and disorderly frensies. Wisdome and folly are near neighbours, there is but a half turn betwixt the one and the other; which we may easily see in the actions of mad men. Philosophie teacheth, that Melancholy is proper to them both. Whereof is framed the finest folly, but of the finest wit. And therefore, saith *Aristotle*, there is no great spirit without some mixture of folly. And *Plato* telleth us, that in vain a temperate and sound spirit knocketh at the door of Poetrie. And in this sense it is, that the wisest and best Poets do love sometimes to play the fool, and to leap out of the hinges. *Insanire jucundum est, dulce desipere in loco: non potest grande & sublime quidquam nisi mota mens, & quamdiu apud se est. It is a delightfull thing sometimes to be mad, a sweet matter in some cases to be foolish: The mind unless it be altogether imployed, can do no great matter, or attempt any thing of moment as long as it is wholly collected within it self.*

16. *It must be bridled and why.*

And this is the cause why man hath good reason to keep it within narrow bounds, to bridle and bind it with Religions, Laws, Customes, Sciences, Precepts, Threatnings, Promises mortall and immortall, which notwithstanding yet we see, that by a lawless kind of liberty it freeth it self, and escapeth all these, so unruly is it by nature, so fierce, so opinative: and therefore it is to be led by Art, since by force it cannot. *Seneca.* *Naturâ contumax est animus humanus, in contrarium atque arduum nitens, sequiturque facilius quàm ducitur, ut generosi & nobiles qui melius facili fræno reguntur. The mind of man is naturally stubborn, alwayes inclining to difficult and contrary things, and doth easier follow then is led by force, like unto generous horses, that are better governed with an easie bridle, then a cutting bit.* It is a surer way gently to tut our it, and to lay it asleep, then to suffer it to wander at its own pleasure: for if it be not well and orderly governed, (as they of the highest *classis* which before we spake of) or weak, and soft and plain (as those of the lower ranck) it will lose it self in the liberty of its own judgement: and therefore it is necessary that it be by some means or other held back, as having more need of lead then wings, of a bridle then a spur, which the great Lawyers and Founders of States did especially regard, as well knowing that people of an indifferent spirit, lived in more quiet and content, then the over-quick and ingenious. There have been more troubles and seditions in ten years in the onely citie of *Florence*, then in five hundred years in the countries of the *Helvetians* & the *Retians*. And to say the truth, men of a common sufficiency

ficiency are most honest, better citizens, more pliant and willing to submit themselves to the yoke of the laws, their superiours, reason it self, then those quick and clear-sighted men, that cannot keep themselves with their own skins. The finest wits are not the wisest men.

17. *The defect of the spirit.* The *Spirit* hath its maladies, defects, cares or refuse, as well as the body and much more, more dangerous, and more incurable: but that we may the better know them, we must distinguish them: some are accidentall, and which come from else-where, and those arise from three causes: the disposition of the body, for it is manifest, that the bodily maladie which after the temperature thereof, doth likewise alter the spirit & judgement; or from the ill composition of the substance of the brain, and organs of the reasonable *Soul*, whether it be by reason of their first formation, as in those that have their heads ill made, either too round, or too long, or too little, or by accident of some blow or wound. The second is the universal contagion of vulgar and erroneous opinions in the world, wherewith the *Spirit* being preoccupated, tainted, and overcome, or which is worse, made drunken, and manacled with certain phantasticall opinions, it ever afterwards followeth and judgeth according to them, without regard either of further enquiry, or recoiling back: from which dangerous deluge all spirits have not force and strength to defend themselves.

*Accidentall proceeding from three causes.*

1. *The body.*

2. *The world.*

3. *The passions.* The third much more near, is the malady and corruption of the will, and the force of the passions, this is a world turned topsie turvy: the will is made to follow the understanding as a guide and lamp unto it; but being corrupted and seized on by the force of the passions (or rather by the fall of our first father *Adam*) doth likewise perhaps corrupt the understanding, and so from hence come the greatest part of our erroneous judgements: Envie, Malice, Hatred, Love, Fear, make us to respect, to judge, to take things others then they are, and quite otherwise then we ought, from whence cometh that common cry, Judge without passion. From hence it is that the beautifull and generous actions of another man are obscured by vile and base mis-constructions, that vain & wicked causes and occasions are feigned. This is a great vice and a proof of a malignant nature and sick judgement, in which there is neither great subtilty nor sufficiency, but malice enough. This proceedeth either from the envie they bear to the glory of another man, or because they judge of others according to themselves, or because they have their taste altered, and their sight so troubled, that they cannot

discern the clear splendour of virtue in its native purity; From this self-same cause and source it cometh, that we make the virtues and vices of another man to prevail so much, and extend them further then we ought, that from particularities we draw consequents and generall conclusions: if he be a friend, all sits well about him, his vices shall be virtues; if he be an enemy, or of a contrary faction, there is nothing good in him: insomuch that we shame our own judgement, to smooth up our own passions. But this rests not here, but goeth yet further; for the greatest part of those impieties, heresies, errours in our faith and religion, if we look well into it, is sprung from our wicked and corrupt wils, from a violent and voluptuous passion, which afterwards draweth unto it the understanding it self, *Sedit populus manducare & bibere, &c. quod vult non quod est, credit, qui cupit errare: The people sitteth down to eat and drink, &c. He that hath a meaning to go astray believes every thing as he would have it, not as it is indeed.* In such sort that what was done in the beginning with some scruple and doubt, hath been afterwards held and maintained for a verity, and revelation from heaven: that which was onely in the sensuality, hath taken place in the highest part of the understanding: that which was nothing else but a passion and a pleasure, hath been made a religious matter and an article of faith: so strong and dangerous is the contagion of the faculties of the Soul amongst themselves. These are the three outward causes of the faults and mis-carriages of the *Spirit*, judgement and understanding of man; The body especially the head, sick, or wounded, or ill-fashioned; The world with the anticipated opinions and suppositions thereof; The ill estate of the other faculties of the reasonable Soul, which are all inferiour unto it. The first are pitifull, and some of them to be cured, some not: the second are excusable and pardonable: the third are accusable and punishable, for suffering such a disorder so near them as this is; those that should obey the Law, to take upon them to give the Law.

*Exod.* 31.2. *Paral.* 15.3. *Reg.* 15. *August. lib.* 2. *De civitate Dei.*

18. *Naturall.* There are other defects of the *Spirit*, which are more naturall unto it, and in it. The greatest and the root of all the rest is pride and presumption (the first and originall fault of all the world, the plague of all spirits, and the cause of all evils) by which a man is onely content with himself, will not give place to another, disdaineth his counsels, reposeth himself in his own opinions, takes upon him to judge and condemn others, yea even that which he understands not. It is truly said, that the best and happiest distribution that God ever made

made, is of judgement, becauſe every man is content with his own, and thinks he hath enough. Now this maladie proceedeth from the ignorance of our ſelves. We never underſtand ſufficiently and truly the weakneſs of our ſpirit: but the greateſt diſeaſe of the ſpirit is ignorance not of Arts and Sciences, and what is included in the writing of others but of it ſelf, for which cauſe this firſt book hath been written.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of Memory.*

MEmory is many times taken (by the vulgar ſort) for the ſenſe and underſtanding, but not ſo truly and properly: for both by reaſon (as hath been ſaid) and by experience, the excellencie of the one is ordinarily accompanied with the weakneſs of the other; and to ſay the truth, it is a faculty very profitable for the world, but it comes far ſhort of the underſtanding, and of all the parts of the *Soul*, is the more delicate, and moſt frail. The excellency thereof is not very requiſite, but to three ſorts of people; Merchants or men of Trade, great talkers, (for the ſtore-houſe of the memorie it more full and furniſhed, then that of invention; for he that wants it, comes ſhort, and muſt be fain to frame his ſpeech out of the forge of his own invention) and liers, *mendacem oportet eſſe memorem: it behoveth a lier to have a good memory*. From the want of memorie proceed theſe commodities: to lie ſeldome, to talk little, to forget offences. An indifferent memory ſufficeth for all.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of the Imagination and opinion.*

THe Imagination is a thing very ſtrong and powerfull it is it that makes all the ſtir, all the clatter; yea the perturbation of the world proceeds from it (as we have ſaid before, it is either the one- 1.
ly, or at leaſt the moſt active and ſtirring facultie of the Soul.) The effects thereof are marvellous and ſtrange: it worketh not *The effects of the Imagination marvellous.*
onely in its own proper body and Soul, but in that of another man, yea it produceth contrary effects: it makes a man bluſh, wax pale, tremble, dote, to waver; theſe are the leaſt and the beſt: it takes away the power and uſe of the engendring parts, yea, when there is moſt need of them, & is the cauſe why men are more

ſharp

ſharp and auſtere, not onely towards themſelves, but others; witneſs thoſe ties and bands, whereof the world is full, which are for the moſt part impreſſions of the apprehenſion, and of fear. And contrariwiſe, without endeavour, without object, and even in ſleep it ſatisfieth the amorous deſires, yea changeth the ſex, witneſs *Lucius Coſſitius*, whom *Pliny* affirmeth to have ſeen to be changed from a woman to a man, atthe day of his marriage; and divers the like: it marketh ſometimes ignominiouſly, yea it killeth, and makes abortive the fruit within the womb; it taketh away a mans ſpeech, and gives it to him that never had it, as to the ſon of *Cræſus*: it taketh a way motion, ſenſe, reſpiration. Thus we ſee how it worketh in the body. Touching the Soul it makes a man to loſe his underſtanding, his knowledg, judgment; it turns him fool and mad man, witneſs *Gallus Vibius*, who having over-bent his ſpirits in comprehending the eſſence and motions of folly; ſo diſlodged and diſ-joyned his own judgment, that he could never ſettle it again: it inſpireth a man with the fore-knowledg of things ſecret, and to come, ond cauſeth thoſe inſpirations, predictions, and marvellous inventions, yea it raviſheth with ecſtaſies: it killeth not ſeemingly but in good earneſt, witneſs that man, whoſe eyes being covered to receive his death, and uncovered again, to the end he might read his pardon, was found ſtark dead upon the ſcaffold. To be brief, from hence ſpring the greateſt part of thoſe things, which the common ſort of people call miracles viſions, enchantments. It is not always the Devill, or a familiar ſpirit, as now adays the ignorant people think, when they cannot finde the reaſon of that they ſee: nor always the ſpirit of God (for thoſe ſupernaturall motions we ſpeak not of here) but for the moſt part it is the effect of the imagination, or long of the agent, who faith and doth ſuch things; or of the patient and ſpectator, who thinks he ſeeth that he ſeeth not. It is an excellent thing, and neceſſary in ſuch a caſe, to know wiſely how to diſcern the reaſon thereof, whether it be naturall, or ſupernaturall, falſe or true, *Diſcretio ſpirituum, A diſcerning of ſpirits.* And not to precipitate our judgments, as the moſt part of the common people do by the want thereof.

In this part and faculty of the ſoul doth opinion lodg, which is a vain, light, crude, and imperfect judgment of things, draw from the outward ſenſes, and common report, ſetling and holding it ſelf to be good in the imagination, and never arriving to the underſtanding, there to be examined, ſifted, and laboured; and to be

made

made reason which is a true, perfect and solid judgment of things: and therefore it is uncertain, inconstant, fleeting, deceitfull, a very ill and dangerous guide, which makes head against reason, whereof it is a shadow and image, though vain and untrue. It is the mother of all mischiefs, confusions, disorders: from it springs all passion all troubles. It is the guid of fools, sots', the vulgar sort; as reason, of the wise and dexterious.

3. *The world is led by opinion.*

It is not the truth and nature of things, which doth thus stir and molest our souls, it is opinion, according to that ancient saying; Men are tormented by the opinions that they have of things, not by the things themselves. *Opinione sæpius quam re laboramus; plura sunt quæ nos tenent, quam quæ premunt. We are more troubled with the opinion of things, then with the things themselves; there are more things that hold us then which press or urge us.* The verity and *Essence* of things entreth not into us, nor lodgeth neer us of it self, by its own proper strength and authority: for were it so, all things should be received of all, all alik and after the same fashion; all should be of like credit, and truth it self, which is never but one and uniform, should be embraced thorowout the whole world. Now for asmuch as there is so great a variety, yea contrariety of opinions in the world, and there is not any thing concerning which all do generally accord, no not the wisest and best born and bred; it giveth us to understand, that things enter into us by composition, yielding themselves to our mercy and devotion, lodging themselves neer unto us, according to our pleasure, and humour, and temper of our souls. That which I believe, I cannot make my companion believe; but, which is more, what do I firmly believe to day, I cannot assure my self that I shall believe to morrow: yea it is certain, that at another time I shall judg quiet otherwise. Doubtless every thing taketh in us such place, such a taste, such a colour, as we think best to give unto it, and such as the inward constitution of the soul is, *Omnia munda mundis; immunda, immundis: All things are clean to the pure and clean; as also unclean, to the impure and unclean.* As our apparell and accoutrements do as well warm us, not by reason of their heat, but our own, which they preserve, as likewise nourish the coldness of the ice and snow; we do first warm them with our heat, and they in recompence thereof preserve our heat.

Almost all the opinions that we have, we have not but from authority: we believe, we judg, we work, we live, we die, and all upon

3. upon credit, even as the publike use and custome teacheth us; and we do well therein: for we are too weak to judg and chuse of our selves; no the wise do it not, as shall be spoken.

*Lib. 1. cap. 1. & 2.*

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of the Will.*

*The preheminence and importance of the will.*

THe will is a great part of the reasonable soul, of very great importance, and it standeth us upon, above all things, to study how to rule it, because upon it dependeth almost our whole estate and good.

*The comparison thereof with the understanding.*

It only is truly ours, and in our power; all the rest, understanding, memory, imagination may be taken from us, altered, troubled with a thousand accidents: not the will.

*Doubtfull, if not erroneous.*

Secondly, This is that, that keepeth a man entire, and importeth him much: for he that hath given his will, is no more his own man, neither hath he any thing of his own.

Thirdly, This is it whereby we are made and called good or wicked, which giveth us the temper and the tincture.

As of all the goods that are in man, virtue or honesty is the first and principall, and which doth far excell knowledg, dexterity; so we cannot but confess, that the will, where virtue and goodness lodgeth, is of all others the most excellent: and to say the truth, a man is neither good nor wicked, honest nor dis-honest, because he understandeth and knoweth those things that are good, and fair, and honest, or wicked, and dishonest; but because he loveth them, and hath desire and will towards them. The understanding hath other preheminences: for it is unto the will as the husband to the wife, the guide and light unto the traveller, but in this it giveth place unto the will.

The true difference betwixt these faculties, is in that by the understanding things enter into the Soul, and it receiveth them (as those words, to apprehend, conceive, comprehend, the true offices thereof do import) but they enter not entire, and such as they are, but according to the proportion and capacity of the understanding: whereby the greatest and the highest do recoil and divide themselves after a sort, by this entrance; as the Ocean entreth not altogether into the *Mediterrane* Sea, but according to the proportion of the mouth of the Strait of *Gibralter*. By the will, on the other side, the soul goeth forth of it, and lodgeth and liveth elsewhere

where in the thing beloved, into which it transformeth it ſelf; and therefore beareth the name, the title, the livery, being called virtuous, vicious, ſpirituall, carnall: whereby it followeth, that the will is enabled by loving thoſe things that are high, and worthy of love; is vilified, by giving it ſelf to thoſe things that are baſe and unworthy; as a wife honoreth or diſhonoureth her, by that husband that ſhe hath taken.

Experience teacheth us, that three things do ſharpen our will, Difficulty, Rarity, and Abſence, or fear to loſe the thing; as the three contrary dull it, Facility, Abundance, or Satiety, and daily preſence or aſſured fruition. The three former give price and credit to things, the three latter ingender contempt. Our will is ſharpned by oppoſition it oppoſeth it ſelf againſt deniall. On the other ſide, our appetite contemneth and letteth paſs that which it hath in poſſeſſion, and runs after that which it hath not, *Permiſſum ſit vile nefas; quod licet, ingratum eſt, quod non licet, acrius urit: Things permitted we deſpiſe, and that which is lawful we loath but violently purſue thoſe things that are prohibited* Yea it is ſeen in all ſorts of pleaſures. *Omnium rerum voluptas ipſo quod debet fugari periculo creſcit: All pleaſures are increaſed, even with the danger wherewith they ought to be diſpiſed* In asmuch that the two extreams, the defect and the abundance, the deſire and the fruition, do put us to like pain. And this is the cauſe why things are not truly eſteemed as they ought, and that there is no Prophet in his own Country.

How we are to direct and rule our wils, ſhall be ſaid hereafter.

## PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS.

### *An Advertiſement.*

THe matter of the paſſions of the mind is very great and plentifull, and takes up a great room in this doctrine of wiſedome. To learn how to know them, and to diſtinguiſh them, is the ſubject of this book. The generall remedies to bridle, rule, and govern them, the ſubject of the ſecond book. The particular remedies of every one of them, of the third book, following the method of this book, ſet down in the Preface. Now that in this firſt book we may attain the knowledg of them, we will firſt ſpeak of them in generall in this firſt Chapter, afterwards in the Chapters

*Lib. 2. cap. 6. & 7. lib. 3. in the virtues of fortitude and temperance.*

ters following, particularly of every one of them. I have not seen any that painteth them out more richly, and to the life, then *Le Sieur du Vair*, in his little morall books, whereof I have made good use in this passionate subject.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Of the Passions in generall.*

1. *The description of Passions.*

PAssion is a violent motion of the *Soul* in the sensitive part thereof, which is made either to follow that which the *Soul* thinketh to be good for it, or to fly that which it takes to be evill.

2. 1 *Their agitation.*

But it is necessary that we know how these motions are made, how they arise and kindle themselves in us; which a man may represent by divers means and comparisons: first in regard of their agitation and violence. The soul which is but one in the body, hath many and divers powers, according to the divers vessels wherein it is retained, the instruments whereof it maketh use, and the objects which are presented unto it. Now when the parts wherein it is inclosed, do not retain and occupy it, but according to the proportion of their capacity, and as far forth as it is necessary for their true use; the effects thereof are sweet, benign, and well governed: but when contrariwise the parts thereof have more motion and heat then is needfull for them, they change and become hurtfull; no otherwise then the beames of the Sun, which wandring according to their naturall liberty, do sweetly and pleasingly warm; if they be collected and gathered into the concavities of a burning glass, they burn and consume that they were want to nourish and quicken. Again, they have divers degrees in the force of agitation; and as they have more or less, so they are distinguished; the indifferent suffer themselves to be tasted and digested, expressing themselves by words and tears, the greater and more violent astonish the soul, oppress it, and hinder the liberty of its actions. *Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent. Light cares move the tongue, but great cause astonishment and silence.*

2. *Of their vice and irregularity*

Secondly, in regard of the vice, disorder, and justice that is in these passions, we may compare man to a Commonweale, and the state of the soul to a state royall, wherein the Soveraign for the government of so many people hath under-magistrates, unto whom for the exercise of their charges, he gives laws and ordinances, reserving

serving unto himself the censuring of the greatest and most important occurrents. Vpon this order dependeth the peace and prosperity of the state: and contrariwise, if the Magistrates, which are as the middle sort betwixt the Prince and the people shall suffer themselves either to be deceived by facility, or corrupted by favour; and without respect either of their Soveraign, or the laws of him established, shall use their own authority in the execution of their affaires, they fill all with disorder and confusion. Even so in man, the understanding is the Soveraign, which hath under it a power estimative, and imaginative, as a Magistrate, both to take knowledg, and to judg by the report of the senses of all things that shall be presented, and to move our affections for the better execution of the judgments thereof: for the conduct and direction whereof, in the exercise of its charge, the law and light of Nature was given unto it: and moreover, as a help in all doubts, it may have recourse unto the counsell of the Superiour, and Soveraign, the understanding. And thus you see the order of the happy state thereof: but the unhappy is, when this power which is under the understanding, and above the senses whereunto the first judgment of things appertaineth, suffereth it self for the most part to be corrupted and deceived, whereby it judgeth wrongfully and rashly, and afterwards manageth and moveth our affections to ill purpose, and filleth us with much trouble and unquietness. That which molesteth and corrupteth this power, are first the senses, which comprehend not the true and inward nature of things, but onely the face and outward form, carrying unto the image of things with some favourable commendation, and as it were a fore-judgment and prejudicate opinion of their qualities, according as they finde them pleasing, and agreeable to their particular, and not profitable and necessary for the universall good of man: and secondly, the mixture of the false and indifferent judgment of the vulgar sort. From these two false advisements and reports of the Senses, and vulgar sort, is formed in the soul and inconsiderate opinion *Opinion.* which we conceive of things, whether good or ill, profitable or hurtfull, to be followed or eschewed; which doubtless is a very dangerous guide, and rash mistres: for it is no sooner conceived, but presently without the committing of any thing to discourse and understanding, it possesseth it self of our imagination, and as within a Citadell, holdeth the Fort against right and reason, afterwards it descendeth into our hearts, and removeth our affections, with violent

lent motives of hope, fear, heavineſs, pleaſure. To be brief, it makes all the Fools, and the ſeditions of the ſoul, which are the paſſions, to ariſe.

I will likewiſe declare the ſame thing, by another ſimilitude of military policie. The *Senſes* are the *Sentinels* of the *ſoul*, watching for the preſervation thereof, and meſſengers, or ſcouts to ſerve as Miniſters, and Inſtruments to the underſtanding, the ſoveraign part of the *ſoul*. And for the better performance hereof, they have received power to apprehend the things, to draw the forms, and to embrace and reject them, according as they ſhall ſeem agreeable, or odious unto their nature. Now in exerciſing their charge, they muſt be content to know, and to give knowledge to others of what doth paſs, not enterpriſing to remove greater forces, leſt by that means they put all into an *alarum* and confuſion. As in an Army, the *Sentinels* many times by want of the watch-word, and knowledge of the deſign, and purpoſe of the Captain that commandeth, may be deceived, and take for their ſuccour, their enemies diſguiſed which come unto them; or for enemies, thoſe that come to ſuccour: So the Senſes, by not apprehending whatſoever is reaſon, are many times deceived by an appearance, and take that for a friend, which is our enemy. And when upon this thought and reſolution, not attending the commandment of reaſon, they go about to remove the power concupiſcible and iraſcible, they raiſe a ſedition and tumult in our ſouls, during which time, reaſon is not heard, nor the underſtanding obeyed.

4. *The diſtinction of the Paſſions according to their object and ſubject. Of the concupiſcible ſix.*

By this time we ſee their regiments, their ranks, their generall kinds and ſpeciall. Every paſsion is moved by the appearance and opinion, either of what is good, or what is ill. If by that which is good, and that the ſoul do ſimply ſo conſider of it, this motion is called love: if it be preſent & ſuch whereof the *Soul* in it ſelf taketh comfort, it is called pleaſure and joy: if it be to come, it is called deſire: If by that which is evil, it is hate: if preſent in our ſelves, it is ſorrow and grief: if in another, it is pity: if it be to come, it is fear. And theſe which ariſe in us by the object of an apparent evil, which we abhor and fly from, deſcend more deeply into our hearts & ariſe with greater difficulty. And this is the firſt band of that ſeditious rout, which trouble the reſt and quiet of our ſouls, that is, in the concupiſcible part, the effects whereof notwithſtanding they are very dangerous, yet they are not ſo violent as thoſe that follow them: for theſe firſt motions formed in this part, by the object which preſent-

eth

teth it self, do pass incontinently into the irascible parts, that is to say, into that compass where the soul seeketh the means to attain, or avoid that which seemeth unto it either good or ill. And then even as a weale that is already in motion, receiving another motion by a new force, turns with far greater speed; so the *Soul* being already moved by the first apprehension, joyning a second endeavour to the first, carrieth it self with far more violence then before, and is stirred up by passions, more puissant and difficult to be tamed, inasmuch as they are doubled, and now coupled to the former, uniting themselves, and backing the one the other by a mutuall consent: for the first passions, which are formed upon an object of an appearing good, entring into consideration of means whereby to obtain it, stir up in us either hope or despair. They that are formed upon an object of an evill to come, stir up in us either fear, or the contrary which is audacity; of a present evill, choler and courage: which passions are strangely violent, and wholly pervert the reason which they finde already shaken. Thus you see the principall winds from whence arise the tempests of our *Soul*, and the pit whereout they rise, is nothing else but the opinion (which commonly is false, wandring, uncertain, contrary to nature, verity, reason, certainty) that a man hath, that the things that present themselves unto us, are either good or ill: for having conceived them to be such, we either follow them, or with violence fly from them. And these are our passions.

*In the Irascible five.*

## OF PASSIONS IN PARTICVLAR.

### *An Advertisement.*

WE will intreat of their natures, that we may thereby see their follies, vanity, misery, injustice, and that foulness that is in them, to the end we may know and learn how justly to hate them. The counsel that is given for the avoidance of them, is in the books following. These are the two parts of physick, to shew the malady, and to give the remedy. It remaineth therefore, that here we first speake of all those that respect the appearing good, which are love and the kinds thereof, desire, hope, despair, joy; and afterwards all those that respect the ill, which are many, choler, hatred, envie, jealousie, revenge, cruelty, fear, sadness, compassion.

*Lib. 3. in the virtue of Fortitude and Temperance.*

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of Love in generall.*

*The distinction of love and comparison.*

THe first and chief mistress of all the passions is Love, which consisteth of divers subjects, and whereof there are divers sorts and degrees. There are three principall kinds unto which all the rest are referred (we speake of the vicious and passionate love, for of the virtues, which is Amity, Charity, Dilection, we will speake in the virtue of justice) that is to say, Ambition or pride, which is the love of greatness and honour; Covetousness, the love of riches; and Voluptuous or carnall love. Behold here the three gulfes, and precipitate steps, from which few there are that can defend themselves: the three plagues and infections of all that we have in hand, the minde, body and goods: the armories of those three captain enemies of the health and quiet of mankind, the Devill, the flesh, the world. These are in truth three powers, the most common and universall passions: and therefore the Apostle hath divided into these three whatsoever is in the world; *Quicquid est in mundo, est concupiscentia oculorum aut carnis, aut superbia vitæ; all that is in the world, is the lust of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life.* Ambition, as more spirituall, so it is most high and noble then the others. Voluptuous love, as more naturall and universall (for it is even in beasts themselves, where the rest are not) so it is more violent, and less vicious: I say simply violent, for sometimes ambition excels it: but this is some particular malady. Covetousness of all the rest is the sickest and most sottish.

*Lib. 1.*

## CHAP. XX.

### *Of Ambition.*

1. *The description*

AMbition (which is a thirst after honour and glory, a gluttonous and excessive desire of greatness) is a sweet and pleasing passion, which distilleth easily into generous spirits, but is not without pain got forth again. Wee think it is our duties to embrace what is good, and amongst those good things, wee account of honour more then them all. See here the reason, why with all our strength we run unto it. An ambitious man will

will alwayes be the first, he never looks backward, but still forward to those that are before him: and it is a greater grief unto him to suffer one to go beyond him, then it is pleasure unto him, to leave a thousand behind him. *Habet hoc vitium omnis ambitio, non respicit: All ambition hath this vice, not to look back.* It is two-fold: the one of glory and honour, the other of greatness and command: that is profitable to the world, and in some sense permitted, as shall be proved; this pernicious. Seneca.

2. *It is naturall.*

The seed and root of ambition is naturall in us. There is a proverb that saith, That nature is content with a little: and another quite contrary; That nature is never satisfied, never content; but it still desireth, hath a will to mount higher, and to enrich it self, and it goeth not a slow pace neither, but with a loose bridle, it runneth headlong to greatness and glory. *Natura nostra imperij est avida, & ad implendum cupiditatem præceps: Wee are naturally greedy of authority and empire, and run headlong to the satisfying of our desires.* And with such force and violence do some men run, that they break their own necks, as many great men have done, even at the dawning as it were, and upon the point of entrance and full fruition of that greatness which hath cost them so dear. It is a naturall and very powerfull passion, and in the end it is the last that leaveth us: and therefore one calleth it, The shirt of the soul: because it is the last vice it putteth off. *Etiam sapientibus cupido gloriæ novissima exuitur. The last vice which even the wise abandon his desire of glory.* Tacitus.

3. *The force and Primacy thereof.*

Ambition, as it is the strongest and most powerfull passion that is, so it is the most noble and haughty, the force and puissance thereof is shewed, in that it mastereth and surmounteth all other things, even the strongest of the world, yea all other passions and affections, even love it self, which seemeth nevertheless to contend with it for the Primacy: As we may see in all the great men of the world, *Alexander*, *Scipio*, *Pompey*, and many other, who have couragiously refused to touch the most beautifull Damosels, that were in their power, burning nevertheless with ambition, yea that victory they had over love, served their ambition, especially in *Cæsar*; For never was there a man more given to amorous delights, even of all sexes, and all sorts of people, witness so many exploits, both in *Rome* and in strange Countries; nor more carefull and curious in adorning his person; yet ambition did alwayes so carry him, that for his amorous

pleasures he never lost an hour of time, which he might employ to the enlargement of his greatness, for ambition had the soveraign place in him, and did fully possesse him. Wee see on the other side that in *Marcus Antonius* and others, the force of love hath made them to forget the care and conduct of their affaires. But yet both of them being weighed in equall ballance, ambition carrieth away the prize. They that hold that love is the stronger, say that both the soul and the body, the whole man, is possessed by it, yea that health it self dependeth thereupon. But contrariwise it seemeth that ambition is the stronger, because it is altogether spirituall: And in as much as love possesseth the body, it is therefore the more weak, because it is subject to saciety, and therefore capable of remedies, both corporable, naturall, and strange, as experience sheweth of many, who by divers means have allaied yea quite extinguished the force and fury of this passion; but ambition is not capable of sacity, yea it sharpned by the fruition of that it desireth, and there is no way to extinguish it, being altogether in the soul it self and in the reason.

4. *The care of life.* It doth likewise vanquish love and robbeth it, not only of its health and tranquillity (for glory and tranquillity are things that cannot lodg together) but also of its own proper life, as *Agrippina* the mother of *Nero* doth plainly prove, who desiring and consulting with others to make her Son Emperor, and understanding that it could not be done, but with the loss of her own life, she answereth, as if ambition it self hath spoken it, *Occidat modo imperet: Let me be slain so he may raign.*

5. *The lawes.* Thirdly, ambition enforceth all the Lawes, and conscience it self; the Learned have said of ambition, that it is the part of every honest man alwayes to obey the Laws, except it be in a case of soveraignty for a Kingdome, which only deserveth a dispensation, being so dainty a morsell, that it cannot but break a mans fast; *Si violendum est jus, regnandi causâ violandum est, in cæteris pietatem cola. If man may at any time violate justice, it must be to gain a Kingdome; in the rest observe Iustice and Piety.*

9. *Religion.* It likewise trampleth under foot, and contemneth the reverence and respect of Religion, witness *Ieroboam*, *Mahumet*, who never took thought for Religion; but tolerated all religions, so he might raign: and all those arch-hereticks who have liked better to be chief leaders in errours and lies with a thousand disorders, then to be disciples of the truth: there-

Therefore saith the Apostle, That they that suffer themselves to be puffed up with this passion and affection, wake shipwrack, and wander from the faith, piercing themselves thorow with many sorrows.

To be short, it offereth violence even to the lawes of Nature it self. This hath been the cause of so many murders of Parents, infants, brothers; witness *Absalon*, *Abimelech*, *Athalias*, *Romulus*, *Sei* King of the *Persions*, who killed both his father and brother, *Soliman* the great Turke, his two brothers. So that nothing is able to resist the force of ambition, it beats all to the ground, so high and haughty is it. It lodgeth onely in great minds, even in the Angels themselves. 7. *It enforceth Nature.*

Ambition is not the vice or passion of base companions, nor of common or small attempts, and daily enterprises: Renown and glory doth not postitute it self to so base a prize; it pursueth not those things that are simply and solely good and profitable, but those that are rare, high, difficult, strange and unusuall. That great thirst after honour and reputation, that casts down a man, and makes him a begger, and to duck and stoop to all sorts of people, and by all means, yea the most abject, at what base price soever, is vile and dishonourable: it is a shame and dishonour so to be honoured. A man must not be greedy of greater glory then he is capable of; and to swell and to be puffed up for every good and profitable action, is to shew his tail while he lifts up his head. 8. *It is a lofty passion.*

Ambition hath many and divers ways, and practised by divers means: there is one way straight and open, such as *Alexander*, *Cæsar*, *Themistocles* took; there is another oblique and hidden, which many Philosophers and professors of piety have taken, who go forwards by going backwards, go before others by going behinde them, not unlike to wier-drawers, who draw and go backward; they would fain be glorious by contemning glory. And to say the truth, there is a greater glory in refusing and trampling glory under foot, then in the desire and fruition thereof, as *Plato* told *Diogenes*. And ambition is never better carried, better guided, then by wandring, and unusuall wayes. 9. *It hath divers wayes.*

Ambition is a folly and a vanity, for it is as much as if a man should run to catch the smoak, in stead of the light, the shadow in stead of the body, to fasten the contentment of his minde upon the opinion of the vulgar sort, voluntarily to renounce his own liber- 10. *It is a folly.*

ty, to follow the passions of others, to enforce himself, to displease himself; for the pleasure of the beholders, to let his own affections depend upon the eyes of another; so far forth to love virtue as may be to the liking of the common sort; to do good, not for the love of good, but reputation. This is to be like unto vessels when they are pierced, a man can draw nothing forth before he give them a vent.

11. *It is insatiable.* Ambition hath no limits, it is a gulf that hath neither brink nor bottome; it is that vacuity which the Philosophers could never finde in Nature; a fire which increaseth by that nourishment that is given unto it. Wherein it truly payeth his master: for ambition is onely just in this, that it sufficeth for his own punishment, and is executioner to it self. The wheel of *Ixion* is the motion of his desires, which turn and return up and down, never giving rest unto his mind.

12. *The excuses of ambition vain.* They that will flatter ambition, say it is a servant or help unto virtue, and a spurr to beautifull actions; for it quitteth a man of all other sins, and in the end, of himself too; and all for virtue: but it is so far from this, that it hideth sometimes our vices; yet it takes them not away, but it covereth or rather hatcheth them for a time under the deceitfull cinders of a milicious hypocrisie, with hope to set them on fire altogether, when they have gotten authority sufficient to reign publikely and with impiety. Serpents loose not their venime, though they be frozen with cold, nor an ambitious man his vices, though with a cold dissimulation he cover them: for when he is arrived to that pitch of height that he desired, he then makes them feel what he is. And though ambition quit a man a man of all other vices, yet it never taketh away it self, An ambitious man putteth himself forth to great and honourable actions, the profit whereof returneth to the publick good, but yet he is never the better man that performs them, because they are not the actions of virtue, but of passion; no, though that saying be often in his mouth, We are not born for our selves, but for the weale publick. The means men use to mount themselves to high estate, and their carriages in their states and charges, when they are arrived thereunto, do sufficiently shew what men they are, and their own consciences tell the most that follow that dance, that however the publick good be their outward colour, yet their own particular is that they intend.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evill you shall finde *Lib.*3.*Cap.*42.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of Covetousnes and her counter-passion.*

TO love and affect riches is covetousnes; not onely the love and affection, but also every over-curious care and industry about riches, yea their dispensations themselves and liberty, with Art and too much attention procured, have a sent of covetousnes: for they are not worthy an earnest care and attention. 1. *What it is.*

The desire of goods, and the pleasure we take in possessing of them is grounded onely upon opinion. The immoderate desire to get riches is a gangrene in our soul, which with a venimous heat consumeth our naturall affections, to the end it might fill us with virulent humours. So soon as it is lodged in our hearts, all honest and natural affection which we ow either to our parents or friends, or our selves, vanisheth away. All the rest, in respect of our profit seemeth nothing, yea we forget in the end, and contemn our selves, our bodies, our minds, for this transitory trash, and as our Proverb is, We sell our horse to get us hay. 2. *The force thereof.*

Covetousnes is the vile and base pasion of vulgar fools, who account riches the principall good of a man, and fear poverty as the greatest evil; and not contenting themselves with necessary means, which are forbidden no man, weigh that is good in a Goldsmiths ballance, when Nature hath taught us to measure it by the ill of necesitie. For what greater folly can there be then to adore that which nature it self hath put under our feet, and hidden in the bowels of the earth, as unworthy to be seen, yea rather to be contemned, and trampled under foot? This is that that the onely sin of man hath torn out of the intrails of the earth, and brought unto light, to kill himself. *In lucem propter quæ pugnaremus excutimus: non erubescimus summa apud nos haberi, quæ fuerunt ima terrarum. We dig out the bowels of the earth, and bring to light those things for which we would fight; we are not ashamed to esteem those things most highly, which are in the lowest and nethermost parts of the earth.* Nature seemeth, even in the first birth of gold, and womb from whence it proceedeth, after a sort to have presaged the misery of those that are in love with it: for it hath so ordered the matter, that in those Countries where it groweth, there grows with it neither gras, nor plant, nor other thing that is worth any thing, as giving us to understand thereby, that in those minds where the desire of this Metall groweth, there cannot remain so much as a 3. *The folly and misery of covetousnes in five points.*

spark of true honour and virtue: for what thing can be more base, then for a man to degrade, and to make himself a servant, and a slave to that, which should be subject unto him? *Apud sapientem divitiæ sunt in servitute, apud stultum in imperio: Riches serves wise men, but commands a fool.* For a covetous man serves his riches, not they him; and he is said to have goods as he hath a fever, which holdeth and tyrannizeth over a man, not he over it. What thing thing more vile then to love that which is not good, neither can make a good man; yea is common, and in the possession of the most wicked of the world, which many times pervert good manners, but never amend them? Without which so many wise men have made themselves happy, and by which many wicked men have come to a wicked end. To be brief, what thing more miserable then to bind the living unto the dead, as *Mezentius* did, to the end their death might be languishing and the more cruell; to tie the spirit to the excrement and scum of the earth; to pierce thorow his own soul with a thousand torments, which this amorous pasion of riches brings with it; and to intangle himself with the ties and cords of this malignant thing, as the Scripture calleth them, which doth likewise tearm them thorns, and theeves which steal away the heart of man, snares of the Devil, idolatry, and the root of all evil. And truly he that shall see the Catalogue of those envies and molestations which riches ingender within the heart of man, as their proper thunder-bolt and lightning, they would be more hated then they are now loved. *Desunt inopiæ multa, avaritiæ omnia: in nullum avarus bonus est, in se pessimus. Poverty wanteth many things, but covetousnes all; a covetous man is good to none, & worst of all to himself.*

4. *The counter-passion to covetousnes.*

There is another contrary pasion to this, and vicious, To hate riches, and to spend them prodigally; this is to refuse the means to do well, to put in practise many virtues, and to flie that labour which is farre greater in the true command and use of riches, then in not having them at all; to govern himself better in abundance then in poverty. In this there is but one kind of virtue, which is, not to faint in courage, but to continue firm and constant. In abundance there are many, Temperance, Moderation, Liberality, Diligence, Prudence, and so forth. There, more is not expressed, but that he look to himself: here, that he attend first himself, and then the good of others. He that is spoiled of his goods hath the more liberty to attend the more weighty affairs of the spirit: and for this cause many, both Philosophers and Christians, out of the greatnes

nesse of their courage, have put it in practise. He doth likewise discharge himself of many duties and difficulties that are required in the good and honest government of our riches in their acquisition, conservation, distribution, use and imployment: but he that quitteth himself of his riches, for this reason, flyeth the labour and businesse that belongs unto them; and quite contrary doth it not out of courage, but cowardize: and a man may tell him, that he shakes off his riches, not because they are not profitable, but because he knoweth not how to make use of them, how to use them. And not to be able to endure riches, is rather weakness of mind, then wisdome, saith *Seneca*.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of carnall Love.*

CArnall love is a fever and furious passion, and very dangerous unto him that suffereth himself to be carried by it: For what becomes of him? He is no more himself; his body endureth a thousand labours in the search of his pleasure; his mind a thousand hells to satisfie his desires; and desire it self increasing, grows into furie. As it is naturall, so it is violent and common to all, and therefore in the action thereof it equalleth and coupleth fools and wisemen, men and beasts together. It maketh all the wisdome, resolution, contemplation, and operation of the soul beastly and brutish. Hereby, as likewise by sleep, *Alexander* knew himself to be a mortall man, because both these suppress the faculties of the soul. 1. *It is strong, naturall and common.*

Philosophy speaketh freely of all things, that it may the better find out their causes, govern and judge of them; so doth Divinity, which is yet more chaste and more strait. And why not, since that all things belong unto the jurisdiction and knowledge thereof? The Sunne shines on the dunghill, and is neither infected, nor annoyed therewith. To be offended with words is a token either of great weakness, or some touch or guilt of the same malady. Thus much be spoken for that which followeth, or the like if it shall happen. Nature on the one side with violence thrusteth us forward unto this action; all the motion of the world resolveth and yieldeth to this copulation of the male and female: on the other side it causeth us to accuse, to hide our selves, to blush for shame, as if it were a thing ignominious and dishonest. We call it a shame- 2. *Why ignominious.*

full

full act, and the parts that serve thereunto our shameful parts. But why shamefull, since naturall, (and keeping it self within its own bounds) just, lawfull, and necessary? Yea, why are beasts exempted from this shame? It is because the countenance seems foul and deformed? Why foul, since naturall? In crying, laughing, champing, gaping, the visage is more distorted: Is it to the end it may serve as a bridle and a stay to such a kind of violence? Why then doth Nature cause such a violence? Or contrariwise: Is it because shame serveth as a spur, and as sulphur; or that the instruments thereof move without our consent, yea against our wills? By this reason beasts likewise should be bashfull, and many other things move of themselves in us, without our consent, which are neither vicious nor shamefull: not onely inward and hidden (as the pulse and motion of the heart, arteries, lungs, the instruments and parts that serve the appetite of eating, drinking, discharging the brain, the belly, and their shuttings and openings, are besides nay, many times against, our wills: witness those sneesings, yawnings, tears, hoquets, and fluxions, that are not in our own power, and this of the body: the spirit forgetteth, remembreth, believeth, misbelieveth, and the will it self, which many times willeth that which we would it willed not) but outward and apparent: the visage blusheth, waxeth pale, wan, the body groweth fat, lean, the hair turneth gray, black, white, grows, stands on end, without and against our consent. Is it that hereby the poverty and weakness of man may be the more truly shewed? that is as well seen in our eating and drinking, our griefs, weariness, the disburdening of our bodies, death, whereof a man is not ashamed. Whatsoever the reason be, the action in it self, and by nature is no way shamefull, it is truly naturall; so is not shame: witnes the beasts. Why say I beasts? The nature of man saith Divinity, maintaining it self in its first originall state, had never known what shame was, as now it doth; for from whence cometh shame, but from weakness, and weakness but from sin, there being nothing in Nature of it self shamefull? The cause then of this shame not being in Nature, we must seek it elsewhere. It is therefore artificiall. It is an invention forged in the closet of *Venus*, to give the greater prize to the busines, and to enkindle the desire thereof the more. This is with a little water to make the fire burn the clearer, as Smiths use to do, to enflame the desire to see what it is, that is hidden; to hear and know what it is that is muttered and whispered. For to handle things

things darkly as if they were mysteries, and with respect and shame, giveth taste and estimation unto them. Contrariwise, a loose, free, and open permission and commodity, derogateth from the worth, and taketh away the true rellish and delight thereof.

This action then it self, and simply taken, is neither shameful nor vicious, since it is naturall and corporall, no more then other the like actions are: yea, if it be well ordered it is just, profitable, necessary at the least, as it is to eat and drink. But that which doth so much discredit it, is, that moderation is seldome kept therein, and that to attain thereunto, we make great stirres, and many times use bad means, whereby it draweth after it, if it go not before, many evils, all worse then the action it self. The charge riseth above the principall, and this is to fish (as it is said) with threds of gold and purple. And all this is purely humane. Beasts that follow simply nature, are quit from all these troubles. But the art of man on the one side sets a strait guard about it, planteth at the gate shame to give it a relish: on the other side (O the cousenage of men!) it inflameth and sharpeneth the desire, it deviseth, removeth, troubleth, turneth all topsie-turvie to attain unto it, (witness Poetry, which sporteth not it self in any thing, so much as in this subject) and findeth every entrance unto it to be better, then by the gate, and the lawfull way, and followeth every wandering way, rather then the common way of marriage. 3. *In what sense vicious.*

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *Desires, Concupiscence.*

THere arise not so many billows and waves in the Sea, as desires in the heart of man: it is a bottomless depth, it is infinite, divers, inconstant, confused, and irresolute; yea, many times horrible and detestable, but ordinarily vain, and ridiculous in its own desires. 1. *The bottomless depth of desire.*

But first it shall not be amisse to distinguish them. Some are naturall, and they are just and lawfull: they are likewise in beasts, they have their limits and bounds, a man may see the end of them; and living according to those, there is no man a begger. Of these shall be spoken hereafter more at large: for (to say the truth) these are not passions. Others are besides nature, proceeding from our opinions and phantasie, artificiall, superfluous, which we may, for distinction sake, call concupiscences or lusts. These are purely hu- 2. *Their distinction. Naturall, necessary, lib. 2. cap. 6. Not naturall.*

humane; beasts know not what they are, onely man is immoderate in his appetites: these are without limits, without end, and are nought else but confusion. Senéca. *Desideria naturalia finita sunt, ex falsa opinione nascentia, ubi desinant non habent. Nullus enim terminus falso est: via eunti aliquid extremum est, error immensus est. Naturall desires have their bounds, but those which grow of a false opinion are without end: For in that which is false, there is no limit: he that travelleth in his right way, comes to an end of his journey; but he that is out of his way, knows not whither he wanders.* And therefore living according to these; there is no man can be rich and contented. Of these it is properly that we have spoken in the beginning of this Chapter, and that we farther intend in this matter of the passions: It is for these that a man sweats, and travels, *Ad supervacua sudatur,* that a man journeyeth by sea and by land, goeth to war, kils himself, drowns, betrays, loseth himself: and therefore it was well said, That concupiscence is the root of all evil. Now it falleth out many times (a just punishment) that when a man seeketh how to satisfie his desires, and to glut himself with the goods and pleasures of Fortune, he looseth and is deprived of those of Nature: and therefore *Diogenes* having refused that money that *Alexander* offered him, desired him to give him that he had taken from him, to go out of the Sun.

## CHAP. XXIV.

### *Hope, Despair.*

OUr desires and concupiscences gather heat and redouble their force, by hope, which inflameth with the soft aud gentle air thereof our foolish desires, kindleth in our minds a fire, from whence ariseth a thick smoak, which blindeth our understanding, carrieth with it our thoughts, holds them hanging in the clouds, makes us dream waking. So long as our hopes endure, our desires endure with them. It is a play-game, wherewith Nature busieth our minds. Contrariwise, when despair is once lodged near us, it tormenteth our souls in such a sort, with an opinion of never obtaining that we desire, that all business besides must yield unto it. And for the love of that which we think never to obtain, we loose even the rest of whatsoever we possess. This passion is like unto little children, who to be revenged of him that hath taken one of their play-games from them, cast the rest into the fire. It is angry

gry with it self, and requireth of it self the punishment of its own folly and infelicity. After those passions that respect the apparant good, come we to those that respect the evil.

## CHAP. XXV.

### *Of Choler.*

CHoler is a foolish passion, which putteth us wholly out of our selves, and with seeking the means to withstand and beat back the evil which it threatneth us, or hath already procured us, maketh the bloud to boyl in our hearts, and stirreth up furious vapours in our spirits, which blind us and cast us headlong to whatsoever may satisfie the desire which we have of revenge: It is a short fury, a way to madness: by the prompt and ready impetuosity and violence thereof, it carrieth and surmounteth all passions. *Repentina & vis universa ejus est: Sudden and violent is the force thereof.* 1. *The description.*

The causes that dispose and move unto choler, are first, Weakness of spirit, as we see by experience in women, old men, infants, sick men who are commonly more cholerick then others. *Invalidum omne naturâ querulum est: All weak things are full of complaint.* A man deceiveth himself, to think that there is courage where there is violence: violent motions are like the endeavours of children and old men, who run when they think to go: for there is nothing more weak then an immoderate motion; and a great imbecillity is it in a man to be cholerick. Secondly, the malady of the mind, whereby it is made over-tender to bear blows, as the ulcerate parts of the body, where the sound being interessed therein, are astonished and wounded with light matters. *Nusquam sine querela ægra tanguntur: Sore things are never touched without complaint.* The losse of a penny, or the omission of gain puts into choler a covetous man; a laughter or glance of his wife, stirs this passion in a jealous man. Thirdly, lust, vain niceness, self-love, which makes a man anxious and angry, puts him into choler for the least cause that may be. *Nullares magis iracundiam alit, quàm luxuria: Nothing doth more nourish anger then luxury.* This love of trifles, of a glasse, a dog a bird, is a kind of folly that troubleth us much, and stirs up this cholerick passion in us. Fourthly, too much curiosity; *qui nimis inquirit, seipsum inquietat; he that searcheth too much, disquieteth himself.* This is to seek occasions, and out of the lightness of the 2. *The cause thereof.* 1. 2. 3. 4.

the heart to caſt a man into choler, not attending any cauſe thereof, *Sæpe ad nos ira venit, ſæpius nos ad illam: anger often cometh unto us, we oftner to it.* Fiftly, lightneſs in believing what comes
5. 6. firſt to the ear. But the principall and former cauſe is, an opinion of contempt and miſ-uſage, either by word, deed, countenance. Theſe are the reaſons whereby we pretend to juſtifie our choler.

3. *The ſigns.* The ſignes and ſymptomes are very manifeſt, and more then of any other paſſion; and ſo ſtrange that they alter and change the whole eſtate of man, they transform and disfigure him. *Ut ſit difficile utrum magis deteſtabile vitium, aut deforme: So that it is difficult to know, whether it be a more deteſtable or deformed vice.* Some of them are outward, the face red and deformed, the eyes fiery, the looks furious, the ear deaf, the mouth foaming, the heart panting, the pulſe beating, the vains ſwollen, the tongue ſtammering, the teeth gnaſhing, the voice loud and hoarſe, the ſpeech imperfect, and to be brief, it puts the whole body into a fire and a fever. Some have broken their veins, ſuppreſt their urine, whereby preſent death hath enſued. What then can the eſtate of the ſpirit be within, when it cauſeth ſo great a diſorder without? Choler at the firſt blow driveth away and baniſheth reaſon and judgement, to the end it may wholly poſſeſſe the place; afterwards it fils all with fire, and ſmoak, and darkneſs, and noiſe; like unto him that puts the Maſter out of the houſe, and then ſets fire and burns himſelf alive within; or like unto a ſhip, that hath neither ſtern nor Pilot, nor ſails nor oars, which commits its fortune to the mercy of the waves, winds, and tempeſts, in the midſt of a furious ſea.

4. *The effects.* The effects thereof are great, many times miſerable and lamentable. *Choler* firſt enforceth us to injuſtice, for it is kindled and ſharpned by a juſt oppoſition, and by the knowledge that a man hath of the little reaſon he hath to be angry. He that is moved to anger, upon a falſe occaſion, if a man yield him any good reaſon why he ſhould not be angry, he is preſently more incenſed even againſt the truth and innocencie it ſelf: *Pertinaciores nos facit iniquitas iræ; quaſi argumentum ſit juſtè iraſcendi, graviter iraſci. The iniquity of anger doth make us more ſtubborn; as if it were an argument and proof of juſt anger, to be grievouſly angry.* The example of *Piſo* is very notable, and proves this true, who excelling otherwiſe in virtue (the hiſtory is very well known) being moved to choler, did unjuſtly put three to death, and by a ſubtile occaſion cauſed them to be found guilty, onely becauſe they acquitted one

as unguilty whom he by his former ſentence had condemned. It is likewiſe ſharpned by ſilence and cold replies, as gathering thereby that it proceedeth out of a contempt both of him and his choler; which is proper unto women, who many times are angry, to the end they may ſtirre up that paſſion in another, and increaſe their choler even to fury, when they ſee that a man vouchſafeth not to nouriſh that humour in them, by chiding with them. So that *Choler* ſheweth it ſelf to be more ſavage then a beaſt, ſince neither by defence or excuſe, nor by ſilence and patience without defence, it will not be wonne or pacified. The injuſtice thereof is likewiſe in this, that it will be both a judge and a party, that it will that all take part with it, and grows to defiance with as many as will ſeem to contradict it. Secondly, for as much as it is inconſiderate and heady, it caſteth us headlong into great miſchiefs, and ſometimes even into thoſe which we moſt flie, and do wiſh and would willingly procure another man. *Dat pœnas dum exigit, It is puniſhed while it puniſheth,* or farre worſe. The paſſion is fitly compared to great ruines, which burſt themſelves in pieces upon that which they fall, it purſueth with ſuch violence the ill of another, that it heeds not the avoiding of its own, It intrappeth and intangleth us, makes us to ſpeak and to do things ſhamefull, uncomely, unworthy our ſelves. Laſtly, it carrieth us ſo beyond our ſelves, that it makes us to do things ſcandalous, dangerous, and irrevocable, murders, poiſonings, treaſons, whereby follow great and too late repentances; witneſs *Alexander* the Great after he had ſlain *Clytus:* and therefore *Pythagoras* was wont to ſay, that the end of *Choler* was the beginning of repentance.

This paſſion feeds upon it ſelf, flattereth and tickleth it ſelf, with a perſwaſion that it hath reaſon, that it is juſt, excuſing it ſelf upon the malice and indiſcretion of another; but the injuſtice of another cannot make that juſt, nor the loſs that we receive by another make that profitable unto us: it is too raſh and inconſiderate to do any thing that is good, it would cure an evil with an evil; for to yield the correction of an offence to *Choler,* is to correct a vice by it ſelf. Reaſon which ſhould have the command over us, needs no ſuch officers as of their own heads execute laws, not attending her ordinance; ſhe would have all things done according to nature by meaſure, and therefore violence doth no way befit it. But what, ſhall virtue ſee the inſolency of vice and not be angry with it? ſhall the liberty thereof be ſo bridled as not to dare to

be

be moved against the wicked? virtue desires no indecent liberty, it needs not turn its own strength against it self, nor that the wickedness of another should trouble it: a wise man must as well bear the vices of a wicked man without choler, as his prosperity without envie. He must endure the indiscretions of rash and inconsiderate men, with the self same patience that Physitians do the injuries of mad men. There is no greater wisdome, nor more profitable in the world, then to endure the folly of another, for otherwise by not suffering it with patience, we make it our own. That which hath heretofore been spoken touching *Choler*, may likewise be spoken of these passions following, hatred, envie, revenge, which are made or formed *Cholers*.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil are *Lib. 3. cap. 31.*

## CHAP. XXVI.

### *Hatred.*

HAtred is a strange, which strangely and without reason troubleth us: and to say the truth, what is there in the world that tormenteth us more? By this passion we put our selves into the power of him that we hate, to afflict and vex us; the sight of him moveth our senses, the remembrance stirreth our spirits both waking and sleeping; yea, we never present him to our memories, but with despight and gnashing of teeth, which puts us besides our selves, and tears our own hearts; whereby we suffer in our selves, the punishment of that evil we wish unto another. He which hateth, is the patient; he that is hated, the agent: contrary to the sound of the words, the hater is in torment, the hated in ease. But what do we hate? Men, or their matters and affairs? Doubtless we hate nothing that we should: for if there be any thing to be hated in this world, it is hate it self, and such like passions, contrary to that which should command in us.

Particular considerations and remedies against this evil, are *Lib. 3. cap. 32.*

## CHAP. XXVII.

### *Envie.*

ENvie is a cousen-germane to Hatred; a miserable passion and outragious beast, which in torment excelleth hell it self. It is a desire of that good that another possesseth, which gnaweth our heart,

heart, and turneth the good of another man to our own hurt. But how should it torment us, since it is as well against that which is ill, as that which is good? Whilest an envious man looketh obliquely upon the goods of another man he loseth what is good in himself, or at leastwise takes no delight in it.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib.* 3. *Cap.* 33.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

### *Jealousie.*

JEalousie is a passion like almost both in nature and effect unto Envie, but that it seemeth that Envie considereth not what is good, but in as much as it is in the possession of another man, and that we desire it for our selves; and Jealousie concerneth our own proper good, whereof we fear another doth partake. 1. *What it is.*

Jealousie is a weak maladie of the soul, absurd, vain, terrible and tyrannicall, it insinuateth it self under the title of amity, but after it hath gotten possession, upon the self-same foundation of love and good will, it buildeth an everlasting hate. Virtue, health, merit, reputation, are the incendiaries of this rage, or rather the fuell unto this fury. 2. *The Weakness.*

It is likewise the Gall that corrupteth all the Honey of our life: it is commonly mingled with the sweetest and pleasantest actions, which it maketh so sharp and sower, as nothing more: it changeth love into hate, respect into disdan, assurance into diffidence: it ingendreth a pernicious curiosity and desire in a man to clear himself of that evil, which being past remedy, by too much stirring stinketh the more: For what doth he but publish, put out of all doubt, bring into the light, sound with a trumpet his own shame and misery, and the dishonour of his own children? 3. *The venum thereof.*

Particular considerations and remedies against this evil, are, *Lib.* 3. *cap.* 35.

## CHAP. XXIX.

### *Revenge.*

THe desire of revenge is first a cowardly and effeminate passion proceeding from a base, weak, and abject mind, which experience telleth us to be true; for we commonly see the weakest 1. *A Cowardly passion.*

minds the most malicious and revengefull, as women and children. The valiant and generous mind doth little feel this passion, but contemneth and disdaineth it, either because the injurie toucheth him not, or because he that offereth the injurry toucheth him not, or because he that offereth the injury is not worthy his revenge, as not daigning so farre to debase himself: *Indignus Cæsaris irâ, Unworthy the anger of Cæsar.* The hail, thunder, and tempests, and those fearfull motions that are in the air, do neither trouble nor touch the superiour celestiall bodies but onely the weak and inferiour: and even so the indiscretions and childish brawls of fools wound not great and high minds. All the great men of the world, *Alexander, Cæsar, Epaminendas, Scipio*; have been so far from revenge, that quite contrary they have done good unto their enemies.

2. *Biting.* Secondly, it is a boyling and biting passion, and like a worm it gnaweth the hearts of those that are infected with it, it molesteth them by day, and by night keeps them awaken.

3. *Vnjust.* It is likewise full of injustice, for it tormenteth tht innocent, and addeth affliction. It is to make the party offending, to feel that evil and punishment, which the desire of revenge giveth to a mans heart; and the party offended goes to lay on the burthen, as if he had not already hurt enough by the injury received: in such sort, that many times and ordinarily, whilest he tormenteth himself to seek means of revenge, he that hath committed the offence laughs and makes himself merry with it. But it is also farre more unjust in the means of the execution, which many times is wrought by treasons and villanous practices.

4. *Dangerous.* Lastly, the execution is not onely painfull, but dangerous too; for experience telleth us, that he that seeks to be revenged doth not that which he would, and what his blow intendeth, but commonly that which he would not, comes to passe, and thinking to put out the eye of his enemy, he putteth out both his own. The fear of justice tormenteth him, and the care to hide those that love him.

5. *To Kill, is not to revenge.* Again, to kill and to make an end of his enemy, is not revenge, but meer cruelty, which proceedeth from cowardlines and fear. To be revenged, is to beat his enemy, to make him stoop, not to kill him: for by killing he feels not the power of his wrath, which is the end of revenge. And this is the reason why a man cares not to be revenged upon a dogge or a beast, because he can no way taste or conceit his revenge. In true revenge there must be a kind

kind of pleasure and delight in the revenger: and he upon whom he is revenged, must feel the weight of his displeasure, suffer pain, and repent him of the cause, which being kild he cannot do; yea, he is rather freed thereby from all misery; and contrariwise, he that is the revenger, endureth many times that torment and fear which he wisheth to his enemy. To kill then is a token of cowardlines and fear, lest his enemy feeling the force of his revenge, should live to requite him with the like; which though it make an end of the quarell, yet it woundeth his reputation; it is a trick of precaution, and not of courage: and is the way to proceed safely, but not honourably. *Qui occidit longè, non ulciscitur, nec gloriam assequitur: He that killeth a farre off, doth neither revenge, nor obtain renown.*

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib.* 3. *Cap.* 34.

## CHAP. XXX.

### *Cruelty.*

CRuelty is a villanous and detestable vice, and against nature and therefore it is likewise called Inhumanity. It proceedeth from weakness; *Omnis ex infirmitate feritas est: All cruelty proceedeth of infirmitie.* And it is the daughter of cowardlines: for a valorous man, doth alwayes exercise his strength against a resisting enemy, whom he hath no sooner at his mercy, but he is satisfied: *Romana virtus, parcere subjectis, debellare superbos: The Romane virtue was to spare the humble, and subdue the proud.* Forasmuch therefore as cowardly weakness cannot be of this rank, to the end it may yet get the name of Valour, it makes bloud and massacres the proof thereof. Murders in victories are commonly executed by common people, and the officers of the baggage. Tyrants are bloudy, because they fear, not knowing how to secure themselves, but by rooting out those that may offend them; and therefore they exercise their cruelty against all, even women too, because they fear all; *Cuncta ferit, dum cuncta timet: He strikes all, because he fears all.* Cowardly dogs bite and tear with their teeth, within the house, the skins of those wild beasts, which in the open field they durst not look upon. What make civil wars so cruel, but that tie wherewith the common people are led and linked, who like dogs that are backt by their master, back one another? The Emperour

*Mauritius* being told that one *Phocas* a ſouldier ſhould kill him, enquired what he was, and of what nature and condition; being told by his ſonne in law *Philip*, that he was a baſe coward: Why then, ſaith he, no marvell if he be a murderer and cruel. It proceedeth likewiſe from the inward malignity of the ſoul, which feedeth and delighteth it ſelf with the hurt of another. Monſters like *Caligula*.

## CHAP. XXXI.

### *Sadneſſe, or heavineſs of heart,*

1. *The deſcription.*

SAdneſs, is a languiſhing feebleneſs of the ſpirit, and a kind of diſcouragement ingendred by the opinion that we have of the greatneſs of thoſe evils that afflict us. It is a dangerous enemie to our reſt, which preſently weakeneth and quelleth our ſouls, if we take not good heed, and taketh from us the uſe of reaſon and diſcourſe, and the means whereby to provide for our affairs, and with time it ruſteth and fenoweth the ſoul, it corrupteth the whole man, brings his virtues aſleep, even then when he hath moſt need to keep them awaked, to withſtand that evil which oppreſſeth them: but we muſt diſcover the foulneſs and folly, the pernicious effects, yea, the injuſtice that is in this cowardly, baſe, and feeble paſſion, to the end we may learn with all our might to flie and avoid it, as moſt unworthy the wiſeſt men, according to the doctrine of the Stoicks; which is not ſo eaſie to be done becauſe it excuſeth and covereth it ſelf with many beautifull colours of Nature, Pietie, Goodneſs, yea, the greateſt part of the world it draws to honour and favour it, making it an ornament to wiſdome, virtue, conſcience.

2. *Not naturall. Publike mournings.*

Firſt then, it is ſo far from being naturall (as it would make men believe) that it is formall, and an enemy to nature, as may eaſily be proved. Touching ceremonious ſorrows, and publick mournings, ſo much affected and practiſed in former times, and likewiſe at this preſent (my meaning is not to touch the honeſtie and moderation of obſequies and funerals, nor that ſorrow that belongs to pietie and religion) what greater impoſture or deceitfull couſenage can there be in any things beſides? How many fained and artificiall counterfeit couſenages are there, with no ſmall coſt and charges, both in thoſe whom it concerneth, the authours of the ſport, and thoſe whoſe offices they make uſe of in that buſineſs? For to give the better

better credit to their judgling tricks, they hire people to lament and to ſend up their ſhreekings, cries and lamentations, which all men know to be fained and extorted for money, tears that are not ſhed but to be ſeen, and ſo ſoon as they are out of ſight, are dried up: where is it that Nature hath taught us this? Nay, what is there that Nature doth more abhor and condemn? It it a tyrannicall, falſe and vulgar opinion (the worſt, as hath been ſaid, almoſt of all the paſſions) that teacheth us to weep, and lament in ſuch a caſe. And if a man cannot finde occaſion of tears and an heavy countenance in himſelf, he muſt buy it at a dear price in another, in ſuch ſort that to ſatisfie this opinion he muſt enter into a great charge, whereof nature if we would credit it, would willingly diſcharge us. Is not this willingly and publikely to betray reaſon, to enforce and to corrupt nature, to proſtitute his own manhood, to mock both the world and himſelf, to ſatisfie the vulgar ſort, which produce nothing but errour, and account of nothing that is not counterfeit and diſguiſed? Neither are thoſe more particular ſorrows naturall, as it ſeems to many; for if they did proceed from nature, they would be common to all men, and almoſt touch all men alike. Now we ſee that the ſelf-ſame things that are cauſes of ſorrow to ſome, give occaſion of joy unto others, that one Province, one perſon laugheth, at that whereat another weepeth; that they that are converſant with thoſe that lament, exhort them to reſolution, and to quit themſelves of their tears. Yea the greateſt part of thoſe that thus torment themſelves, when you have talked with them, or that themſelves have had the leiſure but to diſcourſe upon their own paſſions, they confeſs that it is but a folly thus to afflict themſelves, and praiſe thoſe who in the like adverſities, have made head againſt Fortune, and with a manly and generous courage have withſtood their afflictions. And it is certain, that men do not accommodate their mourning to their cauſe of ſorrow, but the opinion of thoſe with whom they live. And if a man mark them well, he ſhall finde that it is opinion, which the more to annoy us preſenteth the things unto us, which torment us either more then they ſhould, or by anticipation, fear and prevention of that which is to come, ſooner then they ſhould. *Particular.*

But it is againſt nature, inaſmuch as it polluteth and defaceth whatſoever nature hath made beautifull and amiable in us, which is drowned by the force of this paſſion, as the beauty of a pearl is diſſolved in vinegar. We make our ſelves hereby ſpectacles of pity, 3. *Againſt nature.*

we go with our heads hanging our eyes faſtened on the earth, our mouths tongueleſs, our members immovable, our eyes ſerve for no other uſe then to weep, that you may ſay we are nothing but ſweating ſtatues, turned (as the Poets feign) like *Niobe* into a ſtone by the power of this paſsion.

4. *Injuſt and impious.* Now it is not onely contrary and an enemy unto nature, but God himſelf: for what other thing is it, but a raſh and outragious complaint againſt the Lord and common law of the whole world, which hath made all things under the Moon changeable and corruptible? If we know this law, why do we torment our ſelves? If we know it not, whereof do we complain, but of our own ignorance, and that we know not that which Nature hath written in all the corners and creatures of the world? We are here not to give a law, but to receive it, and to follow that which we find eſtabliſhed: for to torment our ſelves by contradicting, doth but double our pain.

5. *Pernicious.* Beſides all this, it is pernicious and hurtfull unto man, and by ſo much the more dangerous, becauſe it killeth when we think it comforts, hurteth under the colour of doing good, under a falſe pretence of plucking the iron out of the wound, it drives it to the heart; and the blows thereof are ſo much the more hardly avoided, and the enterpriſes broken becauſe it is a domeſtical enemy brought up with us, which we have engendred for our own puniſhment.

6. *Outwardly.* Outwardly, by a deformed and new countenance wholly altered and counterfeited; it diſhonoureth and defameth man. Do but conſider when it entreth into us, it filleth us with ſhame, in ſuch ſort, that we dare not ſhew our ſelves in publick place, no not privately to our deareſt friends: and after we are once poſſeſſed of this paſsion, we do nothing but ſeek corners to hide our ſelves from the ſight of men. What is this to ſay, but that it condemneth it ſelf, and acknowledgeth how indecent it is? For it is for a woman that is taken in her wantonneſs to hide her ſelf, and to fear to be known. Again do but conſider the veſtments and habits of ſorrow, how ſtrange and effeminate they are; which ſheweth, that it taketh away whatſoever is manly and generous in us, and puts upon us the countenances and infirmities of women: and therefore the *Thracians* adorned thoſe men that mourned, like women. And ſome ſay, that ſorrow makes men eunuchs. The firſt and more manly and generous laws of the *Romans* forbad theſe effeminate lamentations, finding it an horrible thing, that men ſhould ſo degenerate

degenerate from their own natures, and do things contrary to manhood; allowing onely of thoſe firſt tears which proceed from the firſt incounter of a freſh and new grief, which may fall even from the eyes of Philoſophers themſelves, who keep with their humanity their dignity: and may fall from the eyes, virtue not falling from the heart.

Now it doth not onely alter the viſage, change and diſhoneſtly diſguiſe a man outwardly, but peircing even to the marrow of the bone, *Triſtitia exſiccat oſſa: Heavineſs drieth the bones.* It weakneth likewiſe the ſoul, troubleth the peace thereof, makes a man unapt to good and honourable enterpriſes, taking away the taſte, the deſire, and the diſpoſition to do any thing that is profitable either to himſelf or to another, and not onely to do good, but to receive it. For even thoſe good fortunes that light upon him diſpleaſe him: every thing is tart unto his ſoul, as victuals to a corrupted ſtomack: and laſtly, it maketh bitter our whole life, and poyſoneth all our actions. 7. *Inwardly.*

It is two-fold, great and extreme, or at leaſtwiſe, though not great in it ſelf, yet great when by reaſon of a ſudden ſurpriſe and furious unexpected alarum it ſeaſeth upon the heart of man, pierceth it through, depriveth him of motion and ſenſe, like a ſtone, and not unlike that miſerable mother *Niobe.* 8. *The diſtinction.*

*Diriguit viſu in medio, calor oſſa reliquit,*
*Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore fatur.*
*She ſwounded at the half, all being too much,*
*To ſee at once and live; her grief was ſuch:*
*She falls, ſhe fluctuates, ſhe reſounds and breaks,*
*And ſcarce at length, with much ado ſhe ſpeaks.*

And therefore the Painter diverſly and by degrees preſenting unto us the ſorrow and miſerable eſtate of the parents and friends of *Iphigenia* when ſhe was ſacrificed; when he came to her father, he painted him with his face covered, as confeſsing his Art not ſufficient to expreſs in the viſage a grief of that degree. Yea, ſometimes a ſorrow may be ſuch, that it killeth out-right. The ſecond degree is the indifferent ſorrow, which though perhaps it may be greater then the former, yet in time it is leſſened and eaſed, and is expreſſed by tears, ſobs, ſighs and lamentations: *Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes ſtupent. Light cares do ſpeak, great confound.*

Particular adviſements and remedies againſt this evil, are *Lib. 3. cap. 29.*

## CHAP. XXXII.

### *Compassion.*

WE sigh with those that are afflicted, and with a fellow-like feeling pity their miseries, either because by a secret consent we participate one the others evils, or because we fear that in our selves, which hath happened to others. But this is done two wayes, whereby there is likewise a twofold compassion; The one good, when a man with a good will, not troubling or afflicting himself, not effeminating his own nature, and without impeachment of equity or honour, doth freely and effectually succour those that are afflicted: this is that virtue so much commended in Religion, found in the holiest and wisest in the world: The other is a passion of a feeble mind, a sottish and feminine pitie, which proceedeth from a delicate tenderness, a troubled spirit, proper to women, infants, and to cruell and malicious minds (which are consequently base and cowardly, as hath been proved in the Chapter of *Cruelty*) who pity the punishments of offenders, which produceth unjust effects, not respecting the depth and merit of the cause, but the present fortune, state, and condition.

Advisements and remedies against this evil, you shall find, *Lib. 3. Cap. 30.*

## CHAP. XXXIII.

### *Fear.*

1. *The description.*

FEar is the apprehension of an evil to come, which holdeth us in a continuall care, and runs before those evils which fortune threatneth us.

We speak not here of that fear of God so much commended in Scripture, nor of that fear which proceedeth from love, and is a sweet respect towards the thing beloved, commendable in subjects and all inferiours towards their superiours; but of that vicious fear that troubleth and afflicteth, which is the seed of sinne, the twin of shame, both of one wombe, sprung from that close and cursed marriage of the spirit of man with a diabolicall perswasion. *Timeo eò quòd nudus essem, & abscondi me: I fear, because I was naked, and therefore I hid my self.*

2. *The malice & tyranny thereof*

It is a deceitfull and malicious passion, and hath no other power over us, but to mock and seduce us: it serves its turn with that which

which is to come, where though we seem to foresee much, we see nothing at all: and in that doubtfull darkness it holdeth us, as in a dark place, as thieves do by night, to the end they may rob a man, and not be known, and give a great and sudden affright with a small number. And therefore it tormenteth us with masks and shews of evils, as men fear children with bug-bears; evils that have nothing but a simple appearance, and have nought in themselves whereby to hurt us; yea, are not evils, but that we think them so. It is the onely apprehension which we have, which makes that evil to us, which is not so, and draweth evil even from our own good to afflict us withall. How many do we see every day, that with fear to become miserable, become that they fear, and turn their vain fear into certain miseries? How many have lost their friends, by distrusting their friends; have got diseases, by fearing them? One hath in such sort conceived an opinion that his wife hath played false play with him, that for grief he languisheth; another hath in such sort apprehended such a conceit of poverty, that he falleth sick: and to be brief some have died for fear to die. And even so may a man say almost of whatsoever we fear; for fear seemeth not to other end, then to make us find that which we flie from. Doubtless, fear is of all other evils the greatest and most tedious; for other evils are no longer evils then they continue, and the pain endureth no longer then the cause; but fear is of that which is, and that which is not, and that (perhaps) which never shall be, yea sometimes of that which cannot possible be. Behold then a passion truly malicious and tyrannicall, which draweth from an imaginary evil, true and bitter sorrows, & is over-greedie by thought and opinion, to overtake, nay out-run them.

Fear doth not onely fill us with evils. and many times by false 3.
appearances, but it likewise spoyleth all the good that we have, and all the pleasure of our life; as an enemy to our rest. A man can take no delight in the fruition of that good which he feareth to loose, life it self cannot be pleasant, if a man fear to die. Nothing good (saith an ancient Writer) can bring pleasure with it, but that against the losse whereof a man is alwayes prepared.

It is also a strange passion, indiscreet, and inconsiderate, and pro- 4.
ceeds as often from the want of judgement, as of heart: It ariseth from dangers, & many times casteth us into dangers; for it engendreth in us such an inconsiderate desire to get out, that it astonisheth, troubleth, and hindreth us from taking that order that is fit to

get

get out. It bringeth a violent kind of trouble, whereby the soul being affrighted, with-draweth it self into it self, and debateth with it self how to avoid that danger that is presented. Besides that great discouragement that it bringeth, it seizeth on us with such an astonishment, that we lose our judgement, and there is no longer reason or discourse in us: it maketh us to flie when no man pursueth, yea, many times our own friends and succourers: *Adeò pavor etiam auxilia formidat*; *Insomuch that fear dreadeth his own helps.* Many have run mad herewith, yea the senses themselves have hereby lost their use: we have our eyes open, and see not; one speaks to us, and we hearken not unto him; we would flie, and we cannot go.

An indifferent fear puts wings to our heels; a great nayl fastens our feet and entangles them. Fear perverteth and corrupteth the entire man: both the spirit, *Pavor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expectorat*; *Fear depriveth my mind of all wisdome and understanding.* And the body,

*Obstupui, steteruntque comæ, vox faucibus hæsit.*
*Cold sudden fear, supplants his natures heat,*
*And layes him speechless, till his blond retreat.*

Sometimes it makes desperate, and therefore resolute, like that *Romane* Legion under the conduct of the Consul *Sempronius* against *Hanibal*, *Audacem fecerat ipse timor*; *Fear made him bold.* There are fears and affrightments without any apparant cause, and as it were by some celestiall impulsion, which they call Panick terrours. *Terrores de cœlo, arescentibus hominibus præ timore*; *Terrours from heaven, men consuming away with fear*: such as once happened in the citie of *Carthage*, and wherewith whole people and armies have been confounded. Luke 21.

Particular advisements and remedies against this evil, are *Lib.* 3. *Cap.* 28.

The

# The second Consideration of Man,

## *By comparing him with all other Creatures.*

### CHAP. XXXIV.

WE have considered man wholly and simply in himself: Now let us consider him, by comparing him with other creatures, which is an excellent means to know him. This comparison hath a large extent, and many parts that bring much knowledge of importance, and very profitable, if it be well done. But who shall do it? Shall man? He is a party and to be suspected; and to say the truth, deals partially therein: which may be easily proved, because he keeps neither measure nor mediocrity. Sometimes he placeth himself far above all; he terms himself a master, and disdaineth the rest: divides unto them their morsels, distributeth such a portion of faculties and powers unto them as shall seem good unto him. Sometimes, as it were in despight, he debaseth himself beneath all; he murmureth, complaineth, wrongeth Nature as a cruel step-mother, makes himself the outcast and most miserable of the world. Now both these extremes are equally against reason, verity, modestie. But how would you have him to walk uprightly and evenly with all other creatures, when he doth it not with man his companion, nor with God himself, as shall be shewed? This comparison is also difficult to do: for how can a man know the inward and secret carriages of creatures, that which moveth within them? But yet let us do our endeavour to do it without passion. 1. *A profitable and difficult comparison, wherein man is suspected.* *In the Chapter of presumption*

First, the policie of the world is not so unequall, so deformed and irregular, neither is there so great a disproportion between the parts thereof, but that they that are near neighbours, and touch one another, have a resemblance, some more, some lesse. So is there a great vicinity and kindred betwixt man and other creatures: they have many things alike and common to each other, and they have differences likewise, but not so far distant and unlike, but that they may hold together. Man is neither altogether above, nor beneath the rest. *All that is under heaven*, saith the Wisdome of God, *runs the same fortune.* 2. Eccles. 3.

Let us first speak of those things that are common to all, and almost

3. *Things common.* Eccles. 4.

almost alike; which are, to engender, nourish; to do, move, live, die: *Idem interitus hominis & jumentorum, & æqua utriusque conditio: As the death of men so of beasts, and condition of them both is alike.* And this is against those that find themselves agrieved, saying, That man is the most contemptible creature of Nature, abandoned, left naked upon the naked earth, without covert, without armour, bound, swadled, without instruction of what is fit for him: whereas all other creatures are clothed and covered with shels, husks, hair, wool, feathers, scales; armed with teeth, horns, talons, both to assail and to defend: taught to swim to run, to flie, to sing, to seek their relief, and man knows neither how to go, nor to speak, nor to eat, nor any thing but cry, without an apprentiship and much labour. All these complaints to him that considereth the first composition and naturall condition, are unjust and false; Our skin is as sufficiently proved against the injuries of times and seasons as theirs; witness many Nations (as hath been said) that never knew what garments meant: yea, those parts thas we think good, we keep uncovered, yea the most tender and sensible, as the face, the hands, the stomach, and the delicatest damosels their breasts. Bands and swadling clothes are not necessary, witness the *Lacedemonians*, and in these dayes the *SWitzers*, *Almains*, which dwel in cold countreys; the *Bisques* and vagabonds that are called *Egyptians*. Crying is likewise common unto beasts. all creatures almost complain, and groan for a time, after they come into the world. As for armour, we want not that which is naturall, and have more motion of our members, use their service more naturally and without instruction. If some beasts excell us in this, we in the same excell divers others. The use of eating is both in them and in us naturall, and without instruction. Who doubteth that an infant, being once able to feed himself, knows how to seek his sustenance? And the earth likewise bringeth forth and offereth enough unto him for his necessity, without other culture or art; witness so many Nations, which without labour, industry and care, live plenteously. As for speech, a man may well say, that if it be not naturall, it is not necessary: but it is common to man with other creatures: What else but speech is that faculty we see in them, of complaining, rejoycing, of calling others to their succour, of making love? And as we speak by gestures and motion of the eyes, the head, the shoulders the hands (herein deaf men are very cunning); so beasts as we see in those that have no voice, who nevertheless do enter-

1. *Nakedness, cap. 5.*

2. *Swadling clothes.*

3. *Crying.*

4. *Arms.*

5. *Eating.*

6. *Speech.*

change

change their mutuall offices, and as in some kinde of measure beasts understand us, so wee them. They flatter us, threaten us, intreat us, and we them; we speake to them, and they to us, and if we perfectly understand not one another, where is the fault? In us or in them? That is not to be determined. They may as well account us beasts by that reason, as we them, yea they reproach us for that we our selves understand not one another. We understand not the *Bisques*, the *Britains*, and they all understand the one the other, not only of the same, but (which is more) of a divers kinde. By a certain barking of the dog, the horse knoweth that he is in choler, and by another voice he knoweth he is not.

7. *Mutuall intelligence.*

Again, they have their intelligence with us. In the warrs in the middest of the fight, Elephants, Doggs, Horses, understand with us, they frame their motions according to the occasion they pursue, they make their stand, they retire, nay they have their pay, and divide the booty with us, as it hath been practised in the new conquest of the Indies. And these are those things that are common to all, and alike.

4. *Differences and advantages.*

Let us now come to those differences and advantages that the one hath over the other. Man is singular and excellent in some things above other creatures, and in others, beasts have the superiority, to the end that all things might thereby be knit and inchained together, in this generall policy of the world and nature. The certain advantages or excellencies of man, are those great faculties of the soul; the subtility, vivacity, and sufficiency of the spirit to invent, to judg, to chuse, speech to demand, and to offer, and to succour, the hand to execute that the spirit hath invented either of it self, or learned from another. The form also of the body, the great diversity of the motion of the members, whereby his body doth him better service.

*Of man.*

5. *Of beasts generall.*

The certain advantages that beasts have over men, and such as are past all doubt, are either generall or particular. The generall are health, and strength of body far more perfect, constant, and strong in them, among whom there are no blinde, deafe, lame, mute, diseased, defective and ill born, as amongst men. The *Sereno* hurts them not, they are not subject to rheumes from whence proceed almost all other diseases; from which man though he cover his head with a hat and a house too, can hardly defend himself. Moderation in diet and others actions, innocency, safety, peace, and tranquillity of life, a plain and intire liberty without shame, fear,

fear, or ceremony, in things naturall and lawfull, (for it is onely man that hath cause to hide himself in these actions, and whose faults and imperfections offend others.) Exemption from so many vices and disorders, superstition, ambition, avarice, envie, yea mighty dreams trouble not them as they do men: not so many thoughts and phantasies. The particular advantages are the pure, high healthfull, pleasant ambition, and abode of birds in the aire. Their sufficiency in some Arts, as the Swallow and other birds in building; the Spider in spinning and weaving; divers beasts in Physick; and the Nightingale in Musick. Marvellous effects and properties, not to be imitated, no not imagined, as the property of the fish *Remora*, to stay the greatest vessels of the Sea; as we read of the chief galley of *Marcus Antonius*, and the self same of *Caligula*; of the *Torpedo* or Cramp fish, to benum and dead the members of another, though far distant, and not touching him; of the Hedgehog, to foresee the winds; of the Chameleon., to change his colours. Prognostications, as of birds in their passages from country to country, according to the diversity of the reasons; of all beasts that are dams, in knowing which of their young is the best; for some hap falling out of defending them from danger, or conveying them to them to their nests, they alwayes begin with that they know and foresee to be the best. In all these things man is far their inferiour, and in some of them he hath no skill at all. A man may add unto this, if he will, the length of our lives, which in some beasts doth seven or eight times exceed the longest term of the life of man.

*Particular.* 1.

6. *Disputable advantages.* 1. *Reason.*

Those advantages that man pretend to have above beasts, but are yet disputable, and perhaps as well in beasts as men, are many: First the reasonable faculties, discourse, reasoning, discipline, judgment, prudence. There are here two things to be spoken, the one of the verity of the thing it self. It is a great question, whether beast be deprived of all these spirituall faculties. The opinion that they are not deprived, but have them, is the more true and the more authentick. It is defended by many great Philosophers, especially by *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, the *Stoicks*, *Galen*, *Porphyry*, *Plutarch*, and maintained by this reason. The composition of the brain, which is that part which the soul makes use of, and whereby it reasoneth is all alike, as the same in beasts and men, confirming by experience. Beasts from particulars conclude generals; by the sight of one onely man, they know all men, they know how

how to joyn, and divide, and distinguish, the good from ill, for the safegard of their lives, liberty, and little ones. Yea, we read and see, if we would but mark and consider it, many things done by beasts, that do far excell the sufficiency, subtilty, and all the wit and cunning of the common sort of men; some of those that are best worth the noting, I will note unto you. The Fox being to pass over a river that is frozen with ice, applieth his eare unto the ice to finde whether he can hear any noise, and that the water do run under it, that thereby he may resolve either to go forward, or to retire back; of whom the *Thracians* have learned the same cunning, being to pass their frozen rivers. A Dog, to the end he may know which way of three, either his master, or that beast he hunteth is gone, having assured himself by senting them, that he hath not passed by two of them, because he finds not the trace, without the setting of his nose to the ground or farther traversing he runneth mainly into the third. The Mule of the Philosopher *Thales* crossing a river with a sack of salt on his back, and being plunged into the deep with his burthen, his salt dissolved in the water, and made his burthen the lighter; which the Mule (falling into the deep by chance) having found, being afterwards loaden with wooll, used the same remedy, and sunke the more. *Plutarch* reporteth, that he saw a Dog in a ship, casting stones into a pipe of oile, to make the oile to mount, that he might the better come at it. As much is reported of the Crowes of *Barbarie*, who by that means raise the water when it is too low, that they may drink. So likewise Elephants gather stones and sticks, and cast them into that ditch whereinto their companion is fallen, to help him to get out. The Oxen of the Kings gardens of *Suze*, being taught to go in a wheele a just hundred turns, to draw water to water the gardens, they would never exceed that just number, and were never deceived in their account. All these things, how can they be done, without discourse and reason, addition and division? To say they know not this, were to deny that we see they do. What should we think of that dexterity that is in the Elephant, in plucking those darts and javelings forth of his body, with little or no pain at all? of the Dog that *Plutarch* speaketh of, which in a publike play upon a scaffold counterfeited death, drawing towards his end, trembling, afterwards growing stiff, and suffering himself to be carried forth by little and little coming to himself, & lifting up his head counterfeited a new resurrection? of so many apish imitations and

strange

strange tricks that the dogs of Players and Jugglers do? of the policies and inventions wherewith beasts defend themselves against the assaults we make upon them? of the husbandry and great providence of the Ant, in laying abroad his grain to drie, least it take moisture and so corrupt, in nipping the ends thereof that it grow not? of the policy of the Bee, where there is such diversity of offices and charges so firmly established.

7. *An opposition of the naturall instinct.*

To beat down all this, some do maliciously attribute these things to a naturall, servile and forced inclination; as if beasts did perform their actions by a naturall necessity, like things inanimate, as the stone falleth downward, the fire mounteth upward. But besides that, that cannot be, nor enter into our imagination; for there must be a numbring of the parts, comparison, discourse by addition and division, and consequents; they likewise know not what this naturall inclination and instinct is; they be words which they abuse to small purpose, that they might not be deaf and mute altogether. Again, this saying is retorted against them: for it is beyond all comparison more noble, honourable, and resembleth more the Divinity to work by nature then by Art and apprentiship; to be led and directed by the hand of God, then by our own; regularly to act by a naturall and inevitable condition, then regularly by a rash and casuall liberty.

By this objection of the naturall instinct, they would likewise deprive them of instruction and discipline both active and passive, but experience gives them the lie; for they do both receive it: witness the Pie, the Parret, the Black-bird, the Dogge, the Horse, as hath been said; and they give it, witness the Nightingale, and above all other the Elephant, which excelleth all other beasts in docility, and all kind of discipline and sufficiency.

8. As for this faculty of the spirit whereof man doth so much glory, which is to spiritualize things corporall and absent, robbing them of all accidents, to the end it might conceive them after its own manner, *Nam intellectum est intelligente ad modum intelligentis*; *For that which is understood, is in him that understandeth, after the manner of the understander*, beasts themselves do the like. The Horse accustomed to the wars sleeping in his stable, trembleth and groaneth as if he were in the midst of the fight, conceiveth the sound of the drumme, the trumpet, yea an army it self. The Hare in sleep, panting, lifteth up her scut shaking her legs, conceiveth a spirituall Hare. Dogs that are kept for guard, in their sleep do snarl,

and

and sometimes break out right, imagining a stranger to become. To conclude this first point, we must confess that beasts do reason, have the use of discourse and judgment, but more weakly and imperfectly then man ; they are inferiour unto men in this, not because they have no part therein at all ; they are inferiour unto men, as amongst men some are inferiour unto others ; and even so amongst beasts there is such a difference : but yet there is a greater difference between men ; for (as shall be said hereafter) there is a greater distance between a man and a man, then a man and a beast. But for all this, we must not hereby infer a kinde of equality or parity betwixt a beast and a man (though, as *Aristotle* saith, there are some men so weak and blockish, that they differ from a beast only in figure) and that the soul of a beast is immortall, as that of a man ; or the soul of a man mortall, as that of a beast : for these are but malicious illations. For, besides that in this reasoning faculty, a man hath a very great advantage above beasts, so hath the other faculties more high and wholly spirituall, whereby he is said to be like unto God himself, and is capable of immortality, wherein beasts have no part, and are signified by that understanding, which is more then a simple discourse, *Nolite fieri sicut equus & mulus, in quibus non est intellectus* : *Be not like horse and mule, in whom there is no understanding.*

The other point which we are to speak of in this matter is, that 9.
this preheminence and advantage of understanding, and other spirituall faculties that man pretendeth, is sold him at a dear rate, and brings with it more hurt then good : for it is the principall source of all those evills that oppress him ; of vices, passions, maladies, irresolutions, trouble, despair, which beasts want, by the want of this great advantage : witness the Hog of *Pyrrho*, which did eat his meat peaceably in the ship, in the middest of a great tempest, when all the men were almost dead for fear. It seemeth that these great parts of the soul, have been denied unto beasts ; or at least-wise lessned, and given them more feeble, for their great good and quiet, and bestowed upon man for his torment : for it is long of them that he toileth and travelleth, tormenteth himself with what is past, and that which is to come ; yea he imagineth, apprehendeth, and feareth those evills that are not, nor ever shall be. Beasts apprehend nothing that is ill, untill they feel it; and being escaped, they are presently in security and at peace. So that we see that man is most miserable even in that wherein he

thought himself most happy : whereby it seemeth that it had been better for man not to have been indued and adorned with all those beautifull and celestiall armes, since he turneth them against himself, even to his own destruction. And to say the truth, we see those that are most stupid and feeble of spirit, live at best content, and feel not their evill accidents in so high a degree, as those that are more spirituall.

10. 2 *Signiory and command.*

Another advantage that man pretendeth above beasts, is a signiory and power of commanding, which he thinketh he hath over beasts : but besides, that it is an advantage that men themselves have, and exercise the one over the other this is not true. For where is this command of man, this obedience of the beast ? It is a monster that was never seen, yea men do more fear beasts, then beasts them. It is true, that man hath a great preheminence over beasts ; *Vt præsit piscibus maris, volatilibus cœli, bestiis terræ : That he might rule over the fish of the sea, the fowles of the ayre, and the beasts of the earth.* And this by reason of his beautifull and upright forme, of his wisdome, and the prerogative of his spirit : but not that he should either command, or they obey.

Gen. 1.

11. 3 *Liberty.*

There is likewise another advantage, neer neighbour to this pretended by man, which is a plain liberty, reproaching beasts with their servitude, captivity, subjection : but this is to small purpose. There is far greater reason why man should reproach man ; witness those slaves, not onely made by force, and such as descend from them, but also those that are voluntary, who either sell for money their liberty, or give it out of the lightness of their hearts, or for some commodity, as the ancient Fencers sold out-right women to their mistresses, souldiers to their captains. Now, there is none of all this in beasts, they never serve one another, not yield themselves to any servitude either active or passive, either to serve, or to be served, and are in every thing more free then men. And as man goeth to the chase, taketh, killeth, eateth the beast ; so is he taken killed, eaten by them in his turn, and more honourably too, by main strength, not by wit and art, as man doth : and not onely by them is he killed, but by his companion, by another man, a thing base and dishonourable. Beasts assemble not themselves in troupes to go to kill, to destroy, to ransack, to inthrall another trope of their kinde, as men do.

12. 4 *Virtue.*

The forth and greatest advantage pretended by man is in virtue, but of morall it is disputable (I mean morall materially by the out-

outward action: for formally the morality, good or evill, virtue and vice, cannot be in a beast. Kind acknowledgment, officious amity, fidelity, magnanimity, and many other virtues, which consist in society and conversation, are more lively, more expres and constant, then can be in the common sort of people. *Hircanus* the dog of *Lysimachus* continued upon the bed of his dead master, refusing all kinde of sustenance, and afterwards cast himself into that fire wherein his master was burnt, and there died with him. The self-same did another belonging to one *Pyrrhus*. That dog of wise *Hesiodus* discovered the murder of his master. Another in like sort in the presence of King *Pyrrhus*, and his whole army. Another which never ceased, as *Plutarch* affirmeth, going from city to city, untill that sacrilegious robber of the Temple of *Athens* was apprehended and brought to judgment. That history is famous, of the Lion that was host and nurse to *Androdus* the slave, and his Physitian, which would not touch him being cast out unto him: which *Appion* affirmeth to have seen at *Rome*. An Elephant having in choler killed his governour, repenting himself of it, refused any longer to eate, drink, or live. Contrariwise, there is not a creature in the world, more unjust, unthankfull, traiterous, perfidious, lying, and deceitfull, then man. Again, forasmuch as virtue consisteth in the moderation of our appetites, and the bridling of our pleasures, beasts are much more moderate therein then we, and do better contain themselves within the limits of nature. For they are not onely not touched with unnaturall, superfluous and artificiall passions and desires, which are all vicious and infinite, as men, who for the most part are plunged in them, but also in the naturall, as eating and drinking, the acquaintance betwixt the male and the famale, they are far more moderate and stayed. But that we may see which is the more virtuous or vicious, a man or a beast, and in good earnest to shame a man more then a beast, let us take the virtue most proper and agreeable unto man, that is, as the word it self importeth, humanity: as the most strange and contrary vice is cruelty. Now herein beasts have advantage enough, even to make men blush for shame. They never assail, and seldome offend those of their kinde, *Major serpentum ferarumq; concordia quàm hominum: Greater is the concord and agreement amongst serpents and wilde beasts, then amongst men.* They never fight but for great and just causes, as the defence and preservation of their lives, liberty, and their little ones: and that

*Humanity. Cruelty.*

they do with their naturall and open armes, by their only force and valour, and that one to one, as in single combats, and not in troupes, nor by designment. Their combats are short and soon ended, untill one of them be either wounded, or yieldeth; and the combat ended, the quarrell, hatred, and choler is likewise at an end. But man hath no quarrell but against man, for not only light, vain and frivolous causes, but many times unjust, with artificiall and traiterous armes, by deceits and wicked means, in troup and assembly gathered by assignement; and lastly, his wars are long, and never ended but with death; and when he is able no longer to hurt, yet the hatred and choler endureth.

12. *The conclusion of the second consideration.*

The conclusion of this comparison is, that untruly and vainly doth man glorifie himself above beasts. For if man have in him something more then they, as especially the vivacity of the spirit and understanding, and those great faculties of the soul; so likewise in exchange is he subject to a thousand evills from which the beasts are freed; inconstancy, irresolution, superstition, a painfull care of things to come, ambition, avarice, envie, curiosity, detraction, lying, and a world of disordered appetites, discontentments, emulations. This spirit wherewith man maketh himself so merry, brings him a thousand inconveniences, and then most, when it is most stirred and enforced. For it doth not onely hurt the body, trouble, break and weaken the bodily forces and functions, but also it hurts and hindereth it self. What casteth man into folly and madness, but the sharpeness, agility, and proper force of the spirit? The most subtill follies and excellent lunacies proceed from the rarest and quickest agitations of the spirit, as from greatest amities spring greatest enmities, and from soundest healths mortall maladies: Melancholy men, saith *Plato*, as they are more capable of knowledg and wisdome, so likewise of folly. And he well marketh it, shall finde, that in those elevations and sales of a free soul, there is some mixture of folly; for to say the truth, these things are neer neighbours.

13. *An exhortation.*

Touching a simple life, and such as is according to nature, beasts do far exceed men; they live more freely, securely, moderately, contentedly. And that man is wise that considereth hereof, and benefiteth himself by making them an instruction unto himself, which doing, he frameth himself to innocency, simplicity, liberty, and that naturall sweetness which shineth in beasts, and is wholly altered and corrupted in us by our artificiall inventi-

ons,

tions, and unbridled licentiousnes, abusing that wherein we say we excell them, which is the spirit, and judgement. And therefore God doth many times send us to school to birds, beasts themselves, to the Kite, the Grashopper, the Swallow, the Turtle, the Ant, the Ox, the Asse, and diverse others. Lastly, we must remember that there is a kind of commerce betwixt beasts and us a certain relation and mutuall obligation, whereof there is no other reason, but that they belong to one and the same master, and are of the same family that we are. It is an unworthy thing to tyrannize over them, we owe justice unto men, and pitie and gentlenes to such other creatures as are capable thereof.

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# The third Consideration of Man, which is by his life.

## CHAP. XXXV.

*The estimation, brevity, description of the life of man, and the parts thereof.*

IT is a great and principall point of wisdome, truly to know how to esteem of life, to hold and preserve it, to lose or to take it away, to keep and direct it, as much as after such a manner as is fit; there is not perhaps any thing wherein a man faileth more, or is more hindred. The vulgar unlearned sort account it a sovereign good, and preferreth it above all things; yea, he will not stick to redeem and prolong it by all the delays that may be, upon what conditions soever, thinking it can never be bought too dear: for it is all in all with him, his motto is, *Vitâ nihil charius: Nothing is dearer then life.* He esteemeth and loveth his life for the love of it self: he lives not but to live. It is no marvell if he fail in all the rest, if he be wholly compounded of errours, since from his very entrance, and in this fundamentall point he mistakes himself so grosly. It may be likewise with some lesse esteemed and more basely accouted of then it should, either by reason of some insufficiency in judgement, or a proud misknowledge thereof: for falling into the hands of those that are good and wise, it may be a profitable instrument both to themselves and others, and I cannot be of their opinion (as it is simply taken) that say it is best of all, not to be

1. *Of the estimation and worth of life.*

at all: and that the best is the shortest life: *Optimum non nasci, aut quàm citissimè aboleri: The best thing is, not to be born, or presently to dye.* And it is neither well nor wisely said, What hurt or what matter had it been, if I never had been? A man may answer him with the like question: Where had that good been which is come, and being not come, had it not been evill not to have been? It is a kinde of evill that wanteth good, whatsoever it be, yea though not necessary: These extremities are too extream and vicious, though not equally: but that seems true that a wise man spake, That is such a good as a man would not take, if he knew well what it were before he took; *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus; No man would except of life, if he knew what it were.* It is well that men are within before they see the entrance, and that they are carried hud-winkt into it. Now when they are within, some do cocker and flatter themselves therein, that upon what condition soever, they will not go forth again; others do nothing but murmure and vex themselves: but the wiser sort seeing it to be a market that is made without themselves, (for a man neither lives nor dies when and how he will) and that though the way be rough and hard, yet nevertheless it is not alwayes so, without winsing, or striving and troubling any thing, they accommodate themselves unto it as they may, and so pass their life in quiteness, making of necessity a virtue; which is a token of wisdome and industry: and so doing, they live as long as they should, and not, like fools, as long as they can. For, there is a time to live, and a time to dye: and a good death is far better then an ill life. A wise man lives no longer, then that his life may be worth more then his death: for the longest life is not alwayes the better.

*See hereof lib. 2. cap. 11.*

2. *Of the length and brevity of life.*

All men do much complain of the brevity of the life of man: not onely the simple vulgar sort, who wish it should never have end; but also (which is most strange) the greatest and wisest make it the principall ground of their complaints. To say the truth, the greatest part thereof being diverted and otherwise employed, there remains little or nothing for it self: for the time of our infancy, old age, sleep, maladies of minde and body, and many other times, both unprofitable and unfit for any good, being taken away, that which remaineth, is little or nothing at all. Nevertheless, without opposing the contrary opinion to them that hold a short life, to be a great good and gift of Nature, their complaint seemeth to have little equity and reason, and rather to proceed from malice. For,

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to what end serveth a long life ? Simply to live, to breath, to eat, to drink, to see this world : for all this what needs so long time ? We have seen, known, tasted, all in a short space ; and, knowing it, to desire so long a time to practise it, and still to reiterate the same thing, to what end is it ? Who will not be satisfied, nay wearied, to do alwaies one and the same thing ? If it be not tedious and irksome, at the least it is superfluous : it is a turning wheel where the same things come and go : it is alwayes to begin where we end, and to re-spin the same web. But perhaps they will say they desire a long life, to learn and to profit the more, and to proceed to a greater perfection of knowledg and virtue. Alas ! good souls that we are, what should we know, or who should teach us ? We employ but badly that little which is given us, not only in vanities, and those things that yield us no profit, but in malice and sin ; and then we cry out and complain, that we have not enough given unto us. And to say the truth, to what end serves so great store of knowledg and experience, since in the end we must leave it and dislodg it ; and having dislodged it altogether, forget and lose it all, or know it better and otherwise ? But you will say, that there are beasts that do triple and quadruple the life of man. To omit those fables that are told thereof ; be it so : but yet there are a number that live not a quarter of that time that man doth, and few neither, that live out their time. By what right, or reason, or privileg, can man challenge a longer life then other creatures? Is it because he doth better employ it in matters more high and more worthy life ? By this reason, he should live less time then all other creatures ; for there is none comparable to man, in the ill employments of his life, in wickedness, ingratitude, intemperance, and all manner of disorder and immodesty in manners, as hath been shewed before, in the comparison of man with beast : so that as I asked even now, to what end a long life served ; now I aske what evills there would be in the world, if the life of man were long ? What would he not enterprise, since the shortness of life, which cuts off his way, and (as they say) interrupts his cast ; and the uncertainty thereof, which takes away all heart and courage, cannot stay him, living as if he should live ever ? On the one side he feareth, perceiving himself to be mortall, but notwithstanding that, he cannot bridle himself from not coveting, hoping, enterprising, as if he were immortall. *Tanquam semper victuri vivitis, nunquam vobis fragilitas vestra succurrit : omnia tanquam mor-* Seneca.

*tales timetis, tanquam immortales concupiscitis. Ye live as though ye were alwayes to live; your frailty never comes into your minde: ye fear all things as mortall, but ye desire all things as immortall.* And to say the truth, what need hath Nature of all these great and goodly enterprises and imployments, whereby man challengeth a longer life then other creatures? Man therefore had no subject whereof to complain, but to be angry with himself. We have life enough, but we are not good husbands, we manage it not well; life is not short, but we make it so; we are not in want, but prodigall; *non inopes vitæ, sed prodigi*: we lose it, we dissipate it, we vilifie it, as if it were nought worth, as if we had more then enough: we all fall into one of these three faults, either we employ it ill, or about nothing, or in vain. *Magna vitæ pars elabitur male agentibus, maxima nihil agentibus, tota aliud agentibus. A great par of life is lost to those that do ill, a greater to those that do nothing, and all to those that do that they should not do.* A man studieth not to live, but rather busieth himself in any other thing; he shall never know how to do a thing well, by acquitting himself of labour, but by care and attention. Others reserve their lives untill they can live no longer, then take comfort in life, when there is nothing left but the lees and dregs thereof. Oh what folly, what misery is this! Yea there are some that have sooner ended, then begun to live, and life is past before they thought of it. *Quidam vivere incipiunt, cum desinendum; quidam antè desierunt, quam inceperint. Inter cætera mala, hoc quoq; habet stultitia, semper incipit vivere. Some begin to live, when they should dye; some ended, before they begin; amongst other evils, folly hath this, that it alwaies begins to live.*

Seneca. *Look lib. 3. cap. 6.*

3. *A description of the life of man.*

Our present life is but the entrance and end of a Tragedy, a perpetuall issue of errours, a web of unhappy adventures, a pursuit of diverse miseries inchained together on all sides; there is nothing but evill that it distilleth, that it prepareth; one evill drives forward another evil, as one wave another; torment is ever present, and the shadow of what is good deceiveth us; blindness and want of sense possesseth the beginning of our life, the middle is ever in pain and travell, the end in sorrow; and beginning, middle, and end in errour.

The life of man hath many discommodities and miseries common, ordinary and perpetuall; it hath likewise some particular and distinct, according to the diversity of the parts, ages and seasons; infancy,

infancy, youth, virility, old age ; every one have their proper and particular discommodities.

5. *A comparison betwixt youth and old age.*

The greatest part of the world speak more honourably and favourably of old age, as the more wise, ripe moderate accusing and shaming youth of a vicious, foolish, licencious, but very unjustly : for in truth the infirmities and vices of old age are more in number, more great and troublesome then those of youth, it fills the minde more with wrinckles, then the visage ; and there is not a soul growing old, grows not sowr and rotten. With the body the spirit is used, and the worse for the use, and at last returns to infancy again, *Bis pueri senes : Old men twice children* Old age is a necessary and puissant malady, which loadeth us insensibly with many imperfections. It were absurd to terme wisdome a difficulty of humours, an anxiety and distaste of things present, an impotencie to do as in former times : Wisdome is too noble to be served with such officers. To wax old is not to wax wise, nor to take away vices, but to change them into worse. Old age condemneth pleasure, but it is because it cannot taste or relish it aright, like *Æsops* dog, it saith it will none of it, but it is because it cannot joy in it : for old age leaveth not pleasure properly, but pleasure disdains old age ; for it is alwaies wanton and sporting ; and it is no reason that impotency should corrupt judgment, which should in youth know vice in pleasure ; and, in old age, pleasure in vice. The vices of youth are temerity, indiscreet forwardness, and unbridled liberty, and over-greedy desire of pleasure, which are naturall things proceeding from the heat of the bloud and naturall vigour, and therefore the most excusable ; but the vices of old age are far otherwise. The lighter are a vain and frail protervity, an envious pratling, unsociable humours, superstition, care to get riches, even then when the use of them is lost, a sottish avarice, and fear of death, which proceedeth properly, not from the want of spirit and courage, as they say, but because old men are long acquainted, and as it were cockered in this world, whereby their affections are knit unto it, which is not in young men : but besides these they are envious, froward, unjust : but that which is most sottish and ridiculous in them, is that they would not only be reverenced, but feared, and therefore they put upon them an austre look and disdainfull, thinking thereby to extort fear and obedience : but they are therein much deceived, for this stately and furious gesture is received of youth with mockery and laughter, being practised onely to blinde their eyes, and

and of purpose to hide and disguise the truth of things. There are in old age so many faults on the one side, and so many impotencies on the other, and therefore so fit for contempt, that the best way to compass their desires, is love and affection: for command and fear are no longer fit armes for them. It ill befits them to make themselves to be feared: and though they could do it, yet love and honour is a fairer purchase.

# The fourth Consideration of MAN, *morall, by his manners, humours, conditions, very lively and notable.*

## *THE PREFACE.*

ALL the descriptions, the wise and such as have taken greatest pains in the study of humane knowledg, have given unto men, seem all to note in man four things: *Vanity, Weakness, Inconstancy, Misery*; calling him the spoil of times, the play-game of Fortune, the image of inconstancy, the example and spectacle of infirmity, the ballance of envie and misery, a dreame, a fantasie, ashes, a vapour, a morning dew, a flower that presently fadeth and withereth, a winde, grass, a bladder or bubble, a shadow, leaves of trees carried with the wind, unclean seed in his beginning, a sponge of ordures, a sack of miseries in his middle age, a stench and meat for worms in his end; and to conclude, the most miserable and wretched thing in the world. *Iob*, one of the most sufficient in this matter, as well in the practice and contemplation thereof, hath well and at large discribed him, and after him, *Solomon*, in their books. To be short, *Pliny* seemeth very properly to have deciphered him, in calling him the most miserable, and yet the most arrogant creature of the world. *Solum ut certum sit nihil esse certi, nec miserius quicquam homine aut superbius*: *That it is onely certain, that there is nothing certain, neither any thing more proud, and miserable then man.* By the first word (miserable) he comprehendeth all those former descriptions, and as much as all the rest have said; but by the other (the most proud) he toucheth another chiefe point very important: and he seemeth in these two words to have uttered whatsoever can be said. These are those

two

two things, that seem to hurt and hinder one the other, Misery and Pride, Vanity and Presumption. See then how strange and monstrous a patcht-coat man is.

Forasmuch as man is composed of two diverse parts, the soul and the body, it is a matter of difficulty well to describe him entire, in his perfection and declining state. Some refer unto the body whatsoever ill can be spoken of man; they make him an excellent creature, and, in regard of his spirit, extoll him above all other creatures; but, one the other side, whatsoever is ill, either in man, or in the whole world, is forged and proceedeth from the spirit of man, and in it there is far more vanity, inconstancy, misery, presumption, then in the body, wherein there is little matter of reproach in respect of the spirit, and therefore *Democritus* calleth it a world of hidden miseries, and *Plutarch* proveth it in a book written of that subject. Now let us consider man more according to the life, then heretofore we have done, and pinch him where it itcheth not, referring all to these five heads, *vanity*, *weakness*, *inconstancy*, *misery*, and *presumption*, which are his more naturall and universall qualities, but the two latter touch him more neerly. Again, there are some things common to many of these five, which a man knows not to which to attribute it, and especially, imbecillity and misery.

## CHAP. XXXVI.

### 1. *Vanity.*

VAnity is the most essentiall and proper quality of humane nature. There is nothing so much in man, be it malice, infelicity, inconstancy, irresolution (and of all these there is alwaies abundance) as base feebleness, sotishness, and ridiculous vanity: and therefore *Democritus* met better with it, with a kinde of disdain of humane condition, mocking and laughing at it, then *Heraclitus*, that wept and tormented himself, whereby he gave some testimony, that he made some account thereof; and *Diogenes* who scorned it, then *Timon* that hater and flier of the company of men. *Pindarus* hath expressed it more to the life then any other, by the two vainest things in the world, calling it the dreame of a shadow, σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος. 1.

This is that, that hath wrought in the wisest so great a contempt of man, that hearing of some great designment and honourable enterprise,

enterprise, and judging it such, were wont nevertheless to say, that the world was not worthy a mans labour and pains, (so answered *Statilius* to *Brutus*, talking with him about the conspiracy against *Cesar*) and that a wise man should do nothing but for himself, for it it not reason that wise men, and wisdome should put themselves in danger for fooles.

2. *Thoughts.* This vanity is shewed and expressed many wayes, and after a diverse manner ; first in our thoughts and private imaginations, which are many times more then vain, frivolous, and ridiculous wherein nevertheless we spend much time, and yet perceive it not. We enter into them, we dwell in them, and we come forth again insensibly, which is a double vanity, and great forgetfulness of our selves. One walking in a hall, considereth how he may frame his paces after a certain fashion npon the boords of the floure : another discourseth in his minde, with much time and great attention, how he should carry himself if he were a King, a Pope, or some other thing, that he is assured can never come to pass ; and so he feedeth himself with wind, yea less then wind, that, neither is, nor ever shall be. Another dreameth how he shall compose his body, his countenances, his gestures, his speech after an affected fashion, and pleaseth himself therein, as with a thing that wonderfully becomes him, and that every man should take delight in. But what a vanity and sottish weakness in our desires is this, that brings forth beliefes and hopes far more vain ? And all this falleth out, not onely when we have nothing to do, when we are swallowed up with idleness, but many times in the midst of our most necessary affaires : so naturall and powerfull is vanity, that it robbeth and plucketh out of our hand, the truth, solidity, and substance of things, and fils us with wind, yea with nothing.

3. *Care for time to come.* Another more sottish vanity, is a troublesome care of what shall here fall out when we are dead. We extend our desires and affections beyond our selves, and our being ; we would provide that something should be done unto us, when we know not what is done unto us ; we desire to be praised after our death : what greater vanity ? It is not ambition, as it seemeth, and a man may think it, for that is the desire of a sensible and perceptible honour : if this praise of our selves when we are gone, might any way profit either our children, our parents, or our friends that survive us, it were well, there were some benefit, though not to our selves ; but to desire that as a good, which shall no way touch us, nor benefit

nefit others, is a meer vanity, like that of those who fear their wives will marry after their departure; and therefore they desire them with great passion to continue unmaried, and binde them by their wils so to do, leaving unto them a great part of their goods upon that condition. This is a vanity, and many times injustice. It was contrariwise a commendable thing in those great men in times past, which, dying, exhorted their wives to marry speedily for the better encrease of the Common-wealth. Others ordain, that for the love of them, and for their sakes, a friend keep such and such a thing, or that he do this or that unto their dead bodies, which rather sheweth their vanity, then doth any good to soul or body.

4. See here another vanity, we live not but by relation unto another; we take not so much care what we are in our selves in effect and truth, as what we are in the publike knowledg of men; in such sort, that we do many times deceive and deprive our selves, of our own goods and commodities, and torment our selves, to frame our outward appearances to the common opinion. This is true, not onely in outward things and such as belong to the body, and the expence and charge of our meanes, but also in the goods of the spirit, which seem unto us to be without fruit, if others enjoy them not, and they be not produced to the view and approbation of strangers.

5. *Agitations of the spirit.* Our vanity is not onely in our simple thoughts, desires, and discourses, but it likewise troubleth, shaketh and tormenteth both soul and body. Many times men trouble and torment themselves, more for light occasions and matters of no moment, then for the greatest and most important affaires that are. Our soul is many times troubled with small phantasies, dreames, shadowes, fooliries, without body, without subject, it is intangled and molested with choler, hatred, sorrow, joy, building castles in *Spain*. The remembrance of a farewell of some particular grace or action, afflicteth us more then a whole discourse of a matter of greater importance. The sound of names and certain words pronounced with a pittifull voice, yea with sighs and exclamations, piercеth even to the quick, as Oratours and Players, and others that sell wind and smoak, do well know and practice. And this wind catcheth and carrieth away many times, men that are most constant and setled, if they stand not upon their guard: so puissant is vanity over men. And not onely light and little things do shake and trouble

trouble us, but also lies and impostures, even those we know to be such (a strange thing) in such sort, that we take pleasure to deceive our selves in good earnest, to feed our phantasies with tales, with nothing. *Ad fallendum nosmetipsos ingeniosissimi sumus : We are wise to deceive our selves* ; witness they that weep and afflict themselves hearing a relation, or seeing a tragedy, which they know to be an invention made for delight, even of those things that never were. I could tell you of one that was so besotted, that he died for one whom he knew to be foul, old, deformed, not because he loved her, but because she was well painted, and plaistered or coloured with other impostures, though he alwayes knew them to be such.

*Visitations and offices of courtesies.*

6. Let us come from the particular vanity of every particular man in his common life, to see how much this vanity is tied to the nature of man, not onely as a private and personall vice. What vanity and loss of time is there in those visitations, salutations, congies, and mutuall entertainments, those offices of courtesie, orations, ceremonies, offers, praises, promises ! How many hyperbolicall speeches, hypocrisies and impostures are there in the sight and knowledg of all, both of those that give them, that receive them, that hear of them ! insomuch that it seemeth to be a match and market made together, to mock, lye, and deceive one another. And that which is worth all the rest, he that knows that a man doth impudently lye unto him, must yet give him thanks ; and he that knows that when he lies he is not believed, sets a bold face upon the matter, attending and observing one the other, who shall first begin and end ; when they could both be content they were both asunder. What enconveniences doth man endure ? He faigneth, counterfeiteth, disguiseth himself ; he endureth heat, cold, troubleth his rest, afflicteth his life for those courtly vanities, and leaveth his weighty affaires for the wind. We are vain at the charge of our own ease, yea of our health and of our life. The accidents and the lighter things trample under foot the substance, and the winde carrieth the body, so much is man a slave to vanity : and he that will do otherwise, shall be held for a fool, and a man that understands not the world. It is dexterity well to play this Comedy, and folly, not to be vain. Being entred into speech and familiar discourse, how many vain and unprofitable, false, fabulous tales are there (not to say wicked and pernicious, which are not of this count) how many vaunts and vain boastings ! Man desireth and

delighteth

delighteth to speak of himself and that which is his, and if he think he have either done, or said, or possesse any thing that is worthy estimation, he is not at ease untill he hath uttered it, and made it known to others: when a commodity first commeth, he entreth into an account thereof, he valueth it, he raiseth the price, nay he will not seem to attend his commodity, though he seek it with industry; and then to hear what the speech of the people is abroad, he thrusts himself into company, and it tickleth him at the heart to hear his happy succes spoken of, and that men esteem of him the more, and of what he esteems.

7. *Publike and universall agitations.*

But better to make known what credit and command this vanity hath over the nature of man, let us call to minde that the greatest alterations of the world, the most generall and fearfull agitations of States and Empires, armies, battels, murthers have risen from light, ridiculous and vain causes, witness the warrs of *Troy* and *Greece*, of *Silla* and *Marius*, *Cesar* and *Pompey*, *Augustus* and *Antony*. The Poets signifie as much, when they set all *Greece* and *Asia* on fire for an Apple. The first occasions and motives arise of nothing, afterwards they grow and increase: a testimony of the vanity and folly of man. Many times the accident doth more then the principall, the lesser circumstances touch more to the quick then the greatest, nay the causes and subjects themselves. The robe of *Cesar* troubled *Rome* more then his death did, or those two and twenty stabs with a poignard that were given him.

8. *Felicity and contentment.*

Lastly, the crown and perfection of the vanity of man is shewed, in that which he most affecteth and seeks after; he pleaseth himself and placeth his whole felicity in those vain and frivolous goods, without which he may well and commodiously live, and takes not that care that he should for the true and essentiall: his chance is winde his whole good nothing but opinion and dreames, wherein he is matchless. *God* hath all good things in essence all evill in understanding; man quite contrary possesseth his good things by phantasie, his evill in essence. Beasts content not, nor feed themselves with opinions and phantasies, but with that which is present, palpable, and in verity. Vanity hath been given unto man as his proper part and condition; he returns, he stirs, he hunts up and down, he catcheth a shadow, he adoreth the winde, he flies, he dies, and a moat at the last is the hire of his dayes work; *Vanitati creatura subjecta est etiam nolens, universa vanitas omnis homo*

*homo vivens : Every creature is subject to vanity, even against his will, and all men living are but vanity.*

## CHAP. XXXVII.

### *Debility or Infirmity.*

1. BEhold here the second head of this Consideration and humane knowledg : for how should vanity be other then frail and feeble ? This weakness is confessed, and proved by all that account many things easie to be understood of all, but is not taken to be such in those things it should, as in such wherein a man seemeth to be most strong, and least weak ; in desiring, possessing and using those things that he hath and holdeth, and in every good and evill ; and to be short, in such wherein he glorieth most, wherein he thinketh to excell others, and to be something. These are the true testimonies of his weakness : but we shall see this better apart.

2. *In desiring and chusing.* First, touching desire, a man cannot settle his contentment in any thing, no not his own desire and imagination. It is not in our power to chuse what we should, and whatsoever we have desired or obtained, it satisfies us not : but we go bleating after things unknown and to come, because things present content us not, and we more esteem of things absent. If one should put a man to his own choice, make him his own carver, it is not in his power so to chuse, as that he repent not his choice, or which he will not add unto, or take from, or altar some way or other ; for he desires that which he knows not how to express : and at the last nothing can content him, but he is angry and falleth out with himself.

3. *In passing and using.* The weakness of man doth more appear, and is greater in the possession and use of things, and that divers wayes : first, in that he cannot make use of any thing in its own purity and simple nature ; but he must disguise, altar and corrupt them, before he can accommodate them to his use : the elements, metals, and all things else in their own nature are not fit for use. Good things, delights and pleasures cannot be enjoyed without some mixture of evill and discommodity ; *Medio de fonte leporum surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat : Even from amidst the fountains of delights do arise alwayes some bitterness, which even in the height of pleasure do annoy.* The highest pleasure that is, hath a sigh and a complaint to accompany it ; and being come to perfection is but debility, a dejection

dejection of the minde, languiſhment. And extreme and full contentment hath more moderate ſeverity, then wanton delight; *Ipſa fœlicitas, ſe niſi temperat, premit : Felicity it ſelf, unleſs it temper it ſelf, vexeth.* And therefore it was well ſaid of him, that God ſells unto us whatſoever good thing he ſends us : that is to ſay, That he giveth nothing unto us purely good, but that we buy it at the ſcales with an addition of ſome evill to make up weight. So likewiſe ſorrow is never pure, without the alliance of ſome pleaſure; *Labor voluptaſq́, diſſimillima natura, ſocietate quadam naturali inter ſe ſunt juncta; eſt quædam flere voluptas : Labour and pleaſure, though in nature moſt unlike, yet by a certain naturall ſociety, they are linked together, ſo that even to weep is a certain delight.* So all things in this world are mingled and compounded with their contraries : thoſe motions and wrinkles in the viſage that ſerve to laugh, ſerve to weep, as Painters teach us : and we ſee that the extremity of laughter is mingled with tears. There is no good thing in us, that hath not ſome vicious tincture with it : *Omnes juſtitiæ noſtræ ſunt tanquam pannus menſtruatæ : All our righteouſneſs is as a menſtruous cloth,* as anon ſhall be ſhewed in his due place; nor no evill without ſome good: *Nullum ſine authoramento malum eſt : There is no ſin without puniſhment.* Miſery it ſelf alwayes ſerves to ſome end : for there is no evill without good, no good in man without evill : all is mingled, and there is nothing pure in our hands. Secondly, whatſoever happeneth unto us, we take and enjoy with an ill hand; our taſte is unreſolved and uncertain, it knows not how to hold and poſſeſſe any thing after a good manner: and from thence ſprang that undetermined queſtion of the ſoveraign good. The better things many times in our hands, by our infirmities, vice inſufficiency, are made worſe, are corrupted, become nothing, are unprofitable unto us, yea ſometimes hurtful and contrary.

4. *In good and evill.*

But humane imbecillity is more richly diſplayed in good and evill in virtue and vice : hence it is, that man cannot be, when it ſeems good unto himſelf, either wholly good or wholly wicked, but he hath his weakneſs, his impotencies in them both. Touching virtue, three points are to be conſidered : the firſt is, that it is not in the power of man to do all good, to put in practice all virtue; inſomuch that many virtues are incompatible, and cannot be altogether, at leaſt in one and the ſame ſubject as filiall or maidenly continency and viduall, which are wholly different; the married and unmaried eſtate; the two ſecond of widdowhood and marriage,

being more painfull and busie, and having more difficulty and virtue then the two first, of virginity and the unmarried estate, which have more purity, grace and ease: *Virgo felicior, vidua laboriosior;* Tertul. *in illa gratia, in ista virtus coronatur: The virgine is the happier, the widdow the more painfull, in the former grace, in the latter virtue is crowned.* That constancy which is in poverty, want, adversity, and that which is in abundance and prosperity: patience in beggery and liberality. And this is more true in vices, which are opposite one against the other.

5. The second point is, That many times a man cannot perform that, which belongs to one virtue, without the scandall and offence either of another virtue, or of it self; insomuch that they hinder one the other: whereby it comes to pass, that a man cannot satisfie the one, but at the charge of the other; which we must not attribute unto virtue, or think that the virtues cross and contrary one another, for they agree well enough; but unto the weakness of our humane condition, all the sufficiency and industery thereof being so short and so feeble, that it cannot finde any certain universall and constant rule, whereby to make an honest man: and such order cannot be taken, but that the meanes to do well, do many times hinder one the other. Let us take for example, Charity and Iustice: If I encounter my father or my friend in the warres, on the enemies part, in justice I ought to kill him, but in charity I should spare and save him. If a man be wounded to the death and past all remedy, and that there remained nothing but a grievous languishing, it were a deed of charity to make an end of him, as he did that killed *Saul* at his earnest intreaty; but this charity is punished by justice, as he was by *David*, and that justly, *David* being the minister of publick justice, not private charity: yea to be found neer unto a man in such a case, in a suspicious place, and where there is doubt of the murderer, although he be there to perform some office of humanity, is very dangerous; and the best thing that can happen unto him, is to be called into question, and put to answer to that accident, whereof he is innocent. So that we see that justice doth not only offend charity, but it hampereth and hindereth it self: and therefore it was very well said, and truly, *Summum jus, summa injuria: Extreme right, extreme wrong.*

6. The third point and the most notable is, that a man is constrained many times to use bad means, for the better avoidance of some great evill, or the execution of what is good, in such sort that he must sometimes

sometimes approve as lawfull, not onely those things that are not good, but that are starke naught: as if to be good, it were necessary to be somewhat wicked. And this is seen in every thing, in *Policie, Iustice, Verity, Religion.*

In *Policy*, how many evills are there permitted, and publickly acted, not onely by connivence or permission, but also by the approbation of the lawes themselves? as shall hereafter be said in his due place; *Ex senatusconsultis & plebiscitis scelera exercentur: Crimes are committed by the decrees of the Senate, and approbations of the people.* To disburden a State or Common-wealth, either of too great a number of people, or of such as are inflamed with a desire of wars, which the state, like a body replete with bad or abundant humours, cannot bear, it is the manner to send them elsewhere, and to ease themselves at the charge or disease of another. As the *French, Lombards, Goths, Vandals, Tartarians, Turks* have been accustomed to do. To avoid a civill war, it is the manner to entertain a strange war. To instruct others in the virtue of Temperance, *Lycurgus* caused the *Ilotes* their servants to be made drunk, that by the ugly deformity of their superfluous inundation, others might grow into an horror & detestation of that sin. The *Romans*, to prepare their people to valour, and a contempt of the dangers of death, ordained of purpose those furious spectacles of the Fencers, which at the first they ordained for offenders; afterwards for slaves or servants, but innocents; and lastly for free-men that gave themselves thereunto. Brothell houses in great Cities, *usuries, divorces*, under the law of *Moses*, and in diverse other nations, and religions, have been permitted for the better avoiding of great mischiefes, *Ad duritiem cordis eorum: For the hardnes of mens hearts.* 7. *Policie.*

In justice, which cannot subsist, cannot be executed, without the mixture of some wrong, not onely justice commutative, for that is not strange; it is after a sort necessary, and men could not live and traffick together, without mutuall dammage without offence, and the lawes allow of the loss which is under the moyety of the just price. But also justice distributive as it self confesseth; *Summum jus, summa injuria, & omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra singulos utilitate publicâ rependitur: Extreme right is extreme wrong, and all great examples have some injustice, which for the common good is practised against all*: *Plato* alloweth, and it is not against the law, by deceits and false hopes of favour and pardon, to draw the offender to confess his fault. This is by injustice, deceit 8. *Iustice.*

*Of tortures.* and impudency to do justice. And what should we say of the invention of tortures, which is rather a proof of patience, then verity? For, both he that can suffer them and cannot, will conceal the truth. For, why should grief cause a man rather to speak that which is, then that which is not? If a man think that an innocent is patient enough to endure torments, why should not he that is guilty, being a means to save his life? *Illa tormenta gubernat dolor, moderatur natura, cujusque tum animi, tum corporis regit quæsitor, flectit libido, corrumpit spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot rerum angustiis nil veritati loci relinquatur: Griefe governeth those torments, nature doth moderate, the searcher both of the body and minde doth rule, lust boweth, hope corrupteth, fear weakeneth, so that in so many extremities, there is no place for truth.* In defence hereof it is said, that tortures do astonish and quell the guilty, and extort from him a truth; and contrariwise strengthen the innocent: but we do so often see the contrary, that this may be doubted; and to say the truth, it is a poor means full of uncertaity, full of doubt. What will not a man say, what will he not do, to avoid such torment? *Etenim innocentes mentiri cogit dolor: For griefe enforceth innocents to lie*; in such sort that it falleth out that the Iudg which giveth the torture to the end an innocent should not die causeth him to die an innocent, and tortured too. A thousand and a thousand have falsly accused their own heads, either to shorten their torments, or their lives. But in the foot of this account, is it not a great injustice and cruelty to torment and to rack a man in pieces, for that offence which is yet doubted of? To the end, they may not kill a man without just cause, they do worse then kill him: if he be innocent and bear the punishment, what amends his made him for his unjust torture? He shall be quit; a goodly recompence, and much reason he hath to thank you. But it is the less evill that the weakness of man could invent.

9. *Verity.* If a man be weak in virtue, much more is he in verity, whether it be eternall and divine, or temporall and humane. That astonisheth him with the lightning, and beats him down with the thunder thereof, as the bright beams of the Sun, the weak eyes of the Owle: if he presume to beholdit, being oppressed, he presently fainteth; *Qui scrutator est majetatis, opprimetur à gloria: The curious searcher of Gods majesty shall be oppressed by his glory*, in such sort, that to give himself some breath, some taste, he must disguise, temper, and cover it with some shadow or other. This, that is, humane verity, offendeth and woundeth him, and he that speaks it, is many times holden

holden for an enemy : *Veritas odium parit*, *Truth breedeth hatred.* It is a ſtrange thing, man deſireth naturally to know the truth and to attain thereunto, he removeth all lets whatſoever, and yet he cannot attain it: if it be preſent, he cannot apprehend it, if he apprehend it, he is offended with it. The fault is not in the truth, for that is alwayes amiable, beautifull, worthy the knowledg; but it is humane imbecillity that cannot endure the ſplendour thereof. Man is ſtrong enough to deſire, but too weak to receive and hold what he deſireth. The two principall means, which he uſeth to attain to the knowledg of truth, are reaſon and experience. Now *Cap.14.* both of them are ſo feeble and uncertain (though experience the more weak) that nothing certain can be drawn from them. Reaſon hath ſo many formes, is ſo pliable, ſo wavering, as hath been ſaid, and experience much more, the occurrents are alwaies unlike; there is nothing ſo univerſall in nature, as diverſity, nothing ſo rare and difficult, and almoſt impoſſible, as the likeneſs and ſimilitude of things: and if a man cannot note this diſſimilitude, it is ignorance and weakneſs; I mean this perfect, pure, and entire ſimilitude and diſſimilitude: for to ſay the truth, they are both whole and entire, there is no one thing that is wholly like or diſlike to another. This is an in genious and marvellous mixture of nature.

But after all this, what doth better diſcover this humane imbe- 10.
cillity then Religion? yea, the very intention thereof, is to make *Religion.*
man feel his own evill, his infirmity, his nothing, and to make him to receive from God his good, his ſtrength, his all things. Firſt, it preacheth it unto him, it beats it into our memory, it reproacheth man, calling him duſt, aſhes, earth, fleſh, bloud, graſs. Afterwards it inſinuateth it into him, and makes him feel it after an excellent and goodly faſhion, bringing in God himſelf, humbled, weakned, debaſed for the love of him, ſpeaking, promiſing, ſwearing, chiding, threatning: and to be briefe, converſing and working with man after a baſe, feeble, humane manner, like a father that counterfeits his ſpeech, and plays the child with his children. The weakneſs of man being ſuch, ſo great, ſo invincible, that to give it ſome acceſs and commerce with the Divinity, and to unite it unto God, it was neceſſary that God ſhould debaſe himſelf to the baſeſt: *Deus quia in altitudine ſua à nobis parvulis apprehendi non poterat, ideo ſe ſtravit hominibus: God becauſe in his height he could not be apprehended by us little ones, did humble himſelf to men.* Again, it makes him ſee his own weakneſs by ordinary effects: for all the principal and holieſt exerciſes, the moſt ſolemn actions of religion, are

*Sacrifices.* they not the true symtomes and arguments of humane imbecillity and sickness ? Those sacrifices that in former times have been used thorowout the world, and yet in some countries continue, not onely of beasts, but also of living men, yea of innocents were they not shamefull marks of humane infirmity and misery ? First, because they were signes and symbols of his condemnation and malediction (for they were as publike protestations, that he had deserved death, and to be sacrificed as those beasts were) without which there had never been any bloudy offerings, or propitiatory and expiatory sacrifices. Secondly, because of the baseness of the purpose and intent, which was to think to appease, flatter, and gratifie God by the massacre and bloud of beasts, and of men ; *Sanguine non colendus Deus : qua enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas est ? God is not worshipped with bloud : for what can there be in shedding innocent bloud ?* It is true, that God in those first ages, yet the feeble infancy of the world and nature remaining simple, did well accept of them at the hands of religious men, even for their devotion, or rather Christ his sake : *Respexit Dominus ad Abel, & ad munera ejus : God had respect to Abel, and to his gifts,* taking in good part that which was done, with an intent to honour and serve him ; and also afterwards, the world being as yet in its apprentiship, *sub pædagogo,* was wholly seasoned in this opinion so universall, that it was almost thought naturall. I touch not here that particular mystery of the religion of the Jewes, who used them for figure (that is a point that belongs to religion) and with whom it was common to convert that which was humane, or naturall and corporall, to a holy and sacred use, and to gather from thence a spirituall fruit. But this was not because God took pleasure in them, nor because it was by any reason in it self good : witness the Prophets, and the cleerest sighted amongst them, who have alwayes freely said ; *Si voluisses sacrificium dedissem, utique holocaustis non delectaberis, sacrificium & oblationem noluisti, holocaustum pro peccato non postulasti, non accipiam de domo tua vitulos, &c. If thou wouldest have sacrifice, I had given it thee, but thou delightest not in burnt offerings, neither wilt thou have any sacrifies or oblation, nor requirest any burnt offering for sin, I will not receive the calves from thy house, &c.* And have called back and invited the world to another sacrifice more high, spirituall, and worthy the Divinity ; *Sacrificium Deo spiritus : aures autem perfor âsti mihi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, & legem tuam in me-*

*dio*

*dio cordis mei : Immola Deo sacrificium laudis : Misericordiam volo, non sacrificium : The spirit is a sacrifice to God, thou hast boared mine eares, to the end I might do thy will, and keep thy law in the middest of my heart : Offer unto God the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving. I will have mercy and not sacrifies.* At the last, the Son of God, the Doctor of Truth, being come to secure and freedenize the world, did abolish them wholly : which he had not done, if it had been a thing in it self and essentially good, and that it had pleased his father : for contrarily *Pater non tales quærit, sed tales qui adorent in spiritu & veritate : My Father doth not seek such, but those that worship him in spirit and truth.* And to say the truth, it is one of the godliest effects and fruits of Christianity after the abolition of idols. And therefore *Iulian* the Emperour, his capitall enemy, as in despight of him, offered more sacrifices then ever any other did in the world, attempting to set them up again with idolatry. Wherefore let us here leave them, and let us see those other principall parts of Religion.

*Sacraments.* The Sacraments in a matter base and common bread and wine, and an outward action as base, are they not testimonies of our poverty and baseness ? *Repentance.* Repentance, the universall remedy of our maladies, is a thing in it self shamefull, feeble, yea evill : for to repent, to be sorry, to afflict the spirit, is evill, though by consequent it be good. *An oath.* An oath, what is it, but a symptome and shamefull mark of distrust, infidelity, ignorance, humane infirmity, both in him that requires it, that gives it, that ordaines it ? *Quod amplius est à malo est : That which is more is from the devill.* See then how Religion healeth our evils by meanes not onely small and feeble, our weakness so requiring : *Stulta & infirma mundi elegit Deus : God hath chosen the fooliſh and simple of the world* ; but such as by no meanes are of any value, nor are good in themselves, but good in that they serve and are employed against evill, as medicines are : they sprang from an ill cause, yet they drive away ill : they are good, as gibbets and wheeles are in a Common-wealth, as vomits and other discharges proceed from ill causes, are to the body : to be brief, they are such good things, as that it had been far better we had never had them ; and never had we had them, if man had been wise, and preserved himself in that estate wherein God hath placed him ; neither shall he have them any more, so soon as he is delivered from this captivity, and arrived to his perfection.

11. *In evill.*

All this sheweth how great this humane weakness is to any thing that is good, in Policie, Iustice, Verity, Religion toward God, but that which is more strange is, that this weakness is as great in what is evill: for man, though he be willing to be wicked, yet he cannot be wholly such, but when he hath done his worst, there will be more to do. There is alwayes some remorse and fearfull consideration, that mollifieth the will, and maketh it relent, and still reserveth something to be done; which have been the cause of the ruine of many, although perhaps they made it a project for their safty. This is imbecillity and sottishment, and from hence did arise that Proverb at their cost; That a man must not play the fool by halfes. A speech uttered with judgment; but that may have both a good and ill sense. To say that a man when he is once in, must still proceed to worse, and worse, without any reservation or respect, it is a very pernicious doctrine, and the Proverb saith well against it; The shorter follies are the better. But yet in some certain cases, the middle way is very dangerous; as when a man hath a strong enemy by the throat, like one that holdeth a Wolfe by the eares, he must either win him altogether by courtesie, or utterly undo him and extinguish him; which was alwayes the practice of the *Romanes*, and that very wisely: amongst others, concerning the *Latines* or *Italians*, at the exhortation of *Camillus*; *Pacem in perpetuum petere, vel serviendo, vel ignoscendo: To get perpetuall peace, either serving, or in pardoning*; For in such a case to do things by halfes, is to lose all, as the *Samnites* did, who for want of putting in practice that counsell given them by an old weather-beaten souldier, concerning the *Romanes*, whom they had then incloſed and shut up, paid dearly for it; *Aut conciliandus, aut tollendus hostis: An enemy is either to be reconciled, or made out of the way.* The former course of courtesie is the more noble, honourable, and rather to be chosen; and we ought not to come to the second but in extremeties, and then when the enemy is not capable of the first. By this that hath been said, is shewed the extream imbicillity of man, in good and evill, and that good or evill which he either doth, or flieth, is not purely and entirely good or evill: so that it is not in his power to be wholly deprived of all good, not altogether wicked.

12. *Reprehensions and repulses.*

Let us likewise note many other effects and testimonies of humane weakness. It is imbecillity and pusillanimity not to dare, or not to be able to apprehend another, or to be reprehended: he that

that is feeble or couragious in the one, is so in the other. Now it is a strange kinde of delicateness, to deprive either himself, or another of so great a fruit, for so light and verball a wound, that doth onely touch and pierce the eare. Near neighbour unto this it is, not to be able to give a deniall with reason, nor to receive and suffer a repulse with patience.

13. *False suspitions and accusations.*

In false accusations and wicked suspicions, which are done in place of justice and judgment, there is double imbecillity; the one in those that are accused and suspected, and that in justifying and excusing themselves too carefully, and, as it were, ambitiously. *Mendax infamia terret quem nisi mendacem? Whom doth an infamous lie fear but a lier?* This is to betray their own innocency, to put their conscience and their right to comprimise and arbitrement; for by such plea *Perspicuitas argumentatione elevatur: Perspicuity by argument is made more apparent. Socrates* in judgment it self would not do it, neither by himself, nor by another, refusing to use the learned plea of great *Lysias*, and chose rather to die; the other is in a conrrary case, that is, when the accused is so couragious, that he takes no care to excuse or justifie himself, because he scorneth the accusation and accuser, as unworthy his answer and justification, and he will not do himself that wrong to enter the lists: this course hath been practised by generous men; by *Scipio* above all others, many times out of the marvellous constancy of his minde. Now others are offended herewith, thinking it too great a confidence and pride, and it stingeth them, that he that he hath too sensible a feeling of his innocency, and will not yield himself: or imputing this silence and contempt to the want of heart, distrust of the law and inability to justifie himself. O feeble humanity! the accused or suspected, whether he defend or defend not himself, it is imbecillity and cowardlines. We wish a man courage to defend himself, and when he hath done it, we shew our own weakness by being offended with it.

14. *Tenderness and delicacie.*

Another argument of imbecillity is, when a man shall subject and addict himself to a certain particular form of life; this is a base kinde of tenderness, and effeminate delicacie, unworthy an honest man, and makes us unprofitable, different in conversation, and may be hurtfull too, in a ease where change of manners and carriage is necessary. It is likewise a shame, either not to dare, or not to be able to do that which he seeth every man do besides himself. It were fittest that such people should live, and hide themselves in

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the chimney corner in their private houſes. The faireſt form of living is to be pliable to all, even to exceſs it ſelf if need be; to be able, to dare, to know how to do all things, and yet to do nothing but what is good. It is good to know all, not to uſe all.

15. *Search of books.* It is likewiſe imbecillity, and a great and vulgar ſottiſhneſs, to run after ſtrange and ſcholaſticall examples, after allegations, never to ſettle an opinion without teſtimonies in print, nor to believe men but ſuch as are in books, nor truth it ſelf, but ſuch as is ancient. By this reaſon, fooleries and toyes if they once paſs the Preſs, they have credit and dignity enough. Now there are every day many things done before our eyes, which if we had but the ſpirit and ſufficiency well to collect, to ſearch with dexterity, to judg of, and to apply to their time, which ſhould frame and finde miracles and marvellous examples, which yield not in any thing to thoſe of times paſt, which we ſo much admire, and therefore we admire becauſe they are ancient and in Print.

16. Again, another teſtimony of weakneſs is, that man is not capable but of indifferent things, and cannot endure extremities; for if they be ſmall and in outward ſhew baſe, he contemneth and diſdaineth them as unworthy, and it is offenſive unto him to conſider of them: if they be very great and over ſplendent, he fears them, he admires them, and is offended with them. The firſt doth principally concern great and high minds; the ſecond is common with thoſe that are weak.

17. *Sudden occurrents.* This weakneſs doth likewiſe appear in our hearing, ſight, and in the ſudden ſtroke of a new unexpected occurrent, which ſurpriſeth and ſeizeth upon us unawares. For they do in ſuch ſort aſtoniſh us, that they take from us, both our ſenſe and ſpeech.

*Diriguit viſu in medio, calor oſſa reliquit,*
*Labitur, & longo vix tandem tempore fatur:*
*Stiffe in our ſight he grew, heat left his bones,*
*He fals, and ſcarce at length breathes out theſe mones.*

yea, ſometimes life it ſelf: whether they be good; witneſs that Romane Dame, who died for joy, ſeeing her ſon return ſafe from the warrs; *Sophocles* and *Dionyſius* the tyrant: or whether they be evill; witneſs *Diodorus*, who died in the field for ſhame, becauſe he was not able to reſolve a doubt, nor anſwer an argument.

18. *Braveries and ſubmiſſions.* Yet there is another imbecillity, and it is twofold, and after two contrary manners; Some yield and are overcome by the tears

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and humble supplication of another, and their courage and gallantry is wounded with their words : others quite contrary are not moved by all the submissions and complaints that may be, but are rather more obdurate and confirmed in their constancy and resolution. There is no doubt but the former proceeds of weakness and it is commonly found in effeminate and vulgar mindes: but the second is not without difficulty, and is found in all sorts of people. It should seem that to yield unto virtue, and to manly and generous strength and vigour, is the part of a valorous and generous minde. It is true, if it be done in a reverent esteem of virtue, as *Scanderbeg* did, receiving into grace a souldier whom he had seen to carry himself volorously in fight even against himself, or as *Pompey* did, pardoning the City of the *Mamertains*, for the virtue of *Zenon* a citizen thereof; or as the Emperour *Conradus* did, forgiving the Duke of *Baviers*, and others besieged with him, for the magnanimity of their women, who privily conveyed them away, and took the danger upon their own heads. But if it be done with a kinde of astonishment and affright of the power of virtue, as the people of *Thebes*, who lost their hearts hearing *Epaminondas* then accused, recount unto them his honourable acts, and severely reproaching them with their ingratitude, it is debility and cowardize. The fact of *Alexander*, containing the brave resolution of *Betis* taken with the citie of *Gaza* where he commanded, was neither weakness nor courage, but choler, which in him had neither bridle, nor moderation.

## CHAP. XXXVIII.

### 3. *Inconstancy.*

MAn is a subject wonderfully divers, and wavering, upon whom it is very difficult to settle and assured judgment, I say a judgment universall and entire, by reason of the great contrariety and disagreement of the parts of our life. The greatest part of our actions, are nothing else but eruptions and impulsions enforced by occasions, and that have reference to others. Irresolution on the one part, and afterwards inconstancy and instability, are the most common and apparent vices in the nature of man. Doubtless our actions do many times so contradict one the other, in so strange a manner, that it seems impossible they should all come forth of one and the same shop; we alter and we feel it not, we escape

escape as it were from our selves, and we rob our selves ; *Ipsi nobis furto subducimur : Being stolen as it were from our selves.* We go after the inclinations of our appetite, and as the winde of occasions carrieth us, not according to reason ; *At nil potest esse æquabile, quod non à certa ratione profiscicatur : Nothing can be just which proceedeth not from reason.* Our spirits also and our humours are changed with the change of time. Life is an unequall motion, irrigular, of many fashions. In the end we stirr and trouble our selves, by the instability of our behaviour. *Nemo non quotidiè consilium mutat & votum : modo vxorem vult, modo amicam ; modo regnare vult, modo non est eo officiosior servus ; nunc pecuniam spargit, nunc rapit, modo frugi videtur & gravis, modo prodigus & vanus ; mutamus subinde personam. No man there is, who daily changeth not his minde, purpose, and desires ; sometimes he will have his wife, sometimes a concubine ; sometimes he will dominere, again no servant more humble and officious then he ; Now he prodigally spends his own, at another time he violately raketh after other mens goods ; sometimes he would seem grave and thrifty, another time a spend-thrift and vain ; so every moment we are changed.*

*Quod petijt, spernit repetet quod nuper amisit,*
*Æstuat, et vitæ disconvenit ordine toto.*
*Scornes what he honor'd, seeks what he lost, to finde,*
*Swels and abates, inconstant as the winde.*

Man is a creature of all those the most hard to be sounded and known, for he is the most double and artificiall covert, and counterfeit, and there are in him so many cabinets and blind corners, from whence he comes forth sometimes a man, sometimes a satyre; so many breathing holes, from whence he breathes sometimes heat, sometimes cold, and from whence comes forth so much smoak : all his carriage and motion is a perpetuall race of errours ; in the morning to be born, in the evening to die ; sometimes in the rack, sometimes at liberty ; sometimes a god, sometimes a flie ; he laughs and weeps for one and the same thing ; he is content, and discontent ; he will, and he will not, and in the end he knows not what he will : now he is filled with joy and gladness, that he cannot stay within his own skin, and presently he falleth out with himself, nay dares not trust himself ; *Modo amore nostri, modó tædio laboramus ; sometimes we love, sometimes we loath our selves.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXXIX.

### 4. *Misery.*

BEhold here the main and principall line and lineament of the picture of a man, he is (as hath been said) vain, feeble, frail, inconstant in good, in felicity, in pleasure; but strong, constant, and hardened in misery: he is misery it self quick and incarnate, and this is in a word to express humanity, for a man is all misery, and without him there is not any in the world. It is the property of a man to be miserable, onely man and all man is alwayes miserable. *Homo natus de muliere brevi vivens tempore, repletur multis miseriis: Man born of a woman hath but a short time to live and his full of miseries.* He that will take upon him to represent unto us all the parts of humane misery, had need to discover his whole life, his substance his entrance, his continuance, his end. I do not therefore undertake this business, it were a work without end, and besides, it is a common subject handled by all: but I will here only quote certain points which are not common, nor taken for miseries, either because they are not felt, or sufficiently considered of, although they be such as press man most, if he know how to judg of them. 1. *Misery proper unto man.*

The first point and proof of the misery of man, is his birth; his entrance into the world is shamefull, vile, base, contemptible; his departure, his death, ruine, glorious and honourable: whereby it seemeth that he is a monster, and against nature, since there is shame in making him, honour in destroying him: *Nostri nosmet pœnitet & pudet: We are ashamed and repent our selves of our selves*: Hereof a word or two. The action of planting and making man is shamefull, and all the parts thereof; the congredients, the preparations, the instruments, and whatsoever serves thereunto is called and accounted shamefull, and there is nothing more unclean, in the whole nature of man. The action of destroying and killing him honourable, and that which serves thereunto glorious: we gild it, we enrich it, we adorne our selves with it, we carry it by our sides, in our hands, upon our shoulders. We disdain to go to the birth of man; every man runs to see him die, whether it be in his bed, or in some publick place, or in the field. When we go about to make a man, we hide our selves, we put out the candle, we do it by stealth. It is a glory and a pomp to unmake a man, 2. *In his beginning and his end.* 1. 2.

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to kill himself; we light the candles to see him die, we execute him at high noon, we sound a trumpet, we enter the combat, and we slaughter him when the sun is at highest. There is but one way to beget, to make a man; a thousand and a thousand meanes, inven-

4. tions arts to destroy him. There is no reward, honour or recompence assigned, to those that know how to encrease, to preserve humane nature; all honour, greatness, riches, dignities, empires, triumphs, trophes are appointed for those that know how to af-

5. flict, trouble, destroy it. The two principall men of the world, *Alexander*, and *Cæsar*, have unmade, have slain, each of them (as *Pliny* reporteth) more then a million of men, but they made none, left none behinde them. And in ancient times, for pleasure onely and pastime, to delight the eyes of the people, there was pub-

Tertul. de Spectac. Seneca. lick slaughters, and massacres of men made. *Homo sacra res per jocum & lusum occiditur: satis spectaculi in homine mors est: innocentes in ludum veniunt, ut publicæ voluptatis hostiæ fiant*: *Man though a sacred thing is slain even for sport and delight; death in man is spectacle enough: Innocents come to the game, that they may be made the sacrifices of the publick pleasure.* There are some nations that curse their birth, bless their death. How monstrous a creature is this, that is made a horror unto himself! None of all this is in any other creature, no not in the whole world besides.

The second point and testimony of the misery of man, is, the diminishing of his pleasure, even those small and slight ones that appertain unto him, (for of such as are great and sound he is not capable, as hath been shewed in his weakness) and the impairing of the number and sweetness of them. If it be so, that he do it not for Gods cause, what a monster is this? that is an enemy unto himself, robbes and betrays himself, to whom his pleasures are a burthen and a cross. There be some that flie from health, joy, comfort, as from an evill thing.

*O miseri quorum gaudia crimen habent!*
*O wretched man, whose very goods are naught,*
*And whose indifferences worse, whose joyes have fault.*

We are not ingenious but to our own hurt, it is the true diet of the force of the spirit.

4. *Forging of evils.* But there is yet that which is worse, the spirit of man is not onely a diminisher of his joy, a trouble feast, and enemy to his small, naturall and just pleasures, as I mean to prove; but also a forger of those that are evill: it faineth, feareth, flieth, abhorreth

as

as great mischiefes, things that are not any way evill in themselves, and in truth, which beasts themselves fear not, but that by his own proper discourse and imagination they are fained to be such, as not to be advanced in honour, greatnes, riches, as cuckoldship, sterility, death : for to say the truth, there is nothing but grief it self that is evill, and which is felt. And though some wise men seem to fear these things, yet it is not for their own sakes, but because of that grief which sometimes doth accompany them afterwards: for many times it is a forerunner of death, and sometimes followeth the loss of goods, of credit, of honour. But take from these things griefe, the rest is nothing but fantasie, which hath no other lodging but in the head of man, which quits it self of other business to be miserable ; and imagineth within its own bounds, false evills besides the true, employing and extending his misery in stead of lessening and contracting it. Beasts feel not these evils, but are exempted from them, because Nature judgeth them not to be such.

As for sorrow, which is the only true evill, man is wholly born thereunto, and it is his naturall property. The *Mexicanes* thus salute their infants coming forth of the womb of their mother : *Infant, thou art come into the world to suffer : endure, suffer, and hold thy peace.* That sorrow is naturall unto man, and contrariwise, pleasure but a stranger, it appeareth by these three reasons. 5. *He is born to sorrow.*

All the parts of man are capable of sorrow, very few of delight. 1.

The parts capable of pleasure, cannot receive more then one or two sorts, but all can receive the greatest number of griefes, all different, heat, cold, pricking, rubbing, trampling, fleaing, beating, boyling, languishing, extension, oppression, relaxation, and infinite others, which have no proper name, (to omit those of the soul) in such sort, that man is better able to suffer them, then to express them. 2.

Man hath no long continuance in pleasure ; for that of the body is like a fire of straw ; and if it could continue, it would bring with it much envie and displeasure : but sorrows are more permanent, and have not their certain seasons as pleasures have. Again, the empire and command of sorrow is far more great, more universall, more powerfull, more durable, and (in a word) more naturall, then that of pleasure. 3.

To these three a man may add other three : Sorrow and grief is more frequent, and fals out often ; pleasure is rare. 1.

Evill comes easily of it self, without seeking ; Pleasure never comes willingly, it must 2.

must be sought after, and many times we pay more for it then it is worth. Pleasure is never pure, but alwayes distempered, and mingled with some bitterness, and there is alwayes something wanting; but sorrow and grief is many times entire and pure. After all this, the worst of our market, and that which doth evidently shew the misery of our condition, is, that the greatest pleasures touch us not so neer, as the lightest griefes. *Segnius homines bona, quam mala sentiunt : men more slowly feel that which is good, then that which is evill.* We feel not so much our soundest health, as the least malady that is : *Pungit in cute vix summa violatum plagula corpus, quando valere nil quenquam movet.*

6. *By memory and anticipation.* It is enough that man be indeed and by nature miserable, and besides true and substantiall evils he fain and forge, false and fantasticall, as hath been said; but he must likewise extend and lengthen them, and cause both the true and false to endure, and live longer then they can, so avarous is he of misery; which he doth divers waies. First, by the remembrance of what is past, and the anticipation of what is to come, so that we cannot fail to be miserable, since that those things which are principally good in us, and whereof we glory most, are instruments of misery. *Futuro torquemur & præterito, multa bona nostra nobis nocent, timoris tormentum memoria reducit, providentia atnicipat, nemo præsentibus tantum miser est : We are tormented with that which is past, and with that which is to come, even our own goods do harme us, memory reduceth the torment of fear, providence anticipateth, no man is miserable onely by things present.* It is not enough to be miserable, but we must increase it by a continuall expectation before it come, nay seek it, and provoke it to come, like those that kill themselves with the fear of death; that is to say, either by curiosity or imbecillity, and vain apprehension, to preoccupate evils and inconveniences and to attend them with so much pain and ado, even those which peradventure will never come neer us. These kinde of people will be miserable before their time, and doubly miserable, both by a reall sense or feeling of their misery, and by a long premeditation thereof, which many times is a hundred times worse then the evils themselves. *Minus afficit sensus, fatigatio, quàm cogitatio : The conceit of affliction, doth hurt more then affliction it self.* The effence or being of misery endureth not long, but the minde of man must lengthen and extend it, and entertain it before hand. *Plus dolet quàm necesse est, qui ante dolet quàm necesse est. Quædam magis,*

*quædam*

*quædam antequam debeant, quædam cum omnino non debeant, nos torquent. Aut angemus dolorem, aut fugimus, aut præcipimus: He sorroweth more then he needs, that lamenteth before he hath need: some things afflict us more then they should, some before they should, some when they should not at all; either we increase our grief, or we flie it, or we command it.* Beasts do well defend themselves from this folly and misery, and are much bound to thank Nature that they want that spirit, that memory, that providence that man hath. *Cesar* said well, that the best death was that which was least premeditated. And to say the truth, the preparation before death, hath been to many a greater torment, then the execution it self. My meaning is not here to speake of that virtuous and philosophicall premeditation, which is that temper, whereby the soul is made invincible, and is fortified to the proof against all assaults and accidents, whereof we shall speake hereafter: but of that fearfull and sometimes false and vain apprehension of evils that may come, which afflicteth and darkeneth, as it were with smoke, all the beauty and serenity of the soul, troubleth all the rest and joy thereof, insomuch that it were better to suffer it self to be wholly surprised. It is more easie and more naturall not to think thereof at all. But let us leave this anticipation of evill, for simply every care and painfull thought, bleating after things to come by hope, desire, fear, is a very great misery. For, besides that we have not any power over that which is to come, much less over that which is past; (and so it is vanity, as it hath been said) there doth still remain unto us that evill and dammage, *Calamitosus est animus, futuri anxius; That minde is in a lamentable case, which is troubled for future things*: which robbeth our understanding, and taketh from us the peaceable comfort of our present good, and will not suffer us to settle and content our selves therein. Lib. 2. cap. 7.

But this is not yet enough. For, to the end man may never want matter of misery, yea that he may alwaies have his full, he never ceaseth searching and seeking with great study, the causes and aliments of misery. He thrusteth himself into business even with joy of heart, even such as when they are offered unto him, he should turn his back towards them, and either out of a miserable disquiet of minde, or to the end he may shew himself to be industrious, a man of employment and understanding, that is a fool and miserable too, he enterpriseth, moveth and removeth new businesses, or else he putteth himself into that of other mens. To be short, 7. *By unquiet search.*

he is so strongly and uneessantly molested with care, and thoughts not onely unprofitable and superfluous, but painfull and hurtfull, tormented with what is present, annoyed with what is past, vexed with that which is to come, that he seemeth to fear nothing more, then that he shall not be sufficiently miserable. So that a man may justly cry out, O poor and wretched creatures that you are, how many evils do you willingly endure, besides those necessary evils that nature hath bestowed upon you! But what? Man contenteth himself in misery, he is obstinate to ruminate and continually to recall to minde his passed evils. Complaints are common with him, and his own evils and sorrowes seem many times dear unto him yea it is a happy thing for small and light occasions, to be termed the most miserable of all others: *Est quadam dolendi voluptas: There is a certain delight in griefe.* Now this is a far greater misery to be ambitiously miserable, then not to know it, not to feel it at all. *Homo animal querulum, cupide suis incumbens miseriis: Man is a complaining creature, willingly yielding to his own miseries,*

8. *By incompatibility.* We will not account it a humane misery, since it is an evill common to all men, and not to beasts; that men cannot accommodate themselves and make profit of one another, without the loss and hurt, the sickness, folly, sin, death of one another. We hinder, wound, oppress one the other in such manner, that the better sort even without thought or will thereunto, out of an insensible desire, and innocently thirst after the death, the evill, the pain, and punishment of another.

9. *In the remedies of remedy.* So that we see man miserable, both naturally and voluntarily, in truth and by imagination, by obligation and willingness of heart. He is too miserable, & yet he fears he is not miserable enough, & laboureth to make himself more miserable: let us now see how. When he feels any evill, and is annoyed with some certain misery (for he is never without many miseries that he feels not) he endeavoureth to quit himself thereof; but what are his remedies? Truly such as importune him more then the evill it self, which he would cure; in such sort, that being willing to get forth of one misery, he doth but change it into another, and perhaps into a worse. But what of that? the change it self perhaps delighteth him, or at least yields him some solace: he thinketh to heal one evill with another, which proceedeth from an opinion which the bewitched and miserable world holdeth: that is, That there is nothing profitable, if it be not painfull: That is worth naught that costs nothing,

thing, yea ease it self is much suspected. This doth likewise proceed from an higher cause. It is a strange thing but true, and which convicteth man to be miserable, That no evill can be taken away, but by another evill, whether it be in body or in soul. Spirituall maladies and corporall, are not cured and chased away, but by torment, sorrow, pain. The spirituall by repentance, watchings, fastings, imprisonments, which are truly afflictions, and such as gaule us too, notwithstanding the resolution and devotion willingly to endure them: for if we use them either for pleasure or profit, they can work no effect, but are rather exercises of pleasure, of covetousnes, of household government, then of repentance and contrition of heart. The corporall in like sort be medicines incisions, cauteries, diets, as they well feel that are bound to medicinall rules, who are troubled on the one side with the disease that afflicts them, on the other with that rule, the thought whereof continually annoies them. So likewise other evils, as ignorance is cured by great, long, and painfull study: *Qui addit scientiam, addit & laborem*: *He that encreaseth knowledg, increaseth labour.* Want and poverty, by great care, watchings, travell, sweatings: *In sudore vultus tui*: *In the sweat of thy browes*: So that both for the soul and for the body, labour and travell is as proper unto man, as it is for a bird to flie.

*It was erroneous, but corrected.*

10. *Spirituall miseries.*

All these miseries above mentioned are corporall, or common both to the spirit and to the body, and mount little higher then the imagination and phantasie. Let us consider of the more subtile and spirituall, which are rather to be called miseries, as being erroneous and malignant, more active and more our own, but less felt and confessed, which makes a man more, yea doubly miserable, because he onely feeleth those evils, that are indifferent, and not the greater; yea a man dares not touch them, or speake of them, so much is he confirmed, and so desperate in his miseries. We must therefore by the way as it were, and gently, say something, at least with the finger point a far off, to give him occasion to consider and think thereof, since of himself he hides it not. First, in regard of the understanding, is it not a strange and a lamentable misery of humane nature, that it should wholly be composed of errour and blindnes? The greatest part of common and vulgar opinions, yet the more plausible, and such as are received with reverence, are false and erroneous, and which is worse, the greater part unprofitable for humane society. And although some of the wisest, which are but few in num-

ber understand better then the common sort, and judg of these opinions as they should, nevertheless sometimes they suffer themselves to be carried, if not in all and always, yet in some and sometimes. A man had need be firm and constant, that he suffer not himself to be carried with the stream, yea sound and prepared to keep himself cleer from so universall a contagion. The generall opinions received with the applause of all, and without contradiction, are as a swift river which carrieth all with it: *Proh superi quantum mortalia pectora cæca noctis habent! O miseras, hominum mentes & pectora cæca, qualibus in tenebris vitæ, quantisque periclis degitur hoc ævi quodcunque est! O God, how much sottish blindness rests in the breasts of men! O the senseless and miserable blindness of mens mindes; in what darkness is our life, and how many dangers doth this age whatsoever it is, pass through!* Now it were too long and too tedious a thing, to run over all those foolish opinions by name, wherewith the whole world is made drunken: yet let us take a view of some few of them, which in their due place shall be handled more at large.

*See lib. 3. cap. 1.* 1. To judge of advice and counsell by the events, which are no way in our own hands, and which depends upon the heavens.

*Lib. 2. cap. 8.* 2. To condemn and reject all things, manners, opinions, laws, customes, observations, as barbarous and evill, not knowing what they are, or seeing any inconvenience in them; but onely because they are universall, and different from such as are ordinary and common.

*Lib. 2. cap. 3.* 3. To esteem and commend things, because of their novelty, or rarity, or strangeness, or difficulty, four messengers which have great credit in vulgar spirits: and many times such things are vain, and not to be esteemed, if they bring not with them goodness and commodity. And therefore that Prince did justly contemn him that glorified himself, because he could from far cast a grain of millet, thorow the eye of a needle.

4. Generally all those superstitious opinions wherewith children, women, and weak minds are infected.

5. To esteem of men for their riches dignities, honours, and to contemn those that want them, as if a man should judg of a horse by his saddle and bridle.

6. To account of things not according to their true, naturall, and essentiall worth, which is many times inward and hidden, but

but according to the outward shew, or common report.

7. To think to be revenged of an enemy, by killing him; for that is to put him in safety, and to quit him from all ill, and to bring a vengeance upon himself: it is to take from his enemy all sense of revenge, which is the principall effect thereof. This doth likewise belong unto weakness.

8. To account it a great injury, or to think a man miserable, because he is a cuckold: for what greater folly in judgment can there be, then to esteem of a man the less for the vice of another, which he never allowed? As much may be said of a bastard.

9. To account less of things present, and that are our own, and which we peaceably enjoy; and to esteem of them most, when a man hath them not, or because they are another mans: as if the presence and possession of them did lessen their worth, and the want of them increase it.

*Virtutem incolumem odimus,*
*Sublatam ex oculis quærimus invidi:*
*Absence endeares, we weigh not what we have,*
*And yet in others, would envie and crave.*

And this is the cause, why a Prophet is not esteemed in his own country. So likewise, mastership and authority, ingendreth contempt of those that are subject to that authority: husbands have a careless respect of their wives, and many fathers of their children. Wilt thou (saith the good fellow) love her no more? then marry her. We esteem more the horse, the house, the servant of another, because he is anothers and not ours. It is a thing very strange to account more of things in imagination, then in substance, as a man doth all things absent and that are not his, whether it be before he have them, or after he hath had them. The cause hereof in both cases may be, because before a man possesse them, he esteemeth not according to that they are worth, but according to that which he imagineth them to be, or they have by another been reported to be; and possessing them, he esteemes them according to that good and benefit he getteth by them; and after they are taken from him, he considereth and desireth them wholly, in their perfection and declination, whereas before he enjoyed them and used them, but by peecemeal successively: for a man thinketh he shall alwayes have time enough to enjoy them, and by that means they are gone before he was aware that he had them. And this is the reason, why the grief is greater in having them not, then the pleasure in

possessing them. But herein there is as much imbecillity as misery. We have not the sufficiency to enjoy, but only to desire. There is another vice clean contrary to this, and that is, when a man setleth himself in himself and in such sort conceits himself and whatsoever he hath, that he preferrs it before all, and thinks nothing comparable to his own. Though these kinde of people be no wiser then the other, yet they are at least more happy.

10 To be over zealous in every question that is proposed, to bite all, to take to the heart, and to shew himself importunate and opinative in every thing, so he may have some fair pretext of justice, religion, the weale-publik, the love of the people.

*See cap. 27.* 11 To play the mourner, the afflicted person, to weep for the death, or unhappy accident of another, to think that not to be moved at all, or very little, is for want of love and affection. There is also vanity in this.

*Lib. 2. cap. 10.* 12 To esteem, to make account of actions that are done with rumour, clatter, and clamor, and to contemne those that are done otherwise, and to think that they that proceed after so sweet and calme a manner, do nothing, are as in a dreame without action; and to be briefe, to esteem Art more then Nature. That which is puffed up swollen and elevated by study, fame, report, and striketh the sense, (that is to say artificiall) is more regarded and esteemed, then that which is sweet, simple, plain, ordinary, that is to say, Naturall: that awaketh, this brings us asleep.

13 To give an ill and wrong interpretation of the honourable actions of another man, and to attribute them to base and vain, or vicious causes or occasions; as they that attributed the death of young *Cato*, to the fear he had of *Cæsar*, wherewith *Plutarch* seemes to be offended; and others more foolishly, to ambition. This is a great malady of the judgment, which proceedeth either from malice, and corruption of the will and manners, or envie against those that are more worthy then themselves, or from that vice of bringing their own credit to their own door, and measuring another by their own foot; or rather then all this, from imbecillity and weakness as not having their sight so strong and so certain, to conceive the brightness of virtue, in its own native purity. There are some that think they shew great wit and subtilty, in depraving and obscuring the glory of beautifull and honourable actions, wherein they shew much more malice then sufficiency. It is a thing easie enough to do, but base and villanous.

14 To

14 To defame and to chastise over-rigorously, and shamefully, certain vices, as crimes in the highest degree, villainous, and contagious; which are nevertheless but indifferent, and have their root and excuse in nature: and not so much to detest, and to chastise with so greedy adoe those vices that are truly great, and against nature, as pretended and plotted murders, treasons, and treachery, cruelty, and so forth.

15 Behold also after all this, a true testimony of spirituall misery, but which is wily and subtile, and that is, that the spirit of man in its best temper, and peaceable, setled, and soundest estate, is not capable but of common, ordinary, naturall, and indifferent things. To be capable of divine and supernaturall, as of divination, prophesie, revelation, invention, and as a man may say, to enter into the cabinet of the gods, he must be sick, displaced from his naturall seat, and as it were corrupted, *corruptus*, either by extravagancie, exstasie, inspiration, or by dreaming; insomuch that the two naturall waies to attain thereunto, are either fury, or dead sleep: So that the spirit is never so wise, as when it is a fool, nor more awaked, then when it sleepeth; it never meeteth better, then when it goes on one side, or crosseth the way; it never mounts or flies so high, as when it is most dejected. So that it must needs be miserable, because to be happy, it must be as it were lost, and without it self. This toucheth not in any sort the Divine disposition, for God can to whom, and when it pleaseth him, reveal himself; man in the mean time continuing setled in his sense and understanding, as the Scripture makes mention of *Moses* and divers others.

16 To conclude, can there be a greater fault in judgement, then not to esteem of judgment, not to exercise it, and to prefer the memory, and imagination, or phantasie before it? We see those great goodly, and learned orations, discourses, lectures, sermon-books, which are so much esteemed and admitted, written by men of greatest learning in this age (I except some few) what are they all, but a heap and collection of allegations, and the labours of other men (a work of memory and reading, and a thing very easie, being all culled and disposed to their hands, and hereof are so many books composed) with some few points handled, with a good instruction or two (a work of imagination) and here is all. This is many times a vanity, and there appeareth not in it any spark of judgment, or excellent virtue: so likewise the authors themselves,

are many times weak and common in judgment, and in will corrupted: how much better is it, to hear a country swane, or a merchant talking in his counting-house, discoursing of many goodly proportions and verities, plainly and truly without art or form, and giving good and wholesome counsell, out of a sound, strong, and solid judgment?

II. *Of the Will.* In the will there are as many, or rather more miseries, and more miserable; they are without number, among which these following are some few of them.

1. To be willing rather to seem an honest man, then to be, and rather to be such to another then to himself.

2. To be far more ready and willing to revenge an offence, then to acknowledg a good turn, in such sort, that it is a corrosive to his heart to acknowledg, pleasure and gain to revenge, a proof of a malignant nature, *gratia oneri est, ultio in quæstu habetur.*

3. To be more apt to hate, then to love; to slander, then to commend; to feed more willingly and with greater pleasure upon the evill, then the good of another, to enlarge it more, to display it more in his discourse and the exercise of his style: witness Lawyers, Oratours, and Poets, who in reciting the good of any man, are idle; eloquent, in evill. The words, inventions, figures, to speak ill, to scoffe, are far otherwise, more rich, more emphaticall and significant, then to praise, or speake well.

4. To flie from evill, to do what is good, not properly for the good effect by naturall reason, and for the love of virtue; but for some other strange consideration, sometimes base and idle, of gain and profit, vain-glory, hope, fear, of custome, company; and to be briefe, not simply for himself and his duty, but for some other outward occasion, and circumstance: all are honest men by occasion and accident. And this is the reason why they are such, unequally, diversly; not perpetually, constantly, uniformly.

5. To love him the less whom we have offended, and that because we have offended him, a strange thing; and which proceedeth not alwaies from fear that he will take occasion to be revenged, for it may be he wisheth us never the worse; but it is because his presence doth accuse us, and brings to memory our fault and indiscretion. And if the offender love not the offended the worse, it is because the offence he committed was against his will; for commonly he that hath a will to offend, loves him the less whom he hath offended; *Chi offende, mai non perdona*: He that offends, never forgives.

6. As

6. As much as may be said of him to whom we are much bound for courtesies received, his presence is a burden unto us, he putteth us in minde of our band and duty, he reproacheth unto us our ingratitude and inabilities, and we wish he were not so, we were discharged of that duty. Villaines by nature: *Quidam quò plus debent, magis oderunt: leve æs alienum debitorem facit, grave inimicum: Some, the more they ought to love, the more they hate: a little debt alienateth a little, a great maketh him an enemy.*

7. To take pleasure in the evill, hurt, and danger of another, to grieve and repine at his good advancement, prosperity (I mean when it is without cause of hatred, or private quarrell. for it is another thing when it proceedeth from the ill desert of man) I speak here of that common and naturall condition, whereby without any particular malice, men of indifferent honesty, take pleasure to see others adventure their fortunes at sea, and are vexed to see them thrive better then themselves, or that fortune should smile more upon others, then them, and make themselves merry with the sorrow of another: this is a token of a malicious seed in us.

12. *The conclusion of these spirituall miseries.*

To conclude, that I may yet shew you how great our misery is, let me tell you that the world is repleniſhed with three sorts of people, who take up much room therein, and carry a great sway both in number and reputation: the *Superstitious, Formalists, Pedants*, who notwithstanding they are in divers subjects, jurisdictions, and theatres, (the three principall, religion, life or conversation, and doctrine) yet they are all of one stampe, weak spirits, ill born, or very ill instructed, a very dangerous kinde of people in judgment, and touched with a disease incurable. It is lost labour to speak to these kinde of people, or to perswade them to change their minds, for they account themselves the best and wisest in the world, opinative obstinacy is there in his proper seat; he that is once striken and touched to the quick with any of these evills, there is little hope of his recovery: who is there more sottish, and withall more brain-sick and heady then these kinde of people? Two things there are that do much hinder them, (as hath been spoken) naturall imbecillity, and incapacity, and afterwards an anticipated opinion to do as well, and better then others. I do here but name them, and point at them with the finger, for afterwards in their places here quoted, their faults shall be shewed at large.

1. The *superstitious*, injurious to God, and enemies to true religion, cover

cover themselves with the cloake of piety, zeal and love towards God, even to the punishing and tormenting of themselves more then is needfull, thinking thereby to merit much, and that God is not onely pleased therewith, but indebted unto them for the rest. What would you do to these kinde of people? If you tell them that they do more then they need, and that they receive things with the left hand, in not understanding them aright, they will not believe you, but tell you, that their intent is good (whereby they think to save themselves) and that they do it for devotion. Howsoever, they will not quit themselves of their gain, nor the satisfaction which they receive, which is to binde God unto them.

2. *Formalists.* The *Formalists* do wholly ty themselves to an outward form and fashion of life, thinking to be quit of blame, in the pursuit of their passions and desires, so they do nothing against the tenor of the Lawes, and omit none of their formalities. See here a miserable churle, which hath overthrown and brought to a desperate state many poor families; but this hath fallen out, by demanding that which he thought to be his own, and that by way of justice. Who then can affirm that he hath done ill? O how many good works have been omitted, how many evills committed, under this cloak of formes, which a man sees not! And therefore it is very truly said, That the extremity of law, is the extremity of wrong: and as well said, God shield us from *Formalists*.

3. *Pedants. lib. 3. cap. 13.* The *Pedantie* or houshold schoole-master, having with great study and paines filched from other mens writings their learning, they set it out to the view and to sale, and with a questuous and mercenary ostentation they disgorge it, and let it flie with the winde. Are there any people in the world so sottish in their affaires, more unapt to very thing, and yet more presumptuous and obstinate? in every tongue and nation, *Pedant*, *Clerke*, *Master*, are words of reproach. To do any thing sottishly, is to do it like a *Clerke*. These are a kinde of people, that have their memories stuffed with the wisdome of other men, and have none of their own: their judgments, wils, consciences are never the better, they are unapt, simple, unwise, in such sort, that it seems that learning serves them for no other use, then to make them more fooles, yea more arrogant pratlers: they diminish or rather swallow up their own spirits; and bastardize their understanding, but puffe up their memory. Here is that misery seated which we now come to speak of, and is the last of those of the understanding.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XL.

### 5. *Presumption.*

BEhold here the last and leudest line or lineament of this picture; it is the other part of that description given by *Pliny*; the plague of man, and the nurse of false and erronious opinions, both publick and particular, and yet a vice both naturall and originall in man. Now this presumption must be considered diversly, and in all senses, high, low, collaterall, inward and outward; in respect of God, things high and celestiall, in regard of things base, as of beasts, man his companion, of himself, and all may be reduced to these two; To esteem too much of himself, and not to esteem sufficiently of another: *Qui in se confidebant, & aspernabantur alios*: *Trusted in themselves, and despised others.* A word or two of either. *Luc.* 18.

1. *Presumption in regard of God.*

First in respect of God (and it is a horrible thing) all superstition and want in Religion, or false service of God, proceedeth from this; That we esteem not enough of God, we understand him not, and our opinions, conceits, and beliefes of the Divinity, are not high and pure enough. I mean not by this enough, proportion answerable to the greatnes of God, which being infinite, receiveth not any proportion; for it is impossible in this respect to conceit or believe enough: but I mean enough, in respect of what we can and ought to do. We soare not high enough, we do not elevate and sharpen sufficiently the point of our spirit, when we enter into an imagination of the Divinity; we over-basely conceit him, our services are unworthy his majesty, we deal with him after a baser manner then with other creatures, we speake not only of his works but of his majesty, will, judgments, with more confidence and boldnes then we dare to do of an earthly Prince or man of honour. Many men there are, that would scorn such kinde of service and acknowledgment, and would hold themselves to be abused, and their honours in some sort violated, if a man should speake of them, or abuse their names in so base and abject a manner. We enterprise to leade God, to flatter him, to bend him, to compound or condition with him; that I may not say, to brave, threaten, despise, murmure against him. *Cæsar* willed his Pilot not to fear to hoise up sales, and commit himself to the fury of the seas, even against destiny and the will of the heavens, with this only

only confidence, That it was *Cesar* whom he carried. *Augustus* having been beaten with a tempest at sea, defied god *Neptune*, and in the chiefest pompe of the *Circean* sports, caused his image to be taken down, from where it was placed amongst the rest of the gods, to be revenged of him. The *Thracians* when it thundreth and lighteneth, shoot against heaven, to bring God himself into order. *Xerxes* scourged the sea, and wrote a bill of defiance against the hill *Athos*. And one telleth of a Christian King neer neighbour of ours, who having received a blow from God, swore he would be revenged, and gave commandement that for ten years no man should pray unto him, or speak of him.

*See lib. 1. cap. 10.*

*See lib. 2. cap. 18.*

*See lib. 3. cap. 1.*

*Audax Iapeti genus.*
*Nil mortalibus arduum est;*
*Cælum ipsum petimus stultitia, neque*
*Per nostrum patimur scelus*
*Iracunda Iovem ponere fulmina.*
*Audacious Christians, Iaphes backward seed,*
*Goe the contrary way (to heaven) with speed;*
*Whose sins incessant, minute, hour, and day,*
*Provoke Gods rod to walk, his staffe to stay.*

But, to leave these strange extravagancies, all the common sort of people, do they not plainly verifie that saying of *Pliny*, That there is nothing more miserable, and therewithall more glorious then man? For one the one side he faineth lofty and rich opinions of the love, care, and affection of God towards him, as his minion and onely beloved; and in the mean time, he returneth him no duty or service worthy so great and loving a God. How can a life so miserable, and a service so negligent on the one side, agree with an opinion and beliefe so glorious and so haughty on the other? This is at one and the same time, to be an angell and a swine: and this is that wherewith a great Philosopher reproached the Christians, that there were no people more fierce and glorious in their speech, and in effect more dissolute, effeminate, and villanious. It was an enemy that spake it, perhaps to wrong and abuse us, but yet he spake but that which doth justly touch all hypocrites.

2. *Inrespect of Nature.*

It likewise seemeth unto us, that we burthen and importune God, the world, and nature, that they labour and travell in our affaires, they watch not but for vs, and therefore we wonder and are astonished with those accidents that happen unto us, and especially

cially at our deaths. Few there are that resolve and believe, that it is their last hour, and almost all do even then suffer themselves to be mocked with vain hopes. This proceedeth from presumption, we make too much of our selves, and we think that the whole world hath great interest in our death, that things fail us according to that measure that we fail them; or that they fail themselves, according to that measure that they fail us; that they go the self-same dance with us, not unlike those that row upon the water, think the heavens, the earth, yea Cities themselves to move, when they move; we think to draw all with us, and there is no man amongst us that sufficiently thinks he is but one.

3. Of heaven.

Besides all this, man believeth that the heaven, the stars, all this great celestiall motion of the world, is only made for him. *Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes Deos: And that all the Gods are in contention for him alone.* And the poor miserable wretch is in the mean time ridiculous: he is here beneath, lodged in the last and worst stage of the world, most distant from the celesticall vault, in the sink of the world, amongst the filth and lees thereof, with creatures of baser condition, made to receive all these excrements and ordures, which rain down and fall from above upon his head; nay he lives not but by them, and to endure all those accidents that on all sides happen unto him; and yet he makes himself believe, that he is the master and commander of all, that all creatures, yea those great luminous incorruptible bodies, whereof he knows not the least virtue, and which he is constrained with astonishment to admire, move not but for him, and to do him service. And because he beggeth (wretch that he is) his living, his maintenance, his commodities from the beams, light and heat of the Sun, from the rain and other distillations of heaven, and the aire, he sticks not to say, that he injoyeth the heavens and the elements; as if all had been made, and still move only for him. In this sense a gosling may say as much, and perhaps more justly and peremptorily. For man, who many times receiveth many discommodities from above, and of all that he receiveth hath nothing in his own power or understanding, nor can divine of them, is in continuall doubt and fear, least those superiour bodies should not move aright, and to that end and purpose which he hath proposed, and that they procure unto him sterility, sickness, and whatsoever is contrary to his designment, and so he trembleth under his burthen; whereas beasts receive whatsoever cometh from above, without stir or apprehension

*Sence.* henſion of what ſhall happen unto them, and without complaint of that which is hapned, which man cannot do. *Non nos cauſa mundo ſumus hyemem æſtatemq; referendi ſuas iſta leges habent, quibus divina exercentur: minus nos ſuſpicimus, ſi digni nobis videmur propter quos tanta moveantur: non tanta cœlo nobiſcum ſocietas eſt, ut noſtro fato ſit ille quoque ſiderum fulgor. We are not the cauſe why the World hath courſe and recourſe of winter and ſummer, theſe things have their rules and lawes, by which the will of God is executed: We honour our ſelves the leſs, if we think our ſelves worthy, that for our ſakes ſo many things ſhould be moved: We have not that ſociety with the heavens, that the ſtars ſhould only ſhine for us.*

4. *Of creatures.* In reſpect of things baſe and earthly, that is to ſay, all other creatures, he diſdaineth and contemneth them, as if they did not appertain to the ſame waſter-workman, and came not of the ſame mother, did not belong to the ſame family with him, as if they did not any way concern him, or had any part or relation unto him. And from hence proceedeth that common abuſe and cruelty that is practiſed againſt them, a thing that reboundeth againſt that common and univerſall maſter which hath made them, which hath care of them, and hath ordained laws for their good and preſervation, hath given them preheminence in certain things, and ſent man unto them as to a ſchool. But this belongs to the ſubject of the Chapter following.

Now this derogateth not any thing at all from that common doctrine, that the world is made for man, and man for God: for beſides the inſtruction that man draweth in generall, from every high and low thing, whereby to know God, himſelf, his duty, he alſo draweth in particulars from every thing, either profit, pleaſure, or ſervice. That which is above him, which he hath leaſt in underſtanding, and nothing at all in his power, the azured heaven ſo richly decked and counterpointed with ſtars, and rowling torches never ceaſing over our heads, he only enjoyeth by contemplation, he mounteth and is carried with admiration, fear, reverence of the authour and ſoveraign Lord of all: and therefore in this ſenſe it was truly ſaid by *Anaxagoras*, That man was created to contemplate the heaven and the ſun, and as truly by other Philoſophers was he called, χαμόθκοπον from baſe and inferiour things, he draweth help, ſervice, commodity; but for a man to perſwade himſelf that in the framing of all theſe things, no other thing was thought upon but man, and that he is the only end and But of all

theſe

these luminous and incorruptible bodies, it is a great folly and an over-bold presumption.

Finally, but especially, this presumption is to be considered in man himself, that is to say, in regard of himself, and of man his companion, but within, in the progresse of his judgment and opinions; and without in his communication and conversation with another. Concerning which, we are to consider three things, as three heads which follow on the other, where humanity bewraieth in a sottish imbecillity the foolish presumption thereof. The first in believing or misbelieving (here is no question of Religion, nor of faith and beliefe Theologicall, and therefore we must still call to minde the advertisement given in the preface) where we are to note two contrary vices, which are common in humane condition; the one and the other more ordinary, is a kinde of lightness, *qui cito credit, levis est corde*; *he that lightly believeth, is light in heart*: and too great a facility to believe and to entertain whatsoever is proposed, with any kinde of appearance of truth or authority. This belongeth to the folly, simplicity, tenderness and imbecillity of the weaker sort of people, of spirits effeminate, sick, superstitious, astonished, indiscreetly zealous, who like wax do easily receive all impressions, suffer themselves to be taken and led by the eares. And this is rather an error and weakness, then malice, and doth willingly lodg in minds gentle and debonaire. *Credulitas error est magis quàm culpa, & quidem in optimi cujusq; mentem facile irrepit*: *Credulity is rather an error, then a fault Which easily creepeth into the best mans heart.* We see almost the whole world led and carried with opinions and beliefes, not out of choice and judgment, yea many times before they have either years, or discretion to judg, but out of the custome of the country, or instruction in youth received, or by some sudden encounter as with a tempest, whereby they are in such sort fastened, subjected, and enthralled, that it is a matter of great difficulty, ever to unlearn them again. *Veluti tempestate delati ad quamcunque disciplinam tanquam ad saxum adhærescunt*: *They cleave to any discipline as to a stone, being carried thither as with a tempest.* Thus is the world led, we trust our selves too much, and then perswade others to believe us. *Vnusquisque mavult credere quàm judicare; versat nos & præcipitat traditus per manus error, ipsa consuetudo assentiendi periculosa & lubrica*: *Every one had rather believe then judg; errour comming by tradition, doth precipitate and tosse us, the very custome of assenting is*

6. *Of man himself.*

*Three degrees of humane presumption.*

1 *To believe. misbeliefe.*

*is dangerous and slippery.* Now this popular facility, though it be in truth weakness and imbecillity, yet it is not without presumption. For, so lightly to believe and hold for truth and certainty, that which we know not, or to enquire of the causes, reasons, consequents, and not of the truth it self, is to enterprise, to presume too much. For from what other cause proceeds this? If you shall answer from a supposition that it is true; why this is nothing: a man handleth and stirreth the foundations and effects of a thousand things which never were, whereby both *pro* and *contra* are false. How many fables, false and supposed miracles, visions, revelations, are there received in the world, that never were? And why should a man believe a miracle, a thing neither humane nor naturall, when he is able by nature and humane means to confute, and confound the truth thereof? Truth and lying have like visages, like carriage, relish gate, and we behold them with one and the same eye. *Ita sunt finitima falsa veris, ut in præcipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere: Falshood is so neer unto truth, that a wise man ought not to suffer himself to be unadvisedly carried away.* A man ought not to believe that of a man which is not humane, except he be warranted by supernaturall and superhumane approbation, which is onely God, who is onely to be believed in that he saith, only because he saith it.

7. The other contrary vice, is an audacious temerity, to condemn and reject as false all things that are not easily understood, and that please not the palate. It is the property of those that have a good opinion of themselves, which play the parts of men of dexterity and understanding, especiall Hereticks, *Sophists, Pedanties*: for they finding in themselves some speciall point of the spirit, and that they see a little more cleerly then the common sort, they assume unto themselves law and authority, to decide and determine all things. This vice is far greater, and more base then the former: for it is an enraged folly, to think to know as much as possibly is to be known, the jurisdiction and limits of nature, the capacity of the power and will of God to frame unto himself and his sufficiency the truth and falshood of things, which must needs be in so certain and assured resolution and definition of them: for see their ordinary language, that is false, impossible, absurd: and how many things are there, which at one time we have rejected with laughter as impossible, which we have been constrained afterwards to confess and approve, yea and others too, more strange then they? And

And on the other side, how many things have we received as articles of our faith, that have afterwards proved vanities and lies?

The second degree of presumption, which followeth and commonly proceedeth from the former, is certainly and obstinately to affirm or disprove, that which he hath lightly believed, or misbelieved; So that it addeth unto the first, obstinacie in opinion, and so the presumption increaseth. This facility to believe, with time is confirmed, and degenerateth into an obstinacy, invincible, and uncapable of amendment; yea, a man proceeds so far in this obstinacie, that he defends those things that he knows and understands least, *Majorem fidem homines adhibent iis quæ non intelligunt; cupiditate humani ingenii lubentius obscura creduntur: Men easily believe those things they understand not; by a naturall desire of humane wit, obscure things are easily believed.* He speaks of all things with resolution. Now affirmation and opinative obstinacy, are signes of negligence and ignorance accompanied with folly and arrogancy. 2. *To affirme and condemn.*

The third degree, which followeth these two, and which is the height of presumption, is to perswade others to receive as canonicall whatsoever he believeth, yea imperiously to impose a belief as it were by obligation, and inhibition to doubt. What tyranny is this? Whosoever believeth a thing, thinks it a work of charity to perswade another to believe the same; and that he may the better do it, he feareth not to add of his own invention, so much as he seeth necessary for his purpose to supply that want and willingness, which he thinks to be in the conceit of another of that he tels. There is nothing unto which men are commonly more prone, then to give way to their own opinions. *Nemo sibi tantùm errat, sed aliis erroris causa & author est: No man erres onely to himself, but is the author and cause of error to others.* Where the ordinary mean wanteth, there a man addeth commandement, force, fire, sword. This vice is proper unto dogmatists, and such as will govern, and give laws unto the world. Now to attain to the end hereof, and to captivate the beliefs of men unto themselves, they use two means: First, they bring in certain generall and fundamentall propositions, which they call principles and presuppositions, whereof they say we must neither doubt nor dispute; upon which they afterwards build whatsoever they please, and leade the world at their pleasure: which is a mockery, whereby the world is repleni shed with errors and lies. And to say the truth, if a man should examine 8. 3. *To perswade*

these principles, he should finde as great, or greater untruths and weaknesses in them, then in all that which they would have to depend upon them, and as great an appearance of truth in propositions quite contrary. There have been some in our time, that have changed and quite altered the principles and rules of our Ancients and best Professors in *Astronomy, Physick, Geometrie,* in nature, and the motion of the windes. Every humane proposition hath as much authority as another, if reason make not the difference. Truth dependeth not upon the authority and testimony of man: there are no principles in man if Divinity have not revealed them; all the rest is but a dream and smoke. Now these great masters will, that whatsoever they say, should be believed and received and that every man should trust them, without judging or examining what they teach, which is a tyrannicall injustice. God onely (as hath been said) is to be believed in all that he saith, because that he saith it: *Qui à semetipso loquitur mendax est*: *Hee that speaketh of himself is a liar.*

The other mean is a supposition of some miraculous thing done, new and celestiall revelation and apparition, which hath been cunningly practised by Law-makers, Generals in the field, or private Captains. The perswasion taken from the subject it self, possesseth the simpler sort; but at the first it is so tender and frail, that the least offence, mistaking or imprudence that shall happen, undoeth all: for it is a great marvell, how from so vain beginnings and frivolous causes, there should arise the most famous impressions. Now this first impression being once gotten, doth wonderfully grow and increase, in such sort, that it fasteneth even upon the most expert and skilfull, by reason of the multitude of believers, witnesses, years, wherewith a man suffereth himself to be carried, if he see not well into it, and be not well prepared against it: for then it is to small purpose to spurn against it, or to enquire farther into it, but simply to believe it. The greatest and most powerfull mean to perswade, and the beast touch-stone of truth, is multitude of years and believers: now fools do win the game, *sanitatis patrocinium est insanientium turba*: *The mad multitude is a patronage for sobriety.* It is a very difficult thing for a man to resolve and settle his judgment against the common opinion. All this may easily appear, by those many impostures and fooleries which we have seen to go for miracles, and ravish the whole world with admiration, but instantly exstinguished by some accident, or by the exact

inquiry

inquiry of such as are quick sighted, who have cleared and discovered the cozenage; which if they had but time to ripen, and to have fortified in nature, they had continued for ever, been generally received and adored. And even such as are divers others, which by the favour of fortune, have passed for currant, and gained publick beliefe, whereunto men afterwards accommodate themselves, without any farther desire, to know the thing in its first forme and originall, *Nusquam ad liquidum fama perducitur: Report is never brought to full triall.* And this is the reason, why there are so many kindes of religion in the world, so many superstitious customes of the *Pagans*, which are yet remaining even in Christendome, and concerning which we cannot wholly assure the people. By this whole discourse we see what we are, and to what we tend, since we are led by such guides.

## The fifth and last Consideration of Man, by *those varieties and great differences that are in him, and their comparisons.*

### CHAP. XLI.

*Of the difference and inequality of men in generall.*

THere is nothing in this lower world, wherein there is found so great difference as amongst men, and where the differences are so distant and divers in one and the same subject, and kinde. If a man should believe *Pliny*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, there are shapes of men in some countries, that have very little resemblance with ours, and some that are of a mixt and doubtfull kinde, betwixt men and beasts. There are some countries where men are without heads, carrying their eyes and mouthes in their breasts; where they are *Hermaphrodites*; where they go with four feet; where they have one eye in the forehead, and a head more like to a dogs head then a mans; where they are as fish from the navell downwards, and live in the water; where their women bear children at five years of age, and live but eight; where they have their heads and foreheads so hard, that iron cannot pierce them; where they do naturally change into wolves and other beasts, and afterwards into men again; where they are without a mouth, nourishing themselves with the smell of certain odors; where they yield a

ſeed that is black, where they are very little and dwarfs, where they are very great and giants, where they go alwaies naked, where they are all hairy, where they ſpeake not, but live in woods like beaſts, hidden in caves and hollow trees. And in our times we have diſcovered, ſeen with the eye, and touched with our fingers, where the men are without beards, without uſe of fire, corn, wine, where that is held to be the greateſt beauty, which we account the greateſt deformity, as hath been ſaid before. Touching the diverſity of manners, we ſhall ſpeake elſewhere. And to omit many of theſe ſtrange wonderments, we know that as touching the viſage, it is impoſſible to finde two in all things alike; it may fall out that we may miſtake, and take the one for the other, becauſe of the great reſemblance that may be between two: but this muſt be in the abſence of the one: for in the preſence of them both, it is eaſie to note a difference, though a man know not how to expreſs it. In the ſouls of men there is a far greater difference, for it is not onely greater without compariſon, betwixt a man and a man, then betwixt a beaſt and a beaſt: but there is a greater difference betwixt a man and a man, then a man and a beaſt; for an excellent beaſt comes nearer to a man of the baſeſt ſort and degree, then that man to another great and excellent perſonage. This great difference of men, proceedeth from the inward qualities, and from the ſpirit, where there are ſo many parts, ſo many juriſdictions, ſo many degrees beyond number, that it is an infinite thing to conſider. We muſt now at the laſt learn to know man by thoſe diſtinctions, and differences that are in him, which are divers, according to the many parts in man, many reaſons, and means to compare and conſider of him. We will here ſet down five principall, unto which all the reſt may be referred, and generally all that is in man, *Spirit, body, naturall,* acquired, publike, private, apparent, ſecret: and ſo this fifth and laſt conſideration of man, ſhall have five parts, which are five great and capitall diſtinctions of men, that is to ſay:

The firſt naturall, eſſentiall, and univerſall of all men, ſoul and body.

The ſecond naturall and eſſentiall, principally, and in ſome ſort acquired, of the force and ſufficiency of the ſpirit.

The third accidentall of the eſtate, condition and duty of man, drawn from ſuperiority and inferiority.

The fourth accidentall of the condition and profeſſion of life.

The

The fifth and last of the favours and disfavours of Nature, and of Fortune.

## CHAP. XLII.

*The first distinction and difference of men naturall and essentiall, drawn from the divers situation of the World.*

THe first more notable, and universall distinction of men, which concerneth the soul and body, and whole essence of man, is taken and drawn from the divers site of the world, according to which the aspect and influence of heaven, and the sun, the air, the climate, the country, are divers. So likewise not onely the colour, the feature, the complexion, the countenance, the manners, are divers, but also the faculties of the soul: *plaga cœli non solum ad robur corporum, sed & animorum facit. Athenis tenue cœlum, ex quo etiam acutiores Attici; crassum Thebis ideo pingues Thebani & valentes. The temperature of the celestiall Climat, is of great operation, both for the strength of the body, and the vigour of the minde: The Athenian air is delicate, and therefore they of a more sharp and ready wit; The Theban grosse, and they fat and strong.* And therefore *Plato* thanked God that he was an *Athenian*, and not a *Theban*. As fruits and beasts are divers, according to the divers countries wherein they are: so men are born more and less warlike, just, temperate, docible, religious, chaste, ingenious, good, obedient, beautifull, sound, strong. And this is the reason why *Cyrus* would not agree to the Persians, to abandon their sharp and hilly countrey, to go to another more plain and pleasant, saying, That fat countries and delicate, made men soft and effeminate, and fertile grounds barren and infertile spirits.

1 *The diversity of men proceedeth from the divers situation of the world.*

Following this foundation, we may in grosse, divide the world into three parts, and all men into three kinds of nature: we will make three generall situations of the world, which are, the two extremities, South, and North, and the middle betwixt them both; every part and situation shall have sixty degrees. The Southern parts which is under the Æquator, hath thirty degrees on this side the line thirty on that, that is to say, all that part which is betwixt the two Tropicks, or somewhat more, where are the hot and Southern countries, *Africk*, and *Æthiopia* in the middle betwixt the East and the West; *Arabia*, *Calicut*, the *Moluques*, *Iaves*, *Taprobana* towards the Orient; *Peru* and the great Seas towards

2 *The division of the world into three parts.*

The other middle part, hath thirty degrees beyong the Tropicks, both on this side the line, and on that towards the Poles, where are the middle and temperate regions, all *Europe* with the *Mediterrane* Sea in the middle, betwixt the East and West; all *Asia* both the less and the greater, which is towards the East, with *China*, *Iapan*, and *America*, towards the West. The third, which is the thirty degrees, which are next to the two Poles on both sides, which are the cold and Icie countries, the *Septentrionall* people, *Tartary*, *Muscovy*, *Estotilan*, *Magelan*, which is not yet throughly discovered.

6. *Their natures.* Following this generall partition of the world, the natures of men, are likewise different in every thing, body, soul, religion, manners, as we may see in this title Table: For the

| | *Northern people are* | *Middle are* | *Southern are* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 *In their bodies.* | *High and great, phlegmaticke, sanguine, white, and yeallow, sociable the voice strong, the skin soft and hairy, great eaters and drinkers, puissant,* | *Indifferent and temperate in all those things, as neuters or partakers a little of those two extremities, and participating most of that region to which they are neerest neighbours.* | *Little, melancholick, cold, and drie, blacke, Solitarie, the voice shrill, the skin hard, with little hair, and curled, abstinent, feeble.* |
| 2 *Spirit.* | *Heavy, obtuse, stupid sottish, facill, light, inconstant.* | | *Ingenious, wise, subtile, opinative.* |
| 3 *Religion.* | *Little religious and devout.* | | *Superstitious, contemplative.* |
| 4 *Manners.* | *Warriers valiant, painfull, chaste, free from jealousie, cruell and inhumane.* | | *No warriours, idle, unchaste, jealous, cruell, and inhumane.* |

4. *The proofes of these differences of the body.* All these differences are easily proved. As for those of the body, they are known by the eye, and if there be any acceptions, they are rare, and proceed from the mixture of the people, or from the windes, the water, and particular situation of the place, whereby a mountain is a notable difference, in the self-same degree, yea the self-same country and citie. They of the higher part of the citie of *Athens*, were of a quite contrary humour, as *Plutark* affirmeth, to those that dwelt about the gate of *Pyreus*: and they that

that dwelt on the North side of a mountain, differ as much from those that well on the South side, as they do both differ from those in the valley.

As for the differences of the spirit, we know that mechanicall and manuall Arts belong to the North, where men as made for labour; Speculative sciences came from the South. *Cesar* and other ancients of those times, called the Ægyptians ingenious, and subtile: *Moses* is said to be instructed in their wisdome; and Philosophy came from thence into *Greece*, Greatness began rather with them, because of their spirit and subtilty. The guards of Princes (yea in the Southern parts) are Northern men, as having more strength, and less subtilty and malice. So likewise the Southern people are indued with great virtues, and subject to great vices, as it is said of *Hannibal*: The Northern have goodness and simplicity. The lesser and middle sciences, as policies, lawes, and eloquence, are in the middle nations, wherein the greatest Empires and policies have flourished. 2. *The Spirit.*

As touching the third point, religions may come from the South, *Ægypt*, *Arabia*, *Chaldea*; more superstition in *Africk*, then the whole world besides, witness their vowes so frequent, their temples so magnificent. The Nothern people, saith *Cesar*, having little care of religion, being wholly given to the wars and to hunting. 3. *Religion.*

As for manners, and first touching warrs, it is certain that the greatest armies, Arts, military instruments and inventions have come from the North. The *Scythians*, *Gothes*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, *Tartarians*, *Turkes*, *Germanes*, have beaten and conquered all other nations, and ransacked the whole world; and therefore it is a common saying, That all evill comes from the North. Single combates came from them. The Northern people adored a sword fastened in the earth, saith *Solinus*. To other nations they are invincible, yea to the *Romanes*, who having conquered the rest of the world, were utterly destroyed by them. They grow weak and languish with the Southern windes, and going towards the South; as the Southern men coming into the North, redouble their forces. By reason of their warlike fiercenes, they will not endure to be commanded by authority, they love their liberty, at leastwise elective commanders. Touching chastty and jealousie in the North, saith *Tacitus*, one woman to a man: yea one woman sufficeth many men, saith *Cesar*. There is no jealousie, 4. *Manners.*

saith *Munster*, where men and women bathe themselves together with strangers. In the South *Polygamy* is altogether received. All *Africk* adoreth *Venus*, saith *Solinus*. The Southerns die with jealousie, and therefore they keep Eunuches, as gardians to their wives, which their great Lords have in great number, as they have stables of horses. Touching cruelty, the two extreams are alike cruell, but the causes are divers, as we shall see anon, when we come to speake of the causes. Those tortures of the wheel, and staking of men alive, came from the North : The inhumanities of the *Muscovites* and *Tartars*, are too well know. The *Almanes*, saith *Tacitus*, punish not their offendors by law, but cruelly murther them as enemies. The Southerns flea their offendors alive, and their desire of revenge is so great, that they become furious if they be not glutted therewith. In the middle regions they are mercifull and humane : The *Romanes* punished their greatest offenders with banishment. The *Greeks* used to put their offenders to death, with a sweet drugge, made of a kinde of Hemlock which they gave them to drink. And *Cicero* saith, that humanity and courtesie were the conditions of *Asia minor*, and from thence derived to the rest of the world.

5 *The cause of the aforesaid differences.*

The cause of all these corporall and spirituall differences, is the inequality and difference of the inward naturall heat, which is in those countries and peoples, that is to say, strong and vehement in the Notherns, by reason of the great outward cold, which incloseth and drieth the heat into the inward parts, as caves and deep places are hot in Winter, so mens stomacks, *Ventres hyeme calidiores. Our stomacks are hot in winter.* Weak and feeble in the Southerns, the inward heat being dispersed and drawn into the outward parts, by the vehemency of the outward heat, as in Summer vaults, and places under the earth are cold. Mean and temperate in the middle regions. From this diversity, I say, and inequality of naturall heat, proceed these differences not onely corporall, which are easie to note, but also spirituall ; for the Southerns by reason of their cold temperature, are melancholike, and therefore staid, constant, contemplative, ingenious, religious, wise ; for wisdome is in cold creatures, as Elephants, who as they are of all other beasts the most melancholick, so are they more wise, docile, religious, by reason of their cold bloud. From this melancholy temperature it likewise commeth, that the Southerns are unchaste, by reason of their frothy, fretting tickling melan-

melancholy, as we commonly see in Hares; and cruell, because this fretting sharp melancholy, do violently press the passions and revenge. The Northerns are of a phlegmatick and sanguine temperature, quite contrary to the Southern, and therefore have contrary qualities, save that they agree in this one, that they are likewise cruell and inhumane, but by another reason, that is, for want of judgment, whereby like beasts, they know not how to contain and govern themselves. They of the middle regions are sanguine and cholerick, tempered with a sweet, pleasant, kindly disposed humour; they are active. We could likewise more exquisitely represent, the divers natures of these three sorts of people, by the application and comparison of all things, as you may see in this little Table, where it appeareth that there doth properly belong, and may be referred to the

| *Nothern.* | *Midlers.* | *Southern,* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *The common sense,* | *discourse and reasoning,* | *Vnderstanding.* | *Qualities of the soul.* |
| *Force, as of Beares and other beasts.* | *Reason and justice of men.* | *Subtility of force, and religion of divines.* | |
| *Mars* {*Warre* / *The moon* {*hunting* | *Mercury* {*Emperors,* / *Iupiter.* {*Oratours,* | *Saturn* {*contemplation,* / *Venus* {*love.* | *Planets.* |
| *Art and handicrafts.* | *Prudence, knowledg of good and evill.* | *Knowledg of truth and falshood.* | *Actions and parts of the Common-weal.* |
| *Labourers, Artificers, Souldiers, to execute and obey.* | *Magistrates, provident, to judge, command.* | *Prelates, Philosophers, to contemplate.* | |
| *Yong men, unapt.* | *Perfect men, managers of affaires.* | *Grave old men, wise, pensive.* | |

The other distinction more particular, may be referred to this generall of North, and South: for me may refer to the conditions of the Nothern, those of the West, and that live in mountains, warriours, fierce people, desirous of liberty, by reason of the cold which is in mountaines. So likewise, they that are farr distant from the Sea, are more simple and innocent. And contrarily, to the conditions of the Southerns, we may refer the Easterlings, such as live in valleys, effeminate and delicate persons, by reason of the fertility of the place, which naturally yieldeth pleasure. So likewise

wise they that live upon the Sea coasts are subtile, deceivers by reason of their commerce and traffick with divers sorts of people and nations. By all this discourse we may say see that generally those of the North do excel in body, have strength for their part; and they of the South in spirit, and have for their part subtiltie; they of the middle Regions partake of both, and are temperate in all. So likewise we may see that their manners, to say the truth, are neither vices nor virtues, but works of Nature, which to amend or renounce altogether is more then difficult; but to sweeten, temper and reduce the extremitie, to a mediocritie, it is a work of virtue.

## CHAP. XLIII.

*The second distinction, and more subtile difference of the sprits and sufficiencies of men.*

1 *Three sorts and degrees of people in the world.*

THis second distinction which respecteth the spirit and sufficiencie, is not so plain, and perceptible as the other, and comes as well from nature as atchievment; according unto which there are three sorts of people in the world, as three conditions and degrees of spirits. In the first and the lowest are the weak and plain

1. spirits, of base and slender capacity, born to obey, serve, and to be

2. led, who in effect are simply men. In the second and middle stage are they that are of an indifferent judgment, make profession of sufficiency, knowledg, dexterity, but do not sufficiently understand and judg themselves, resting themselves upon that which is commonly held, and given them at the first hand, without further enquirie of the truth and source of things, yea with a perswasion that it is not lawful; and never looking farther then where they be, but thinking that it is every where so, or ought to be so, and that if it be otherwise, they are deceived, yea they are barbarous. They subject themselves to opinions, and the municipal lawes of the place where they live, even from the time they were first hatched, not onely by observance and custome, which all ought to do, but even from the very heart and soul, with a perswasion that that which is believed in their village is the true touchstone of truth, (here is nothing spoken of divine revealed truth, or religion) the onely, or at least the best rule to live well. These sorts of people are of the schoole and jurisdiction of *Aristotle*, affirmers, positive men, dogmatists, who respect more utility then verity, according to the use

and

and custome of the world, then that which is good and true in it self. Of this condition there are a very great number, and divers degrees, the principal and most active amongst them govern the world, and have the command in their hand. In the third and highest stage are men indued with a quick and clear spirit, a strong, firm, and solid judgment, who are not content with a bare affirmation, nor settle themselves in common received opinions, nor suffer themselves to be wonne and preoccupated by a publick and common belief, whereof they wonder not at all, knowledg that there are many cousenages, deceits and impostures received in the world with approbation and applause, yea publick adoration and reverence : but they examine all things that are proposed, sound maturely, and seek without passion the causes, motives, and jurisdictions even to the root, loving better to doubt, and to hold in suspence their belief, then by a loose and idle facilite or lightness, or precipitation of judgment to feed themselves with lies, and affirm or secure themselves of that thing whereof they can have no certain reason. These are but few in number, of the Schoole of *Socrates* and *Plato*, modest, sober, stayed, considering more the verity and realty of things then the utilitie; who if they be well born, having with that above mentioned probitie and government in manners, they are truly wise, and such as here we seek after. But because they agree not with the common sort, as touching opinions, see more cleerly, pierce more deeply, are not so facil and easie drawn to believe, they are suspected and little esteemed of others, who are far more in number, and held for phantasticks and Philosophers ; a word which they use in a wrong sense, to wrong others. In the first of these three degrees or orders there is a farre greater number then in the second, and in the second then in the third. They of the first and last, the lowest and highest, trouble not the world, make no stirre, the one for insufficiency and weakness, the other by reason of two great sufficiency, stability, and wisedom. They of the middle make all the stirre, the disputations that are in the world, a presumptuous kinde of people, alwaies stirred, and alwaies stirring. They of the lower rank, as the bottome, the lees, the sink, resemble the earth, which doth nothing but receive and suffer that which comes from above. They of the middle resemble the region of the aire, wherein are formed all the meteors, thundrings, and alterations are made, which afterwards fall upon the earth. They of the higher stage resemble the firma-

ment

ment it self, or at least the highest region next unto heaven, pure, clear, neat and peaceable. This difference of men proceedeth partly from the nature of the first composition and temperature of the brain, which is different, moist, hot, dry, and that in many degrees, whereby the spirits and judgments are either very solid, couragious, or feeble, fearful, plain: and partly from instruction and discipline; as also from the experience and practcie of the world, which serveth to put off simplicitie, and to become more advised. Lastly, all these three sorts of people are found under every robe, form and condition both of good and evil men, but diversly.

2 *Another distinction.*

There is another distinction of spirits and sufficiencies, for some there are that make way themselves, and are their own guides and governours. These are happy, of the higher sort, and very rare; others have need of help, and these are of two sorts: For some need only a little light, it is enough if they have a guide and a torch to go before them, they will willingly and easily follow. Others there are that must be drawn, they need a spurr. and must be led by the hand. I speak not of those that either by reason of their great weakness cannot, as they are of the lower range, or the malignitie of their nature will not, as they of the middle, who are neither good to follow, nor will suffer themselves to be drawn and directed, for these are a people past all hope.

## CHAP. XLIIII.

### *The third distinction and difference of men accidental, of their degrees, estates and charges.*

THis accidentall distinction, which respecteth the estates and charges is grounded upon two principles and foundations of humane society, which are to command and obey, power and subjection, superiority and inferiority. *Imperio & obsequio omnia constant*: *All things do consist of command and subjection.* This distinction we better see, first in grosse in this Table.

All


All power and subjectiõ is either
Private which is either in
Families and housholdgovernment; and it is fourfold:
Mariage, of the husband and the wife. This is the source of humane society.
Paternal, of parents over their children. This is truly natural.
Herile, which is twofold, of
Lords, over their slaves.
Masters, over their servants.
Patronall, of Patrons over their pupils: the use whereof is less frequent.
Corporations and Colledges, Civil communities over the particular members of that communitie.
Publike which is either
Soveraign, which is threefold, and they are three sorts of estates, cunctas nationes & urbes, populus aut primores aut singuli regunt, i.
Monarchie, of one.
Aristocracie, of a few.
Democracie, of all.
Subaltern, which is in those who are superiors and inferiors, for divers reasons, places, persons, as
Particular lords, in many degrees.
Officers of the soveraignty, whereof there are divers sorts.

The first generall division.

This publike power, whether it be soveraign, or subaltern, hath other subdivisions, necessary to be known. The soveraign, which (as hath been said) is threefold, in regard of the manner of government, is likewise threefold; that is to say, every one of these three is governed after a threefold manner, and is therefore called Royall, or Signorial, or Tyrannical. Royal, wherein the soveraign (be it one, or many, or all) obeying the lawes of Nature, preserveth the

The subdivision of the soveraig power.

the naturall liberty and propriety of the goods of his subjects. *Ad reges potestas omnis pertinet, ad singulos proprietas : omnia Rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio. All power belongeth to Kings, to every particular man the propriety, the King possesseth all by command, private men by possession.* Seignoriall or lordly, where the soveraign is Lord both of men and goods, by the right of armes, governing his subjects as slaves. Tyrannicall, where the soveraign contemning all laws of Nature, doth abuse both the persons and goods of his subjects, differing from a Lord, as a thief from an enemy in war. Of the three soveraign states, the *Monarchie*, and of the three governments, the Lordly, are the more ancient, great, durable, and majesticall; as in former times, *Assyria, Persia, Egypt*, and now *Ethiopia* the most ancient, that is, *Muscovie, Tartary, Turkie, Peru.* But the better and more naturall state and government, is the *Monarchy Royall.* The most famous *Aristocracies*, hath sometimes been that of the *Lacedemonians*, and now the *Venetians.* The *Democricies, Rome, Athens, Carthage*, Royall in their government.

3. *Of particular Lords.* The publike subaltern power, which is in particular Lords, is of many kindes and degrees, principally five, that is to say, Lords *Tributaries*, who pay onely tribute.

*Feudetaries*, simple *Vassals*, who owe faith and homage for the tenure of their land. These three may be soveraigns.

*Vassals* bound to do service, who besides faith and homage, owe likewise personall service, whereby they cannot truly be soveraigns.

Naturall subjects, whether they be Vassals or *Censors*, or otherwise, who owe subjection and obedience, and cannot be exempted from the power of their soveraign, and these are Lords.

4. *Of officers.* The publick subaltern power, which is in the officers of the soveraignty, is of divers kindes, and both in regard of the honour, and the power may be reduced to five degrees.

1. The first and basest, are those ignominious persons, which should remain without the city, the last executioners of justice.

2. The second, they that have neither honour nor infamie, Sergeants Trumpeters.

3. The third, such as have honour without knowledg and power, Notaries, Receivers, Secretaries.

4. The fourth, they that have with honour, power, and knowledg, but without jurisdiction, the Kings servants.

The

The fifth, they that have with the rest jurisdiction; and these are properly called Magistrates: of whom there are many distinctions, and especially these five, which are all double: 5.

1 { Majors, Senatours, / Minors, Judges. } 2 { Politicks. / Militaries. }

2 { Civill. / Criminall. } 4 { Titularies in offices of form, who have it by inheritance. / Commissaries. }

3 { Perpetuall, as the lesser both in number and otherwise should be. / Temporall and moveable, as the greater should be. }

## Of the estates and degrees of Men, in particular following this precedent Table.

### *An Advertisement.*

HEre we are to speak in particular of the parts of this table, and the distinctions of powers and subjections, (beginning with the private and domesticall) that is to say, of every estate and profession of men, to the end we may know them; and therefore this may be called, The Book of the knowledge of man: for the duties of every one shall be set down in the third Book, in the vertue of justice; where in like manner and order all these estates and chapters shall be resumed and examined. Now before we beginne, it shall be necessary summarily to speak of commanding and obeying, two foundations and principall causes of these diversities of estates and charges.

## CHAP. XLV.

### *Of commanding and obeying.*

THese, as hath been said, are the two foundations of all humane societie, and the diversitie of estates and professions. They are Relatives, they do mutually respect, ingender, and conserve one the other, and are alike required in all assemblies and communities; but are yet subject to a naturall kind of envy, and an everlasting contestation, complaint and obtrectation. The popular estate make the Sovereign of worse condition then a Carter. The Monarchie placeth him above God himself. In commanding

ding is the honour, the difficulty (these two commonly go together) the goodness, the sufficiency, all qualities of greatness; Command, that is to say, sufficiency, courage, authority, is from heaven and of God, *Imperium non nisi divino fato datur : omnis potestas à Deo est : Empire and dominion is not given but by divine destiny: all power is from God above.* And therefore *Plato* was wont to say, That God did not appoint and establish men, that is to say, men of a common sort and sufficiency, and purely humane, to rule others, but such as by some divine touch, singular virtue, and gift of heaven, do excell others : and therefore they are called *Heroes.* In obeying is utility, proclivity, necessity, in such sort, that for the preservation of the weale publick, it is more necessary then well to command; and the deniall obedience, or not to obey as men should, is far more dangerous, then for a Prince not to command as he should. Even as in marriage, though the husband and the wife be equally obliged to loyalty, and fidelity, and have both bound themselves by promise in the same words, the same ceremonies and solemnities; yet notwithstanding the inconveniencies are incomparably far greater, in the fact of adultery, to the wife then the husband : even so, though command and obedience are equally required in every state and company, yet the inconveniences of disobedience in subjects, are far more dangerous then of ill government in a Commander. Many States have a long time continued and prospered too, under the command of wicked Princes and Magistrates, the subjects obeying, and accommodating themselves to their government : and therefore a wise man being once asked, why the Common-wealth of *Sparta* was so flourishing, and whether it were, because their Kings command well? Nay rather, saith he, because the Citizens obey well. For if the subjects once refuse to obey, and shake off their yoke, the state must necessarily fall to the ground.

## CHAP. XLVI.

### *Of Marriage.*

NOtwithstanding the state of mariage be the first, more ancient and most important, and as it were the foundation and fountain of humane society, whence arise families, and from them common weales, *Prima societas in conjugio est, quod principium urbis, seminarium Reipublicæ; the first society is in wedlock, which*

*was*

*was the beginning of cities, and the seminary of the common-wealth:* Yet it hath been contemned and defamed by many great personages, who have judged it unworthy men of heart and spirit, and have framed many objections against it.

2. *Objections against mariage.*

First, they account the band and obligation thereof unjust, a hard and oversight captivity, insomuch that by marriage, a man is bound and enthralled to the cares and humours of another. And if it fall out that he hath mistaken in his choise, and have met with a hard bargain, more bone then flesh, his life his ever afterwards most miserable. What iniquity and injustice can there be greater, then for one hours folly, a fault committed without malice, and by meer over-sight, yea many times to obey the advice of another, a man should be bound to an everlasting torment? It were better for him to put the halter about his neck, and to cast himself into the sea his head downward, to end his miserable life, then to live always in the pains of hell, and to suffer without intermission on his side, the tempest of jealousie, of malice, of rage, of madness, of brutish obstinacy, and other miserable conditions: and therefore one sticks not to say, That he that invented this knot and tie of marriage, had found a goodly and beautifull means to be revenged of man; a trap or gin to intangle beasts, and afterwards to make them languish at a little fire. Another saith, That to marry a wise man to a fool, or a fool to a wise man, is to bind the living to the dead, which was the cruellest death invented by tyrants, to make the living to languish and die by the company of the dead. Secondly, they say, that mariage is a corruption and adulterating of good and rare spirits, insomuch that the flatteries and smooth speeches of the party beloved, the affection towards children, the care of houshold affaires, and advancement of their families, do lessen, dissolve, and molifie the vigour and strength of the most lively and generous spirit that is, witness *Sampson, Solomon, Marc. Antony.* And therefore howsoever the matter go, we had not need to marry. But those that have more flesh then spirit, strong in body, and weak in minde, tie them to the flesh, and give them the charge of small and base matters, such as they are capable of. But such as are weak of body, have their spirits great, strong, and puissant, is it not then a pitty to binde them to the flesh, and to mariage, as men do beasts in the stable? We see that beasts the more noble they are, the stronger and fitter for service, as horses and dogs, the more are they kept asunder from

the company and acquaintance of the other sex, and it is the manner to put beasts of least esteem at randome together. So likewise, such men and women as are ordained to the most venerable and holiest vocation, and which ought to be as the cream, and marrow of Christianty, Church men and religious, are (though not by any warrant from the word of God) excluded from marriage. And the reason is, because marriage hindereth and averterh those beautifull and great elevations of the soul, the contemplation of things high, celestiall and divine, which is incompatible with the troubles and molestations of domesticall affaires: for which cause the Apostle preferreth the solitary continent life before marriage. Vtility may well hold with mariage, but honesty is on the other side.

Again, it troubleth beautifull and holy enterprises: as Saint *Austin* reporteth, that having determined with some other his friends, amongst whom there was some married, to retire themselves from the city and the company of men, the better to attend to the study of wisdome and virtue, their purpose was quickly broken and altered, by the wives of those that were married. And another wise man did not doubt to say, that if men could live without women, they should be visited and accompanied by Angels. Moreover marriage is an hinderance to such as delight in travell, and to see strange countries, whether to learn to make themselves wise, or to teach others to be wise, and to publish that to others which they know. To conclude, mrariage doth not onely corrupt and deject good and great spirits, but it robbeth the weale-publick of many beautifull and great things which cannot manifest themselves, remaining in the bosome and lap of a woman, or being spent upon young children. But it is not a goodly sight, nay a great loss, that he that is able for his wisdome and policy, to govern the whole world, should spend his time in the government of a woman and a few children? And therefore it was well answered by a great personage being sollicited to marry, That he was born to command men, not a woman; to counsell Kings and Princes, not little children.

3. *The answer to the aforesaid objections, cap. 4.*

To all this a man may answer, that the nature of man is not capable of perfection, or of any thing against which nothing may be objected, as hath elsewhere been spoken. The best and most expedient remedies that it hath are in some degree or other but sickly, mingled with discommodities: They are all but necessary evils

evils. And this is the best that man could devise for his preservation and multiplication. Some (as *Plato*, and others) would more subtilly have invented means to have avoided these thornie inconveniencies; but besides that they built castles in the ayr, that could not long continue in use, their inventions likewise if they could have been put in practise, would not have been without many discommodities and difficulties. Man hath been the cause of them, and hath himself brought them forth by his vice, intemperancy, and contrary passion; and we are not to accuse the state, nor any other but man, who knowes not well how to use any thing. Moreover a man may say, that by reason of these thornes and difficulties, it is a school of vertue, an apprentiship, and a familiar and domestical exercise: and *Socrates*, a doctor of wisdome, did once say, to such as hit him in the teeth with his wives pettish frowardnes, *That he did thereby learn even within his own dores, to be constant and patient every where else, and to think the crosses of fortune to be sweet and pleasant unto him.* It is not to be denied, but that he that can live unmarried doth best: but yet for the honour of marriage, a man may say, that it was first instituted by God himself in *Paradise*, before any other thing, and that in the state of innocency and perfection. See here four commendations of marriage, but the fourth passeth all the rest, and is without reply. Afterwards the Son of God approved it, and honoured it with his presence at the first miracle that he wrought, and that miracle done in the favour of that state of marriage, and married men; yea he hath honoured it with this priviledge, that it serveth for a figure of that great union of his with the Church, and for that cause it is called a mysterie, and great.

4. *Wholly good, or wholly ill.*

Without all doubt, marriage is not a thing indifferent: It is either wholly a great good, or a great evil; a great content, or a great trouble; a paradise, or a hell: It is either a sweet and pleasant way, if the choice be good; or a rough and dangerous match, and a gauling burthensome tie, if it be ill: It is a bargain where truly that is verified which is said, *Homo homini Deus, aut lupus*; *Man is to man either a God or a Wolf.*

5. *A good marriage a rare good.*

Marriage is a work that consisteth of many parts; there must be a meeting of many qualities, many considerations besides the parties married. For whatsoever a man say, he marrieth not onely for himself; his posterity, family, alliance, and other means, are of great importance, and a grievous burthen. See here the cause why so few

good are found; and becauſe there are ſo few good found, it is a token of the price and value thereof; it is the condition of all great charges: Royalty is full of difficulty, and few there are that exerciſe it well and happily. And whereas we ſee many times that it falleth not out ſo luckily, the reaſon thereof is the licentious liberty, and unbridled deſire of the perſons themſelves, and not in the ſtate and inſtitution of marriage: and therefore it is commonly more commodious, and better fitted in good, ſimple, and vulgar ſpirits, where delicacy, curioſity, and idleneſs are leſs troubleſome: unbridled humours and turbulent wavering mindes are not fit for this ſtate or degree.

6. *A ſimple deſcription and ſummary of marriage.*

Marriage is a ſtep to wiſdome, a holy and inviolable band, an honourable match. If the choiſe be good and well ordered, there is nothing in the world more beautifull: It is a ſweet ſociety of life, full of conſtancy, truſt, and an infinite number of profitable offices, and mutable obligations: It is a fellowſhip not of love, but amity. For love and amity are as different, as the burning ſick heat of a feaver, from the naturall heat of a ſound body. Marriage hath in it ſelf amity, utility, juſtice, honour, conſtancy, a plain pleaſure, but ſound, firm, and more univerſall. Love is grounded upon pleaſure onely, and it is more quick, piercing, ardent. Few marriages ſucceed well, that have their beginnings and progreſſe from beauty and amorous deſires. Marriage hath need of foundations, more ſolid and conſtant, and we muſt walk more warily; this boyling affection is worth nothing, yea marriage hath a better conduct by a third hand.

7. *A deſcription more exact.*

Thus much is ſaid ſummarily and ſimply; but more exactly to deſcribe it, we know that in marriage there are two things eſſentiall unto it, and ſeem contraries, though indeed they be not; that is to ſay, an equality ſociable, and ſuch as is between Peeres: and an inequality, that is to ſay, ſuperiority and inferiority. The equality conſiſteth in an entire and perfect communication and community of all things, ſouls, wills, bodies, goods, the fundamentall law of marriage, which in ſome places is extended even to life and death, in ſuch ſort, that the husband being dead, the wife muſt incontinently follow. This is practiſed in ſome places by the publike laws of the countries, and many times with ſo ardent affection, that many wives belonging to one husband, they contend, and publikely plead for the honour to go firſt to ſleep with their Spouſe (that is their word) alleaging for themſelves, the better to obtain their ſuit and preferment herein, their good ſervice, that they were beſt

beloved, had the last kisse of their deceased husband, and have had children by him.

*Et certamen habent lethi, quæ viva sequatur*
*Conjugium; pudor est non licuisse mori.*
*Ardent victrices, & flammæ pectora præbent,*
*Imponuntque suis ora perusta viris.*
*Strive (and give reasons) each one earnestly*
*To have the honour, with their husband die;*
*To live is shame and loss, who doth obtain,*
*Imputes to pleasure, that which We count paix,*
*And is so ardent hot in her desire,*
*Fearing reversed judgment, more then fire,*
*That she makes haste, &c.*

In other places it was observed, not by publike laws, but private compacts and agreements of marriage, as betwixt *Marc. Antony*, and *Cleopatra*. This equality doth likewise consist in that power which they have in commune over their family, whereby the wife is called the companion of her husband, the mistress of the house and family, as the husband, the master and lord: and their joynt authority over their family, is compared to an *Aristocracie*.

8. *Inequality.*

The distinction of superiority and inferiority consisteth in this, that the husband hath power over the wife, and the wife is subject to the husband. This agreeth with all laws and policies; but yet more or less, according to the diversity of them. In all things the wife, though she be far more noble, and more rich, yet is subject to the husband. This superiority and inferiority is naturall, founded upon the strength and sufficiency of the one, the weakness and insufficiency of the other. The Divines ground it upon other reasons drawn from the Bible: Man was first made by God alone and immediately, expresly for God, his head, and according to his Image, and perfect; for nature doth always begin with things perfect. The woman was made in the second place, after man, of the substance of man by occasion and for another thing, *mulier est vir occasionatus*, *A woman is a man occasionate, a mans occasion, and the occasion of a man*, to serve as an aid, and as a second to man, who is her head, and therefore imperfect. And this is the difference by order of generation. That of corruption and sin proveth the same, for the woman was the first in prevarication, and by her own weakness and will did sin, man the second, and by occasion of the woman; the woman then the last in good and in generation, and by occasion, the first

in evill and the occasion thereof, is justly subject unto man, the first in good, and last in evill.

9. *The power of the husband.* *Dion Halicar. l.2.* *Lib.2.* *Lib.6.bel.Gal.*

This superiority and power of the husband, hath been in some places such as that of the father, over life and death, as with the *Romanes*, by the law of *Romulus*: and the husband had power to kill his wife in four cases, *Adultery*, *Suborning of children*, *counterfeiting of false keyes*, *and drinking of wine*. So likewise with the *Greeks*, as *Polybius*, and the ancient *French*, as *Cesar* affirmeth, the power of the husband, was over the life and death of his wife. Elsewhere, and there too, afterwards this power was moderated; but almost in all places the power of the husband and the subjection of the wife, doth infer thus much, That the husband is master of the actions and vowes of his wife, and may with words correct her and hold her to the stocks (as for blows, they are unworthy a woman of honour and honesty, saith the Law) and the wife is bound to hold the condition, follow the quality, countrey, family, habitation and ranke of her husband; she must accompany and follow him in all things, in his journeyes if need be, his banishment his imprisonment, yea a wandring a person a vagabond, a fugative. The examples hereof are many and excellent: of *Sulpitia*, who followed her husband *Lentulus*, being banished into *Cicily*; *Erithrea* her husband *Phalaris*; *Ipsicrates* the wife of King *Mithridate* vanquished by *Pompey*, who wandred thorow the world. *Corn. Tacit.* Some add unto this, That wives are to follow their husbands even in the warrs, and into those provinces, whither the husband is sent with publick charge. Neither can the wife bring any thing into question of law, whether she be plaintiffe or defendant, without the authority of her husband, or of the Judge, if he refuse; neither can she call her husband into judgment, without the permission of the Magistrate.

10. *The divers rules of marriage.*

Marriage is not carried after one and the same fashion, neither hath it in every place the same lawes, and rules, but according to the diversity of religions and countries, it hath rules either more easie, or more streight: according to the rules of Christianity, of all other the streightest, marriage is more subject, and held more short. There is nothing but the entrance left free; the continuance is by constraint, depending of something else then our own wills. Other nations and religions, to make marriage more easie, free and fertile, have received and practised *Polygamy* and repudiation, liberty to take and leave wives: they accuse Christianity for taking away

these

theſe two, by which means amity, and multiplication, the princi-pall ends of marriage, are much prejudiced, inasmuch as amity is an enemy to all conſtraint, and they do better maintain themſelves in an honeſt liberty; and multiplication is made by the woman, as Nature doth richly make known unto us in wolves, of whom the race is ſo fertile in the production of their young, even to the num-of twelve or thirteen, that they far excell all other profitable crea-tures: of theſe there are great numbers killed every day, by which means there are but few; and they, though of all others the moſt fertile; yet by accident the moſt barren: the reaſon is, becauſe of ſo great a number as they bring, there is one onely female, which for the moſt part beareth not, by reaſon of the multitude of males that concur in the generation, of which the greateſt part die with-out fruit, by the want of females. So likewiſe we may ſee how much *Polygamy* helpeth to multiplication, in thoſe nations that re-ceive it; *Iewes*, *Turks*, and other *Barbarians*, who are able to raiſe forces, of three or four thouſand fighting men fit for warrs. Contrariwiſe, in Chriſtendome there are many linked together in matrimony, the one of which, if not both, are barren, which being placed with others, both the one and the other may happily leave great poſterity behinde them. But to ſpeake more truly, all his fertility conſiſteth in the fertility of one onely woman. Finally they object, That this Chriſtianlike reſtraint, is the cauſe of many laſcivious pranks, and adulteries. To all which we may anſwer, That Chriſtianity conſidereth not of marriage by reaſons purely hu-mane, naturall, temporall; but it beholds it with another viſage, and weigheth it with reaſons more high and noble, as hath been ſaid. Add unto this, That experience ſheweth in the greateſt part of marriages, that conſtraint increaſeth amity eſpecially in ſimple and debonair mindes, who do eaſily accommodate themſelves, where they finde themſelves in ſuch ſort linked. And as for laſci-vious and wicked perſons, it is the immodeſty of their manners that makes them ſuch, which no liberty can amend. And to ſay the truth, Adulteries are as common, where Polygamie and repudiati-on are in force; witneſs the Jewes, and *David*, who for all the wives that he had, could not defend himſelf from it: and contra-riwiſe, they have been a long time unknown in policies well govern-ed, where there was neither Poligamie, nor repudiation; witneſs *Sparta* and *Rome* a long time after the foundation. And therefore it is abſurd to attribute it unto religion, which teacheth nothing but purity and continency.

*Polygamie divers.*

The liberty of Polygamie, which seemeth in some sort naturall, is carried diversly according to the diversity of nations and policies. In some, all the wives that belong to one husband live in common, and are equall in degree, and so are their children. In others, there is one who is the principall, and as the mistris, whose children inherit the goods, honours, and titles of the husband: the rest of the wives are kept a part, and carry in some places the titles of lawfull wives, in others of concubines, and their children are onely pensioners.

12. *Repudiation divers.*

The use of repudiation in like sort is different: for with some, as the *Hebrewes*, *Greeks*, *Armenians*, the cause of the separation is not expressed, and it is not permitted to retake the wife once repudiated, but yet lawfull to marry another. But by the law of *Mahumet*, the separation is made by the Iudge, with knowledg taken of the cause (except it be by mutuall consent) which must be adultery, sterility, incompatibility of humours, an enterprise on his, or her part, against the life of each other, things directly and especially contrary to the state and institution of marriage: and it is lawfull to retake on another, as often as they shall think good. The former seemeth to be the better, because it bridleth proud women, and over-sharpe and bitter husbands: The second, which is to express the cause, dishonoureth the parties, and discovereth many things which should be hid. And if it fall out that the cause be not sufficiently verified, and that they must continue together, poysonings and murthers doth commonly ensue, many times unknown unto men: as it was discovered at *Rome* before the use of repudiation, where a woman being apprehended for poysoning of her husband, accused others, and they others too, to the number of threescore and ten, which were all executed for the same offence. But the worst law of all others hath been, that the adulterer escapeth almost every where without punishment of death, and all that is laid upon him is divorce, and separation of company, brought in by *Iustinian*, a man wholly possessed by his wife who caused whatsoever laws to pass, that might make for the advantage of women. From hence doth arise a danger of perpetuall adultery, desire of the death of the one party, the offender is not punished, the innocent injured remaineth without amends.

The duty of married folke, See *Lib.* 3. *Cap.* 12.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XLVII.

### *Of Parents and Children.*

THere are many sorts and degrees of authoritie and humane power, Publick and Private; but there is none more naturall, nor greater then that of the Father over his children, (I say Father, because the mother who is subject unto her husband cannot properly have her children in her power and subjection) but it hath not been alwayes and in all places alike. In former times almost everie where it was absolute and universall, over the life and death, the libertie, the goods, the honour, the actions and carriages of their children, as to plead, to marrie, to get goods; as namely with the *Romanes* by the expresse Law of *Romulus*; *Parentum in liberos omne jus esto, relegandi, vendendi, occidendi: Let the Parents have full libertie to dispose of their children; yea, of banishing selling or killing them.* Except onely children under the age of three years, who as yet could not offend either in word or deed: which Law was afterwards renued by the Law of the twelve Tables, by which the father was allowed to sell his children to the third time: with the *Persians*, according to *Aristotle*; the ancient *French*, as *Cesar* and *Prosper* affirm; with the *Muscovites* and *Tartars*, who might sell their children in the fourth time. And it should seem from the fact of *Abraham* going about to kill his sonne, that this power was likewise under the Law of Nature: for if it had been against his dutie, and without the power of the Father, he had never consented thereunto, neither had he ever thought that it was God that commanded him to do it, if it had been against nature. And therefore we see that *Isaac* made no resistance, nor alledged his innocency, knowing that it was in the power of his Father: which derogateth not in any sort from the greatnesse of the faith of *Abraham*, because he would not sacrifice his sonne by virtue of his right or power, nor for any demerit of *Isaac*, but onely to obey the commandment of God, So likewise it was in force by the Law of *Moses*, though somewhat moderated. So that we see what this power hath been in ancient times, in the greatest part of the world, and which endured unto the time of the Romane Emperours With the Greeks it was not so great and absolute, nor with the Egyptians: Nevertheless, if it fell out that the father had killed his sons wrongfully, and without cause, he had no other punishment, but to be shut

1. *Fatherly power*

Dion Halic. lib.2.antiq. Rom.l.in suis ff. de lib. & post. Aul. Gel.lib.20. Lib.8. Eth. cap.20. Lib.6. Bel. Gal. Prosper. Aquitan. in Epist. Sig.

Deut.21.

shut up three dayes together with the dead body.

2. *The reasons and fruits thereof.*

Now the reasons and fruits of so great and absolute a power of Fathers over their children, necessary for the culture of good manners, the chasing away of vice, and the publick good, were first to hold the children in aw and duty: and secondly, because there are many great faults in children, that would escape unpunished, to the great prejudice of the weal publick, if the knowledg and punishment of them, were but in the hand of publick authority; whether it be because they are domesticall and secret, or because there is no man that will prosecute against them: for the parents who know them, and are interessed in them, will not discredit them; besides that, there are many vices and insolences, that are never punished by justice. Add hereunto, that there are many things to be tried, and many differences betwixt parents and children, brothers and sisters, touching their goods or other matters, which are not fit to be published, which are extinct and buried by this fatherly authority. And the Law did alwayes suppose, that the father would never abuse this authority, because of that great love which he naturally carrieth to his children, incompatible with cruelty: which is the cause that instead of punishing them with rigour, they rather become intercessours for them, when they are in danger of the Law: and there can be no greater torment to them, then to see their children in pain. And it falleth out very seldome or never, that this power is put in practice without very great occasion; so that it was rather a scar-crow to children, and very profitable, then a rigour in good earnest.

3. *The declination.*

Now this fatherly power (as over-sharpe and dangerous) is almost of it self lost and abolished, (for it hath rather hapened by a kinde of discontinuance, then any expres law) and it began to decline, at the coming of the Romane Emperours: for, from the time of *Augustus*, or shortly after, it was no more in force, whereby children became so desperate and insolent against their parents, that *Seneca*, speaking to *Nero*, said, That he had seen more parricides punished in five years past, then had been in seven hundred years before; that is to say, since the foundation of *Rome*. In former times, if it fell out that the father killed his children, he was not punished, as we may see by the examples of *Fulvius* the Senatour, who killed his son, because he was a partner in the conspiracy of *Cataline*: and of divers other Senators, who have made criminall processe, against their children in ther own houses, and have condemned

Lib. 1. de Clem.
Salust. in bel. Catil.
Valer. Maxi.

demned them to death, as *Cassius Tratius* ; or to perpetuall exsile, as *Manlius Torquatus* his Son *Sillanus*. There were afterwards laws ordained, that injoyned the father to present unto the Judge his children offending, that they might be punished, and that the Judge should pronounce such a sentence as the father thought fit, which is still a kind of foot-step of antiquity : and going about to take away the power of the father, they durst not do it but by halfes, and not altogether and openly. These latter laws, come somewhat neer the law of *Moses*, which would, That at the onely complaint of the father made before the Judge, without any other knowledg taken of the cause, the rebellious and contumacious child should be stoned to death ; requiring the presence of the Judge, to the end the punishment should not be done, in secret or in choler, but exemplarily. So that according to *Moses*, this fatherly power was more free and greater, then it hath been after the time of the Emperours ; but afterwards under *Constantine* the Great, and *Theodosius*, and finally under *Iustinian*, it was almost altogether extinct. From whence it is, that children have learned to deny their obedience to their parents, their goods, their aid, yea to wage law against them ; a shamefull thing to see our Courts full of these cases. Yea they have been dispenced herewith, under pretext of devotion and offerings, as with the Iewes before Christ, wherewith he reproacheth them ; and afterwards in Christianity, according to the opinion of some : yea it hath been lawfull to kill them, either in their own defence, or if they were enemies to the Common-weale : although to say the truth, there should never be cause just enough, for a son to kill his father. *Nullum tantum scelus admitti potest à patre, quod sit parricidio vindicandum, et nullum scelus rationem habet. A father cannot commit such a crime, as may be revenged with parricide, and no Wickednes hath any reason.* Mat. 15.

Now we feel not what mischiefe and prejudice hath hapened to the world, by the abolishing and extinction of this fatherly power. The common-weales wherein it hath been in force, have alwayes flourished. If there were any danger or evill in it, it might in some sort be ruled and moderated ; but utterly to abolish it, as now it is, is neither honest nor expedient, but hurtfull and inconvenient, as hath been said.

Of the reciprocall duty of Parents and children, See *Lib.* 3. *Cap.* 14.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XLVIII.

### *Lords and slaves, Masters and servonts.*

1. *The use of slaves universal and against nature.*

THe use of slaves, and the full and absolute power of Lords, and Masters over them, although it be a thing common thorowout the world, and at all times (except within these four hundred years, in which time it hath somewhat decaied, though of late it revive again) yet it is a thing both monstruous and ignominious in the nature of man, and such as is not found in beasts themselves, who consent not to the captivity of their like, neither actively nor passively. The law of *Moses* hath permitted this as other things, *ad duritiem cordis eorum, for their hardness of heart*, but not such as hath been else-where: for it was neither so great, nor so absolute, nor perpetuall, but moderated within the compass of seven years at the most. Christianity hath left it, finding it universall in all places, as likewise to obey idolatrous Princes and Masters, and such like matters as could not at the first attempt and altogether be extinguished, they have abolished.

2. *Distinctions.*

There are four sorts. Naturall, that is, slaves born; Enforced, and made by right of warr; Iust, termed slaves by punishment, by reason of some offence, or debt, whereby they are slaves to their Creditors, at the most for seven years, according to the law of the Iewes, but alwaies untill payment and restitution be made, in other places; Voluntaries, whereof their are many sorts, as they that cast the dice for it, or sell their liberty for mony, as long sithence it was the custome in *Almaigne* and now likewise in some parts of Christendome, where they do give and vow themselves to another for ever, as the Iewes were wont to practise, who at the gate, bored a hole in their eare, in token of perpetuall servitude. And this kinde of voluntary captivity, is the strangest of all the rest, and almost against nature.

Tacit. de mor German.

3. *The cause of slaves.*

It is covetousnes that is the cause of slaves enforced, and leaudnes the cause of voluntaries. They that are Lords and masters, have hoped for more gain and profit by keeping, they by killing them: and indeed, the faireſt possessions and the richest commodities, were in former times slaves. By this means *Crassus* became the richest among the *Romanes*, who had besides those that served him five hundred slav s, who every day brought gain and commodity, by their gainfull Arts and mysteries, and afterwards when he

he had made what profit by them he could, he got much by the sale of them.

4. *The cruelties of Lords against their slaves.*

It is a strange thing to read of those cruelties practised by Lords upon their slaves, even by the approbation and permission of the Laws themselves: They have made them to till the earth being chained together, as the manner is in *Barbary* at this day; they lodge them in holes and ditches: and being old, or impotent, and so unprofitable, they sell them, or drown them and cast them into lakes to feed their fish withal: They kill them not onely for the least fault that is, as the breaking of a glasse, but for the least suspition, yea for their own pleasure and pastime, as *Flaminius* did, one of the honestest men of his time. And to give delight unto the people, they were constrained in their publike Theaters to kill one another. If a Master hapned to be killed in his house by whomsoever, the innocent slaves were all put to death, insomuch, that *Pedonius* the *Romane* being slain, although the murderer were known, yet by the order of the Senate, four hundred of his slaves were put to death.

5. *The cruelties of slaves against their Lords.*

On the other side, it is a thing as strange, to hear of the rebellions, insurrections, and cruelties of slaves against their Lords, when they have been able to work their revenge, not onely in particular by surprise and treason, as it fell out one night in the Citie of *Tyre*, but in set battel both by sea and land: from whence the proverb is, *So many slaves, so many enemies.*

6. *Diminution of Slaves.*

Now as Christian Religion, and afterwards *Mahumetisme* did encrease the number of slaves did increase, and servitude did cease, insomuch that the Christians, and afterwards the *Turks*, like apes imitating them, gave freedome and liberty to all those that were of their Religion; in such sort, that about the twelve hundred yeer, there were almost no slaves in the world, but where these two religions had no authority.

7. *The increase of poor people and vagabonds*

But as the number of slaves diminished, the number of beggers and vagabonds increased: for so many slaves being set at liberty, come from the houses and subjection of their Lords, not having wherewithal to live, and perhaps having children too, filled the world with poor People.

8. *Return to servitude.*

This poverty made them return to servitude, and to become voluntary slaves, paying, changing, selling their liberty, to the end they may have their maintenance and life assured, and be quit of the burthen of their children. Besides this cause, and this voluntary servitude,

servitude, the world is returned to the use of slaves, because the Christians and Turks alwaies maintaining warres one against the other, as likewise against the Gentiles both oriental and occidental, although by the example of the *Jews* they have no slaves of their own nation, yet they have of others, whom, though they turn to their religion, they hold slaves by force.

The power and authority of masters over their servants, is not very great, nor imperious, and in no sort can be prejudicial to the liberty of servants; onely they may chastise and correct them with discretion and moderation. This power is much lesse over those that are mercenary, over whom they have neither power nor correction.

The dutie of Masters and Servants, see *lib.* 3. *chap.* 15.

## CHAP. XLIX.

### *Of the State, Soveraignty, Soveraigns.*

1. *The description and necessity of the state.*

HAving spoken of private power, we come to the publike, that of the state. The state, that is to say, Rule, dominion, or a certain order in commanding and obeying, is the prop, the cement, and the soul of humane things: It is the bond of societie, which cannot otherwise subsist; It is the vital spirit, whereby so many millions of men do breathe, and the whole nature of things.

2. *The nature of the state. Tacit.*

Now notwithstanding it be the pillar and prop of all, yet it is a thing not so sure; very difficult, subject to changes, *Arduum & subjectum fortunæ cuncta regendi onus: The burthen of government is a hard matter, and subject to fortune:* which declineth, and sometimes falleth by hidden and unknown causes, and that altogether at an instant, from the highest step to the lowest, and not by degrees, as it useth to be long a rising. It is likewise exposed to the hatred both of great and small, whereby it is gauled, subject to ambushments, underminings, and dangers, which hapneth likewise many times by the corrupt and wicked manners of the Soveraigns, and the nature of the Soveraigntie, which we are about to describe.

3. *The description of Soveraignty.*

Soveraigntie is a perpetual and absolute power, without constraint either of time or condition. It consisteth in a power to give lawes to all ingeneral, and to every one in particular, without the consent of any other, or the gift of any person. And as another saith, (to derogate from the common law) Soveraigntie is so called; and

and absolute, because it is not subject to any humane lawes, no not his own. For it is against nature to give laws unto all, and to command himself in a thing that dependeth upon his Will. *Nulla obligatio consistere potest, qua à voluntate promittentis statum capit: No obligation can stand good, which hath his strength from the will of the promiser*: nor of another, whether living; or of his predecessors, or the countrey. Soveraign power is compared to fire, to the Sea, to a wild beast; it is a hard matter to tame it, to handle it it will not be croſt, nor offended, but being, is very dangerous. *Potestas res est qua moveri, docerique non vult & castigationem ægre ferat: Power is a thing which will neither be admonished nor taught, and with great difficulty, suffereth any correction.*

The marks and properties thereof are, to judge the last appeals, to ordain laws in time of peace and war, to create and appoint magistrates and officers, to give graces and dispensations against the Law, to impose Tributes, to appoint money, to receive homages, ambassages, oathes. But all this is comprehended under the absolute power, to give and make Laws according to their pleasure. Other marks there are of lesse weight, as the Law of the Sea and shipwrack, confiscation for Treason, power to change the Tongue, title of Majestie. 4. *The properties.*

Greatnesse and Soveraignty is so much desired of all, because all the good that is in it appeareth outwardly, and all the ill is altogether inward: As also because to command others, is a thing as beautiful and divine, as great and difficult: and for this cause they are esteemed and reverenced for more then men. Which belief in the people, and credit of theirs, is very necessary and commodious to extort from the people due respect and obedience, the nurse of peace and quietnes. But in the end they prove to be men cast in the same mould that other men are, and many times worse born, & worse qualified in nature then many of the common sort of people. It seemeth that their actions, because they are weighty and important, do proceed from weighty and important causes: but they are nothing, and of the same condition that other mens are. The same occasion that breeds a brawl betwixt us and our neighbour, is ground enough of a war betwixt Princes: and that offence for which a Lackey deserves a whipping, lighting upon a King, is the ruine of a whole Province. They will as lightly as we, and we as they, but they can do more then we: the self-same appetites move a flye and an elephant. Finally, besides these passions, defects, and natural conditions, 5.

which

which they have common with the meaneſt of thoſe which do adore them, they have likewiſe vices and diſcommodities which their greatneſſe and ſoveraignty bears them out in, peculiar unto themſelves.

6. *The manners of Soveraigns.* The ordinary manners of great perſonages are, untamed pride, *Durus eſt veri inſolens, ad recta flecti regius non vult tamor*: *He that is inſolent, is uncapable of the truth, kingly pride will not yield to thoſe that are true,* Violence too licentious. *Id eſſe regni maximum pignus putant, ſi quicquid aliis non licet, ſolis licet: quod non poteſt, vult poſſe, qui nimium poteſt: They think it the greateſt teſtimony of their royalty, that that which is not permitted others, is not lawful for them, he that hath power to do too much, will have power to do what he cannot*: Their Motto that beſt pleaſeth them is, *Quod libet licet; What they liſt is lawful*: Suſpicion, jealouſie, *Suapte natura potentiæ anxii, They are naturally careful of their power,* yea even of their own infants; *Suſpectus ſemper, invinſque dominantibus quiſquis proximus deſtinatur, adeo ut diſpliciant etiam civilia filiorum ingenia: The next whoſoever deſtinated to ſucceed them, is alwaies miſtruſted and envied, inſomuch that the civil demeanour of their own children doth alſo diſpleaſe them.* Whereby it falleth out, that they are many times in alarum and fear, *Ingenia regum prona ad formidinem, Kings are naturally apt to fear,*

Seneca. Tacitus.

7. *The miſeries, and diſcommodities.* The advantages of Kings and Soveraign Princes above their people, which ſeem ſo great and glittering, are indeed but light, and almoſt imaginary; but they are repayed with great, true, and ſolid advantages and inconveniencies. The name and title of a Soveraign, the ſhew and outſide is beautiful, pleaſant, and ambitious; but the burthen and the inſide is hard, difficult, and irkſome; There is honour enough, but little reſt and joy, or rather none at all: it is a publike and honourable ſervitude, a noble miſery, a rich captivity, *Aureæ & fulgidæ compedes, claræ miſeriæ; witneſſe that which Auguſtus, Marcus, Aurelius, Pertinax, Dioclefian,* have ſaid and done, and the end that almoſt all the firſt twelve *Cæſars* made, and many others after them. But becauſe few there are that believe this, but ſuffer themſelves to be deceived by the beautiful ſhew, I will more particularly quote the inconveniencies and miſeries that accompany great Princes.

8. 1 *In their charge.* Firſt, the great difficulty to play their part, and to quit themſelves of their charge: for can it be but a great burthen to govern ſo many people, ſince in the ruling of himſelf there are ſo many difficultics?

difficulties? It is an easier matter, and more pleasant to follow then to guide; to travel in a way that is already traced, then to find the way; to obey, then to command; to answer for himself onely then for others too: *ut satius multò jam sit parere quietum, quàm regere imperio res velle: It is far better to procure peace and quiet, then to govern a kingdome.* Adde hereunto, that it is required that he that commandeth, must be a better man then he that is commanded: so said *Cyrus* a great Commander. How difficult a thing this is, we may see by the paucitie of those that are such as they ought to be. *Vespasian*, saith *Tacitus*, was the onely Prince that in goodness excelled his predecessors: another sticks not to say, that all the good Princes may be graven in a ring.

9

2. *In the pleasures and actions of life.*

Secondly, in their delights and pleasures, wherein it is thought they have a greater part then other men. But they are doubtlesse of a worse condition then the pleasures of private men: for besides that the lustre of their greatness makes them unfit to take joy in their pleasures, by reason that they are too clear and apparent, and made as a butt and subject to censure, they are likewise crost and peered into even to their very thoughts, which men take upon them to divine and judge of. Again, the great ease and facility that they have to do what pleaseth them, because all men apply themselves unto them, takes away the taste, and sowreth that sweet which should be in their pleasures: which delight no man, but those that taste them, with some scarcity and difficulty. He that gives no time to be thirsty, knows not what a pleasure it is to have drink: Saciety is noysome, and goes against the stomack.

*Pinguis amor nimiumque potens in tædia nobis*
*Vertitur: & stomacho dulcis ut esca nocet.*
*Extremity of Pleasure turns to pain.*
*So Venus satiates, and honey's bane.*

10

3. *In their marriages.*

There is nothing more tedious and loathsome then abundance, yea they are deprived of all true and lively action, which cannot be without some difficultie and resistance. It is not going, living, acting in them, but sleeping, and an insensible sliding away.

The third inconvenience that followeth Princes, is in their marriages. The marriages of the vulgar sort are more free and voluntary; made with more affection, libertie, and contentment. One reason hereof may be that the common sort of men find more of their degree to choose, whereas Kings and Princes, who are not of the rout, as we know, have no plentifull choice. But the other rea-

son is better, which is, that the common sort in their marriages look but into their own affairs, and how they may accommodate it best unto themselves; but the marriages of Princes are many times inforced for publick necessity: they are great parts of the State, and instruments serving for the generall good and quiet of the world. Great Personages and Sovereigns marry not for themselves but for the good of the State, whereof they must be more amorous and jealous, then of their wives and children: for which cause they many times hearken unto marriages where there is neither love nor delight; and matches are made between persons, who never knew nor have seen one another, much lesse affect: yea, such a great man takes such a great Lady, whom if he were not so great, he would not take: but this is to serve the Weal-publick, to assure the States, and to settle peace amongst their people.

11 *4. Attempt of honour.*

The fourth is, That they have no true part in the attempts that men make one against the other in emulation of honour and vaour, in the exercises of the mind and of the body, which is one of the most delightfull things in the commerce and conversation of men. The reason hereof is, because all the world gives place unto them, all men spare them, and love rather to hide their own valour, to betray their own glory, then to hurt or hinder that of their Sovereigne, especially where they know he affects the victory. This, to say the truth, is by force of respect to handle men disdainfully, and injuriously; and therefore one said, That the children of Princes learned nothing by order and rule, but to manage a horse, because in all other exercises every one bows unto them, and gives them the prise: but the horse who is neither flatterer nor Courtier, casts as well the Prince to the ground as the Esquire. Many great personages have refused the praises and approbations offered them, saying, I would accept and esteem of them, and rejoyce in them, if they came from free-men, that durst say the contrary, and tax men if there were cause.

12 *5. Liberty of travell.*

The fifth is, That they are deprived of the liberty to travell in the world, being as it were imprisoned within their own Countreys, yea, within their own Palaces, being alwayes incloſed with people, suters, gazers, and lookers on, and that whersoever they be, and in all actions whatsoever, prying even thorough the holes of the chair: whereupon *Alphonsus* the King said, That in this respect the estate of an asse was better then the condition of a King.

The

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The sixth misery, That they are deprived of all amity and mutuall society, which is the sweetest and perfectest fruit of humane life, and cannot be but betwixt equalls, or those betwixt whom the difference is but small. This great disparity puts them without the commerce and societie of men; all humble services, and base offices, are done unto them by those that cannot refuse them, and proceed not from love, but from subjection, or to encrease their own greatnesse, or of custome and countenance; which is plain, because wicked Kings are as well served and reverenced as the good; they that are hated, as they that are beloved; there is no difference, the self-same apparell, the self-same ceremony. Whereupon *Julian* the Emperour answered his Courtiers, that commended him for his Justice, *Perhaps I should be proud of these prayses, if they were spoken by such as durst to accuse me, and to dispraise my actions when they shall deserve it.*

*6. Mutual and hearty amity.*

14

The seventh misery, worse perhaps then all the rest, and more dangerous to the Weal-publick, is, That they are not free in the choice of men, nor in the true knowledge of things. They are not suffered truly to know the state of their affairs, and consequently not to call and employ such as they would, and as were most fit and necessary. They are shut up, and beset with a certain kind of people, that are either of their own bloud, or by the greatness of their Houses and Offices, or by prescription, are so farre in authority, power, and managing of affairs before others, that it is not lawfull, without putting all to hazzard, to discontent, or in any sort to suspect them. Now these kind of people that cover, and hold as it were hidden the Prince, do provide that all the truth of things shall not appear unto him; and that better men, and more profitable to the State come not near him, lest they be known what they are. It is a pitifull thing not to see but by the eyes, not to understand but by the ears of another, as Princes do. And that which perfecteth in all points this miserie, is, that commonly and as it were by destinie, Princes and great personages are possessed by three sorts of people, the plagues of humane kind, Flatterers, Inventers of imposts or Tributes, Informers, who under a fair and false pretext of zeal and amity towards the Prince, as the two first, or of loyaltie and reformation, as the latter, spoyl and ruinate both Prince and State.

*7. Ignorance of things.*

15

The eight misery is, that they are lesse free, and masters of their own wills then all other, for they are inforced in their proceedings by

*8. Not Masters of their wills.*

by a thousand considerations and respects, whereby many times they must captivate their designments, desires, and wills: *In maxima fortuna, minima licentia; In the greatest honour, the least liberty.* And in the mean time in stead of being plaintiffs they are more rudely handled and judged then any other: For men will not stick to divine of their designes, penetrate into their hearts and inventions, which they cannot do: *Abditos Principis sensus, & quid occultius parat exquirere; illicitum anceps nec ideo assequare: To prie into the hidden secret of the Prince, and to search if they can find any thing more secret; neither will they herein forbear although they know it unfitting:* and looking into things with another visage, where they understand not sufficiently the affairs of the state, they require of their Princes what they think should be done, blame their actions, and refusing to submit themselves to what is necessarie, they commonly proceed in their businesse rudely enough.

16. Finally it falleth out many times, that they make a miserable end, not onely tyrants and usurpers, for it belongs to them, but such as have a true title to their Crown; witnesse so many Romane Emperours after *Pompey* the Great, and *Cesar*, and in our time *Mary* Queen of *Scotland*, who lost her life by the hand of an executioner, and *Henry* the third, wilfully murdered in the middle of fourtie thousand armed men, by a little Monk; and a thousand the like examples. It seemeth that as lightning and tempest oppose themselves against the pride and height of our buildings, so there are likewise spirits that envie and emulate greatnesse below upon earth.

9. *A miserable end.*

*Usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam*
*Obterit & pulchros fasces, sævasque secures*
*Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.*
*So farre some hidden Highnesse seems to frown*
*On humane pride in Diademe or Crown,*
*As it both laughs at it, and beats it down.*

17. To conclude, the condition of Sovereigns is hard and dangerous: Their life if it be innocent, is infinitely painfull; if it be wicked, it is subject to the hate and slander of the world, and in both cases exposed to a thousand dangers; for the greater a Prince is, the lesse may he trust others, and the more must he trust himself. So that we see, that it is a thing as it were annexed to Sovereigntie, to be betrayed.

*The conclusion of their miseries.*

Of their dutie, See the third Book, Chap. 16.

CHAP.

## CHAP. L.

### *Magistrates.*

THere are divers degrees of Magistrates as well in honour as power, which are the two things to be considered in the distinction of them, and which have nothing common the one with the other, and many times they that are more honourable have lesse power, as Counsellers of the Privie Councel, the Secretarie of the State. Some have but one of the two; others have both, and that of divers degrees, but they are properly called Magistrates that have both. 1. *The distinction*

The Magistrates that are in the middle betwixt the Sovereign and the particulars, in the presence of their Sovereigns have no power to command. As rivers lose both their name and power at the mouth or entrance into the Sea, and the starres their light in the presence of the Sunne; so all power of Magistrates is but upon sufferance in the presence of their Sovereign: as also the power of inferiours and subalternate Magistrates in the presence of their superiours. Amongst equals there is neither power nor superioritie, but the one may hinder the other by opposition and prevention. 2.

All Magistrates judge, condemn and command either according to the law, and then their sentence is but the execution of the law; or according to equitie, and such judgement is called the office or dutie of the Magistrate. 3.

Magistrates cannot change nor correct their judgements, except the Sovereign permit it, under pain of injustice: they may revoke their commands or make stay of them, but not that which they have judged and pronounced with knowledge of the cause. 4.

Of the duties of Magistrates, See *Lib.* 3.

## CHAP. LI.

### *Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers.*

IT is one of the vanities and follies of man, to prescribe laws and rules that exceed the use and capacitie of men, as some Philosophers and Doctors have done. They propose strange and elevated forms or images of life, or at leastwise so difficult and austere, that the practise of them is impossible at least for a long time, yea, the

attempt is dangerous to many. These are Castles in the air, as the Common-wealth of *Plato*, and *More*, the Oratour of *Cicero*, the Poet of *Horace*, beautifull and excellent imaginations; but he was never yet found that put them in use. The sovereign and perfect Law-giver and Doctour took heed of this, who both in himself, his life and his doctrine, hath not sought these extravagancies and forms divided from the common capacitie of men; and therefore, he calleth his yoke easie, and his burthen light: *Jugum meum suave, & onus meum leve*; *My yoke sweet, and my burthen light*. And they that have instituted and ordered their company under his name, have very wisely considered of the matter, that though they make speciall profession of virtue, devotion, and to serve the weal-publick above all others, nevertheless they differ very little from the common and civill life. Wherein there is first great justice: for there must alwayes be kept a proportion betwixt the commandment, and the obedience, the duty and the power, the rule and the workmaster: and these bind themselves and others to be necessarily in want, cutting out more work then they know how to finish: and many times these goodly Law-makers, are the first Law-breakers: for they do nothing; and many times do quite contrary to that they enjoyn others, like the Pharisies, *Imponunt onera gravia, & nolunt ea digito movere: They impose great burdens, but will not themselves touch them with a finger.* So do some Physicians and Divines: so lives the World, rules and precepts are enjoyned, and men not onely by an irregularitie of life and manners, but also by contrary opinion and judgement follow others.

There is likewise another fault full of injustice, they are far more scrupulous, exact and rigorous in things free and accidentall then in necessary and substantiall, in positive and humane, then in naturall and divine; like them that are content to lend, but not to pay their debts; and all like the Pharisies, as the great and heavenly Doctour telleth them to their reproach. All this is but hypocrisie and deceit.

## CHAP. LII.

### *People or vulgar sort.*

1. THe people (we understand here the vulgar sort, the popular rout, a kind of people under what covert soever, of base, servile, and mechanicall condition) are a strange beast with many heads, and

and which in few words cannot be described, inconstant and variable, without stay, like the waves of the sea; they are moved and appeased, they allow and disallow one and the same thing at one and the same instant: there is nothing more easie then to drive them into what passion he will; they love not warres for the true end thereof, nor peace for rest and quietnesse, but for varieties sake, and the change that there is from the one to the other: confusion makes them desire order, and when they have it, they like it not: they runne alwayes one contrary to another, and there is no time pleaseth, but what is to come: *Hi vulgi mores; odisse præsentia, ventura cupere, præterita celebrare: It is the custome of the vulgar sort, to despise the present, desire the future, praise & extoll that which is past.*

2. They are light to believe, to gather together news, especially such as are most hurtfull; holding all reports for assured truths. With a whistle, or some sonet of news, a man may assemble them together like Bees at the sound of the bason.

3. Without judgement, reason, discretion. Their judgement and wisdome is but by chance, like a cast at dice, unadvised and headlong of all things, and alwayes ruled by opinion or custome, or the greater number, going al in a line, like sheep that run after those that go before them, and not by reason and truth. *Plebi non judicium, non veritas: ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca judicat. The common people have no judgement, no verity; deem many things by opinion, few by the truth it self.* Tacit. Cic.

4. Envious and malicious, enemies to good men, contemners of virtue, beholding the good hap of another with an ill eye, favouring the more weak and the more wicked, and wishing all ill they can to men of honour they know not wherefore, except it is because they are honourable and well spoken of by others.

5. Treacherous and untrue, amplifying reports, smothering of truths, and alwayes making things greater then they are, without faith, without hold. The faith or promise of a people, and the thought of a child, are of like durance, which change not onely as occasions change, but according to the difference of those reports that every houre of the day may bring forth.

6. Mutinous, desiring nothing but novelties and changes, seditious, enemies to peace and quietnes. *Ingenio mobili, seditiosum discordiosum, cupidum rerum novarum, quieti & otio adversum: Of a mutable disposition, seditious, a breeder of discord, desirous of novelties, enemies to peace and quietnes.* Especially when they meet with a Salust.

leader: for then even as the calm sea, of nature tumbleth, and foameth, and rageth, being stirred with the fury of the winds; so do the people swell, and grow proud, wilde. and outragious: but take from them their Leader, they become deject, grow milde, are confounded with astonishment: *Sine Rectore præceps, pavidus, socors, nil ausura plebs Principibus amotis*: *Headlong without a Governour, fearfull, careless, daring nothing in absence of their Princes.*

7 Procurers and favourers of broyls and alterations in household affairs, they account modestie, simplicitie; wisdome, rusticitie: and contrariwise, they give to fiery and headie violence, the name of valour and fortitude. They preferre those that have hot heads, and active hands, before those that have a settled and temperate judgement, and upon whom the weight of the affairs must lie; boasters and pratlers before those that are simple and stayed.

8 They care neither for the publick good nor common honesty, but their private good onely; and they refuse no base offices for their gain and commoditie. *Privata cuiq; stimulatio, vile decus publicum: Every one hath his private spur, contemning the publick honour.*

9 Alwayes muttering and murmuring against the State, alwayes belching out slanders and insolent speeches against those that govern and command. The meaner and poorer sort have no better pastime, then to speak ill of the great and rich; not upon cause and reason, but of envie, being never content with their governours, nor the present State.

10 They have nothing but a mouth, they have tongues that cease not, spirits that bowge not: they are a monster, whose parts are all tongues; they speak all things, but know nothing; they look upon all, but see nothing; they laugh at all, and weep at all; fit to mutiny and rebell, not to fight. Their property is rather to aslay to shake off their yoke, then to defend their libertie: *Procacia plebis ingenia, impigræ linguæ, ignavi animi: the wits of the vulgar sort are shamelesse, talkative, base minded.* Tacit. Salust.

11 They never know how to hold a measure, nor to keep an honest mediocrity. Either like slaves they serve over-basely, or like Lords they are beyond all measure insolent and tyrannicall. They cannot endure a soft & temperate bit, nor are pleased with a lawful liberty; they run alwaies to extremities, either out of hope too much trusting, or too much distrusting out of fear. They will make you afraid if you fear not them: when they are frighted, you chock them under the chin, and you leap with both feet upon their bellies. They

are

are audacious and proud, if a man shew not the cudgel; and therefore the Proverb is, *Tickle them, and they will prick thee; prick them, and they will tickle thee. Nil in vulgo modicum terrere ni paveant, ubi pertimuerint impunè contemni: audacia turbidum nisi ubi metuat, aut servit humiliter, aut superbè dominatur: libertatem, quæ media, nec spernere nec habere.*

Very unthankfull towards their benefactours. The recompense of all those that have deserved well of the Common-wealth, have alwayes been banishment, reproach, conspiracie, death. Histories are famous, of *Moses*, and all the Prophets, *Socrates*, *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Lycurgus*, *Demosthenes*, *Themistocles*. And the Truth it self hath said, That he being one that procured the good and health of the people, escaped not: and contrariwise, they that oppresse them, are dearest unto them. They fear all, they admire all. 12

To conclude, the people are a savage beast, all that they think is vanity; all they say is false and erronious; that they reprove, is good; that they approve is naught: that which they praise, is infamous: that which they do and undertake is folly. *Non tam bene cum rebus humanis geritur, ut meliora pluribus placeant; argumentum pessimi turba est: It goes not so well in humane affairs, as that the best things do please the most; multitude is an argument of the worst.* The Vulgar multitude is the mother of ignorance, injustice, inconstancie, idolatry, vanitie, which never yet could be pleased: their motto is, *Vox populi, vox Dei: The voice of the people is the voice of God:* but we may say, *Vox populi vox stultorum: The voice of the people is the voice of fools.* Now the beginning of wisdome is for a man to keep himself clear and free, and not to suffer himself to be carried with popular opinions. This belongs to the second book, which is now near at hand. 13 Seneca. Lib. 2. cap. 1.

## *The fourth distinction and difference of men, drawn from their divers professions and conditions of life.*

### *THE PREFACE.*

BEhold here another difference of men, drawn from the diversitie of their professions, conditions and kinds of life. Some follow the civil and sociable life, others flie it, thinking to save themselves in the solitary wildernes: some love arms, others

others hate them: some live in common, others in private: it pleaseth some best to have charge, and to lead a publick life; others to hide and keep themselves private: some are Courtiers, attending wholly upon others, others court none but themselves: some delight to live in the Citie, others in the fields, affecting a countrey life, whose choise is the better, and which life is to be preferred, it is a difficult thing simply to determine, and it may be impertinent. They have all their advantages and disadvantages, their good and their ill. That which is most to be looked into and considered herein, as shall be said, is, That every man know how to choose that which best befits his own nature, that he might live the more easily and the more happily. But yet a word or two of them all, by comparing them together: but this shall be after we have spoken of that life which is common to all, which hath three degrees.

## CHAP. LIII.

### *The distinction and comparison of the three sorts or degrees of life.*

THere are three sorts of life, and as it were three degrees, one private of every particular man within himself, and in the closet of his own heart, where all is hid, all is lawfull: the second, in his house and family, in his private and ordinary actions, where there is neither studie nor art, and whereof he is not bound to give any reason; the third, is publick in the eyes of the world. Now to keep order and rule in this first low and obscure stage, it is very difficult, and more rare then in the other two; and in the second, then in the third: the reason is, because where there is neither Judge nor Controller, nor regarder, and where we have no imagination either of punishment or recompense, we carry our selves more loosely and carelessely, as in private lives, where conscience and reason onely is our guide, then in publick, where we are still in check, and as a mark to the eyes and judgement of all, where glory, fear of reproach, base reputation, or some other passion doth lead us (for passion commands with greater power then reason) whereby we keep our selves ready, standing upon our guard: for which cause it falleth out that many are counted holy, great, and admirable in publick, who in their own private have nothing commendable. That which is done in publick is but a fable, a fiction, the truth in secret, and in private; and he that will well judge of a man must converse every day

day with him, and prie into his ordinary and naturall carriage; the rest is all counterfeit; *Universus mundus exercet histrioniam: The whole World playes the Comedian:* and therefore said a wiseman, *That he is an excellent man, who is such within and in himself, which he is outwardly, for fear of the Laws, and speech of the World.* Publick actions thunder in the ears of men, to which a man is attentive when he doth them; as exploits in warre, sound judgement in counsel, to rule a people, to perform an ambassage. Private and domesticall actions are quick and sure, to chide, to laugh, to sel, to pay, to converse with his own, a man considers not of them, he doth them, not thinking of them: secret and inward actions much more, to love, to hate, to desire.

Again, there is here another consideration, and that is, that that is done by the naturall hypocrisie of men, which we make most account of, and a man is more scrupulous in outward actions, that are in shew, but yet are free, of small importance, and almost all in countenances and ceremonies, and therefore are of little cost, and a little effect, then in inward and secret actions that make no shew, but are yet requisite and necessary, and therefore they are the more difficult: of those depend the reformation of the soul, the moderation of the passions, the rule of the life: yea, by the attainment of these outward, a man becomes careless of the inward.

Now of these three lives, inward, domesticall, publick, he that is to lead but one of them, as Hermites, doth guide and order his life at a better rate, then he that hath two: and he that hath but two, his condition is more easie, then he that hath all three.

## CHAP. LIV.

### *A comparison of the civil and sociable life with the solitary.*

THey that esteem and commend so much the solitary and retired life, as a great stay and sure retrait from the molestations and troubles of the world, and a fit means to preserve and maintain themselves pure and free from many vices, in as much as the worse part is the greater, of a thousand there is not one good, the number of fools is infinite, contagion in a preass is dangerous, they seem to have reason on their side: for the company of the wicked is a dangerous thing, and therefore they that adventure themselves upon the sea, are to take heed that no blasphemer, or dissolute & wicked person

son enter their ship; not onely *Jonas* with whom God was angry, had almost lost all; *Bias* to those that were in the ship with him crying out in a great danger for help unto their gods, pleasantly said, Hold you your peace, for the gods perceive not that you are here with me. *Albuquerque* the Vice-roy of the *Indies* for *Emanuel* King of *Portugall*, in a great danger at sea, took upon his shoulders a little child, to the end that his innocencie might serve as a surety to God for his sinnes. But to think that a solitarie life is better, more excellent and perfect, more fit for the exercise of virtue, more difficult, sharp, laborious and painfull, as some would make us believe, they grossely deceive themselves: for certainly it is a great discharge and ease of life, and it is an indifferent profession, yea, a simple apprentiship and disposition to virtue. This is not to enter into businesse, troubles, and difficulties, but it is to flie them, and to hide themselves from them, to practise the counsell of the Epicures (Hide thy self) it is to runne to death, to flie a good life. It is out of all doubt, that a King, a Prelate, a Pastour is a farre more noble calling, more perfect, more difficult, then that of a Monk, or a Hermit. And to say the truth, in times past the companies of Monks were but seminaries and apprentiships, from whence they drew those that were fit for Ecclesiasticall charge, and their preparitives to a greater perfection. And he that lives civilly having a wife, children, servants, neighbours, friends, goods, businesse, and so many divers parts which he must satisfie, and truly and loyally answer for, hath without comparison farre more businesse, then he that hath none of all these, hath to do with none but himself: Multitude and abundance is farre more troublesome, then solitarinesse and want. In abstinencie there is but one thing, in the conduct and use of many, divers things, there are many considerations, divers duties. It is an easier thing to part from goods, honours, dignities, charges, then to govern them well, and well to discharge them. It is easier for a man to live altogether without a wife, then in all points duly to live, and to maintain himself with his wife, children and all the rest that depend upon him: so is the single life more easie then the married state.

2. So likewise to think that solitarinesse is a sanctuary and an assured haven against all vices, temptations, and impediments, is to deceive themselves; for it is not true in every respect. Against the vices of the world, the stirre of the people, the occasions that proceed from without, it is good; but solitarinesse hath its inward and spirituall affairs

affaires and difficulties: *Ivit in desertum ut tentaretur à diabolo: He went into the desart to be tempted of the Divell.* To imprudent and unadvised young men, solitarinesse is a dangerous staffe, and it is to be feared, that whilest he walks alone, he entertains worse company then himself, as *Crates* said to a young man who walked all alone far from company. It is there where fools contrive their wicked designments, begin their own overthrowes, sharpen their passions and wicked desires. Many times, to avoid the gulf of *Charybdis*, they fall into *Scylla*; to flie is not to escape, it is many times to increase the danger, and to loose himself: *Non vitat, sed fugit: magis autem periculis patemus aversi. He doth not eschew it, but flieth it: we live more open to dangers being averted from them.* A man had need be wise and strong, and well assured of himself, when he falls into his own hands; for it falls out many times that there are none more dangerous then his own. *Guarda me dios de mi; God keep me from my self,* saith the *Spanish* proverb very excellently; *Nemo est ex imprudentibus qui sibi relinqui debeat; solitudo omnia mala persuadet. No unwise man should be left alone to himself; solitarinesse perswadeth all evill.* But for some private and particular consideration, though good in it self (for many times it is for idleneſſe, weakneſſe of spirit, hatred, or some other passion) to flie and to hide himself, having means to profit another, and to do good to the weal-publike, is to be a fugitive, to bury his talent, to hide his light, a fault subject to the rigour of judgment.

## CHAP. LV.

### *A comparison betwixt the life lead in common and in private.*

SOme have thought, that the life lead in common, wherein nothing is proper to any man, whereby he may say, this is mine, or that is thine, but where all things are common, tendeth most to perfection, and hath most charitie and concord. This may take place in the company of a certain number of people, lead and directed by some certain rule, but not in a State and Common-weale, and therefore *Plato* having once allowed it, thinking thereby to take away all avarice and dissention, did quickly alter his opinion, and was otherwise advised: for as the practise sheweth, there is not onely not any hearty affection towards that that is common to all, and as the proverb is, *The common asse is alwaies ill sadled*: but also

also the community draweth unto it self contentions, murmurings, hatreds, as it is alwaies seen, yea even in the Primitive Church: Luc. Acts 6. *Crescente numero discipulorum, factum est murmur Græcorum adversus Hebræos: The number of the disciples increasing, there grew a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrewes.* The nature of love is such, as that of great rivers, which being overcharged with abundance of waters, being divided, are quit of that charge; so love being divided to all men, and all things, loseth its force and vigour. But there are degrees of community; to live, that is to say, to eat and drink together is very good, as the manner was in the better and most ancient common-weales, of *Lacedemon* and *Crete*; for besides that modesty and discipline is better retained amongst them, there is also a very profitable communication; but to think to have all things common, as *Plato* for a while would, though he were afterwards otherwise advised, is to pervert all.

## CHAP. LVI.

### *The comparison of the countrey-life With the Citizens.*

THis comparison to him that loveth wisdome is not hard to make, for almost all the commodities and advantages are on one side, both spiritual and corporal, liberty, wisdome, innocency, health, pleasure. In the fields the spirit is more free, and to it self: in Cities, the persons, the affaires, both their own and other mens, the contentions, visitations, discourses, entertainments, how much time do they steal from us? *Amici fures temporis: Friends steal away time.* How many troubles bring they with them, avocations, allurements to wickedness? Cities are prisons to the spirits of men, no otherwise then cages to birds and beasts. This celestial fire that is in us, will not be shut up, it loveth the ayr, the fields; and therefore *Columella* saith, that the countrey-life is the cousen of wisdome, *Consanguinea* which cannot be without beautiful and free thoughts and meditations; which are hardly had and nourished among the troubles and molestations of the City. Again, the countrey life is more neat, innocent and simple; In cities vices are hid in the root, and are not perceived, they passe and insinuate themselves pell-mell, the use, the aspect, the encounter so frequent and contagious, is the cause. As for pleasure and health, the whole heavens lie open to the view, the sun, the ayr, the waters, and all the elements are free,

exposed

exposed and open in all parts, alwaies sustaining us, the earth discovereth it self, the fruits thereof are before our eyes; and none of all this is in cities in the throng of houses: so that to live in cities, is to be banished in the world, and shut from the world. Again, the countrey life is wholly in exercise, in action, which sharpneth the appetite, maintaineth health, hardeneth and fortifieth the body. That which is to be commended in cities, is commodity either private, as of merchants and artificers, or publike, to the managing whereof few are called, and in ancient times heretofore they were chosen from the countrey life, who returned, having performed their charge.

## CHAP. LVII.

### *Of the military profession.*

THe military profession is noble in the cause thereof, for there is no commodity more just, nor more universal, then the protection of the peace and greatnesse of his countrey; noble in the execution, for valour is the greatest, the most generous and heroical virtue of all others: honourable, for all humane actions, the greatest and most glorious is the warriers, and by which all other honours are judged and discerned; pleasant, the company of so many noblemen, young, active, the ordinary view of so many accidents and spectacles, liberty and conversation without Art, a manly fashion of life without ceremonie, the variety of divers actions, a couragious harmony of warlike musick, which entertains us, and stirres our blood, our ears, our soul; those warlike commotions which ravish us with their horrour and fear, that confused tempest of sounds and cries, that fearful ordering of so many thousands of men, with so much fury, ardour, and courage. 1. *The praise thereof.*

But on the other side, a man may say, that the Art and experience of undoing one another, of killing, ruinating, destroying our own proper kind, seems to be unnatural, and to proceed from an alienation of our sense and understanding; it is a great testimony of our weakneſse and imperfection, and it is not found in beasts themselves, in whom the image of Nature continueth far more entire. What folly, what rage is it, to make such commotions, to torment so many people, to run thorow so many dangers and hazards both by sea and land, for a thing so uncertain and doubtfull as the issue of war, to run with such greedinesse and fiercenesse after 2. *The dispraise.*

ter death, which is easily found every where, and without hope of sepulture, to kill those he hates not, nor ever saw? But whence proceedeth this great fury and ardor, for it is not for any offence committed? What frensie and madnesse is this, for a man to abandon his own body, his time, his rest, his life, his liberty, and to leave it to the mercy of another? to expose himself to the losse of his own members; and to that which is a thousand times worse then death, fire and sword, to be trodden, to be pinched with hot iron, to be cut, to be torn in pieces, broken, and put to the gallies for ever? And all this, to serve the passion of another, for a cause which a man knowes not to be just, and which is commonly unjust: for wars are commonly unjust, and for him whom a man knowes not, who takes so little care for him that fights for him, that he will be content to mount upon his dead body, to help his own stature, that he may see the farther. I speak not here of the duty of Subjects towards their Prince and Countrey, but of voluntaries and mercenary souldiers.

## *The fifth and last distinction and difference of men, drawn from the favours and disfavours of Nature and Fortune.*

### THE PREFACE.

THis last distinction and difference is apparent enough, and sufficiently known, and hath many members and considerations, but may all be reduced to two heads, which a man may call with the vulgar sort, Felicity or good fortune, and Infelicity or ill fortune. Greatnesse or littlenesse. To Felicity and greatnesse belong health, beauty, and the other goods of the body, liberty, nobility, honour, dignity, science, riches, credit, friends. To Infelicity or littlenesse, belong all the contraries, which are privations of the other good things. From these things doth arise a very great difference, because a man is happy in one of these, or in two, or three, and not in the rest, and that more or lesse by infinite degrees: few or none at all are happy or unhappy in them all. He that hath the greatest part of these goods, and especially three, Nobility, Dignity, or Authority and riches, is accounted great; he that hath not any of these three, little. But many have but one or two, and are accounted midlings betwixt the great and the little.

We

We must speak a little of them all.

Of health, beauty, and other natural goods of the body, hath been spoken before; as likewise of their contraries, Sickness, Grief. *Chap. 11. Chap. 6.*

## CHAP. LVIII.

### *Of Liberty and Servitude.*

Liberty is accounted by some a soveraign good, and Servitude an extream evil, insomuch, that many have chosen rather to die a cruel death, then to be made slaves, or to see either the publick good, or their own private, endangered. But of this there may be too much, and of these too many, as of all other things. There is a two-fold liberty; the true, which is of the mind or spirit, and is in the power of every one, and cannot be taken away, nor indammaged by another, nor by fortune it self: contrariwise, the servitude of the spirit is the most miserable of all others, to serve our own affections, to suffer our selves to be devoured by our own passions, to be led by opinions. O pitiful captivity! The corporal liberty is a good greatly to be esteemed, but subject to fortune: and it is neither just nor reasonable, (if it be not by reason of some other circumstance) that it should be preferred before life it self, as some of the ancients have done, who have rather made choice of death, then to loose it; and it was accounted a great virtue in them: so great an evil was servitude thought to be: *Servitus obedientia est fracti animi & abjecti, arbitrio carentis suo: Servitude is the obedience of a base and abject mind, which wanteth his due judgment.* Many great and wise men have served, *Regulus, Valerianus, Plato, Diogenes*, even those that were wicked, and yet dishonoured not their own condition, but continued in effect and truth more free then their masters.

## CHAP. LIX.

### *Nobilitie.*

NObility is a quality every where not common, but honourable, brought in and established with great reason, and for publick utility. 1. *The description of Nobility.*

It is divers, diversly taken and understood, and according to divers nations and judgments, it hath divers kinds. According to

the generall and common opinion and custome, it is a qualitie of a race or stock. *Aristotle* saith, that it is the antiquitie of a race and of riches. *Plutarch* calleth it the virtue of a race, ἀρετην γένους, meaning thereby a certain habite and qualitie contained in the linage. What this qualitie or virtue is, all are not wholly of one accord, saving in this, that it is profitable to the weal-publick. For to some, and the greater part this qualitie is militarie, to others it is politick, literarie of those that are wise, palatine of the officers of the Prince. But the militarie hath the advantage above the rest: for besides the service that it yieldeth to the weal-publick as the rest do, it is painfull, laborious, dangerous; whereby it is recounted more worthy and commendable. So hath it carried with us by excellencie, the honourable title of Valour. There must then according to this opinion be two things in true and perfect nobilitie, profession of this virtue, and qualitie profitable to the common-weal, which is as the form; and the race as the subject and matter, that is to say, a long continuance of this qualitie by many degrees and races, and time out of mind, whereby they are called in our language Gentlemen, that is to say of a race, house, familie, carrying of long time the same name, and the same profession. For he is truly and entirely noble, who maketh a singular profession of publick virtue, serving his Prince and Countrey, and being descended of parents and ancestours that have done the same.

3. *The distinction*

There are some that separate these two, and think that one of them sufficeth to true nobilitie, that is, either onely virtue and qualitie, without any consideration of race or ancestours. This is a personall and acquired nobilitie, and considered with rigour it is rude, that one come from the house of a Butcher or Vintner should be held for noble, whatsoever service he hath done for the Common-weal. Nevertheless this opinion hath place in many nations, namely, with the *Turks*, contemners of ancient nobilitie, and esteeming of no other but personall, and actuall militarie valour; or onely antiquitie of race without profession of the qualitie; this is in bloud and purely naturall.

4. *Naturall Nobilitie.*

If a man should compare these two simple and imperfect nobilities together, that which is purely naturall (to judge aright,) it is the lesse, though many, out of their vanitie have thought otherwise. The naturall is another mans qualitie and not his own: *Genus & proavos & quæ non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra puto: nemo vixit in gloriam nostram; nec quod ante nos fuit nostrum est: I scarce*

*accounts*

*account those things ours which descend from our linage or ancestours, or any thing which we our selves have not done; no man hath lived for our glory and renown: Neither are we to account that ours which hath been before us.* And what greater folly can there be, then to glory in that which is not his own? This honour may light upon a vicious man, a knave and one in himself a true villain. It is also unprofitable to another; for it communicateth not with any man, neither is any man bettered by it, as science, justice, goodnesse, beautie, riches do. They that have nothing else commendable in them but this nobilitie of flesh and bloud, make much of it, they have it alwayes in their mouths, it makes their cheeks swell and their heart too (they will be sure to manage that little good that they have) it is the mark by which they are known and a token that they have nothing else in them, because they rest themselves wholly upon that. But this is vanitie, for all their glory springeth from frail instruments, *Ab utero, conceptu, partu; From the womb, the conception, the birth;* and is buried under the tomb of their Ancestours. As offenders being pursued have recourse to Altars and the Sepulchres of the dead, and in former times to the statues of Emperours; so these men being destitute of all merit and subject of true honour, have recourse to the memorie and armouries of their Ancestours. What good is it to a blind man, that his parents have been well sighted, or to him that stammereth that his Grandfather was eloquent? and yet these kind of people are commonly glorious, high minded, contemners of others; *Contemptor animus & superbia commune nobilitatis malum: A contemptible and proud mind, are common vices accompanying Nobilitie.* Salust.

5. *Acquired and personall honour.*

The personall and acquired honour hath conditions altogether contrary and very good. It is proper to the possessour thereof; it is alwayes a worthy subject and profitable to others. Again, a man may say, that it is more ancient and more rare then the naturall, for by it the naturall began; and in a word, that is true honour which consisteth in good and profitable effects, not in dreams and imagination, vain and unprofitable, and proceedeth from the spirit, not the bloud, which is the same in noble men that is in others. *Quis generosus? ad virtutem à natura bene compositus animus facit nobilem, cui ex quacunque conditione supra fortunam licet surgere: Who is a gentleman? a mind well disposed to virtue maketh noble, who, upon what accident or condition soever is able to raise it self above fortune.* Sen.

6. *Natural and acquired.*

But they are both oftentimes, and very willingly together, and so they make a perfect honour: The natural is a way and occasion to the personal; for things do easily return to their first nature and beginning. As the natural hath taken his beginning and essence from the personal, so it leadeth and conducteth his to it; *Fortes creantur fortibus: hoc unum in nobilitate bonum, ut nobilibus imposita necessitudo videatur, ne à majorum virtute degenerent: The valiant begets those that are valiant, this is the onely good of nobility, that necessity seemeth to be imposed on those that are noble, not to degenerate from the virtue of their ancestors.* To know that a man is sprung from honourable ancestors, and such as have deserved well of the Common-weal, is a strong obligation and spur to the honourable exploits of virtue. It is a foul thing to degenerate, and to belie a mans own race. The nobility that is given by the bounty and letters patent of the Prince, if it have no other reason, it is shameful, and rather dishonourable, then honourable; It is a nobility in parchment, bought with silver or favour, and not by blood as it ought. If it be given for merit, and notable services, it is personal and acquired, as hath been said.

## CHAP. LX.

### *Of honour.*

1. *The description of honour.*

Some say (but not so well) that honour is the price and recompence of virtue, or not so ill, an acknowledgment of virtue, or a prerogative of a good opinion, and afterwards of an outward duty towards virtue; It is a priviledge that draweth his principal essence from virtue. Others have called it, the shadow of virtue; which sometimes followeth, sometimes goeth before it, as the shadow the body. But to speak truly, it is the rumour of a beautifull and virtuous action, which reboundeth from our souls to the view of the world, and by reflection into our souls, bringing unto us a testimony of that which others believe of us, which turneth to a great contentment of mind.

2 Honour is so much esteemed and sought for by all, that to attain thereunto, a man enterpriseth, endureth, contemneth whatsoever besides, yea life it self, nevertheless it is a matter of small and slender moment, uncertain, a stranger, and as it were separated in the ayr, from him that is honoured; for it doth not onely not enter into him, nor is inward and essential unto him, but it doth not

so

so much as touch him (being for the most part either dead or absent, who feeleth nothing) but settleth it self and stayeth without at the gate, sticks in the name, which receiveth and carrieth all the honours and dishonours, praises and dispraises, whereby a man is said to have either a good name or a bad. All the good or evil that a man can say of *Cæsar*, is carried by his name. Now the name is nothing of the nature and substance of the thing it is only the image which presenteth it, the mark which distinguisheth it from others, a summarie which containeth in it a small volume, mounteth it, and carrieth it whole and entire, the mean to enjoy it and to use it (for without the names there would be nothing but confusion, the use of things would be lost, the world would decay, as the historie of the tower of *Babel* doth richly teach us): to be brief, the stickler and middle of the essence of the thing, and the honour or dishonour thereof, for it is that that toucheth the thing it self, and receiveth all the good or ill that is spoken. Now honour before it arrive to the name of the thing, it goes a course almost circular, like the Sun, performed and perfected in three principall sites or places, the action or work, the heart, the tongue: for it begins and is conceived, as in the matrix and root, in that beautie, goodnesse, profit of the thing honoured which comes to light and is produced, this is (as hath been said) the rumour of a beautifull or honourable action. *Cœli ennarrant gloriam Dei: pleni sunt cœli & terra gloria tua: The heavens declare the glorie of God, the heavens and earth are full of thy glory* (for whatsoever valour, worth, and perfection the thing have in it self, and inwardly, if it produce nothing that is excellent, it is altogether uncapable of honour, and is as if it were not at all) from thence it entreth into the spirit and understanding, where it takes life, and is formed into a good, haughty, and great opinion; finally sallying forth from thence, and being carried by the word verball or written, it returns by reflexion, and as it were dissolveth, and endeth in the name of the authour of this beautifull work, where it had the beginning, as the Sun in the place from whence it departed, and then it bears the name of honour, praise, glory, and renown.

But the question is, what those actions are to which honour is due. Some think that it is generally due to those that perform their duty in that which belongs to their profession, although it be neither famous nor profitable, as he that upon a Stage playes the part of a servant well, is no lesse commended, then he that presenteth 3.

the person of a King, and he that cannot work in statues of gold, cannot want those of leather or earth wherein he may as well shew the perfection of his Art. All cannot employ themselves, neither are they called to the managing of great affairs, but the commendation is, to do that well that he hath to do. This is too much to lessen and vilifie honour, which is not a common and ordinary guest for all persons; and all just and lawfull actions. Every chaste woman, every honest man is not honourable. The wisest men require thereunto two or three things, the one is difficultie, labour or danger, the other is publick utilitie, and this is the reason why it is properly due to those that administer, and well acquit themselves of great charges, that be the actions as privately and generally good and profitable as they will, they shall have approbation and sufficient renown with those that know them, and the safetie and protection of the lawes; but not honour which publick, and hath more dignitie, fame, and splendour. Some adde unto these a third, and that is, that it be not an action of obligation, but of supererogation.

*Desires of honour chap. 20.*

The desire of honour and glorie, and the approbation of another, is a vicious, violent, powerfull passion; whereof we have spoken in the passion of ambition, but very profitable to the weal-publick, to contain men in their dutie, to awaken and inflame them to honourable actions, a testimonie of weakness and humane insufficiencie, which for want of good money useth light and false coin. Now in what, and how farre forth it is excusable, and when not commendable, and that honour is not the recompence of virtue, shall be said hereafter.

*Lib. 3. in the virtue of Temperancy.*

5.

*Marks of honour.*

The marks of honour are very divers, but the better and more beautifull are they that are without profit and gain, and are such as a man may not strain, and apply to the vicious, and such as by some base office have served the weal-publick. These are the better and more esteemed: they are in themselves more vain that have nothing of worth in them, but the simple mark of men of honour and virtue, as almost in all policies, crowns, lawrell garlands, oak, a certain form of accoutrements, the prerogative of some surname, precedencie in assemblies, orders of Knighthood. And it falleth out sometimes, that it is a greater honour not to have the marks of honour, having deserved them, then to have them. It is more honourable unto me, said *Cato*, that every man should ask me, why I have not a statue erected in the market place, then they should ask why I have it.

CHAP.

## CHAP. LXI.

### *Science.*

SCience, to say the truth, is a beautifull ornament, a very profitable instrument to him that knows well how to use it; but in what rank to place it, and how to prize it, all are not of one opinion: and therein they commit two contrary faults, some by esteeming it too much, some too little. Some make that account of it, that they preferre before all other things, and think that it is a sovereign good, some kind and ray of Divinitie, seeking it with greedinesse, charge and great labour; others contemn it, and despise those that professe it: the mediocritie betwixt both is the more just and most assured. For my part I place it farre beneath honestie, sanctitie, wisdome, virtue, yea, beneath dexteritie in affairs: and yet I dare to range it with dignitie, naturall nobilitie, militarie valour: and I think they may very well dispute of the precedencie; and if I were called to speak my opinion, I should make it to march either side by side with them, or incontinently after. As sciences are different in their subjects, and matters, in the apprentiship and acquisition, so are they in their utilitie, honestie, necessitie, as also in their gain and glorie: some are Theoricks and in speculations onely, others are practick & in action: again, some are Reals, occupied in the knowledge of things that are without us, whether they be natural or supernatural; others are particular, which teach the tongues to speak, and to reason. Now without all doubt, those sciences that have most honestie, utilitie, necessity, and least glorie, vanitie, mercenary gain, are far to be preferred before others. And therefore the practick are absolutely the better which respect the good of man, teaching him to live well, and to die well, to command well, to obey well; and therefore they are diligently to be studied by him that indeavoureth to be wise: whereof this work is a brief and summarie, that is to say, Morall, Science, Oeconomicall, Politicall. After these is Naturall, which serveth to the knowledge of whatsoever is in the world fit for our use, as likewise to admire the greatnesse, goodnesse, wisdome, power of the chief work-master. All other knowledges are vain, and are to be studied cursorily, as appendents unto these, because they are no wayes beneficiall to the life of man, and help not to make us honest men. And therefore it is a losse and a follie to employ therein so much time, so much cost, so much labour as we do. It is true that they serve to heap up crowns

*See lib. 3. cap. 14.*

and to win reputation with the people, but it is in policies that are not wholly sound goods.

## CHAP. LXII.

### *Of riches and poverty.*

1. *The cauſe of troubles.*

THeſe are the two ſources and elements of all diſcords, troubles, and commotions that are in the world: for the exceſſive riches of ſome, do ſtir them up to pride, to delicacies, pleaſures, diſdain of the poor; to enterpriſe and attempt: the extream poverty of others, provokes them to envie, extream jealouſie, fury, deſpair, and to attempt fortunes. *Plato* called them the plagues of a Common-wealth. But which of the two is the more dangerous, is not thorowly reſolved amongſt all. According to *Ariſtotle* it is aboundance, for a State needs not doubt of thoſe that deſire but to live, but of ſuch as are ambitious and rich. According to *Plato* it is poverty, for deſperate poor men are terrible and furious creatures; for wanting either bread, or work, to exerciſe their Arts and occupations, or too exceſſively charged with impoſts, they learn that of the miſtreſſe of the ſchool, Neceſſity, which of themſelves they never durſt to have learned; and they dare, becauſe their number is great. But yet there is a better remedy for them, then for the rich, and it is an eaſier matter to hinder this evil: for ſo long as they have bread and employment, to exerciſe their myſteries, and live, they will never ſtir. And therefore, the rich are to be feared for their own ſakes, their vice and condition: the poor, by reaſon of the imprudency of governours.

2. *Againſt the equality, and inequality of riches.*

Now, many Law-makers, and great States-men, have gone about to take away theſe two extremities, and this great inequality of goods and fortunes, and to bring in a mediocrity and equality, which they called the nurſing-mother of peace and amity; and others likewiſe have attempted to make all things common, which could never be, but by imagination. But beſides this, it is impoſſible to eſtabliſh an equality, by reaſon of the number of children which increaſe in one family, and not in another; and that it can hardly be put in practiſe, although a man be enforced, and it coſt much to attain thereunto, it were alſo inexpedient, and to ſmall purpoſe, and by another way to fall into the ſame miſchief: for there is no hatred more capital then betwixt equals; the envie and jealouſie of equals is the ſeminary of troubles, ſeditions, and cruel wars.

wars. Inequality is good, so it be moderate. Harmony consisteth not of like sounds, but different and well according.

*Nihil est æqualitate inæqualius :*
*Nothing can lesse equall be*
*Then it self, Equalitie.*

This great and deformed inequality of goods proceedeth from many causes, especially two: the one is from unjust lones; as usuries and interests, whereby the one eat the other, and grow fat with the substance of another: *Qui devorant plebem sicut escam panis : Who devour the people as a morsell of bread.* The other from dispositions, whether amongst the living, as alienations, donations, endowments in marriages; or testamentaries by reason of death. By both which means some do excessively increase above others, who continue poor. The heirs of rich men marry with those that are rich, whereby some houses are dismembred and brought to nothing; and others made rich and exalted. All which inconveniencies must be ruled and moderated by avoiding excessive extremities, and in some mediocrity and reasonable equality: for to have either intire, is neither possible, nor good, nor expedient as hath been said. And this shall be handled in the virtue of Justice.

*FINIS.*

# OF VVISDOME, THE SECOND BOOK.

## *Containing the general instructions and rules of Wisdome.*

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### *THE PREFACE.*

*Wherein is contained a general portrait of Wisdome, and the sum of this Book.*

1. HAving in the First Book laid open unto man many and divers means to know himself, and our humane condition, which is the first part, and a great introduction to Wisdome, we are now to enter into the doctrine, and to understand in this Second Book, the general rules and opinions thereof, reserving the more particular to the Third and last Book. It is worthiest consideration, and as a Preamble to the rest, to call man unto himself, to taste, sound, study himself, to the end he may know and understand his defects and miserable condition, and so make himself capable of wholesome and necessary remedies, which are the advisements and instructions of wisdome.

2. But it is a strange thing, that the world should take so little care of its own good and amendment. What wit is it for a man to be utterly

utterly careleſſe that his buſineſſe be well done? Man would onely live, but he cares not to know how to live well. That which a man ſhould eſpecially and only know is that which he knowes leaſt, and cares leaſt to know.

Our inclinations, deſignments, ſtudies, are (as we ſee) from our youth divers, according to the diverſity of natures, companies, inſtructions, occaſions, but there is not any that caſteth his eyes to the other ſide, that endeavoureth to make himſelf wiſe, not any that ruminateth hereupon, or that doth ſo much as think thereon. And if perhaps ſometimes he doth, it is but by chance, and as it were paſſing by, and he attendeth it, as news that is told, which concerneth him not at all. The word pleaſeth ſome well, but that is all, the thing it ſelf is neither accounted of, nor ſought for in this world, of ſo univerſal corruption and contagion. To underſtand the merit and worth of Wiſdome, ſome kind of ayr or tincture of nature is neceſſary: for men are willing to uſe, ſtudy, and endeavour, rather for thoſe things that have their effects and fruits glorious, outward, and ſenſible, ſuch as ambition, avarice, paſſion have, then for wiſdome, whoſe effects are ſweet dark, inward, and leſſe viſible.

O how much doth the world erre in this account, it loveth better the wind with noiſe, then the body it ſelf, the eſſence without it; opinion and reputation, then verity! Man (as hath been ſaid in the firſt book) is nothing but vanity and miſery, uncapable of wiſdome. Every man hath a taſte of that ayr which he breatheth, and where he liveth, followeth the train and cuſtome of living followed by all, how then ſhould he adviſe himſelf of any other? We follow the ſteps of another, yea we preſſe and inflame one another, we inveſt our vices and paſſions one into another; no man ſtayes us, or cryes *hola* unto it, ſo much do we fail and miſtake our ſelves. We have need of ſome ſpecial favour from heaven, and withal, a great and dangerous force and conſtancy of nature, to note that common errour which no man findeth, in adviſing and conſulting of that which no man conſidereth, and reſolving our ſelves quite contrary to the courſe of other men.

There are ſome though rare, I ſee them, I underſtand them, I 3.
ſmell them with pleaſure and admiration; but what, they are all *Democrites*, or *Heraclites*; the one ſort do nothing but mock and gibe, thinking they ſhew truth & wiſdom enough in laughing at errour and folly. They laugh at the world, for it is ridiculous, they are pleaſant, but not good and charitable. The other are weak and poor, they ſpeak with a low voice, their mouthes half open, they diſguiſe their

their language, they mingle and ſtuff their propoſitions, to make them paſſe more currantly, with ſo many other things, and with ſuch Art, that they are hardly diſcerned. They ſpeak not diſtinctly, clearly, aſſuredly, but doubtfully like oracles: I come after them, and under them, but I ſpeak in good ſooth that which I think, and believe clearly, and perſpicuouſly.

I give here a picture, with certain leſſons of wiſdome, which perhaps may ſeem to ſome new and ſtrange, and ſuch as no man in former time hath given in ſuch a faſhion; and I doubt not but malicious people, who have neither patience nor power to judge truly and wiſely of things, malicioufly condemn whatſoever agrees not with their palat, and with that which they have already received. But that is all one, for who is he that can aſſure himſelf of the good opinion of all? But my hope is, that the ſimple and debonaire, the Ætherian and ſublime ſpirits will judge indifferently. Theſe are the two extremities and ſtages of peace and ſerenity; In the middle are the troubles, tempeſts, and meteors, as hath been ſaid.

Lib. 1.

*The diviſion of this book into 4. parts.*

To the end we may have ſome rude and general knowledge of that which is handled in this book, and the whole doctrine of wiſdome, we may divide this matter into four points or conſiderations. The firſt are preparatives to wiſdom, which are two: the one an exemption and freedome from all that may hinder the attainment thereof, which are either the external errours and vices of the world; or inward, as paſſions: the other is a plain, entire, and univerſal liberty of the mind. Theſe two firſt, and the more difficult, make a man capable and apt for wiſdome, becauſe they empty and cleanſe the place, to the end it may be more ample and capable to receive a thing of ſo great importance as Wiſdome is *Magna & ſpatioſa res eſt Sapientia, vacuo illi loco opus eſt, ſuper-vacua ex animo tollenda ſunt: Great and ſpacious is Wiſdome, and had need of large room: the mind muſt be freed from things ſuperfluous.* And this is the firſt. Afterwards they make him open, free, and alwaies ready to receive it. This is the ſecond.

1. *Preparatives.*

2. *Foundations.*

The ſecond are foundations of wiſdome, which are likewiſe two, true and eſſential probity, and to have a certain end and courſe of life. Theſe two reſpect nature, they rule and accommodate us thereunto, the firſt to the univerſal nature, which is reaſon; for probitie or honeſty, as ſhall be ſaid, is no other thing: the ſecond to the particular of every one of us; for it is the choice of the kind of life proper and fit for the nature of every one.

The

The third belongs to the raising of this building, that is to say, Offices and functions of wisdome, which are six, whereof the three first are principally for every one in himself, which are piety, inward government of our selves and thoughts, and a sweet carriage in all accidents of prosperity and adversitie: the other three respect another, which are such an observation as is necessary of Laws, Customes, and Ceremonies, a sweet conversion with another, and prudence in all affairs. These six do correspond and comprehend the foure morall virtues, the first, fourth, and fifth, do properly appertain to *justice*, and to that which we ow to God and our neighbour; the second and third, to *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, the sixth to *Prudence*. And therefore these six, are the matter and subject of the third Book, which handleth at large the foure morall virtues and in particular the offices and duties of a wise man, but in this book they are handled in generall. 3 *Offices.*

The fourth, are the effects and fruits of wisdome, which are two: To be alwayes ready for death, and to maintain a mans self in true tranquillitie of spirit, the crown of wisdome, and the sovereigne good. 4 *Fruits.*

These are in all twelve rules and lessons of wisdome, divided into so many Chapters; which are the proper and peculiar foot-steps and offices of a wise man, which are not found else-where. I mean in that sense wherein we take them, and now describe them: For although some of them, as honestie, the observation of the Laws, seem to be found in others of the common and profane sort, yet not such as we here require and decipher them to be. He then is wise, who maintaining himself truly free and noble, is directed in all things according to nature, accommodating his own proper and particular to the universall, which is God, living and carrying himself before God, with all, and in all affairs, upright, constant, chearfull, content, and assured, attending with one and the same foot, all things that may happen; and lastly, death it self.

## CHAP. I.

### *Exemption and freedome from errours, and the vices of the world, and from Passions. The first disposition to Wisdome.*

IT is here necessary for the first lesson and instruction unto Wisdome, to put the knowledge of our selves and our humane condition

dition: for the first in every thing, is well to know the subject, wherewith a man hath to do, and which he handleth and manageth to bring to perfection. But we hold that to be already done, for it is the subject of our first Book: We can onely say here, as a summary repetition of all that hath been spoken, that a man aspiring unto wisdome, should above all things, and before all other works, sufficiently know himself, and all men besides. This is the true science of man, very profitable, a matter of great study, fruit, and efficacy, for man is all in all. It is proper to a wise man: for, onely he that is wise knows himself, and he that knows himself well, is wise. It is very difficult, for a man is extreamly counterfeited and disguised, not onely man with man, but every man with himself. Every one takes a delight to deceive himself, to hide, to rob, to betray himself, *Ipsi nobis furto subducimur*, flattering and tickling himself to make himself laugh, extenuating his defects, setting a high price of whatsoever is good in himself, winking of purpose lest he should too clearly see himself. It is very rare and sought for by a few, and therefore no marvell if wisdome be so rare; for they are very few that do well know this first lesson, or that do studie it; there is not a man that is master to himself, much lesse to another. In things not necessary and strange, there are many masters, many disciples. In this point we are never with, nor within our selves, we alwayes muse of outward things, and man better knoweth all things then himself. O miserie! O madnes! To the wise in this point, it is necessary that we know all sorts of men, of all airs, climates, natures, ages, estates, professions, (to this end serves the traveller and the history) their motions, inclinations, actions, not onely publick, (they are least to be regarded, being all fained and artificiall) but private, and especially the more simple and peculiar, such as arise from their proper and naturall jurisdiction; as likewise all those that concern them particularly, for in these two their nature is discovered: afterwards that we confer them all together to make an entire bodie and universall judgement; but especially that we enter into our selves, taste and attentively sound our selves, examine every thought, word, action. Doubtlesse we shall in the end learn, that man is in truth on the one side a poor, weak, pitifull, a miserable thing, and we cannot but pitie him: and on the other, we shall find him swollen and puffed up with wind, presumption, pride, desires, & we cannot but disdain and detest him. Now he hath been sufficiently decyphered and presented unto us even unto the life, in the first

Book

Book, by divers means in all senses, and according to all his visages: and this is the reason why we speak no more of this knowledge of man, and of our selves in this place; but we set down here for the first rule of wisdome, the fruit of this knowledge, to the end, that the end and fruit of the first Book, might be the beginning and entrance of the second. This fruit is to defend and preserve men from the contagion of the world, and of themselves; these are the two evils and formall hindrance of wisdome, the one outward; as popular opinions and vices, the generall corruption of the world; the other inward, that is our passions. Now we are to see how difficult this is, and how a man may defend himself against these two. Wisdome is difficult and rare, and the greatest, yea almost the onely endeavour that we have to attain unto it, is to set at liberty, and to free our selves from that miserable double captivitie, publick and domesticall, of another and of our selves: this being attained, the rest will be easie. Let us speak of these two evils distinctly and apart.

2 *Exemption of vulgar errours.*

As concerning the outward, we have before sufficiently displayed the vulgar nature, and strange humours of the world, and the common sort of people: whereby it is easie enough to know what can proceed from them; for since they are worshippers of vanity, envious, malicious, unjust, without judgement, discretion, mediocrity, what can they deliberate, think, judge, resolve, speak, do well and justly? We have likewise as it were by example reported and quoted (in presenting the misery of mankind) many great faults, which the world doth generally commit in judgement and will, whereby it is easie to know that it is wholly composed of errour and vice, whereunto all the sayings of the wisest in the world do accord, affirming, that the worser part is the greater, of a thousand there is not one good; the number of fools are infinite, and contagion is most dangerous in a presse.

3

And therefore they counsel us, not onely to preserve our selves neat and clear from popular opinions, designements, and affections, as being all base, feeble, indigested, impertinent, and very often false, at the least imperfect: but also to flie above all things the multitude, the company and conversation of the vulgar sort, because a man cannot approach near unto it, without some losse and impeachment. The frequentation of the people is contagious and very dangerous, even to the wisest and best settled men that are: for who is able to withstand the force and charge of vices, coming with so great

great a troop? One example of covetousnes or incontinency doth much harm. The companie of one delicate, effeminate person, doth soften and make nice by little and little, those that live with him. One rich neighbour gives light and life to our covetousnesse. One dissolute person worketh (if I may so say) and applieth his vice, like rust, into the neareſt and pureſt mind. What then can we look for from such manners, after which the world runneth, and as it were with a loose bridle?

4 But what? it is very rare and difficult so to do. It is a plausible thing, and that hath great appearances of goodnes and justice, to follow the way approved by all: the great beaten way doth easily deceive: *Lata est via ad mortem, & multi per eam; mundus in maligno positus: Broad is the way to death, and many walk therein: The world is given unto wickedneſs:* we go one after another like beasts for company; we never dive into the reason, the merit, the equity of the cause; we follow examples and customes, and as it were of envie and emulation, we stumble, and fall one upon another; we throng one another, and draw every one to a head-long downfall. We borrow our own overthrow, and perish upon credit: *Alienis perimus exemplis; We perish by other mens example.* Now he that would be wise, must alwayes suspect whatsoever pleaseth, and is approved by the people, by the greater number, and must look into that that is true and good in it self, and not into that which seemeth to them; and that is most used and frequented, and not suffer himself to be cunny-catcht and carried by the multitude, which should not be accounted but for one: *Unus mihi pro populo, & populus pro uno: One is to me for the people, and the people for one.* And when to stop his mouth, and to beat him down at a blow, it shall be said, That the whole world saith it, believes it, doth it; he must say in his heart, It is so much the worse, it is but a simple and wicked caution; I esteem it the lesse, because the world esteems it so much: likewise *Phocion*, who seeing the people highly to applaud something which he had spoken, turned to his friends that stood by him, and said unto them, *Hath any folly unwitting of my self escaped my mouth, or any loose or wicked word, that all this people do so approve me? Quis placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? malis artibus quæritur popularis favor: Who is he to whom virtue is pleasing, that can please the people? The favour of the people is attained by ill means.* We must then as much as is possible flie the haunt and company of the sottish, illiterate, ill-composed people, but above all

all preserve our selves from their judgements, opinions, vicious behaviour, and without any stirre keep alwayes our own thoughts apart by themselves: *Quod scio non probat populus, quod probat populus ego nescio: Sapiens non respicit quod homines judicent: non it quà populus, sed ut sidera mundi contrarium iter intendunt, it à hic adversus opiniones omnium vadit: What I know the people allow not: what the people allow, I know not: A wise man respecteth not what men judge of him: He goes not the same way with the people, but as the starrs run a contrary course to the word, so he to the opinions of all men.* Remaining in the world, without being of the world, like the kidnies covered with fat, but have none themselves. *Non estis de mundo, ideo odit vos mundus: odi profanum vulgus & arceo: You are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you: The profane multitude I both hate and abandon.* This is that solitarinesse so much commended by the wise, which is to disburthen the soul of all vices and popular opinions, and to free it from this confusion and captivitie, to draw it to it self, and to set it at libertie.

5 *The second part, exemption of passions.*

The other evil and hinderance to wisdome which a man must carefully avoid, and which is inward, and therefore the more dangerous, is the confusion and captivity of his passions, and turbulent affections, whereof he must disfurnish and free himself, to the end he may be emptie and neat, like a white paper, and be made a subject more fit to receive the tincture and impressions of wisdome, against which the passions do formally oppose themselves: and therefore the wisest were wont to say, that it was impossible even for *Jupiter* himself to love, to be in choler, to be touched with any passion, and to be wise at one time. Wisdome is a regular managing of our soul with measure and proportion: It is an equability, and sweet harmony of our judgements, wills, manners, a constant health of our mind; whereas the passions are contrariwise but the furious reboundings, accessions and recessions of folly, violent and rash sallies and motions.

6 *Generall remedies against the passions.*

We have sufficiently decyphered the passions in the first Book, and said enough to bring us into horrour, and detestation of them: the generall means and remedies to overcome them (for the particular in every one are in the third book, in the virtue of fortitude and temperance) are many and different, good and evil. And not to speak of that goodnes and felicitie of nature, so well tempered and seasoned, that it maketh us calm and clear, exempt and quit from strong passions and violent motions and keepeth us in good

case, equall, united, firm, and as strong as steel against the assault of our passions, a thing very rare: for this is not a remedy against this evil, but an exemption of evil, and health it self: but of the remedies against them we may note four.

7 *Stupidity.* The first improper, and by no means commendable, is a kind of stupiditie and insensibleness in not perceiving and apprehending of things a brutish pampering food of base minds, or such as have their apprehension wholly dulled, a spirituall leprosie, which seemeth to have some shew of health, but it hath not: for it is not possible there should be wisdome and constancie, where there is not knowledge and understanding, and imployment in affairs: so that it is onely a complexion, and not a virtue. This is not to feel the disease, and therefore not to cure it: nevertheless this state is nothing so bad, as to know and feel, and understand, and yet to suffer himself to be gulled and overcome:

*——Pratulerim delirus inérsque videri,*
*Dum mea delectent mala me, vel denique fallant,*
*Quàm sapere & ringi.——*
*I rather choose to seem a fool with ease,*
*Then to be Wise indeed, and yet displease.*

8 *Counterpassion.* The second remedie is little better then the evil it self. but yet more in use, that is, when a man conquereth and extinguisheth one passion by a stronger then it: for passions are never of equall force, but there is alwayes one or another (as in the humours of the bodie) which is the predominant, which ruleth and devoureth the rest and we attribute many times very untruly that unto virtue and wisdome, which ariseth from passion: but it is not enough in these men, when those passions that bear sway in them, are not of the worst.

9 *Precaution.* The third remedie and good (though it be not the best) is wise and artificiall, whereby a man avoideth, flieth and hideth himself from all such accidents whatsoever, as may stirre, awaken, or kindle his passions. This is a kind of studie and Art, whereby a man prepareth himself before the occasions, in diverting of evils, and providing that we feel them not; like that King, who brake a beautifull and rich cup that one gave him, to take away in a good hour all matter of brawl and anger that might happen about it. The prayer of these kind of people is, *Nè nos inducas in tentationem: Lead us not into temptation.* By this remedie, he that sets himself forward to the sport, sports not himself;

men

men of honour, prompt and cholerick, flie contentions, altercations, and stay themselves at the first onset and occasion of passion: For when a man is once entred, it is no easie matter to carry himself wisely and discreetly. We guide our affairs in the beginning, and hold them at our mercy; but after they are once afoot and thoroughly heated, they guide and carry us. Passions are farre more easily avoided, then moderated, *excinduntur animo facilius quàm temperantur:* becauſe all things are in their first birth feeble and tender. In their weakness we discover not the danger, and in their full growth and strength we know not how to withstand them; as we may see in divers, who easily and lightly enter into quarrels, and law and contentions, but are afterwards enforced to get out as they can, with shame enough, and to come to any agreement, be it never so base and dishonourable, yea to seek false interpretations, to belie themselves, to betray their own hearts, to plaister and cover the fact, which are all remedies a hundred times worse then the evil they go about to heal; *Melius non incipient, quàm desinent: They shall not begin better, then they end:* from the want of wisdome, they fall into the want of heart: This is contrary to that saying of *Bias, Enterprise coldly, pursue ardently.* It is like fools, who, out of a vicious shame, are easily perswaded to agree to whatsoever a man demands, and as easily flie from their words, and revoke that they have spoken. We must therefore in all our affairs and commerce with men, from the beginning be prudent and advised.

The fourth and best remedie of all, is a lively virtue, resolution, and constancie of the mind, whereby a man seeth and confronteth all accidents without trouble, he wrestleth and entreth into a combate with them. It is valiant, noble, and glorious impassibilitie, quite contrary to the first, which we have spoken of, base stupiditie. Now, to form it, and to attain unto it, there is nothing more necessary then a precedent discourse. Discourse is the master of our Passions, premeditation is that which giveth the temper to the soul, and makes it hard, and steely, and impenetrable, against whatsoever would wound or hurt it. The proper means to appease and sweeten these passions, is, to know them well, to examine, to judge what power they have over us, and we over them. But above all, the sovereigne remedie is to believe, and not to suffer himself to be carried with opinion, which is that which cherisheth and kindleth our passions, and is (as hath been said) false, foolish, in- 10 *Virtue.*

constant, and uncertain, the guide of fools and the vulgar sort; but to suffer himself to be sweetly led by reason and nature, which is the guide of the wiser sort, ripe, solid, and settled. But hereof, hereafter more at large.

11 *Presumption.* But above all other passions, it is necessary that we do carefully guard and defend our selves from the self-love, presumption, and foolish dotage of our selves, the plague of mankind, the capitall enemy of wisdome, the true gangrene and corruption of the soul, whereby we adore our selves, and rest contented with our selves, we hearken to none other, and believe none other but our selves. Now we should know that we are not in greater danger in the hands of any, then of our selves. It is an excellent mott originally come from the *Spanish* tongue, *O God keep my self from my self.* This presumption and foolish love of our selves, proceeds from the ignorance we have of our selves, of our weakness, and that little that is in us, not onely in generall of the infirmitie and misery of mankind; but also of our own proper and personall imperfections: but whosoever he be that hath the least grain or touch of this folly, shall never attain unto wisdome. Faith, modestie, a hearty and serious acknowledgement of that little that we have, is a great testimony of a good and sound judgement, of a right will, and is an excellent disposition unto wisdome.

## CHAP. II.

### *An universall and plain libertie of spirit both in judgement and Will, the second disposition to Wisdome.*

THe other disposition unto wisdome, which followeth the first (which doth quit us from this outward and inward captivitie and confusion, popular and pasionate) is a plain, entire, generous, and lord-like liberty of the minde, which is twofold, that is to say, of Judgement, and Will.

1. *The first part, libertie of judgement.* The first, of Judgement, consisteth in the consideration, judgement, examination of all things, and not in tying himself to any one, but remaining free in himself, universall, ready, and open for all. And this is the highest point, the proper law and true priviledge of a wise and active man. But few they are that will understand it, and acknowledge it, fewer that practise it as they should: and this is the reason why we must here establish it, against such as

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are incapable of wiſdome. And firſt, to avoid all miſcountings, we explain the words, and give the ſenſe. There are here three things which maintain, cauſe, and conſerve one the other, that is to judge of all things, not to be married or bound to any, to continue open and ready for all. When I ſay to judge, my meaning is not to reſolve, affirm, determine: this were contrary to the ſecond, which is, not to bind our ſelves to any thing: but it is to examine, and weigh the reaſons and counter-reaſons on all parts, the weight and merit of them, and thereby work out the truth. So likewiſe not to bind our ſelves to any thing, is not to ſettle our ſelves, and to remain ſhort of that he ſhould, bleating in the ayr, and to ceaſe our endeavours, and to proceed in our neceſſary actions and deliberations: For I will that in all outward and common actions of our life, and in whatſoever is ordinarily uſed, a man ſhould agree and accommodate himſelf to the common ſort; for our rule extendeth not it ſelf to that which is outward, and to the action, but to that which is within, the thought, and ſecret and inward judgment: yea and therein likewiſe I conſent, that a man ſettle and apply himſelf to that which ſeemeth moſt agreeable to the truth, moſt honeſt and profitable; but yet that it be without determination, reſolution, affirmation, or condemnation of contrary or divers judgments, old, or new, but alwaies to hold himſelf ready to entertain better if it appear, yea not to be offended, if another ſhall conteſt with him againſt that which he thinketh better, but rather deſire to hear what may be ſaid; for this the mean, to exerciſe the firſt, which is to judge, and alwaies to enter into the ſearch of the truth. Theſe three, I ſay, do maintain and conſerve one the other; for he that judgeth well, and without paſſions of all things, findeth in every thing appearances of reaſon, which hinder his reſolution, whereby he feareth to ſettle his judgment, and ſo remaineth undetermined, indifferent, and univerſal; whereas contrariwiſe, he that reſolveth, judgeth no more, but ſetleth and reſteth himſelf upon that which he holdeth, and ſo makes himſelf a partaker, and a particular. To the former, fools, ſimple and weak people are contrary: to the ſecond, obſtinate opinative affirmers: to the third, both of them, which are particulars: but all three are practiſed by the wiſe, modeſt, diſcreet, and temperate ſearcher of the truth, and true Philoſophie. It remaineth for the explication of this our propoſition, that I let you know, that by all things, and ſome thing, (for it is ſaid, to judge of all things, not to be aſſured of any,) we underſtand not thoſe di-

vine verities which have been revealed unto us, which we are to receive simply with all humilitie and submission, and without all controversie and discussion, submit our selves, and captivate our minds thereunto *captivantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei: Submitting our understanding to the obedience of faith:* but we understand hereby all other things without exception. This simple explication would be sufficient perhaps to perswade an indifferent spirit to receive this rule of wisdome: but I see and perceive a sort of people, glorious, affirmative, which would rule the world, and command it as it were with a rod; and as others in former times have sworn to certain principles, and married themselves to certain opinions, so they would that all others should do the like, whereby they oppose themselves to this noble libertie of the spirit. It shall be necessary therefore to establish it more amply, and by order to confirm and handle these three points and members thereof.

2. *The first to judge of all.*

The first is, to judge of all. It is the propertie of a wise and spirituall man, saith one of the first and wisest of the world, *Spiritualis omnia dijudicat & à nemine judicatur: The spirituall man judgeth all, and is judged of none.* The true office of man, his most proper and naturall exercise, his worthiest profession is to judge. Why is he a man discoursing, reasoning, understanding? Why hath hath he a spirit, to build (as they say) castles in the air, and to feed himself with fooleries and vanities, as the greatest part of the world doth? *Quis unquam oculos tenebrarum causâ habuit? Who had ever eyes given him to keep them shut?* No doubtlesse, but to understand, to judge of all things, and therefore he is called the governour, the superintendent, the keeper of nature, of the world, of the works of God. To go about to deprive him of this right, is to make him no more a man, but a beast; to do it singularly, excellently, is the part of a wise man; if not to judge, hurts the simple and proper nature of man, what shall it do in a wise man, who is as farre above the common sort of men, as a comman man is above beasts? It is then strange that so many men (I speak not of idiots, and the weaker sort, who have not the faculties and mean to exercise it) who either are, or make shew of understanding and sufficiencie, deprive themselves willingly of this right and authoritie so naturall, so just, and excellent, who without the examining or judging of any thing, receive and approve whatsoever is presented, either because it hath a fair semblance and appearance, or because it is in authoritie, credit, and practice; yea, they think that it is not lawfull

lawfull to examine or doubt any thing, in such sort do they debase and degrade themselves: they are forward and glorious in other things, but in this, they are fearfull and submisse, though it do justly appertain unto them, and with so much reason. Since there are a thousand lies for one truth, a thousand opinions of one and the same thing, and but one that is true, why should not I examine with the instrument of reason, which is the better, the truer, the more reasonable, honest and profitable? Is it possible that amongst so many laws, customes, opinions, different manners, and contrary to ours, as there are in the world, there are none good but ours? Hath all the world besides been mistaken? Who dares to say so, and who doubteth but others say as much of ours, and that he that thus condemneth others, if he had been there born and brought up, would think them better, and preferre them before those he now accounteth the onely good, and all because he hath been accustomed unto them? To conclude, to him that shall be so fool-hardie to say it; I do answer, that this rule shall at the least be good for all others, to the end that they judging and examining all may find ours to be the better. Go to then, the wiseman shall judge of all, nothing shall escape him which he bringeth not to the barre, and to the ballance. It is to play the part of profane men and beasts, to suffer themselves to be lead like oxen. I will that men live, and speak, and do, as others, and the common sort do; but not that they judge like the common sort, but judge them. What can a wise man, or a holy man have above a profane, if he must have his spirit, his mind, his principall and heroicall part a slave to the vulgar sort? The publick and common should content it self, if a man conform himself thereunto in all apparent things; what hath it to do with our inside, our thoughts, and judgements? They shall govern as long as they will my hand, my tongue, but not my spirit, for that by their leave, hath another master. It is a hard thing to bridle the libertie of the spirit; and if a man would do it, it is the greatest tyrannie that may be: a wise man will take heed thereof actively and passively, will maintain himself in his libertie, and not trouble that of other men.

3. *The effect of this first treatise.*

Now a wise man enjoying this his right to judge and examine all things, it many times comes to passe, that the judgement and the hand, the mind and the body, contradict one another, and that he will carry himself outwardly after one manner, and judge inwardly after another, will play one part before the world, and another in his mind, which he must do to preserve equitie and justice

*A wise man one within, another without.*

in all. That general saying, *Universus mundus exercet histrioniam*, *All the world carrieth two faces in one head*, should properly and truly be understood of a wise man, who is another man within, then he outwardly shews. If he were without, such as he is within, he should not be accounted of, but in all things offend the world: If he were within, such as without, he should be no more a wise man, he should judge amisse, be corrupted in his mind. He must do, and carry himself outwardly, for publike reverence, and so as he offend no man, according to the law, custome, and ceremony of the countrey; and inwardly judge of the truth as it is, according to the universal reason, whereby it many times comes to passe, that he condemneth that which outwardly he doth. *Sapiens faciet quæ non probabit, ut ad majora transitum inveniat, nec relinquet bonos mores, sed tempori aptabit omnia: quæ imperiti faciunt & luxuriosi, faciet; sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito: multa sapientes faciunt quâ homines sunt, non quâ sapientes.* *A wise man will do that which himself will not allow, to make a way unto greater matters thereby: neither will he forsake good manners, but accommodate all things to the time: What unskilful and dissolute persons do, that will he do; but not in the same manner, or to the same purpose. Many things wise men do as they are men, but not as wise men.* He will carry himself in things and actions as *Cicero* in words, who said, I leave the use or custome of speech to the people, and observe the true science and knowledge of words: *Loquendum & extrà vivendum ut multi, sapiendum ut pauci: We must speak and carry our selves outwardly as the greater number, and be wise as the smaller.* Some few examples hereof, and first of things of lesse moment. In all humility I take off my hat, and keep my head uncovered before my superiour, for so doth the custome of my countrey require; but yet I will not leave to judge, that the custome of the East is far better, to salute and do reverence, by laying the hand upon the breast, without uncovering the head, to the prejudice of our health, and other inconveniencies. Contrariwise, if I were in the East, I would take my repast sitting upon the earth, or leaning on the elbow, or half lying, looking upon the table side-waies as they do there, and as our Saviour with his Apostles did use to do, *recumbentibus, discumbentibus*: and yet I would not cease to judge, that the manner of sitting upright at table, our faces towards it, as the custome is here, is more honest, more fit, and commodious. These examples are of small weight, and there are a thousand the like: let us take another

ther of better importance. I will, and I yield my consent, that the dead be interred and left to the mercy of the worm of rottennesse and stench, because it is now the common custome almost every where; but yet I will not cease to judge, that the ancient manner of burning them, and gathering their ashes together, is more noble, and more neat, to commit and commend to the fire, the excellentest element, enemy to putrefaction and stench, neighbour to heaven it self, a sign of immortality, a shadow of the divinity, and whereof the use is proper and peculiar unto man, rather then to the earth, which is the ordure, lees, dregs of the elements, the sink of the world, the mother of corruption, and to the worms, which is the extremest ignominy and horrour, and so to couple and handle alike a man and a beast. Religion it self teacheth and commandeth to dispose after this manner, of all things, as of the paschal lamb which might not be eaten, and (where Popery beareth sway) the consecrated host, and divers the like; why then should not the like respect be had of our bodies? What can a man do that is more dishonourable to the body, then to cast it into the earth there to corrupt? It seemeth to me to be the uttermost punishment that can be inflicted upon infamous persons and hainous offenders, and that the carcasses of honest and honourable men should be handled with better respect. Doubtlesse of all the manners in disposing of dead bodies, which may be reduced to five, that is, to commit them to the four elements, and the bowels of wild beasts, the vilest, and basest, and most shameful, is to interre them, the most noble and honourable to burn them. Again, I will and consent, that this my Wise man in things natural be modest, that he hide and cover those parts and actions that are called shameful, dishonourable; and he thet should do otherwise, I would detest, and think hardly of him, because it is almost the custome of the whole world; but yet I will nevertheless, that he judge that simply in themselves, and according to nature, they are no more shamefull then the nose or the mouth, to drink and to eat. Nature, that is, God, having made nothing shameful, but it is for another cause, not from nature, that is to say, from the enemy of nature, which is sin. Divinity also more chaste then Philosophie telleth us, that the entire nature, not yet altered by the sin of man, these parts and actions were not shameful, for then shame was not, it is the enemy of nature, the fruit of sin. I consent to apparel my self like those of my countrey and profession, and if I had been born in those countries where they

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go naked, I would have gone so too: but yet I cease not to judge, that neither of the two fashions is very good; and if I were to choose, and ordain, I would choose a fashion indifferent betwixt both, out of those countries where they cover themselves with one onely and simple covering, light and easie enough, without fashion, or cost; for our manner of attiring is not good, yea worse then to go naked, to be so fast wrapped and bound, with such a multitude and variety of coverings of divers stuffes, even to the number of four, five, six, one upon another, and whereof some are double, that they hold us prest and packt up with so many ties, bindings, butnings, (not to speak of that dissolute and abominable excess condemned by all good laws) that we can hardly stirre our selves in them. I will content my self with these examples. The self-same a man may say of all laws, customes, manners, and of that which is *de facto*, and much more of opinions, and that which is *de jure*.

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*An Objection.* If any man shall say, that I have judged amisse in these examples, and that generally, if liberty be given to judge of all things, the spirit will wonder and lose it self, filling and furnishing it self with follies and false opinions: I answer to the first, which toucheth me in particular, that it is very easie to erre in finding the truth in all these instances, and yet it is over-boldnesse to accuse any man; for it is as much as if he should say, that a man knowes where and what the truth is in things, which who can perfectly know or judge of? Now not to find the truth, is not to judge amisse; to judge amisse, is to weigh and ballance, and compare amisse, that is to say, not to examine the reasons, and to ponder them according to the first and universal nature, (both which though a man do, yet it followeth not, that he must needs find out the truth.) Now I believe nothing that is but simply affirmed, if it be not likewise proved; but if any man by contrary reasons more strong and forcible, shall make good what he saith, of all others he is the welcomest man unto me, and the man I look for: oppositions and contradictions well urged, and with reason, are the true means to exercise this judging office. I had never set down these opinions, but that I looked that some one or other should abrogate them, and help me to better, and to answer more effectually, and to that general objection of the danger that there is in this liberty, besides that which hath been spoken, and shall more expresly be said in the third lesson of Wisdome and Chapter following, that the rule which we ought to hold in judging, and in all things, is nature, natural and universal reason, following

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ing which a man can never erre. See here the other member of this judicious liberty which we are about to handle, which will furniſh us with a remedy againſt this pretended danger.

The other point of this lord-like liberty of ſpirit, is an indifferency of taſte, and a deferring of a ſetled reſolution, whereby a wiſe man conſidering coldly, and without paſſion, all things, as is ſaid, is not obſtinate, doth not ſwear, tye, bind himſelf to any opinion; keeping himſelf alwaies ready to receive the truth, or that which ſeems to him to have beſt ſemblance of truth, and ſaying in his inward and ſecret judgement, that which our ancients were wont to ſay in their outward and publick, *Ità videtur*, it ſeemeth ſo, there is great appearance of truth on this ſide; and if any man do contradict and oppoſe himſelf, with patience he is ready to underſtand the contrary reaſons, and to receive them, finding them more ſtrong and better; and when he hath heard what he can hear, he ſtill thinketh that either there is, or may be better, though as yet it appeareth not. This dilation and putting off of a mans judgement, is founded firſt upon thoſe propoſitions ſo much celebrated among the wiſe, *That there is nothing certain, that we know nothing, that there is nothing in nature but doubt, nothing certain but incertaintie. Solum certum, nihil eſſe certi: hoc unum ſcio, quod nihil ſcio: The onely thing certain is, that nothing is certain; this one thing know I, that I know nothing:* That of all things a man may diſpute alike, that we do nothing but ſearch, enquire, and grope after appearances: *Scimus nihil, opinamur veriſimilia: We know nothing, and imagine likelihoods.* That verity is not a thing of our own invention and purchaſe, and when it yields it ſelf into our hands, we have nothing in our ſelves whereby we may challenge it, poſſeſſe it, or aſſure our ſelves of it: That truth and falſhood enter into us by one and the ſame gate, and there hold the ſame place and credit, and maintain themſelves by the ſame means: That there is no opinion held by all, or currant in all places, none that is not bated and diſputed, that hath not another held and maintained quite contrary unto it: That all things have two handles and two viſages, and there is reaſon for all, and there is not any that hath not his contrary; it is of lead, it turneth and accommodateth it ſelf to whatſoever a man will have it: To be ſhort, It is the doctrine and practice of all the wiſeſt, greateſt, and moſt noble Philoſophers, who have made profeſſion of ignorance, doubting, inquiring, ſearching. Others, notwithſtanding they have been dogmatiſts, and affirmers, yet

5. *Not to bind our ſelves to any thing.*

yet it hath been of gestures and words onely, and that to shew how far they could wade in the purchase and search of the truth, *Quam docti fingunt magis quàm norunt: Which the learned rather imagine, then know:* giving unto all things no other nor stronger title, then probabilitie and true likelihood, and handling them diversly, sometimes with one visage and in one sense, sometimes in another by problematicall questions, rather enquiring then instructing; and many times shewing that they speak not in earnest, but in sport and for exercise: *Non tam id sensisse quod dicerent, quàm exercere ingenia materiæ difficultate voluisse videntur: They will seem noe so much to think what they say, as to exercise their wits with the difficulty of the matter.* And who will believe that it was the purpose of *Plato* to tie men to his Common-wealth, and his *Idea's*, of *Pythagoras* to his numbers, of *Epicurus* to his *Atomes*, or to give them for currant coin? They took pleasure to solace their spirits with pleasant and subtile inventions, *Quæ ex ingenio fingunter, non ex scientiæ vi: which they rather feigne wittily, then know skilfully.* Sometimes likewise they have studied after difficultie, to cover the vanitie of their subject, and to employ the curiosity of their spirits. And *Aristotle* the most resolute of all the rest, the Prince of dogmatists, and peremptory affirmers, the god of pedanties, how often hath he been crost in his opinions, not knowing what to resolve in that point of the soul, wherein he is almost alwayes unlike to himself, and in many other things more base, which he knew not how to finde or understand, ingenuosly confessing sometimes the great weakness of man in finding and knowing the truth.

6 *Objects.* They that have come after, of a pedanticall and presumptuous spirit, who make *Aristotle* and others say what they please, and are more obstinate in their opinions then ever they were, disavowing those for Disciples that faint in their opinions, hate and arrogantly condemn this rule of wisdome, this modestie, and Academicall stayednes, glorying in their obstinate opinions, whether they be right or wrong, loving better a headie froward affirmer against their own opinions, and against whom they may exercise their wit and skill, then a modest peaceable man, who doubteth and maketh stay of his judgement, against whom their wits are dulled, that is to say, fool then a wise man: like to women, who love better to be contradicted, even with injurie, then that a man either out of the coldnes of his nature, or contempt, should say nothing to them, where-

whereby they imagine they are either scorned or condemned, wherein they shew their iniquity. For why should it not be as lawfull to doubt, and consider of things as doubtfull, not determining of any thing as it is to them to affirm? Why should it not be lawful ingenuously to confesse that which a man knoweth not, since in verity he knoweth it not, and to hold in suspence that which he is not assured of, and against which there are many reasons and oppositions? It is certain according to the opinion of the wisest, that we are ignorant of much more then we know, that all our knowledge is the lesser part, and almost nothing in regard of that we know not: the causes of our ignorances are infinite, and both in respect of the things themselves either too far from us, or too neer, too great, or too little, to durable, or not durable enough, perpetually changing, and in respect of our selves, and the manner of knowing them, which as yet is not sufficiently learned. And that which we think we know, we know not, neither can we hold it well, for with violence it is got from us; and if it may not be gotten because our obstinacy in opinion is strong, yet we are contented with, and much troubled. Now how should we be capable to know more or lesse, if we grow resolute in our opinions, settle and repose our selves in certain things, and in such manner, that we seek no farther, nor to examine any more that which we think to hold? They think this suspension a shame and a weaknesse, because they know not what it is, and they perceive not that the greatest men that are have made profession thereof; they blush, and have not the heart freely to say, I know not, so much are they possessed with the opinion and presumption of science: and they know not that there is a kind of ignorance and doubt, more learned, and more certain, more noble and generous then all their science and certainty. This is that that hath made *Socrates* so renowned, and held for the wisest man: It is the science of sciences, and the fruit of all our studies: It is a modest, milde, innocent, and hearty acknowledgement of the mystical height of truth, and of the poverty of our humane condition full of darknesse, weaknesse, uncertainty, *cogitationes mortalium timidæ, incertæ, ad inventiones nostræ; Deus novit cogitationes hominum quoniam vanæ sunt. Mans thoughts are fearful, and our inventions uncertain: God knowes the thought of man, how vain it is.* Here I would tell you, that I caused to be graven over the gate of my little house which I built at *Condom*, in the year 1600. this word, *I know not.*

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But they will needs that we submit our selves in all dutie to certain principles, which is an unjust tyrannie. I yield my consent, that a man employ them in all judgement, and make use of them, but yet not so, as that a man may not spurn against them, for against that opinion I oppose my self. Who is he in the whole world, that hath right to command, and give laws to the world, to subject the spirits of men, and to give principles, which may be no more examined, that a man may no more denie or doubt of, but God himself, the sovereign spirit, and true principle of the world, who is onely to be believed, because he saith it? All other things are subject to triall and opposition, and it is weakness to subject our selves unto it. If they will that I submit my self to principles, I will say to them, as the Curat said to his Parishioners in a matter of time, and as a Prince of ours to the Secretaries of this age in a point of religion; Do you first agree to these principles, and then I will submit my self unto them. Now there is as great doubt and dispute in the principles, as in the conclusions, in the *Theses*, as in the *Hypotheses*, whereby there are so many sects among them, that if I yield my self to the one, I offend all the rest. They say likewise, that it is a great affliction, not to be resolved, to remain alwayes in doubt, yea, that it is a matter of difficultie for a man to continue long in that state. They have reason to say it, for they find it so in themselves, being the property of fools, and weak minds, of presumptuous fools, passionate and obstinate in certain opinions, who condemn all others, and although they be overcome, never yield themselves, vexing and putting themselves into choler, never acknowledge any reason. If they be constrained to change their opinions, being altered they are as resolute and obstinate in their new, as they were before in their first opinion, not knowing how to hold any thing without passion, and never disputing to learn and find the truth, but to maintain that which they have sworn and bound themselves unto. These kind of people know nothing, neither know they what it is to know, because they think to know and to hold the truth in their sleeve: because thou thinkest thou seest, thou seest nothing, saith the Doctor of truth to the glorious and presumptuous man; *Si quis existimet se scire aliquid, nondum cognovit quemadmodum oporteat eum scire: He that thinks he knows something, knows not yet what he ought to know.* It is fit that weak men that have not strength to keep themselves upright upon their feet, be kept up with props, they cannot live but in bonds, nor maintain themselves

John 9.

2 Cor. 8.

themselves free, a people born to servitude, they fear Bug-bears, or that the Wolf will eat them if they be alone. But in wise, modest, and staid men it is quite contrary, the surest stay and most happie estate of the spirit, which by this means keepeth it self firm, upright constant, inflexible, alwayes free and to it self: *hoc liberiores & solutiores sumus, quia integra nobis judicandi potestas manet: Herein we are free, because in our selves we have full power to judge.* It is a very sweet, peaceable, and pleasant sojourn or delay, where a man feareth not to fail or miscount himself, where a man is in the calm, under covert, and out of danger of participating so many errours produced by the phantasie of man, and whereof the world is full of entangling himself in complaints, divisions, disputes, of offending divers parts, of belying and gainsaying his own belief, of changing, repenting, and re-advising himself. For how often hath time made us see that we have been deceived in our thoughts, and hath enforced us to change our opinions? To be brief, it is to keep the mind in peace and tranquillitie, farre from agitations and vices, which proceed from that opinion of science which we think to have in things; for from thence do spring pride, ambition, immoderate desires, obstinacie in opinion, presumption, love of novelties, rebellion, disobedience: from whence come trouble, sects, heresies, seditions, but from men fierce, obstinate, and resolute in opinion? not from Academicks, neuters, modest, indifferent stayed, that is to say, wise men. Moreover let me tell them, that it is a thing that doth more service to pietie, religion, and divine operation, then any thing whatsoever. I say service as well in the generation and propagation, as the conservation thereof. Divinitie, yea, the mysticall part thereof, teacheth us, that well to prepare our souls for God and the receiving of his holy spirit, we must emptie, cleanse, purifie them, and leave them naked of all opinion, belief, affection; make them like a white paper, dead to it self and to the world, that God might live & work in it, drive away the old master, to establish the new; *Expurgate vetus fermentum, exuite veterem hominem: Purge the old leaven, and put off the old man.* So that it seemeth, that to plant and establish Christianitie among Infidels, or mis-believing people, as in these dayes in *China*, it were a very excellent method to begin with these propositions and perswasions: That all the wisdome of the world is but vanitie and leasing: That the world is wholly composed, torn, and vilified with the forged phantasticall opinions of every private mans brain: That God hath created

man

man to know the truth, but that he cannot know it of himself, nor by any humane means: And, that it is necessary that God himself, in whose bosome it resideth, and who hath wrought a desire thereof in man, should reveal it as he doth. But, That the better to prepare himself for this revelation, man must first renounce and chase away all opinions and beliefs, wherewith the spirit is alreadie anticipated and besotted, and present himself white, naked, and ready to receive it. Having well beaten and gained this point, and made men as it were Academicks and Pyrrhonians, it is necessary that we propose the principles of Christianitie as sent from heaven, brought by the Embassadour and perfect messenger of the Divinitie, authorised and confirmed in his time by so many marvellous proofs and authenticall testimonies. So that we see that this innocent and modest delay from resolution, is a great means to true pietie, not onely to receive it, as hath been said, but to preserve it, for with it there never are heresies, and selected particular extravagant opinions. An *Academick* or *Pyrrhonian* was never heretick, they are things opposite. It may be some man will say that he will never be either good Christian or Catholick, because he will as well be a neuter and irresolute in the one, as the other. This is to understand amisse that which hath been spoken, because there is no delay to be made, nor place to judge, nor liberty in that which concerneth God; but we must suffer him to put and engrave that which pleaseth him, and none other. I have made here a digression for the honour of this our rule against such as contradict it. Let us now return to the matter.

7.

3. *The third part, universality of spirit.*

After these two, to judge of all, to be slow in determining, there cometh in the third place, the universality of spirit, whereby a wise man taketh a view, and entreth into consideration of the whole Universe, he is a citizen of the world, like *Socrates*, he containeth in his affection all humane kind, he walketh through all, as if they were near unto him, he seeth like the Sunne, with an equall settled, and indifferent regard, as from a high watch-tower, all the changes and interchangeable courses of things, not changing himself, but alwayes continuing one and the same, which is a livery of the divinitie, and a high priviledge of a wiseman, who is the image of God upon earth. *Magna & generosa res animus humanus, nullos sibi poni nisi communes & cum Deo terminos patitur. Non idem sapientem qui cæteros terminos includit, omnia illi secula ut Deo serviunt. Nullum seculum magnis ingeniis clausum, nullum*

*non*

*non cogitationi pervium tempus. Quàm naturale in immensum mentem suam extendere; in hoc à natura formatus homo, ut paria diis velit, ac se in spatium suum extendat. Great and generous is the mind of man; it endureth no bounds, but such as belong to God himself. The same holdeth not a wise man, which includeth all other things, all times obey him as God himself. No times are hid from great wits, nor any not subject to their thoughts. It is naturall for mans mind to reach beyond the moon, wherein nature hath framed in man a desire to be equal to the gods, and to extend himself to his greatnesse.* The most beautiful and greatest spirits are the more universal, as the more base and blunt are the particular. It is a sottish weakness to think that a man must believe, do, live, in all respects as at home in his own village and countrey, or that the accidents that fall out here, concern, and are common with the rest of the world. A fool, if a man tell him that there are diverse manners, customes, laws, opinions, contrary to those which he seeth in use, either he will not believe them, and saith they are fables, or he presently refuseth and condemneth them as barbarous, so partial is he, and so much enthralled with those his municipal manners; which he accounteth the only true, natural, universal. Every man calleth that barbarous that agreeth not with his palat and custome; and it seemeth that we have no other touch of truth and reason, then the example and the *Idea* of the opinions and customes of that countrey where we live. These kind of people judge of nothing, neither can they; they are slaves to that they hold, a strong prevention and anticipation of opinions doth wholly possess them, they are so besotted, that they can neither say, nor do otherwise. Now partiality is an enemy to liberty, and over-ruleth the mind already tainted and preoccupated with a particular custome, that it cannot judge aright of others; an indifferent man judgeth all things. He that is fastned to one place, is banished and deprived from all others. The paper that is blurred with another colour, is no more capable of any other, whereas the white is fit to receive any. A Judge that hears a cause with a prejudicate opinion, and inclineth to one part more then to another, cannot be a just, upright, and true Judge. Now a wise man must free himself from this bruitish blockishness, and present unto himself as in a table this great image of our mother nature in her entire majesty; mark and consider her in a realm, an empire, yea in this whole visible world, as in the figure of a small point, and there read that general and constant variety in all things, so many humours, judge-

ment, beliefs, customes, laws, so many alterations of States, changes of fortune; so many victories and conquests buried and forgotten, so many pomps and greatnesses vanished, as if they had never been. Hereby a man may learn to know himself, to admire nothing, to think nothing new, or strange, to settle and resolve himself in all things. For the better attaining of this universal spirit, this general indifferencie, we are to consider these four or five points.

1. The great inequality and difference of men in their nature, form, composition, whereof we have spoken.

2. The great diversity of laws, customes, manners, religions, opinions, whereof we will speak hereafter.

3. The divers opinions, reasons, sayings of Philosophers, touching unity and plurality the eternity and temporality, the beginning, and end, the durance and continuance, the ages, estates, changes, and interchangeable causes of the world, and the parts thereof: The *Egyptian* Priests told *Herodotus*, that since their first King, (which was above eleven thousand yeers before the picture and statue of whom, and of all that succeeded him, they shewed him drawn to the life) the Sun had changed his course four times. The *Chaldeans* in the time of *Diodorus* (as he saith) and *Cicero*, had a register of seven hundred thousand years. *Plato* saith, they of the city of *Sais* had memorials in writing of eight thousand years, and that the City of *Athens* was built a thousand years before the said City of *Sais*. *Zoroaster*, *Pliny*, and others have affirmed, that *Socrates* lived six thousand years before the time of *Plato*. Some have said, that the world hath been from all eternitie, mortal, and growing and being again by interchangeable courses. Others, and the more noble Philosophers, have held the world for a god, made by another god greater then it; or as *Plato* averreth, and others argue from the motions thereof, that it is a creature composed of a body, and of a soul, which soul lodging in the center thereof, disperseth and spreadeth it self by musical numbers into the circumference, and parts thereof, the heaven, the stars, composed of bodies, and of a soul, mortal, by reason of their composition; immortal, by the decree and determination of the Creator. *Plato* saith, that the world changeth countenance in all respects, that the heaven, the stars, the sun change and quite alter by turnes their motion, in such sort, that that which was first, is last, the East is made the West; and according to the ancient and most authentical opinion, and of the more famous

famous spirits, worthy the greatness of God, and founded upon reason, there are many worlds, insomuch, that there is nothing one and only in this world, all kinds are multiplyed in number, whereby it seemeth not to have semblance of truth, that God hath made this onely work, without companion, and that all is concluded in this one *individuum*; at the least Divinity saith, that God could make many, and infinite worlds; for if he could make no more but this one visible, his power should be finite, because the world is such.

By that which we have learned of the discovery of the new world, the East and West Indies, we see first, that all our ancient Writers have been deceived, thinking to have found the measure of the habitable earth, and to have comprehended the whole *Cosmographie*, except some scattered Ilands, doubting of the *Antipodes*: for now behold another world, almost such as ours is, and that all upon firm land inhabited, peopled, politickly governed, distinguished by Realms, and Empires, beautified with cities, that excell in beauty, greatness, opulency, all those of *Asia*, *Africa*, *Europe*, many thousand years ago: And who doubteth, but that in time hereafter, there will be discovered divers others? If *Ptolomy*, and other our ancient Writers, have been heretofore deceived, why should not he be likewise deceived that affirmeth, that all is already found and discovered? Say it he that will, I will believe him as I list.

Secondly, we see that the *Zones*, which were thought inhabitable by reason of their excessive heat and cold, are habitable.

Thirdly, that in these new countries, almost all things which we so much esteem of here, and hold that they were first revealed and sent from heaven, were commonly believed and observed, (from whence they came, I will not say, who dares determine it?) Yea many of them were in use a thousand years before we heard any tydings of them, both in the matter of Religion, as the belief of one only man, the father of us all, of the universal deluge, of one God, who sometimes lived in the form of a man undefiled and holy, of the day of judgment: the resurrection of the dead, circumcision like to that of the *Jews*, and *Mahumet*: And in the matter of policy, as that the elder son should succeed in the inheritance, that he that is exalted to a dignity, loseth his own name, and takes a new; tyrannical subsidies, armouries, tumblers, musical instruments, all sorts of sports, Artillery, Printing. From all these discourses, we may easily draw these conclusions: That this great body which we call

the world, is not that which we think and judge it to be; That neither in the whole, nor parts thereof, it is alwaies the same, but in perpetual flux and reflux; That there is nothing said, held, believed at one time, and in one place, which is not likewise said, held, believed in another, yea and contradicted, reproved, condemned elsewhere, the spirit of man being capable of all things, the world alwaies tumbling, sometime the same, sometimes divers; That all things are settled and comprehended in their course and revolution of nature, subject to increase, changing, ending, to the mutation of times, places, climates, heavens, aires, countries. And from these conclusions we learn, to marry our selves, to swear, to nothing; to admire, to trouble our selves at nothing; but whatsoever shall happen, whatsoever men talk of and trouble themselves about, to resolve upon this point, that it is the course of the world, that it is nature that worketh these things; but yet wisely to provide that nothing hurt us by our own weakness and dejection of mind. Enough is said of this perfect liberty of judgment, established by these three parts, to judge of all, to judge nothing, to be universal: wherein I have the rather insisted, because I know that it pleaseth not the palat of the world, it is an enemy to pedantry as well as wisdome, but it is a fair flower or ornament of wisdome, which preserveth us from two contrary rocks, whereon the vulgar sort do commonly lose themselves, that is to say, from being heady, opinative, shameful gainsayers, repenters, mutable; and a man maintaineth himself in a sweet, peaceable, and assured modesty and great liberty of spirit, noble and magnifical universality. This is that great quality and sufficiency of *Socrates*, the *Coryphæus* of the wise, by the confession of all, of whom it is said, as *Plutarch* discourseth, That he never brought forth, but serving as a Midwife, he made others to bring forth. This is very neer, and in some sense, the disorder of the *Pyrrhonians*, the neutrality and indifferency of the *Academicks*, from whence proceedeth, not to be astonished at any thing, not to admire any thing, the sovereign good of *Pythagoras*, the magnanimity of *Aristotle*.

*Nil admirari, prope res est una, Numici,*
*Soláque, quæ possit facere, & servare beatum.*
*One thing, at nothing wonder up to take,*
*It is, that may you happy keep and make.*

It is a strange thing that man will not so much as taste it, yea is offended to hear speech thereof, loveth better to continue a slave, to run

run from one part to another, then to be to himself, to live of his own, to be above all, and to passe equally thorow all. 5. Hath he not reason to cry with *Tiberius*, and far more justly, *O homines ad servitutem nati ! O men born to servitude.* What monster is this, to desire to have all things free, his body, his members, his goods, and not his spirit, which nevertheless is onely born unto liberty? A man will willingly make benefit of whatsoever is in the world, that comes from the East or the West, for the good and service of his body, nourishment, health, ornament, and accommodate it all unto his use, but not for the culture of his spirit, benefit and enriching; giving his body the liberty of the fields, and holding his spirit in close prison. 5.

The other liberty which is of the Will, must likewise be in high esteem with a wise man. We speak not here of the free will of man, according to the manner of Divines: we say, that a wise man to maintain himself in rest and liberty, must manage his will and his affections, in giving himself to and affecting but few things, and those just, (for the just are but few in number, if a man judge well) and that without violence and asperity. There enter here into combat (or to speak more mildly, there are to be explicated and understood) two popular and plausible opinions in the world; the one teacheth to be ready and willing in the service of another, to forget our selves for our neighbour, and principally for the weal-publick, in respect whereof the particular is not to be respected: the other to carry our selves couragiously with activity, zeal, affection. He that doth not the first, is accused not to have any charity: He that doth not the second, suspected to be cold, not to be a friend, and not to have that zeal of sufficiency that he ought. Some would have these two opinions to prevail beyond reason and measure, and there is not any thing which hath not been spoken hereof: for the heads or chieftains many times preach things according to that use for which they serve, not according as they are: And many times the truest opinions are not the more profitable. And afterwards seeing we hold our selves too much to our selves, and with a tie too natural, they would distract us and draw us along, as they that go about to streighten a crooked staffe, bend it as much more the contrary way. 7. 2. *The second part, the liberty of Will.*

But these opinions ill understood and ill taken, as they are by divers, bring with them injustice, trouble, pain, and much evil, as a man may see in those who back-bite, and detract from all, giving 8.

themselves to hire, and the service of another: They do not onely suffer themselves to be carried, and seized upon, but they likewise thrust themselves into all matters, as well into those that concern them not, as those that do; as well into small as great, and many times for no other cause, but to employ and busie themselves; *In negotiis sunt negotii causa: That busie themselves because they would be busie:* And because they cannot hold and stay themselves, as if they had nothing to do, with and within themselves, and that for want of inward, essential, proper and domestical affairs, they seek and undergo those that are strange unto them. They are good husbands and frugal enough of their purse, but prodigal of their souls, their lives, their time, affection, and wills; the good husbandry whereof is only profitable and commendable. And if they give themselves to any thing, it is with such passion and violence, that they are no more their own men, so wholly do they engage and insinuate themselves thereinto. Great men seek after such people, that will grow into passion and kill themselves for them, and they allure them with fair promises and much Art, to win them unto them; and they alwaies find fools enough that believe them, but they that are wise will take heed of them.

9. This is first unjust, it wholly troubleth the State, drives away the rest and liberty of the spirit. It is, not to know that which every one ought to know, and by how many offices every man is obliged unto himself; whilest they seek to be officious and serviceable to another, they are unjust to themselves. We have all businesse enough with and within our selves, and need not seek meanes to lose our selves without, and to give our selves unto others: every man must hold him to himself. He that knowes not how to live honestly, healthfully, and merrily, is ill advised, and takes an ill and unnatural course, if he think to do it by serving another. He must affect and tie himself but to a few things, and those just.

10. Secondly, this sharp intention and passionate affection, troubleth all, and hindereth the conduct of those affairs to which he so much giveth himself; as in a precipitate pase, too much haste makes a man stumble and enterfear, and so staies him whether he will, or no: *Ipsa se velocitas implicat, unde festinatio tarda est: Qui nimium properat serius absolvit: Haste makes waste, and hinders it self: He that maketh too much speed dispatcheth too late.* So likewise a man being drunken with this violent intention, he entangleth and fettereth himself, commits many indiscretions and wrongs, growes into

hard

hard conceits and suspitions of others, becomes impatient in crosse or slow occurrents, that fall not out according to his own desire: *Malè cuncta ministrat impetus: Violence doth nothing well.* This is seen not only in serious affairs, but also vain and frivolous; as in play, where he that is carried with an ardent thirst of gaining, troubleth himself; and the more he troubleth himself, the more he loseth. He that walks moderately, is alwaies with himself, directeth his businesse with better advantage, and more suredly and cheerfully: he dissembleth, applyeth, deferreth all to his own leisure, and as his occasions shall fall out: if he chance to be convicted in a matter, it is without torment and affliction, being alwaies ready for a new change: he alwaies marcheth with the bridle in his hand, *festinat lentè.*

Thirdly, this violent affection infecteth and corrupteth even the 11.
the judgment it self: for following one part, and desiring the advantage thereof, they wax mad if they be contradicted, attributing to their party false praises and conditions, and to the contrary false accusation; interpreting all prognostications and occurrents at their own pleasure, and making them serve their own designments. All that are of the contrary part, must needs be wicked and of contrary conditions; yea and they that speak any good, or descry any good thing in them, are likewise suspected to be of their part. Can it not possibly be, that a man honest in all things else, or at least in some thing, may follow a wicked person, maintain a wicked cause? It is enough that passion enforce the will, but that it carry likewise the judgment, and make that a fool, this is too much. It is the soveraign and last part that should alwaies maintain its own authority; and we must ingeniously, and in good sooth acknowledge the good that is in our adversaries, and the evil that is in those whom we follow. The ground and foundation of the controversie being laid aside, we must keep moderation and indifferencie, and out of the business it self banish all choler, all discontent. And thus we see the evils that this over-great affection to any thing whatsoever bringeth with it; of all, yea of goodness and wisdome it self, a man may have too much.

But for a rule herein, we must remember, that the principle and 12.
most lawful charge, that we have, is in every man the conduct and *An advisement.*
guide of himself. The reason why we are here, is, that we should maintain our selves in tranquillity and liberty. And to do this, the best remedy is, to lend our selves to others, and to give

our selves to none, but to our selves, to take our affaires into our hands, not to place them in our hearts, to take businesse upon us, but not incorporate them into us, to be diligent, not passionate, not to tie our selves but to a few, but rather alwayes to reserve our selves unto our selves. This counsel condemneth not those offices due to the weal-publick, to our friends our neighbours, yea it is so far from it, that a wise man must be officious and charitable, apply unto himself the customes of other men and the world, and the rather to do it, he must contribute to publick society those offices and duties which concern him. *Qui sibi amicus est, hunc omnibus scito esse amicum: He that is a friend to himself, is a friend to all.* But I require a double moderation and discretion herein; the one, that a man apply not himself to all that is presented unto him, but to that which is just and necessary; and that is not hard to be done: the other, that it be without violence and trouble. He must desire little, and that little moderately; busie himself little, and that peaceably: and in those charges that he undertaketh, employ his pase, his speech, his attentions, his sweatings, his means, and, if need be, his blood, his life: but yet without vexation and passion, keeping himself alwayes to himself in health and tranquillity. A man may perform his duty sufficiently without this ardency, and this so great contention of Will. And they deceive themselves very much, that think that a business is not well done, and there is no manner of affection, if it be not done with tempest, clamour, and clatter: for contrariwise, it is that that hindreth and troubleth the good guide and conduct thereof, as hath been said. O how many men hazzard their lives every day in those warrs which no way concern them, and thrust themselves into the danger of that battel, the loss whereof doth no way trouble their sleep: and all to the end they may not fail in their duty! whilest there is another in his own house, that dares not enter the danger, or look the enemy in the face, is more affected with the issue of that war, and hath his mind more troubled, then the souldier that adventureth his blood and life in the field.

13. Finally, we must know how to distinguish and separate our selves from our publick charges: every one of us playeth two parts, two persons; the one strange and apparent, the other proper and essential: we must discern the skin from the shirt. An active man will perform his charge, and yet withal not leave to judge of the folly, vice, deceit that is therein: he will conform himself to every thing, because

because the custome of his countrey requireth it, it is profitable to the weal-publick; the world lives so, and therefore it must be done. A man must serve and make use of the world such as he findeth it; in the mean time, he must likewise consider it as a thing estranged from it self, know how to keep and carry himself apart, and to communicate himself to his own trusty good, howsoever things fall out with himself.

## CHAP. III.

### *True and essential honesty, the first and fundamentall part of Wisdome.*

HAving prepared and disposed our scholar to wisdome, by these precedent advisements; that is to say, having purified and freed him from all evils, and placed him in a good estate, of a full and universal liberty, to the end he may have a perfect view, knowledg, and power over all things (which is the priviledge of a wise and spiritual man: *Spiritualis omnia dijudicat: The spiritual man judgeth all things.*) it is now time to give him instructions and general rules of wisdome. The two first shall be as preambles and foundations, whereof the first and principal is honesty or probitie.

1. It will not be perhaps, any matter of difficulty, to make good this proposition, *That honesty is the first principal and fundamental part of Wisdome*: for all (whether in truth and good earnest, or in outward shew, for shame or fear to say the contrary) do applaud it; they alwaies honour it in the first place, confessing themselves servitors and affectionate followers thereof: but it will cost me some labour to shew and perswade, which is that true and essential probitie we here require. For that which is in authority and credit, wherewith the whole world contenteth it self; that which is onely known, sought for, and possessed, (except some few of the wiser) is bastardly, artificial, false, and counterfeit.

2. *Masks of honesty.* First, we know that many times we are lead and pricked forward to virtue and honourable actions, by wicked & condemned means, by default and natural impotencie, by passion, and vice it self; chastity, sobriety, temperancy may be in us, by reason of our corporal imbecillity: the contempt of the world, patience in adversity, constancy in danger, proceed many times from want of apprehension and judgment: valour, liberality, justice it self, from ambition: discretion, prudence, from fear, from avarice. And how many beautiful

beautiful actions hath presumption and temerity brought forth? So that the actions of virtue are many times no other but masks; they carry the outward countenance, but they have not the essence; they may very well be termed virtuous, in consideration of another, and of the visage they carry outwardly and in publick, but in truth and with the actor himself they are nothing so; for it will appear at the last, that profit, glory, custome, and other the like strange causes, have induced him to do them.

Sometimes they arise from stupidity and brutish sottishness, and therefore it is said, that wisdome and sottish simplicity do meet in one and the same point, touching the bearing and suffering of humane actions. It is then very dangerous to judge of the probitie or improbitie of a man by his actions: we must sound him within, from what foundation these motions do arise: wicked men perform many times many good and excellent actions, and both good and evil preserve themselves alike from doing evil: *Oderunt peccare boni & mali: Both good and evil fear to offend.* To discover therefore, and to know which is the true Honesty, we must not stay in the outward action; that is but the sign, the simplest token, and many times a cloak and mask to cover villanie: we must penetrate into the inward part, and know the motive which causeth the strings to play, which is the soul and the life that giveth motion to all. It is that whereby we must judge, it is that wherein every man should provide to be good and entire, and that which we seek.

3. *Vulgar honesty, and according to the style of the world.*

That honesty which is commonly accounted true, and so much preached and commended of the world, whereof they make expresse profession, who have the title and publick reputation to be men of honesty, and setled constancy, is scholastical, and pedantical, servant to the lawes, enforced by hope and fear, acquired, learned and practised out of a submission to, and a consideration of, the religion, laws, customes, commands of superiours, other mens examples, subject to prescript forms, effeminate, fearful, and troubled with scruples and doubts: *Sunt quibus innocentia nisi metu non placet: Innocency without fear likes not some*; which is not onely in respect of the world divers and variable, according to the diversity of religions, lawes, examples, forms, (for the jurisdictions changing, the motions must likewise alter) but also in it self unequal, wavering, deambulatorie, according to the acces, reces, succes of the affairs, the occasions which are presented, the persons with whom a man hath

hath to do, as a ship driven with the winds and the oares, is carried away with an unequal tottering pase, with many blowes, blasts, and billowes. To be brief, these are honest men by accident and occasion, by outward and strange events, and not in verity and essence: they understand it not, and therefore it is easie to discover them, and to convince them, by shaking of a little their bridle, and sounding them somewhat nearer, but above all, by that inequality and diversity which is found in them: for in one and the same action they will give divers judgments, and carry themselves altogether after a divers fashion, going sometimes a slow pase, sometimes running a main gallop. This unequal diversity proceedeth from this, that the outward occasions which move and stir them, do either puff them up, multiply and increase them, or make them lukewarm, and deject them, more or less, like accidents, *Quæ recipiunt magis & minus.*

4. *The description of true honesty.*

Now that true honesty, which I require in him that will be wise, is free, manly and generous, pleasant, and cheerful, equal, uniform, and constant, which marcheth with a staied pase, stately and haughty, going alwaies his own way, neither looking on this side, or behind him, without staying or altering his pase, or gate for the wind, the times, the occasions, which are changed, but that is not, I mean in judgment and will, that is in the soul, where honesty resideth and hath its seat. For outward actions, especially the publick, have another jurisdiction, as shall be said in his place: This honesty I will describe in this place, giving you first to understand, that following the designment of this book declared in the Preface, I speak of humane honesty and wisdome, as it is humane, whereby a man is called an honest man and a wise, not of Christian, though in the end I may chance to speak a word or two thereof.

5. *Nature enjoyneth honesty.*

The jurisdiction of this honesty is nature, which bindeth every man to be, and to make himself such as he ought, that is to say, to conform and rule himself according unto it. Nature is together both a mistris which enjoyneth and commandeth honesty, and a law and instruction which teacheth it unto us. As touching the first, there is a natural obligation inward, and universal in every man to be honest, just, upright, following the intention of his author and maker. A man ought not to attend or seek any other cause, obligation, instinct, or motive of this honesty; and he can never know how to have a more just and lawful, more powerful, more ancient; it is altogether as soon as himself, born with himself.

Every

Every man should be, or should desire to be, an honest man, because he is a man, and he that takes no care to be such, is a monster, renounceth himself, believeth, destroyeth himself, by right he is no more a man, and in effect should desist to be a man. It is necessary that honesty grow in him by himself that is to say, by that inward instinct which God hath put in him, and not from any other outward and strange cause, any occasion, or induction. A man will not, out of a just and regular will, any thing that is depraved, or corrupt, or other then its own nature requireth, it implyeth a contradiction to desire or accept a thing, and nothing to care whether it be worth the caring for; a man would have all his parts good and sound, his body, his head, his eyes, his judgment, his memory, yea his hose and shooes; and why will he not likewise have his will, and his conscience good, that is to say, be wholly good and sound? I will therefore that he be good, and have his will firm and resolved to equity and honesty for the love of himself, and because he is a man, knowing that he can be no other, without the renouncing and destruction of himself, and so his honesty shall be proper, inward, essential, even as his own essence is unto him, and he unto himself. It must not then be for any outward consideration, and proceeding from without, whatsoever it be, for such a cause being accidental and outward, may happen to fail, grow weak, and alter, and consequently all that honesty that is grounded therenpon, must do the like. If he be an honest man, for honour, or reputation, or other recompence, being in a solitary place, where he hath no hope to be known, he either ceaseth to be honest, or putteth it in practice very coldly and negligently. If for fear of the laws, magistrates, punishments; if he can deceive the laws, circumvent the Judges, avoid or disprove the proofs, and hide himself from the knowledge of another, there is an end of his honesty. And this honesty is but frail, occasioned, accidental and miserable; and yet it is that which is in authority and use, no man knowes of any other, there is not an honest man, but such as is enforced or invited by some cause, or occasion; *Nemo gratis bonus est: No man is freely good.* Now I would have in this my wise man, an essential and invincible honesty, which dependeth of it self, and ariseth from its own root, and may as hardly be separated, and rooted out, as humanity from a man. I will that he never consent unto evil; and though his honesty be not made known to any, yet if he know himself, what needs any more? If all the world besides should know it, it is not so much: *quid tibi prodest*

*non*

*non habere conscium, habenti conscientiam? What is it to thee that hast a conscience, not to have a Witnesse of thy conscience?* And what though he receive no great recompence for it? For what may it be that concerneth him so near, as his own proper essence? This were, not to care how bad the horse is, so the saddle be fair. I will then that these things be inseparable, to be, and to consent to live a man, to be, and to be willing to be an honest man. This first hath been sufficiently pressed. Let us come to the second.

Now the pattern and rule to be honest, is this nature it self, which absolutely requireth that we be such, it is, I say, this equity and universall reason which shineth in every one of us. He which worketh according to it, worketh truly according to God, for it is God, or at least his first fundamentall and universall law, which hath brought it into the world, and which came first from God; for God and nature are in the world, as in a state the king, the authour and founder, and the fundamentall law which he hath made for the preservation and government of the said estate. This is a lightning and ray of the divinity, a stream and dependance of the eternall law, which is God himself and his will: *Quid natura nisi Deus, & divina ratio toti mundo, & partibus ejus inserta? What is nature but God, and divine reason inserted to the whole world, and all the parts thereof?* He worketh also according to himself, for he worketh according to the stern, and animated instinct, which he hath within himself moving and stirring him: and so he is an honest man essentially, and not by accident and occasion; for this law and light is essentiall and naturall in us, and therefore it is called Nature, and the law of nature. He is also by consequent an honest man alwaies and perpetually, uniformly and equally at all times and in all places: for this law of equitie, and naturall reason is perpetuall in us, *Edictum perpetuum, A perpetuall edict*, inviolable, which can never be extinct nor defaced, *Quam nec ipsa delet iniquitas; vermis eorum non morietur; Which neither iniquitie it self may deface; their worm shall never die.* Universall and constant in all things, and alwaies the same, equall uniform, which neither time nor place can alter nor disguise, receiveth neither accesse nor recesse, more nor lesse, *Substantia non recipit magis & minus.* What seekest thou else-where, either law or rule in the world? What may a man say or alledge which thou hast not about thee and within, if thou wilt but feel and hearken to thy self? A man may say to thee, as to a bad debtor, who asked for what the debt is and will see the bill which he hath

*6. Nature teacheth honestie.*

about

about him, *Quod petis intus habes*; *What thou demandest is within thy self*; Thou demandest that which thou hast in thy own bosome.

Rom. 1. *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui. Gentes naturaliter quæ legis sunt faciunt: ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis; lex scripta in cordibus nostris. The light of thy countenance is sealed in us. People naturally observe the law: they shew the work of the law written in their hearts: the law is written in our hearts.* The law of *Moses* in his decalogue, is an outward and publick copie, the law of the twelve tables, and the Romane law, the morall instructions of Divines and Philosophers, the advisements and counsels of Lawyers, the edicts and ordinances of Princes are no other but pietie and particular pourtraies thereof: so that if there be any law, that strayeth the least that may be from this first and originall mistris, it is a monster, falshood, and errour. To be brief, all the lawes of the world, are no other but copies and abstracts brought forth into judgement against thee that holdest hidden the originall and makest as if thou knewest it not, extinguishing as much as in thee lieth, this light, which enlightneth thee within, *Qui veritatem Dei detinent in injustitia*, *Who detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse*, for these lawes had never been published abroad, but because that law which was inward, wholly celestiall and divine, hath been too much contemned and forgotten. These are all rivers, but such as neither have so much water, nor so pure as the source and invisible fountain, which is within thee, if thou suffer it not to perish, and to be lost: I say, not so much water, *Quàm multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, fides exigunt, quæ extra tabulas sunt! Piety, humanity, liberality and faith require many things that are not in the tables.* O the miserable honestie of formalists, who hold themselves to the words of the law, and so think themselves discharged! How many duties are there required besides? *Quàm angusta innocentia ad legem bonum esse: latius officiorum patet quàm juris regula. What a strict innocency is required, according to the law; the rule of duty extendeth it self further then the rule of the law.* The rule of our dutie is far larger then that of the law, which is neither so strong, nor so lively, witnesse this one thing, that well to understand and know their intention, to quit our selves of ambiguitie, difficultie, contrarietie, we must bring them to the source, and re-entring into the inward part, put them to the touch and rule of nature: *Anima legis ratio*; *Reason is the life of the law.* Behold then an essentiall, radicall, and fundamentall honestie, sprung in us from its own proper roots by

*Augusti.*

the

the seed of that universall reason which is in the soul, as the spring and ballance in a clock, as the naturall heat in the body, maintaining it self strong of it self and invincible, whereby a man worketh according to God, according to himself, nature, the universall order and policie of the world, quietly, sweetly and as silently without noise, as a ship that is not driven but by the naturall and ordinary course of the water: All other is ingrafted by Art and accidentall discipline, as the heat and cold of fevers, acquired and conducted by strange occasions and considerations, working with clamour and clatter ambitiously.

This is the reason why the doctrine of all the Sages doth teach, that to live well, is to live according to nature, that the chiefest good in this world is to consent to nature, that in following nature as our guide and mistris, we can never erre, *Naturam si sequaris ducem, nusquam aberrabis: bonum est quod secundùm naturam; omnia vitia contra naturam sunt: Idem beatè vivere & secundùm naturam: If thou follow nature as thy guide, thou shalt not erre. All goodnesse is naturall; vices unnaturall: it is one and the same thing to live blessedly, and according to nature*: understanding by nature that equitie and universall reason which shineth in us, which containeth and hatcheth in it the seeds of all virtues, probitie, justice, and is the matrix from whence all good and excellent laws do spring & arise, yea those true and just judgements that are sometimes pronounced by the mouth of an ideot. Nature hath disposed all things in the best state that they could be, and hath given them the first motion to good, and the end which they should seek in such sort, that he that will follow her, need not obtain and possess his own good and his own end, *Sapientia est in naturam converti, & ea restitui unde publicus error expulerit: Ab illa non deerrare, ad illius legem exemplúmq; formari sapientia est. It is wisdome to be conformable to nature, and to yield unto it, whereby he may expell all publick and grosse errour; From which not to wander, but to fashion and apply himself thereto is wisdome.* Men are naturally good, and follow not evil, but for profit or pleasure, and therefore Law-makers, to induce them to follow their naturall and good inclination, and not to enforce their wills, have proposed two contrary things, punishment and reward. 7. *We must follow nature.*

Doubtlesse, Nature in every one of us is sufficient, and a sweet mistris and rule to all things, if we will hearken unto her, employ and awaken her; and we need not seek else-where, nor begge of 8. *As a good and sufficient mistris.*

Art

Art and the Sciences, the means, the remedies, and the rules which we have need of: Every one of us if he will, may live at his pleasure of his own. To live content and happy, a man need not be wise, a Courtier, nor so active; all his sufficiency that is beyond the common and natural is vain and superfluous, yea it bringeth more evil with it then good. We see ignorant people, idiots, and simple men, lead their lives more sweetly and chearfully, resist the assaults of death, of want, of sorrow, more constantly and contentedly, then the wisest men and most active, And if a man mark it well, he shall find among peasants and other poor people, examples of patience, constancy, equanimity, more pure then all those that are taught in Schools; they follow simply the reason and conduct of nature, they travel quietly and contentedly in their affaires, not enflaming or elevating themselves, and consequently more soundly: Others mount themselves upon their great horses, play the light horsemen, bandie themselves one against the other, keep their brains alwaies in work and agitation. A great master and admirable Doctor in nature was *Socrates*, as *Aristotle* in Art and science. *Socrates* by simple and natural discourses, by vulgar similitudes and inductions, speaking like a countrey swain, did furnish us with precepts and rules of good life, and remedies against all evils, so substantial and strong, that all the Art and science of the world could not devise better or the like.

But we do not only not hearken unto it, believe and follow it according to the counsel of the wise, but also (not to speak of those monsters who by the violence of their vices, inordinate and perverse delights and pleasures, suffocate and extinguish, as much as in them lieth, the light, mortifie the seed thereof) we endeavour to avoid it, we suffer it to sleep and to cease, loving better to beg elsewhere our first rudiments, to run to study any Art, then to content our selves with that which is bred within us. We have a busie troublesome spirit which offereth it self to rule and govern in all things, and which carrieth it self after our own wills, disguiseth, changeth, and troubleth all, will adde, invent, alter, and cannot stay it self in home-born simplicity, it thinketh nothing good wherein there is not craft and subtilty. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solertem scientium versa est: That simple and open virtue is ever turned into obscure and crafty cunning.* And it is a vice common amongst us, not to account of any thing that is in us, we esteem only of that which is bought, which is costly, and is brought from far:

*By Art.*

far: we prefer Art before nature, we shut the windows at high noon, and light candles. This fault and folly proceedeth from another, that is, that we esteem not of things according to their true and essential value, but according to the shew and report. How many are there more scrupulous and exact in those things that belong to the positive and municipal law, then the natural? Truly almost all, yea even in the ceremonial, and law of civility, which we have framed to our selves, in respect whereof we disdain and are ashamed of nature. We speak little, we make a fair shew, and carefully keep a *decorum* or decency, and make no difficulty to go directly against nature, duty, conscience. So that the shadow is more unto us then the body, the root; the countenance more then the substance and sound verity. That we may not offend a ceremony, we cover and hide things natural; we dare not name, and we blush at the sound of things, which we do in no sort fear to do, both lawful and unlawful. We dare not speak that which is permitted to do, we dare not directly to name our own proper members, and yet we fear not to employ them in all manner of wickedness: we pronounce, speak, and do, without fear and without shame, wicked things, and such as are against nature and reason, forswear, betray, assail, kill, deceive, and we blush to speak of things good, natural, necessary, just and lawful. There is not a husband, which is not more ashamed to embrace his wife in the open view of the world, then to kill, lye, assail; nor a woman that will not rather utter any wickedness in the world, then name that wherein she taketh most delight, and may lawfully do. Even to treasons and murders, they tie themselves to the laws of a ceremony, and there fasten their devoires. A strange thing that injustice should complain of incivility, malice of indiscretion! The act of a ceremony doth it not prevail against nature? The Ceremony forbiddeth us to express natural things and lawful, and we give credit thereunto: Nature and reason forbiddeth us things unlawful, and no man believes it: A man sends his conscience to to the Brothel-house, and keeps his outward countenance in order. All this is monstrous, and the like is not found among beasts. I will not for all this say, (as I perceive malice doth already mutter) that Ceremony and decency ought not carefully to be kept, which is the salt and seasoning of our actions and conversations. *Amo verecundiam, in eo ornatus vitæ, & vis decori: I love modesty, for in it is the ornament of our life, and the force of comelinesse.* But I say to them, as our Saviour

*By Ceremony.*

Cicero.

to men of the like spirit: *O hypocritæ excolantes culicem, camelum deglutientes, qui minima curatis, graviora spernitis. Hæc oportet primùm facere, tum illa non omittere. O ye hypocrites that strain a gnat, and swallow a Camell, which are carefull for small things, and despise greater matters: These ought ye first to do, and also not to omit the rest.*

Matt. 23.

10. *In such sort, that it is no more known in man.*

From this generall and universall alteration and corruption it is come to passe, that there is nothing of nature known in us. If we must say what the lawes thereof are, and how many they are, we are much hindred. The ensign and mark of a naturall law is the universitie of approbation: for that which Nature shall have truly ordained for us, we with a common consent shall follow without doubting; and not onely every nation, but every particular person.

Now there is not any thing in the world which is not denied and contradicted, not by one nation, but by divers: and there is not any thing so strange and unnaturall in the opinion of divers, which is not approved and authorised in many places by common use. The little care of having children, the murther of parents, of children, of himself, marriage of the neareſt in bloud, theft, publick marchandise of their libertie and bodies, as well of males as females, are received by publick use in many nations.

11. *And we must seek it elsewhere.*

Doubtlesse there remaineth no more any image or trace of nature in us, we must go seek it in beasts, where this troublesome and unquiet spirit, this quick-silver, neither Art, nor beautifull ceremony hath power to alter it; they have it pure and entire, if it be not corrupted by our usage and contagion, as sometimes it is. All the world followeth nature, the first and universall rule which the authour thereof hath given and stablished, except man onely, who troubleth the policie and state of the world with his gentle spirit, and his free will to wickednesse, he is the onely irregular creature, and enemie of nature.

12. *Tyne honestly.*

So then the true honestie (the foundation and pillar of wisdom) is to follow nature, that is to say, reason. The good and the end of man, in whom consisteth his rest, his libertie, his contentment, and in a word, his perfection in this world, is, to live and do according to nature, when that which is the most excellent thing in him commandeth that is to say, reason. True honestie is a right and firm disposition of the will to follow the counsel of reason: And as the needle touched with the adamant never resteth it self untill he

see

see the north point, and thereby ordereth and directeth the navigation; so a man is never well, yea, he is as it were undone, and dislocated untill he see this law, and directeth the course of his life, his manners, his judgements and wils, according to the first, divine, naturall law which is an inward domesticall light, whereof all the rest are but beams.

13 *The distinction of true honesty.*

But to effect it, and to come to the practice, it is farre more easie to some, then to others. There are some that have their particular nature, that is to say, their temper, and temperature so good and pleasing (which especially proceedeth from the first formation in the womb of the mother, and afterwards from the milk of the nurse, and this first and tender education) that they find themselves without endeavour, and without Art or discipline, wholly carried and disposed to goodnesse and honestie, that is to say, to follow and conform themselves to the universall nature, whereby they are termed wel-born; *gaudeant bene nati.*

*Naturall goodnesse.*

This kind of naturall and easie honestie, and as it were born with us, is properly called goodnesse, a qualitie of a soul well born and well governed, it is a sweetnesse, facultie, and debonair mildnesse of nature: and not (lest any body should be deceived) a softnesse, a feminary, sottish calmnesse and vicious facilitie, whereby a man delighteth to please all, and not to displease or offend any, although he have a just and a lawfull cause, and it be for the service of reason and justice; whereby it comes to passe, that they will not employ themselves in lawfull actions, when it is against those that take offence thereat; nor altogether refuse the unlawfull, when they please thereby those that consent thereunto. Of these kind of people it is said (and this commendation is injurious.) He is good, since he is good even to the wicked; and this accusation true, How should he be good, since he is not evil to those that are evil? We should rather call this kind of goodnesse innocencie, as men call little children sheep, and the like innocent creatures. But an active, valiant, manly, and effectuall goodnesse is that I require, which is a ready, easie, and constant affection unto that which is good, right, just, according to reason and nature.

There are others so ill born and bred, that it seem (that like monsters) their particular natures are made, as it were, in despight of the universall nature, so crosse and contrary are they thereunto. In this case the remedy to correct, reform, sweeten, make tame, and amend this evil, rough, savage and crooked nature, to bend it and

*Acquired virtue.*

apply it to the rule of this generall and great mistris the universall nature, is to have recourse to the studie of Philosophie ( as *Socrates* did ) and unto virtue, which is a combate and painfull endeavour against vice, a laborious study, which requireth time, labour, and discipline. *Virtus in arduo & circa difficile : ad januam virtutis excubant labor & sudor. Dii mortalibus virtutem laboris pretio vendiderunt. Virtue is alwayes employed about things difficult, at whose gate attends labour and pain. God for great pain and travell hath sold virtue unto men.* This is not to bring in a new, strange, or artificiall honestie, and so accidentall, and such, as I have said before, is not the true; but it is by taking away the lets and hindrances, to stirre up and enlighten this light almost extinct and languishing, to revive those seeds almost choaked by the particular vice, and ill temperature of the particular person ; as by taking away the moat from the eye, the sight is recovered, and the dust from off the glasse, a man seeth the clearer.

14. *Three degrees of perfection.*

By all this that hath been said, it appeareth that there are two sorts of true honestie ; the one naturall, sweet, easie, just, called goodnesse; the other acquired, difficult, painfull, and laborious, called virtue. But to say the truth, there is also a third, which is as it were, composed of the two, and so there should be three degrees of perfection. The lowest of the three is a facil and debonair nature, distasted by it self by reason of vice; we have named it goodnesse, innocencie. The second more high, which we have named virtue, is with a lively force to hinder the progresse of vice, and having suffered himself to be surprised, with the first motions of the passions, to arm and bind himself to stay their course, and to overcome them. The third and chiefest is out of an high resolution, and a perfect habit, to be so well framed, that temptations cannot so much as grow in him, and the seeds of vice are wholly rooted out, in so much that his virtue is turned into a complexion, and into nature. This last may be called perfection. That and the first, which is called goodnesse, do resemble one other, and differ from the second, in that they are without stir, pain, or endeavour. This is the true tincture of the soul, her naturall and ordinary course, which costeth nothing. The second is alwayes in care and aw. The last and perfect is acquired by the long study and serious exercise of the rules of Philosophie ; joyned to a beautifull and rich nature. For both are necessary, the naturall and the acquired. This is that, those two sects did so much study, the *Stoicks*, and much more the *Epicures* ( which

(which would have seemed strange, if *Seneca* and other ancient Philosophers did not testifie it, who are rather to be credited, then all the other more modern) who made a sport and play-game of shame, want, sickness, griefs, tortures, death: They did not onely contemn, patiently endure and vanquish all asperities and difficulties, but they sought them, they took pleasure and delight in them; and all to keep their virtue in breath, and in action, which made them not only firm, constant, grave, and severe, as *Cato* and the *Stoicks*, but cheerfull, merry, wanton, and if a man may so say, foolhardy too.

By the comparison of these three together, it seemeth to some (who understand not the height and value of the third) that the second, which we call virtue, by reason of the difficulties, dangers, endeavours thereof, carrieth the honour, and that as *Metellus* said, to do evil is an idle and a base thing; to do good where there is neither pain nor danger, is a common thing and too easie; but to do good where there is danger and pain, is the part of an honest man, and of virtue: it is the motto of that divine Philosopher, χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά. But to speak in truth that which it is, besides that difficulty (as elsewhere hath been said) is no true, nor just and lawful cause, why a thing should be the more esteemed; it is certain, that in the like thing the natural is more worth then the acquired; that it is far more noble, more excellent and divine to work by nature then by Art, easily, equally, uniformely, then painfully, unequally, with doubt and danger. God is good after the first manner, that is, the natural and essential goodnesse; we dare not call him virtuous, nor the Angels and spirits fortunate; they are called good. But because virtue maketh a greater clamor & stir, and worketh with greater vehemency and goodness, it is more admired and esteemed of the vulgar sort (who are but foolish Judges) but wrongfully. For these great exalters and extravagant productions, which seem to be all zeal and fire, are no part of the play, and do not in any sort appertain to true honesty; they are rather maladies and furious entrances, far distant from that wisdome we here require, which is sweet, equal, and uniform.

Thus much be spoken in gross of honesty; for the parts thereof, and the duties, shall be handled in the third book, especially in the virtue of Justice. I will here adde a word or two (according to promise) to rebate and blunt the point of detraction, and to stay the plaints of those, that dislike that I attribute so much to nature, 16.

(although it be God, as hath been said, and this book speaketh not but of the naturall and humane) as if that were all, and there were nothing else to be required. Wherefore besides all that hath been said, there remaineth yet one thing to make this work compleat and perfect, and that is the grace of God, whereby this honesty, goodnesse, virtue, hath life, is brought forth in his due time, and receiveth its last and perfect portraict, it is elevated, christened, crowned, that is to say, accepted, verified, approved by God, and made (after a sort) worthy its due reward. Honestie is like to a good Organist, who toucheth well and truly according to Art: the grace and spirit of God, is the blast and wind which expresseth the touch, giveth life, and maketh the instrument to speak, and to make a pleasant melodie. Now this good consisteth not in long discourse, precepts and instructions, neither is it attained by our own proper act and labour, it is a free gift from above, whereof it taketh the name, Grace: but we must desire it, ask, implore it, both humbly and ardently. O God, vouchsafe of thy infinite goodnesse to look upon me with the eye of thy clemencie, to accept and to like of my desire, mine essay, my little work, which comes originally from thee, by that obligation and instruction, which thou hast given me in the law of nature, which thou hast planted in me, to the end it may return unto thee, and that thou maist end that thou hast begun, that so thou maist be both my α and ω. Sprinkle me with thy grace, keep me, and account me thine, and so forth. The better to obtain it, *Art.* 14. that is to say, to incline God unto us, is this honestie (as hath been said in the Preface, whither (that I may not iterate it) I resend the Reader) the matter being well prepared, is the fitter for the form, the grace, is not contrary, neither doth it enforce or destroy nature, but sweetly it relieveth and perfecteth it, so that it must not oppose it self thereunto as to its contrary, but put it on as a Crown. They are both of God, they must not therefore be confounded, every one hath his jurisdiction, his action a part: The Organist, and he that worketh at the bellows, are two, so are honestie and grace, the action good in it self naturally, morally, humanely, and that by grace made acceptable. That may well be without this, and hath his worth, as in those Philosophers and great men in times past, admirable in nature, and in all kind of morall virtue, and is likewise found in misbelievers or infidels; but this cannot be without that, no more then the covering, the Crown and perfection can be without the entire body. The player or Organist

ganist may in every point exercise his Art, without the bellows, blower, and so likewise honestie without grace. It is true that this cannot be but *æs sonans*, and *cymbalum tinneens*, but this requireth that: wherein I see many to mistake themselves very grossely, who never have any taste, or do ever conceive the image of true honesty, and continue puffed up with a perswasion of grace, which they think to practise, to attract, to attain by certain easie and idle means, after the manner of the Pharisees, wherewith they rest contented, not troubling themselves any further for the true honestie, *Promoti per saltum*, Masters without apprentishipp, Doctors and Nobles in parchment. Now I see many of these kind of people in the world, but very few such as *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Cato*, *Regulus*, *Socrates*, *Scipio*, *Epaminondas*, that is to say, professors of an exact, true and solid morall virtue, and philosophicall probitie. That complaint and reproach so frequent of the sovereign Doctor of the truth, against hypocriticall Pharisees, will alwayes have place, for such people will never be wanting, no not amongst the Censors and reformers of the world. Now having spoken much of honestie, we must likewise in a word or two touch the contrary thereunto.

17. *The description of wickedness.*

Wickedness is against nature, it is foul deformed and unprofitable, it offendeth every good judgement, it breedeth a hatred of it self being well known; whereupon some have said, that it was bred and brought forth by idleness and ignorance. Again, wickedness ingendreth offence and repentance in the soul, which like an ulcer in the flesh, eateth and fretteth it, malice and mischief buildeth up torments against it self: *Malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit: malum consilium consultori pessimum*: *Malice it self suppeth up the greatest part of his own poyson*: *Evil counsel is worst to him that giveth it*: like the wasp, which with his sting offendeth another, but much more himself, for he leaveth behind him and that for ever, both his sting and his strength: vice hath pleasure in it, otherwise it would not be received, nor find place in the world, *Nemo enim animi causâ malus est*; *No man is wicked for his mind sake*; but it doth withall ingender displeasure and offence, pain following sin saith *Plato*; yea it groweth with it, saith *Hesiodus*: which is quite contrary to the will and to virtue, which rejoyceth and contenteth. There is a congratulation, a pleasing contentment and satisfaction in well doing, it is the true and essentiall reward of a good soul, which can never fail him, and wherewith he must content himself in this world.

18. *Whether it be never permitted to sin.*

There is no man maketh a doubt, whether vice be to be avoided, and hated above all things; but it is a question whether there may be any such profit or pleasure, as may carry with it a sufficient excuse for the committing of such or such a sin. It seemeth to divers, that there may: Touching profit, if it be publick, there is no doubt; (but yet with limitation, as shall be said in the virtue of politick prudence) but some will say as much of particular profit and pleasure. *Lib. 3. cap. 2.* A man might speak and judge hereof more certainly, if some certain fact or example were proposed: but to speak simply, we are firmly to hold the negative.

19. *Whether all sin ingender repentance. The distinction of vice or wickedness.*

That sin cannot inwardly furnish us with such pleasure & content, as honesty doth, there is no doubt; but that it tormenteth (as hath been said) it is not universally and in all senses true: we must therefore distinguish it. There are three sorts of wickedness and wicked people: some are incorporated into evil, by discourse and resolution, or by long habit, in such sort, that their understanding it self approveth it and consenteth thereunto. This falleth out, when sin having met with a strong and rigorous heart, is in such sort rooted therein, that it is there formed, and as it were naturalized, and the soul infected and wholly tainted therewith. Others contrariwise do ill by impulsions, according as the violent wind of temptation troubleth, stirreth and precipitateth the soul unto sin, and as they are surprised and carried by the force of passion. The third, as midlings betwixt these two, account their vice such as it is, they accuse and condemn it, contrary to the first, and they are not carried by passion or temptation, as the second; but in cold blood, having well thought thereof, they enter into the market, they ballance it with some great pleasure or profit, and in the end at a certain price and measure they yield thereunto, and they think they have some excuse to do it. Of this sort of sins are usuries, obscenities or venereous pleasure, and other sins many times resumed, consulted, deliberated; as also the sins of complexion.

20. *Their comparison.*

Of these three, the first do never repent, without some extraordinary touch from heaven: for being settled and hardned in wickedness, they feel not the prick and sting thereof: for since the understanding approveth it, and the soul is wholly tainted therewith, the will hath no will to gainsay it. The third repent, or seem in a certain fashion, that is to say, simply considering the dishonest action in it self, but afterwards weighing it with profit or pleasure, they repent not at all: and to say the truth, and to speak properly, they

do

do not repent, since both their reason and conscience willeth and consenteth to the fault. The second are they that repent and readvise themselves, and of whom properly it is called repentance: whereof I will here take occasion to speak a word or two.

21 *Of repentance*

Repentance is a disavowing or deniall, and a retraction of the will, that is, a sorrow or grief ingendred in us by reason, which driveth away all other sorrows and griefs, which proceed from outward causes. Repentance is inward, inwardly ingendred, and therefore more strong then any other, as the heat and cold of a fever, is more violent then that which is outward. Repentance is the medicine of the soul, the death of sinne, the cure of our wills and consciences: but it is necessary that we well know it. First, it is not of every sin, as hath been said, not of that which is inveterate, habituated, authorized by the judgement it self; but of the accidentall, and that which happeneth either by surprise, or by force: nor of things that are not in our power, whereof we are sorry we cannot repent: neither can it be in us, by reason of bad issues, and contrary to our counsels and designments. If a matter fall out besides a mans thought, conceit and advice; for that he must not repent him of his counsel and advice, if he therein carrie himself as he ought; for a man cannot divine of events, and if a man did know them, yet hath he no place to consult of them; and we never are to judge of counsels by their issues; neither must it grow in him by the age, impotencie, and distaste of things; this was to suffer his judgement to be corrupted: for the things are not changed, because we are changed, by age, sickness, or other accidents. The growing wise, or amendment, which comes by anxietie, distast, or feebleness, is not true and religious, but idle and languishing. The weakness of the body is no fit Post to carrie us to God, and to our duty and repentance; but true repentance is the gift of God, which toucheth our heart, and must grow in us not by the weakness of the body, but by the force of the soul, and of reason.

22 *Of Confession, and excuse.*

Now from true repentance there ariseth a true, free, and religious confession of our faults. As in the maladies of the body we see two kinds of remedies; the one which healeth, taking away the cause and root of the maladie; the other which doth onely cover it, and bring it asleep: and therefore the former is more forcible, and more wholsome. So likewise in the maladies of the soul, the true remedie which cleanseth and healeth, is a serious and modest confession of our faults; the other false, which doth onely disguise and

cover

cover, is excuſe, a remedie invented by the authour of evill it ſelf, whereof the Proverb is, *That ſin ſoweth it ſelf a garment*, that is, excuſe, the garment made of figleaves by the firſt offenders, who covered themſelves both with words & deeds, but it was a garment without warmth. We ſhould therefore learn to accuſe our ſelves, boldly to confeſſe all our actions and thoughts: for beſides that it were a fair and generous liberty, it were likewiſe a mean not to do or think any thing, which were not honeſt and fit to be publiſhed: for he that will be content to be bound to tell all, will be likewiſe content to bind himſelf to do nothing that a man is conſtrained to hide; but contrarily, every man is diſcreet and ſecret in confeſſion, but not in actions. Boldneſs to ſin, is in ſome ſort bridled by boldneſs to confeſſe. If it be undecent to do a thing, it is farre more undecent not to dare to avouch it. Many great and holy men, as S. *Auſtin*, *Origen*, *Hippocrates*, have publiſhed the errours of their opinions, and we ſhould do the like of our manners. But going about to hide them, a man falleth many times into great evils, as he that ſolemnly denieth that he hath abuſed his bodie with another, by thinking to mend the matter, marres it, at leaſtwiſe multiplies his ſin. This is not to excuſe vice, but to adde thereunto.

## CHAP. IIII.

### *To have a certain end and form of life, the ſecond foundation of Wiſdome.*

After this firſt foundation of true and inward honeſtie, there cometh, as it were by way of preamble, a ſecond foundation, neceſſary for the government of our life; which is, to prepare and frame our ſelves to a certain and aſſured courſe of life, to make choice of that calling which doth beſt befit us, and is proper unto us; that is to ſay, which our particular nature (following alwayes the univerſall, our great and generall miſtris and governour) doth willingly accommodate and apply it ſelf unto. Wiſdome is a ſweet and regular conduct and carriage of our ſoul, guiding it with meaſure and proportion, and conſiſteth in an equalitie of life and manners.

2

*This choice a difficult thing, wherein a man carrieth himſelf diverſly.*

This choice then is a matter of great difficulty, wherein a man carrieth himſelf very diverſly, and wherein he findeth himſelf hindered by divers conſiderations, which draw him into divers parts, and many times hurt and hinder one another. Some are happy there-

therein, who by a great goodnesse and felicity of nature, have known both speedily and easily how to choose, and either by a certain good hap, without any great deliberation, are, as it were, wholly carried into that course of life, which doth best befit them; in such sort that fortune hath been their chooser, and led them unto it, or by the friendly and provident hand of another, they have been guided and directed. Others contrarily are unhappy, who having failed even from the entrance, and wanting the spirit, or industry to know themselves, and in a good hour to be readvised, how they might cunningly withdraw their stake in the midst of the game, are in such sort engaged, that they can no more recall themselves, and so constrained to lead a life full of inconvenience and repentance.

But it likewise proceedeth many times from the great default of him that deliberateth, either in not knowing himself well, and presuming too much of himself whereby it falleth out that he must either shamefully desist from that which he hath undertaken, or endure much pain and torment in persisting therein. He must remember that to carry a burthen, it is necessary there be more strength then burthen; otherwise, a man is constrained either to leave it, or to sink under it. A wise man doth never charge himself with more business, then he knoweth how to go through: or in not settling himself in any thing, but changing from day to day, as they do that are never pleased nor satisfied with any thing, but that which they have not, every thing discontenteth them, as well ease, as businesse, to command as to obey. These kind of people live miserably, and without rest, as men constrained. The other likewise cannot hold themselves quiet they cease not to go and come to no purpose, they seem to do much and do nothing; the actions of a wise man do alwayes tend to some certain end. *Magnam rem puta unum hominem agere, præter sapientem nemo unum agit, multiformes sumus. Think it a great matter for a man to do one thing: Except no man, but a wise man, doth one thing: for we are of many and divers fashions and shapes.* But the most part do not deliberate, and consult of any thing, they suffer themselves to be lead like oxen, or carried according to the times, company, occasion, and then know not how to give a reason, why they are rather of this calling then another, except it be because their father profest the same, or that they were unawares carried into it, and so have continued therein, in such sort, that as they did never well consider of their entrance, so they know

not

not which way to get out. *Pauci sunt qui consilio se suáque disponant; cæteri eorum more qui fluminibus innatant, non eunt sed feruntur. Few dispose advisedly of themselves or their affaires: others do it in that manner as men swim; who go not, but are carried with the water and course of the stream.*

3. *Counsel in those affaires.* Now, that a man may carry himself well herein, choose well, and well acquit himself, he must know two things, and two natures: his own, that is, his complexion, his port and capacity, his temperature, in what a man excelleth, in what he is feeble, what he is fit for, for what he is unfit: For to go against his own nature, is to tempt God, to spit against the heavens, to leave the business undone, because he can do it, *Nec quidquam sequi quod assequi nequeas; Attempt not any thing, that thou canst not attain to,* and to expose himself to laughter and mockery. Afterward he must know that which belongs to his affairs, that is to say, the state, profession, and kind of life that is proposed. There are some wherein the affaires are great and weighty, others where they are dangerous, others where they are not so great, but are mingled and full of entanglements, and that draw after them many other businesses: These charges do much afflict the spirit. Every profession requireth more specially one certain faculty of the soul, one the understanding, another the imagination, another the memory. Now, to know these two natures, his own, and that of the profession and course of life, that which hath been said of the divers temperatures of the inward parts and faculties, will help much. Knowing these two natures, we must compare them together, to see whether they can well joyn and endure together; for it is necessary that they agree: if a man be to contest with his own nature, and to enforce it for the service and performance of a function and charge which he undertaketh; or contrarily, if to follow his nature, whether willingly, or that by force and insensibly it draw him, a man happen to fail or erre in his duty, what disorder is there? Where is equity? Where is decency? *Si quicquam decorum, nihil profecto magis quàm æquabilitas vitæ universæ, & singularum actionum; quam conservare non possis, si aliorum imiteris naturam, omittas tuam. If any thing be comely, nothing is more comely then the equability of the whole life, and of every particular action; which thou canst not preserve, if thou wilt follow the nature of other men, and omit thine own.* This is the account we must make when we think to do any thing

thing that hath worth or grace in it, if nature it self be wanting.

*Tu nihil invitâ dices faciesve Minervâ.*
*If thy nature bend not to,*
*Never think to speak or do.*

*Id quemque decet quod est suum maximè: sic est faciendum, ut contra naturam universam nil contendamus, eâ servatâ propriam sequamur. That becomes every man best, that is his own: so ought we to carry our selves, as we contend not against universal nature, but that being kept, follow our own.* And if it fall out, that by mishap, imprudency, or otherwise, a man find himself engaged in a vocation and course of life painful and unprofitable, and that a man cannot flie back; it is the part of wisdome, to resolve to bear it, to sweeten it, to accommodate it unto himself as much as he can, doing as in a game at hazzard, according to the counsel of *Plato*, wherein if the die or card fall not out to be good, a man taketh it patiently, and endeavoureth to mend his ill chance by his good play; and like Bees, who from Time, a sharp and dry herb, gather sweet honie, and as the Proverb is, make a virtue of necessity.

## CHAP. V.

### *To study true Piety, the first office of Wisdome.*

THe preparatives made, and the two foundations laid, it is time to build, and to set down the rules of Wisdome, whereof the first and most noble concerneth the religion and worship of God. Piety holdeth the first place in the rank of our duties, and it is a thing of great importance, wherein it is dangerous and very easie to erre and be mistaken. It is necessary therefore to be advised, and to know how he that studieth wisdome should govern himself, which we purpose to do, having a little discoursed of the state and success of religions in the world, referring the rest unto that which I have said in my three Verities.

It is first a very fearful thing, to consider the great diversity of religions which have been and are in the world, and much more of the strangeness of some of them, so fantastical and exorbitant, that it is a wonder that the understanding of man should be so much besotted and made drunken with impostures; for it seemeth, that there is nothing in the world, high or low, which hath not been deified in some place or other, and that hath not found a place wherein to be worshipped. 1. *Diversity of religions.*

They

2 *That all agree in many principles.*

They all agree in many things, and have likewise taken their beginning in the same climate. *Palestina* and *Arabia* which joyn together (I mean the more renowned and famous Mistresse of the rest) have their principles and foundations almost alike: The belief of one God, the authour of all things, of his providence and love towards mankind, the immortality of the soul, reward for the good, chastisement for the wicked after this life, a certain outward profession of praying, invocating, honouring and serving God. To winne them credit, and that they may be received, they alledge and furnish themselves, whether indeed and in verity, as the true, or by imposture and fair semblance, with revelations, apparitions, prophets, miracles, prodigies, holy mysteries, Saints. All have their fountain and beginning small, feeble, humble; but by little and little, by the imitation and contagious acclamation of the people, with some fictions as fore-runners, they have taken footing, and been authorised; insomuch that they all are held with affirmation and devotion, yea, the absurdest among them. All hold and teach, that God is appeased and won by prayers, presents, vows, and promises, and the like: All believe that the principall and most pleasant service of God, and the powerfullest means to appease him, and to obtain his grace, is to punish, to cut themselves, to impose upon themselves some painful and difficult labour: witnesse throughout the world, and almost in all religions, and rather in the false then in the true, in Mahumetisme, then Christianitie, so many orders, companies, hermitages, and friaries, destinated to certain and divers exercises, very painfull, and of a strict profession, even to the lancing and cutting of their bodies, thinking thereby to merit much more then the common sort, who purifie not themselves with afflictions and torments as they do, and every day they provide new: and the nature of man doth never cease to invent means of pain and torment, which proceedeth from the opinion, that God taketh pleasure, and is pleased with the torment and ruine of his creatures, which opinion is founded upon the sacrifices, which were universall throughout the world, before the birth of Christianity, and exercised not onely upon innocent beasts, which were massacred with the effusion of their bloud, for a precious present unto God, but (a strange thing that man should be so sottish) upon infants, innocents, and men, as well good and honest, as offenders, a custome practised with great religion almost in all nations: As the *Getæ*, a people of *Scythia*; who among other ceremonies and sacrifices dis-

patched

patched unto their god *Zamolxis*, from five years to five, a man amongst them to demand things necessary for them. And because it was thought necessary that one should die suddenly, at an instant, and that they did expose themselves unto death after a doubtfull manner, by running themselves upon the points of three javelins, whereby it fell out, that many were dispatched in their order until there came one that lighted upon a mortall wound, and died suddenly, accounting him the fittest messenger, and in greatest favour with their god, and not the rest: As the *Persians*, witnes the fact of *Amestris* the mother of *Xerxes*, who at an instant buried alive fourteen young men of the best houses, according to the religion of the countrey: As the ancient *Gauls*, the *Carthaginians*, who sacrificed to *Saturn* their children, their fathers & mothers being present: the *Lacedemonians*, who flattered their goddess *Diana* by whipping their youths in favour of her, many times even to death: the *Greeks*, witnes the sacrifice of *Iphigenia*: the *Romanes*, witnes the two *Decii*: *Quæ fuit tanta iniquitas deorum ut placari pop. Rom. non possent, nisi tales viri occidissent? Was the offence of the gods so great & so unjust, as it could not be appeased, but by the death of such men as these?* *Turks*, who so massacre their visage, their breasts, their members, to gratifie their prophet: the new East and West *Indies*; and in *Themistitan*, where they cement their idols with the bloud of children. What madnes was this, to think to flatter the Divinity with inhumanitie; to content the Divine goodnes with our affliction, and to satisfie the justice of God with cruelty! Justice then thirsting after humane bloud, innocent bloud, drawn and shed with so much pain and torment; *Ut sic dii placentur quemadmodum ne homines quidem sæviunt: As if the divinity should be satisfied by our inhumanity.* Seneca. From whence can this opinion and belief spring, that God taketh pleasure in torment, and in the ruine of his works, and humane nature? Following this opinion, of what nature should God be? But all this hath been abolished throughout Christendom, as before hath been said.

3 *They differ.*

They have also their differences, their particular articles, whereby they are distinguished among themselves, and every one preferrs itself above the rest, assuring himself it is the better, and more true then the rest, reproaching the one the other with some things, and so condemn and reject one another.

4 *Christian religion above all.*

But no man doubteth, neither is it a matter of labor to know wch is the truest; the Christian religion having so many advantages and priviledges, so high and so authenticall above others, and especially

ly

ly these. It is the subject of my second veritie, where is shewed how far all others are inferiour unto it.

5 *The latter are built upon the former.*

Now as they spring up one after another, the younger doth alwayes build upon the more ancient, and next precedent, which from the top to the bottom it doth not wholly disprove and condemn: for then it could not be heard or take footing; but it onely accuseth it either of imperfection, or of the end, and that therefore it cometh to succeed it, and to perfect it, and so by little and little overthroweth it, and enricheth it self with the spoils thereof: as the Judaicall, which hath retained many things of the Gentile Egyptian Religion the elder, the Hebrews not being easily purified of their customes: the Christian built upon the verities and promises of the Judaicall: the Turkish upon them both, retaining almost all the verities of Christ Jesus, except the first and principle, which is his Divinity: so that if a man will leap from Judaisme to Mahumatisme, he must passe by Christianity: and such there have been among the Mahumatists as have exposed themselves to torments, to maintain the truth of Christian religion, as a Christian would do to maintain the truth of the Old Testament. But yet the elder and more ancient do wholly condemn the younger, and hold them for capitall enemes.

6 *All are strange to nature.*

All Religions have this in them, that they are strange and horrible to the common sense: for they propose and are built and composed of parts, whereof some seem to the judgement of man base, unworthy, and unbefitting, wherewith the spirit of man, somewhat strong and vigorous, jesteth and sporteth it self; others too high, bright, wonderfull, and mysticall, where he can know nothing, wherewith it is offended. Now the spirit of man is not capable but of indifferent things it contemneth and disdaineth the small, it is astonished and confounded with the great; and therefore it is no marvell, if it be hardly perswaded at the first onset, to receive all religion, where there is nothing indifferent and common, and therefore must be drawn thereunto by some occasion: for if it be strong, it disdaineth and laugheth at it; if it be feeble and superstitious, it is astonished and scandalized: *Prædicamus Jesum crucifixum, Judeis scandalum, gentibus stultitiam: We preach Jesus crucified, a scandal to the Jews, to the people folly.* Whereof it comes to passe, that there are so many misbelievers and irreligious persons, because they consult and hearken too much to their own judgements, thinking to examine and judge of the affairs of religion, according to their

own

own capacity, and to handle it with their own proper and natural instrument. We must be simple, obedient, and debonair, if we will be fit to receive religion, to believe and live under the law, by reverence and obedience to subject our judgment, and to suffer our selves to be led and conducted by publick authority; *Captivantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei: Submitting our understanding to the obedience of faith.*

But it was required so to proceed, otherwise religion should not be respected, and had in admiration as it ought; now it is necessary that be received and sworn to, as well authentically and reverently, as difficultly; If it were such as were wholly pleasing to the palat and nature of man without strangeness, it would be thought more easily, yet less reverently received.

7. *Why they are not to be gotten by humane means.*

Now the religions and beliefs being such as hath been said, strange unto the common sense, very far exceeding all the reach and understanding of man, they must not, nor cannot be gotten nor settled in in us, by natural and humane means, (for then among so many great minds as there have been rare and excellent, some had attained thereunto) but it must needs be, that they be given us by extraordinary and heavenly revelation, gotten and received by divine inspiration, and as sent from heaven. In this manner likewise all do affirm, that they hold their religion and believe it, not from men, or any other creature, but from God.

8. *And yet they are gotten by humane means*

But to say the truth, and not to flatter or disguise, this is nothing; they are, whatsoever some say, held by humane hands and means, which is true in every respect, in false religions, being nothing but prayers, and humane or diabolical inventions: the true, as they have another jurisdiction, so are they both received and held by another hand; nevertheless we must distinguish. As touching the receiving of them, the first and general publication and installation of them hath been, *Domino cooperante, sermone confirmante, sequentibus signis; God working, his Word confirming, and signs following*, divine and wonderful: the particular is done by humane hands and means; the nation, countrey, place, gives the religion, and that a man professeth which is in force in that place, and among those persons where he is born, and where he liveth: He is circumcised, baptized, a Jew, a Christian, before he knowes that he is a man; for religion is not of our choice or election, but man without his knowledg is made a Jew or a Christian, because he is born in Judaisme or Christianity: and if he had been born elsewhere among the Gentiles,

tiles, or Mahumentans, he had been likewiſe a Gentile or a Mahumetan. As touching the obſervation, the true and good profeſſors thereof, beſides the outward profeſſion, which is common to all, yea to miſ-believers, they attribute to the gift of God, the teſtimony of the Holy Ghoſt within: but this is a thing not common nor ordinary, what fair colour ſoever they give it, witneſs the lives and manners of men, ſo ill agreeing with their belief, who for humane occaſions, and thoſe very light, go againſt the tenour of their religion. If they were held and planted with a divine hand, nothing in the world could ſhake us, ſuch a tie would not be ſo eaſily broken: If it had any touch or ray of divinity, it would appear in all, it would produce wonderful effects that could not be hid, as Truth it ſelf hath ſaid; *If you have but as much faith as a muſtard ſeed, you ſhould remove mountains.* But what proportion or agreement is there betwixt the perſwaſion of the immortality of the ſoul, and a future reward ſo glorious and bleſſed, or ſo inglorious, and accurſed, and the life that a man leadeth? The only apprehenſion of thoſe things that a man ſaith he doth firmly believe, will take his ſenſes from him: The only apprehenſion and fear to die by juſtice, and in publick place, or by ſome other ſhameful and diſhonourable action, hath made many to loſe their ſenſes, and caſt them into ſtrange trances: and what is that in reſpect of the worth of that which religion teacheth us is to come? But is it poſſible in truth to believe, to hope for that immortality ſo happy, and yet to fear death a neceſſary paſſage thereunto? to fear and and apprehend that infernal puniſhment, and live as we do? Theſe are things as incompatible as fire and water. They ſay they believe it, they make themſelves believe they believe it, and they will make others believe it too; but it is nothing, neither do they know what it is to believe. For a belief, I mean ſuch as the Scripture calleth hiſtorical, is diabolical, dead, informed, unprofitable, and which many times doth more hurt then good. Such believers (ſaith an ancient Writer) are mockers and impoſtors; and another ſaith, that they are in one reſpect, the moſt fierce and glorious, in another the moſt looſe, diſſolute, and villanous of the world; more then men in the articles of their belief, and worſe then ſwine in their lives. Doubtleſs if we hold our ſelves unto God, and our religion, I ſay not by a divine grace as we ſhould, but only after a ſimple and common manner, as we believe a hiſtory, or a friend, or companion, we ſhould place them far above all other things for that infinite goodneſs

that

that shineth in them, at the least, they should be put in the same rank or degree with honour, riches, friends. Now there are very few that do not fear less to commit an offence against God, and any point of his religion, then against his father, his master, his friend, his equals. All this hurteth not the dignity, purity, and height of Christianity, no more then the dunghil infecteth the beams of the Sun, which shines upon it; for as one saith, *Fides non à personis, sed contra.* But a man cannot pronounce so great a *Væ* against those false hypocrites, whom Verity it self so much condemneth, as they belch out of their own mouthes against themselves. Mat. 23.

*A distinction betwixt the true and false religion.*

The better to know true piety, it is necessary first to separate it from the false, fained and counterfeit, to the end, we may not equivocate as the most part of the world doth. There is nothing that maketh a fairer shew, and that taketh greater pains to resemble true piety and religion; and yet that is more contrary and enemy thereunto, then superstition: like the Woolf, which doth not a little resemble the dog but yet hath a spirit and humour quite contrary: and the flatterer who counterfeiteth a zealous friend and is nothing less: or like false coin, which maketh a more glittering shew then the true; *Gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus adversa: The people is subject to superstition, contrary to true religion.* It is likewise envious & jealous, like an amorous adulteress, who with her smooth speeches makes shew of greater affection, and care of the husband, then the true and lawful wife, whom she endeavoureth to make odious unto him. Now the notable differences of these two are, that religion loveth and honoureth God, settleth a man in peace and rest, and lodgeth in a liberal, free, and generous soul: Superstition troubleth a man, and makes him wild, and injureth God himself, teaching to fear with horror and astonishment, to hide himself, and to fly from him, if it were possible; it is a weak, poor, and base malady of the soul; *Superstitio error insanus, amandos timet, quos colit violat: morbus pusilli animi, qui superstitione imbutus est, quietus esse nusquam potest. Varro ait Deum à religioso vereri, à superstitioso timeri: Superstition is a frantick error, it feareth friends; corrupteth those that love it: It is the disease of a weak mind, which being infected with superstition, can never be at rest. Varro saith, religious men fear God for love, the superstitious for punishment.* Let us speak of them both apart. Tacit. Augustin.

*Superstition described.*

A superstitious man suffereth neither God nor man to live in peace. He apprehendeth God as one anxious, spightful, hardly contented, 10

tented, easily moved, with difficulty appeased, examining our actions after the humane fashion of a severe Judge, that watcheth our steps; which he proveth true by his manner of serving him, which is all after one fashion. He trembleth for fear, be is never secure, fearing he never doth well enough, and that he hath left something undone, by the omission whereof all is worth nothing that he hath done; he doubteth whether God be well content, and laboureth to flatter him, to the end he may appease and win him: he importuneth him with prayers, vows, offerings: he faineth to himself miracles, easily believeth and receiveth such as are counterfeited by others, and interpreteth all things though purely natural, as expressly sent and done by God, and runneth after whatsoever a man saith with all the care that may be; *Duo superstitionis propria, nimius timor, nimius cultus: Two things are proper to superstition; too much fear, too much honour.* What is all this but by punishing himself, vilely, basely, and unworthily to deal with God, and more mechanically, then a man would do with a man of honour? Generally all superstition, and fault in religion, proceedeth from this, that we make not that account of God that we should, we revoke him, and compel him into order, we judge of him according to our selves, we put upon him our humours. O what blasphemy is this!

II. *It is natural.* Now this vice and malady is almost natural unto us, and we have all a kind of inclination thereunto. *Plutarch* deploreth the infirmity of man, who never knoweth how to keep a measure, or to settle himself upon his feet: for it leaneth and degenerateth either into superstition and vanity, or into a contempt and carelesness of divine things. We are like to an ill advised husband, besotted and couzened with the coyning subtilties of a light woman, with whom he converseth more by reason of her artificial flatteries, then with his honest spouse who honoureth and serveth him with a simple and natural shamefastnes: and even so superstition pleaseth us more then true religion.

12. *Popular.* It is likewise vulgar, it proceedeth from a weakness of the soul, an ignorance or mis-knowledg of God, and that very grosse, and therefore it is most commonly found in children, women, old men, sick, and such as have been assaulted with some violent accident. To be brief, it is in barbarous natures; *Inclinant naturam ad superstitionem barbari: Barbarous natures incline sooneſt to superstition:* Of this then it is said, and not of true religion, that it is true that *Plato* affirmeth, that the weakness and idleness of men hath brought

*Plutarch in Sertorio.*

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in religion, and made it prevail, whereby children, women, and old men, should be most capable of religion, more scrupulous and devout: this were to wrong true religion, to give it so poor and frail a foundation.

Besides these seeds of natural inclination and superstition, there are many that shake hands with it, and favour it greatly for the great gain and profit they receive by it. Great men likewise and mighty, though they know what it is, will not trouble nor hinder it, because they know it is a very fit instrument to lead a people withal, and therefore they do not only enflame and nourish that which is already grafted in nature, but when need require, they forge and invent new, as *Scipio*, *Sertorius*, *Sylla*, and others: *Qui faciunt animos humiles formidine divûm, de pressósque premunt ad terram. Nulla res multitudinem efficiùs regit, quàm superstitio: Which makes their minds humble for offending the gods, and lowly prostrate themselves to the ground. Nothing more forcibly carrieth a multitude then superstition.* 13. *Nourished and maintained by humane reason.* Curtius.

Now quitting your selves of this base and foul superstition, (which I would have him to abhor whom I desire to instruct unto wisedome) let us learn to guide our selves to true religion and piety, whereof I will give some grounds and pourtraits, as lesser lights thereunto. But before we enter thereinto, let me here say in general, and by way of preface, that of so many divers religions, and manners of serving God, which are or may be in the world, they seem to be the most noble, and to have greatest appearance of truth, which without great external and corporal service, draw the soul into it self, and raise it by pure contemplation, to admire and adore the greatness and infinite majesty of the first cause of all things, and the essence of essences, without any great declaration or determination thereof, or prescription of his service; but acknowledging it indefinitely, to be goodness, perfection, and infiniteness, wholly incomprehensible and not to be known, as the *Pythagorians*, and most famous Philosophers do teach. This is to approach unto the religion of the Angels, and to put in practise that word of the Son of God, To adore in spirit and truth; for God accounteth such worshippers the best. There are others on the other side, and in another extremity, who will have a visible Deity, capable by the senses; which base and cross errour hath mocked almost all the world, even *Israel* in the desert, in framing to themselves a molten Calf. And of these they that have chosen the sun for their god, seem 14. *An entrance to the discourse of true religion.*

seem to have more reason then the rest, because of the greatnesse, beauty, and resplendent and unknown virtue thereof, even such as enforce the whole world to the admiration and reverence of it self. The eye seeth nothing that is like unto it, or that approacheth neer unto it in the whole universe, it is one Sun, and without companion. Christianity, as in the middle, tempereth the sensible and outward with the insensible and inward, serving God with spirit and body, and accommodating it self to great and little, whereby it is better establi hed, and more durable. But even in that too, as there is a diversity, and degrees of souls, of sufficiency, and capacity of divine grace; so is there a difference in the manner of serving of God: the more high and perfect incline more to the first manner, more spiritual and contemplative, and lesse external; the less and imperfect, *Quasi sub pædagogo. As it were under a Tutor*, remain in the other, and do participate of the outward and vulgar deformities.

15. *Divers descriptions of Religion.* Religion consisteth in the knowledge of God, and of our selves; (for it is a relative action between both) the office thereof is to extol God to the uttermost of our power, and to beat down man as low as may be, as if he were utterly lost, and afterwards to furnish himself with means to rise again, to make him feel his misery and his nothing, to the end he may put his whole confidence in God alone.

16. The office of religion is to joyn us to the author and principall cause of all our good, to reunite, and fasten man to his first cause, as to his root, wherein so long as he continueth firm and settled, he preserveth himself in his own perfection; and contrariwise when he is separated, he instantly fainteth and languisheth.

17. The end and effect of religion is faithfully to yield all the honour and glory unto God and all the benefit unto man. All good things may be reduced to these two; The profit, which is an amendment, and an essential and inward good, is due unto poor, wretched, and in all points miserable man: the glory, which is an outward ornament, is due unto God alone, who is the perfection and fulnesse of all good, whereunto nothing can be added: *Gloria in excelsis Deo, & in terra pax hominibus: Glory be to God on high, and peace with men upon earth.*

18. *An instruction to Piety.* Thus much being first known, our instruction to piety is first to learn to know God: for from the knowledg of things proceedeth that honour we do unto them. *1. To know God.* First then we must believe that he is, that he hath created the world by his power, goodnes, wisdom,

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and that by it he governeth it; that his providence watcheth over all things, yea the least that are; that whatsoever he sendeth us, is for our good, and that whatsoever is evil proceedeth from our selves. If we account those fortunes evil that he sendeth us, we blaspheme his holy name, because naturally we honour those that do us good, and hate those that hurt us. We must then resolve to obey him, and to take all in good part which cometh from his hand, to commit and submit our selves unto him.

19. 2. *To honour him.*

Secondly, we must honour him: and the most excellent and devoutest way to do it, is first, to mount up our spirits from all carnal, earthly, and corruptible imagination; and by the chastest, highest, and holiest conceits, exercise our selves in the contemplation of the Divinity; and after that we have adorned it, with all the most magnifical and excellent names and praises that our spirit can imagine, that we acknowledg that we have presented nothing unto it worthy it self: but that the fault is in our weakness and imbecility, which can conceive nothing more high. God is the last endeavour and highest pitch of our imagination, every man amplifying the *Idea*, according to his own capacity: and to speak better, God is infinitely above all our last and highest endeavours and imaginations of perfection.

20. 3. *To serve him in spirit.*

Again, we must serve him with our heart and spirit, it is the service answerable to his nature: *Deus spiritus est: si Deus est animus, sit tibi purâ mente colendus: God is a Spirit; if God be a Spirit, worship him in purity of spirit.* It is that which he requireth, that which pleaseth him: *Pater tales quærit adoratores: The Father desireth such worshippers.* The most acceptable sacrifice unto his Majesty, is a pure, free, and humble heart: *Sacrificium Deo spiritus: A pure heart is a sacrifice unto God.* An innocent soul, an innocent life: *Optimus animus, pulcherrimus Dei cultus: religiosissimus cultus imitari: unicus Dei cultus non esse malum: A pure mind is the best service of God; the most religious worshipping of God is to follow him; the only honour of God is not evil.* A wise man is the true sacrifice of the great God, his spirit is his temple, his soul is his image, his affections are his offerings, his greatest and most solemn sacrifice is to imitate him, to serve and implore him: for it is the part of those that are great, to give; of those that are poor, to ask: *Beatius dare quàm accipere: It is better to give then to take.*

Senec. Lactan. Merc. Trism.

21. 4. *To serve him with our bodies.*

Nevertheless, we are not to contemn and disdain the outward and publick service, which must be as an assistant to the other, by

observing the ceremonies, ordinances, and customes, with moderation, without vanitie, without ambition, or hypocrisie, without avarice, and alwayes with this thought, That God will be served in spirit: and that that which is outwardly done, is rather for our selves, then for God; for humane unity, and edification, then for divine veritie: *Quæ potiùs ad morem quàm ad rem pertinent; VVhich rather belong to manners and custome, then to the thing it self.*

22 *5. To pray unto him.*

Our vows and prayers unto God should be all subject unto his will: we should neither desire nor ask any thing, but as he hath ordained, having alwayes for our bridle, *Fiat voluntas tua.* To ask any thing against his providence, is to corrupt the Judge and Governour of the world; to think to flatter him, and to win him by presents and promises, is to wrong him. God doth not desire our goods; neither (to say the truth) have we any: all is his. *Non accipiam de domo tua vitulos, &c. meus est enim orbis terræ, & plenitudo ejus: I will not take the calves from thy house, &c. for the whole world is mine, and all that is therein.* But his will is, that we onely make our selves fit to receive from him, never expecting that we should give unto him, but ask and receive: for it is his office to give, as being great, and it belongs to man as being poor and needy, to beg and to receive: to prescribe unto him that which we want, and we wil, is to expose our selves to the inconveniencies of *Midas*; but that is alwayes best, which pleaseth him best. To be brief, we must think, speak, and deal with God, as if all the world did behold us; we must live and converse with the world, as if God saw us.

23 *well to use his name.*

It is not with respect to honour the name of God as we ought, but rather to violate it, lightly and promiscuously to mingle it in all our actions and speeches, as it were by acclamation or by custome, either not thinking thereof, or cursorily to passe him over: we must speak of God and his works soberly, but yet seriously, with shamefastnes, fear, and reverence, and never presume to judge of him.

24 *The conclusion*

And thus much summarily of piety, which should be in high esteem; contemplating alwayes God, with a free, chearfull, and filiall soul; not wild, nor troubled, as the superstitious are. Touching the particularities as well of the belief as observation, it is necessary that we tie our selves to the Christian, as to the true, more rich, high, and honourable to God commodious and comfortable to man, as we have shewed in our second verity, and therein remaining, we must

must with a sweet submission submit and settle our selves to that which the Catholick Church in all times hath universally held, and holdeth, and not intangling our selves with novelties, or selected and particular opinions, for the reasons set down in my third Veritie, and especially in the first and last Chapters, which may suffice unto him, that cannot, or will not read the whole book.

25 *An advisement to joynt pietie and probitie together.*

Let me onely give this one advice, necessary for him that intendeth to be wise, and that is, not to separate piety from true honestie, whereof we have spoken before, and so content himself with one of them, much lesse to confound and mingle them together. These are two things very different, and which have divers jurisdictions; pietie and probity, religion and honesty, devotion and conscience: I will that both of them be joyntly in him whom I here instruct, because the one cannot be without the other entire and perfect, but confused. Behold here two rocks whereof we must take heed, and few there be that know them, to separate them, and to rest contented with the one, to confound and mingle them, in such sort, that the one be the jurisdiction of the other.

26 *Of those which have pietie without probity.*

The first that separate them, and that have but one of them, are of two sorts, for some do wholly give themselves to the worship and service of God, taking no care at all of true virtue and honesty, whereof they have no taste; a vice noted as naturall to the Iews especially, (a race above all other superstitious, and for that cause odious to all) and much displayed by their Prophets, and afterwards by the *Messias*, who reproached them, that of their Temple they had made a den of thieves, a cloak and excuse for many wickednesses, which they perceived not; so were they besotted with this outward devotion, wherein putting their whole confidence, they thought themselves discharged of all duty; yea, they were made more hardie to do any wickedness. Many are touched with this feminine and popular spirit, wholly attentive to those small exercises of outward devotion; whereby they are made never the better, from whence came that Proverb, *An angel in the Church, a devil in the house:* they lend the shew and outward part unto God, like the Pharisies, they are sepulchres, white walls: *Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor eorum longè à me*: *This people honour me with their lips, but their heart is far from me*: yea, they make pietie a cover for impiety, they make it (as they say) an occupation or a merchandise, and alledge their offices of devotion, to extenuate and recompence their sinne and iniquitie. Others quite contrary make no account but of Matth. 15. and 22.

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virtue and honestie, little caring for any thing that belongs to religion, a fault of many Philosophers, and which is likewise too common among our Atheists. These are two vicious extremities, but which is the more or the lesse extreme, or which of the two is the more worthy, religion or honesty, it is not my purpose to determine; I will onely say, (to compare them in three points) that the first is far more easie, of greater shew, of simple and vulgar spirits: the second is far more difficult and laborious in the performance, of lesse shew, of spirits valiant and generous.

27 *A comparison.*

28 *Against those that confound piety and probitie.*

I come to others, who differ not much from the first, who take no care but of religion. They pervert all order, and trouble all, confounding honestie, religion, the grace of God, (as hath been said before) whereby it comes to passe, that they have neither true honesty, nor true religion, nor consequently the grace of God, as they think, a people onely content with themselves, and ready to censure and condemn others; *Qui confidunt in se, & aspernant alios: Who trust in themselves, and contemn others.* They think that religion is a generality of all good, and of all virtue, that all virtues are contained in it, and necessarily follow it, whereby they acknowledge no other virtue nor honestie, but that which is opened with the key of religion. Now it is quite contrary; for religion, which is the latter, is a speciall and particular virtue, distinguished from all other virtues, which may be without them, and without probity, as hath been said of the Pharisees, religious and wicked: and they without religion, as in many Philosophers good and virtuous, but yet irreligious. It is likewise, as all divinitie teacheth, a morall humane virtue, appertaining to justice, one of the four cardinall virtues, which teacheth us in generall, to give unto every one that which belongeth unto him, reserving to every one his place. Now God being above all, the universall author and master, we must give unto him all sovereign honour, service, obedience, and this subaltern Religion, and the *Hypothesis* of justice, which is the generall *Thesis*, more ancient and naturall. They on the other side, will that a man be religious before he be honest, and that religion (which is acquired and gotten by an outward cause, *ex auditu*; *Quomodo credent sine prædicante? by hearing; how can they believe, without preaching?*) ingendreth honestie, which we have shewed should proceed from nature, from that law and light which God hath put into us, from our first beginning. This is an inverted order, These men will that a man be an honest man, because there is a Paradise and a hel: so that

*Thom. p. 2. 2. q. 81.*

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if they did not fear God, or fear to be damned (for that is often their language) they would make a goodly piece of work. O miserable honestie! What thanks deservest thou, for what thou dost? O cowardly and idle innocency; *quæ nisi metu non placet! which pleaseth not Without fear!* Thou keepest thy self from wickedness, because thou darest not be wicked, and thou feares to be beaten, and even therein art thou wicked. *Oderunt peccare mali formidine pœnæ: The Wicked forbear to offend, for fear of punishment.* Now I will that thou dare, but yet that thou wilt not, though thou be never chidden: I wil that thou be an honest man, not because thou wouldst go to Paradise; but because nature, reason, God willeth it; because the Law, and the generall policie of the world, whereof thou art a part, requireth it; so as thou canst not consent to be any other, except thou go against thy self, thy essence, thy end. Doubtlesse such honestie occasioned by the spirit of religion, besides that it is not true and essentiall, but accidentall; it is likewise very dangerous: producing many times verie base and scandalous effects (as experience in all times hath taught us) under the fair and glorious pretext of pietie. What execrable wickednesses hath the zeal of Religion brought forth? Is there any other subject or occasion, that hath yielded the like? It belongeth to so great and noble a subject, to work great and wonderfull effects.

*Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum,*
*Quæ peperit sæpe scelerosa atque impia facta:*
*So ill is good abus'd, and so accurst,*
*As the corruption of the best is Worst:*
*For the unjustest warre we undertake,*
*Incontinent religion's brought to stake.*
*So* Luther, *Hungarie Was cause to loose,*
*So Christ himself became a block to Jews.*

Not to love him, yea to look upon him with a wicked eye, as a man should look upon a monster, that believeth not as he believeth. To think to be polluted by speaking, or conversing with him, is one of the sweetest and most pleasing actions of these kind of people. He that is an honest man by scruple, and a religious bridle, take heed of him, and account of him as he is. And he that hath religion without honesty, I will not say, he is more wicked, but farre more dangerous then he that hath neither the one nor the other: *Omnis qui interficiet vos, putabit se obsequium præstare Deo: VVho so killeth you, thinks he doth an acceptable service unto God:* not because religion

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teacheth or any way favoureth wickednesse, as some very foolishly, and maliciously from this place do object, for the most absurd and falsest religion that is, doth it not; but the reason is, that having no taste, nor image, nor conceit of honestie, but by imitation, and for the service of religion, and thinking that to be an honest man is no other thing, then to be carefull to advance religion, they believe all things whatsoever, be it treason, treacherie, sedition, rebellion, or any other offence to be not onely lawfull and sufferable, being coloured with zeal and the care of religion, but also commendable, meritorious, yea, worthy canonization, if it serve for the progresse and advancement of religion, and the overthrow of their adversaries. The Jews were wicked and cruell to their parents, unjust towards their neighbours, neither lending, nor paying their debts, and all because they gave unto the Temple, thinking to be quit of all duties, and rejecting the whole world, by saying *Corban*.

Matt. 15. 5. Mark 7. 11.

I will then (to conclude this discourse) that there be in this my wise man, a true honestie, and a true pietie, joyned and married together, and both of them compleat and crowned with the grace of God, which he denieth none that shall ask it of him. *Deus dat spiritum bonum omnibus petentibus eum. God giveth a good spirit to all that ask it of him:* as hath been said in the Preface, article the 14.

S. Hierome.

## CHAP. VI.

### *To govern his desires and pleasures.*

IT is a principall duty of a wise man, to know well how to moderate and rule his desires and pleasures; for wholly to renounce them, I am so farre from requiring it in this my wise man, that I hold this opinion to be not onely fantasticall, but vitious and unnaturall. First then we must confute this opinion, which banisheth and wholly condemneth all pleasures, and afterwards learn how to govern them.

1. *The first part.*

It is a plausible opinion, and studied by those that would seem to be men of understanding, and professours of singular sanctitie, generally to contemn and tread under foot all sorts of pleasures, and all care of the body, retiring the spirit unto it self, not having any commerce with the body, but elevating it self to high things, and so to passe this life as it were insensibly, neither tasting it, nor attending it. With these kind of people that ordinary phrase of passing

*An opinion of the contempt of the world.*

passing the time, doth very well agree; for it seemeth to them, that well to use and employ this life, is silently to passe it over, and as it were to escape it, and rob themselves of it, as if it were a miserable, burthensome, and tedious thing, being desirous so to slide thorow the world, as that not onely recreation and pastimes are suspected, yea, odious unto them, but also naturall necessities, which God hath seasoned with some pleasure. They come not where any delight is, but unwillingly; and being where it is, they hold their breath till they be gone, as if they were in a place of infection: and to be brief their life is offensive unto them, and death a solace, pleasing themselves with that saying, which may be as well ill taken and understood, as well, *Vitam habere impatientia, mortem in desiderio: Not impatient of life, but rather to desire death.*

But the iniquity of this opinion may many wayes be shewed. 2.
First, there is nothing so fair and lawfull, as well and duly to play *Rejected.*
the man, well to know how to lead this life. It is a divine knowledge and very difficult, for a man to know how he should lawfully enjoy his own essence, lead his life according to the common and naturall model, to his proper conditions, not seeking those that are strange; for all those extravagances, all those artificiall and studied endeavours, those wandring wayes from the naturall and common, proceed from folly and passion: these are maladies, without which whilst these men would live, not by playing the men, but the divines, they play the fools; they would transform themselves into Angels, and they turn themselves into beasts: *aut Deus, aut bestia. homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto: Either a God or a beast; I am a man, and I account my self no other then humane.* Man is a body & a soul, and it is not wel done to dismember this building, to divide and separate this brotherly and naturall conjunction; but contrariwise, we should renue it by mutuall offices, the spirit must awaken & revive the heavy body, the body must stay the lightnes of the spirit, which many times proves but a trouble-feast; the spirit must assist and favour the body, as the husband the wife, and not reject it, not hate it. It must not refuse to participate the naturall pleasures thereof, which are just, and such as befit that marriage that is betwixt them, alwaies holding therein, as the more wise, a true moderation. A man must studie, know and meditate on this life, to the end he may return condign thanks unto him who hath lent it. There is nothing which God hath made for us in this present life unworthy our care, and we are accountable for them, even to the very

verie hairs of our head; for it is no frivolous warrant or commission, for a man to direct himself and his life according to his natural condition, but God hath given it him seriously and expressely.

3 But what greater folly is there, and more against nature, then to
*Lib.3.cap.38.* account our actions vicious, because they are naturall; unworthy, because they are necessary? Now this necessitie and pleasure is an excellent marriage, made by God himself. Nature willeth very wisely, that those actions which it hath enjoyned us for our necessitie be also delightfull, inviting us thereunto not onely by reason, but also by appetite; and these rules these kind of men go about to break. It is an equall fault and injustice, to loath and condemn all pleasures, and to abuse them, by loving them overmuch; we must neither run to them, nor flie from them, but receive them, and use them discreetly and moderately, as shall presently be said in the rule. Temperance, which is the rule of our pleasures, condemneth as well the insensibility and privation of all pleasure, *stuporem naturæ*, which is the failing extremity, as intemperancie, *Libidinem*, which is the exceeding extremitie. *Contra naturam est torquere corpus suum, faciles odisse munditias & squallorem appetere: delicatas res cupere, luxuriæ est; usitatas & non magno parabiles fugere, dementiæ est: It is against nature, to inforce our selves to hate & contemn neat and necessary things, and to desire filthinesse and deformity: It is wantonnesse to desire delicate things; and meer madnesse to avoid those that are common and needfull.*

4 He that desireth to discard his soul, let him boldly do it if he can, when his body is not in health, but endureth some torment, to the end he may disburthen himself of that contagion: but he cannot do it; as likewise he ought not to do it: for to speak according to right and reason, it should never abandon the body; it is apishnesse to do it, it should behold pleasure and sorrow with a like settled countenance; in the one live severely, in the other chearfully: but in all cases it should assist the bodie, to maintain it alwayes in order.

5 To contemn the world, is a brave proposition, and many delight, nay glory to speak, to discourse thereof, but I cannot perceive that they well understand it, much lesse that they practise it: what is it to contemn the world? What is this world? Is it the heaven, the earth, and in a word the creatures that are therein? No, I think not so: What then? Is it the use, the profit, the service, and commodity that we gather thereby? If so, what ingratitude is this against the

the authour that hath made them to these ends? What accusation against nature? What reason to contemn them? If (in the end) thou wilt say, that it is neither the one, nor the other, but it is the abuse of them, the vanities, follie, excesse, and wickednesse that is in the world; I may answer, that it were well said, if this were of the world, but they are not so; but against the world, and the policie thereof; they are thine own additions, not naturall, but artificiall. To preserve thy self from them, as wisdome and the rule following teacheth, is not to condemn the world, which remaineth wholly entire without it; but it is well to use the world, well to govern thy self in the world, and as Divinity teacheth, to make use and benefit of the world, and not to enjoy it, *uti, non frui*. Now these kind of people think to practise the contempt of the world, by certain outward particular manners and fashions, separated by the common course of the world; but this is but mockery. There is nothing in the world so exquisite, the world laugheth not, and is not so wanton within it self, as without; in those places where men make profession of flying it, and trampling it under foot, which is spoken against hypocrites, who have so much degenerated from their beginning, that there remaineth nothing but the habit, and is also very much changed, if not in form, at the least in matter, which serveth them for no other use, then to puff them up, to make them more bold and impudent, which is quite contrary to their institution; *Væ vobis qui circuitis mare & aridam, ut faciatis unum proselytum, & cùm factus fuerit, facitis filium Gehennæ*: *Wo be to you that compass sea and land to make one of your profession; and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell*: and not against the good, much lesse against the estate in it self, which is the schoole of true and holy Philosophy. It is then a phantasticall and unnaturall opinion, generally to reject and condemn all desires and pleasures. God is the creatour and authour of pleasure; *Plantavit Dominus Paradisum voluptatis, posuit hominem in paradiso voluptatis, protulit omne lignum pulchrum, suave, delectabile*: *God planted the Paradise of pleasure, wherein he placed man, which brought forth all kind of beautifull, sweet, and delectable trees*, as shall be said. But we must first learn how to carry our selves therein. Matth. 23.

6 *The second part of the rule in our pleasures and desires.*

This instruction may be reduced to four points (which if these mortified men, and great contemners of the world did know how to put in practice, they would work wonders) to know little, naturally, moderetely, and by a short relation to himself. These four go almost

almost alwayes together, and make an entire, and perfect rule, and he that will may gather and comprehend all these four in this word, Naturally; for nature is the fundamentall & sufficient rule for all. But yet to make the matter, more clear and easie, we will distinguish these four points. The first point of this rule, is to desire *Little.* little: A short good, but an assured means to brave fortune, taking from it all accidents, and all power over us to hinder the happie content of our life: and in a word, to be wise, is to shorten our desires, to desire either little, or nothing at all. He that desireth nothing, although he have nothing, is as rich as he that possesseth the whole world, for both come to one end: *Nihil interest an habeas, an non concupiscas: It is all one whether thou hast it, or no, if thou desirest it not:* and therefore it was well said, That it is not multitude and abundance that contenteth and inricheth, but want, yea nothing. It is the want of desire, for he that is poor in desires is rich in contentment, *Summæ opes inopia cupiditatum: The want of desires, is great riches.* To be brief, he that desireth nothing is in some sort like unto God, and those that are already blessed, who are happie and blessed not because they have and possesse all, but because they desire nothing: *Qui desiderium suum clausit, cum Jove de felicitate contendit: Who bridleth his desire, contendeth even with Jupiter in felicitie.* Contrarily, if we let loose the bridle to our appetite to follow abundance and delicacie, we shall continue in perpetuall pain and labour; superfluous things will become necessary, our souls will be made slaves to our bodies, and we can live no longer, then that we live in pleasure and delight. If we moderate not our pleasures and desires, and measure them not by the compasse of reason, opinion will carry us into a headlong downfall, where there is niether bottome nor brink: as for example, we will make our shoes of velvet, afterwards of cloth of gold, and lastly of embroiderie with pearls and diamonds; we will build our houses of marble, afterwards of jasper and porpherie. Now this mean for a man to inrich himself, and to make him content, is very just, and in the power of every man: he need not to seek this contentment elsewhere and without himself, let him but ask it, and he presently obtaineth it of himself. Let him stay the course of his desires, it is injustice to importune God, Nature, the world, by vows and prayers, to give him any thing, since he hath so excellent a mean in his own power to attain thereunto. Why should I rather desire another to give unto me, then my self not to desire? *Quare potiùs à fortuna*

*fortuna impetrem ut det, quàm à me nè petam? quare autem petam oblitus fragilitatis humanæ? Wherefore should I rather desire fortune to give unto me, then I seek it of my self? but wherefore should I desire the oblivion of humane fragility?* If I cannot or will not obtain of my self not to desire, how and with what face can I presse another to give, over whom I have no right nor power? The first rule then touching our desires and pleasures is that this (little) or at least a mediocrity and sufficiency is that which doth best content a wise man, and keeps him in peace. And this is the reason why I have chosen for my device, *Peace and Poverty*. With a fool nothing sufficeth, nothing hath certainty or content: he is like the Moon, who asketh a garment that may fit it; but it was answered, That that was not possible, because it was sometimes great, sometimes little, and alwayes changeable. Plutarch.

The other point cousen-germane to this, is (naturally): for we know that there are two sorts of desires and pleasures, the one naturall, and these are just and lawfull, and are likewise in beasts limited and short, whose end a man may see: according to these, no man is indigent, for every thing yields something to content. Nature is contented with little, & hath so provided, that in all things, that which sufficeth is at hand and in our own power, *Parabile est quod natura desiderat & expositum; ad manum est quod sat est. Ready and at hand is it, that nature desires; and at hand also that which sufficeth.* It is this which nature demandeth for the preservation of its own essence, it is a favour for which we are to thank nature, that those things that are necessary for this life, it hath made easie to find, and such as are hardly obtained are not so necessary; and that seeking without passion that which nature desireth, fortune can no way deprive us of it. To these kind of desires a man may adde (though they be not truly naturall, yet they come very near) those that respect the use and condition of every one of us, which are somewhat beyond, and more at large then those that are exactly naturall, and so are just and lawfull in the second place. The other desires are beyond nature, proceeding from an opinion and phantasie, artificiall, superfluous; and truly passions, which we may to distinguish them by name from others, call cupidities or lusts, whereof we have spoken before at large in the passions: from which a wise man must wholly and absolutely defend himself. 7 *Naturally.* Seneca.

The third, which is moderately and without excesse, hath a large field, and divers parts, but which may be drawn to two heads; that 8 *Moderately.* *See lib. 3. c. 38.*

is, to say, to desire without the hurt of another, of himself: of another without his scandall, offence, losse, prejudice; of himself, without the losse of his health, his leasure, his functions and affairs, his honour, his duty.

9 *By relation.* The fourth is a short and essentiall relation to himself; besides that the carrier of our desires and pleasures must be circumscribed, limited, and short; their course likewise must be managed, not in a right line, which makes an end elsewhere and without it self; but in a circle, the two points whereof do meet and end in our selves. Those actions that are directed without this reflexion, and this short and essential turning, as of covetous and ambitious men, and divers others, who run point blank, and are alwayes without them, are vain and unsound.

## CHAP. VII.

### *To carry himself moderately and equally in prosperity and adversitie.*

THere is a twofold fortune, wherewith we are to enter the list, good and ill, prosperity and adversity; these are the two combats, the two dangerous times, wherein it standeth us upon to stand upon our guard, and to gather our wits about us: they are the two schools, essayes, and touch-stones of the spirit of man.

2 *The opinion of the vulgar.* The vulgar ignorant sort do acknowledge but one: they do not believe that we have any thing to do, that there is any difficulty; any fight or contradiction with prosperity and good fortune, wherein they are so transported with joy, that they know not what they do, there is no rule with them: and in affliction they are as much astonished and beaten down, as they that are dangerously sick, and are in continuall anguish, not being able to endure either heat or cold.

3 *Which of the two is more difficult to bear, prosperity or adversity.* Arist. Senec. The wise men of the world acknowledge both, and impute it to one and the same vice and folly, not to know how to command in prosperity, and how to carry our selves in adversity: but which is the more difficult and dangerous, they are not wholly of one accord, some saying it is adversitie, by reason of the horrour and bitterness thereof: *Difficilius est tristitiam sustinere; quàm à delectabilibus abstinere: majus est difficilia perstringere, quàm læta moderari. Harder it is to sustain grief, then to abstain from pleasures, but more hard to pass through difficult things, then to moderate our pleasures.*

*sures.* Some affirming it to be prosperity, which by her sweet and pleasing flatterie, doth abate and mollifie the spirit, and insensibly robbeth it of its due temperature, force and vigour, as *Dalila* did *Samson*; in such sort, that many that are obdurate, obstinate, and invincible in adversity, have suffered themselves to be taken by the flattering allurements of prosperity, *Magni laboris est ferre prosperitatem: segetem nimia sternit ubertas, sic immoderata felicitas rumpit. Great labour is it to live in prosperity: too much plentie plasheth down the corn: so too much felicity casteth us down.* And again, affliction moveth even our enemies to pitie, prosperity our friends to envie. In adversitie a man seeing himself abandoned by all, and that all his hopes are reduced unto himself, he taketh heart at grasse, he rouzeth himself, calls his wits about him, and with all his power adds his own endeavours to his own help: in prosperitie seeing himself assisted by all that laugh at him, and applaud all he doth he groweth lasie and careless, trusting in others, without any apprehension of danger or difficulty, and perswading himself that all is in safetie, when he is many times therein much deceived. It may be, that according to the diversity of natures and complexions both opinions are true: but touching the utility of either, it is certain that adversity hath this preheminence, it is the seed, the occasion, the matter of well-doing, the field of heroicall virtues, *Virescit vulnere virtus: ægræ fortunæ sana consilia melius in malis sapimus: secunda rectum auferunt. Virtue flourisheth by adversity: We better know sound advice by the difficult fortune of disastrous things; prosperitie blindeth the truth.*

4 *The advice of the wise upon both.*

Now wisdome teacheth us to hold our selves indifferent and upright in all our life, and to keep alwayes one and the same countenance, pleasant and constant. A wise man is a skilfull artificer, who maketh profit of all; of every matter he worketh and formeth virtue, as that excellent Painter *Phidias*, all manner of images; whatsoever lighteth into his hands he maketh it a fit subject to do good, and with one and the same countenance he beholdeth the two different faces of Fortune. *Ad utrosq; casus sapiens aptus est, bonorum rector, malorum victor: In secundis non confidit, in adversis non deficit, nec avidus periculi, nec fugax, prosperitatem non exspectans, ad utrumque paratus; adversus utrumque intrepidus, nec illius tumultu, nec hujus fulgore percussus. Contra calamitates fortis & contumax, luxuriæ non adversus tantùm, sed & infestus: hoc præcipuum in humanis rebus erigere animũ supra minas & promissa fortunæ. A wise man*

*himself for all fortunes he governeth the good, subdueth the evil; He presumes not in prosperity, nor despairs in adversitie; he neither desires danger; nor shuns it, he exspecteth not prosperity but is ready at all assayes; fearing neither felicity nor adversity: not moved with the clamour of the one, nor the glory of the other. Strong and despising all miseries, not onely against all superfluitie and excesse, but even an enemy unto it; who in worldly things, hath a spirit erected above fortunes threats or promises.* Wisdome furnisheth us with arms and discipline for both combats; against adversitie with a spurre, teaching us to raise, to strengthen and incite our courage; and this is the virtue of fortitude: against prosperitie, it furnisheth us with a bridle, and teacheth us to keep and clap down our wings, and to keep our selves within the bounds of modestie; and this is the virtue of temperancie: these are the two morall virtues, against the two fortunes, which that great Philosopher *Epictetus* did very well signifie, containing in two words all morall Philosophie, *Sustine & Abstine*, bear the evil, that is, adversitie; abstain from the good, that is, from pleasure and prosperitie. The particular advisements against the particular prosperities and adversities shall be in the third book following, in the virtue of fortitude and temperancie. Here we will onely set down the generall instructions and remedies against all prosperitie and adversitie, because in this book we teach the way in generall unto wisdome, as hath been said in the preface thereof.

5 *Of Prosperity.* Against all prosperitie, the common doctrine and counsel consisteth in three points: The first, that honours, riches, and the favours of fortune, are ill and wrongfully accounted and called goods, since they neither make a man good, nor reform a wicked man, and are common both to good and wicked. He that calleth them goods, and in them hath placed the good of man, hath fastened our felicitie to a rotten cable, and ankred it in the quick-sands. For what is there more uncertain and inconstant, then the possession of such goods, which come and go, passe and run on like a river? like a river they make a noise, at their coming in, they are full of violence, they are troubled; their entrance is full of vexation, and they vanish in a moment, and when they are quite dried up, there remaineth nothing in the bottome but the mud.

The second point is to remember, that prosperitie is like a honied poyson, sweet and pleasant, but dangerous, whereof we must take very good heed. When fortune laugheth, and every thing falleth out according to our own hearts, then should we fear most, and

stand upon our guard, bridle our affections, compose our actions by reason, above all avoid presumption, which ordinarily followeth the favour of the time. Prosperitie is a slipperie pase, wherein a man must take sure footing, for there is no time wherein men do more forget God. It is a rare and difficult thing to find a man who doth willingly attribute unto him the cause of his felicitie. And this is the cause why in the greatest prosperitie we must use the counsel of our friends, and give them more authoritie over us, then at other times; and therefore we must carry our selves as in an evil and dangerous way, go with fear and doubt, desiring the hand and help of another. In these times of prosperitie, adversitie is a medicine, because it leadeth us to the knowledge of our selves.

The third is to retain our desires, and to set a measure unto them. Prosperitie puffeth up the heart, spurreth us forward, findeth nothing difficult, breedeth alwayes a desire of great matters (as they do that by eating get an appetite) and it carrieth us beyond our selves, and in this state it is where a man loseth himself, drowneth and maketh a mockery of himself. He playeth the Monkie, who leapeth from bough to bough, till he come to the top of the tree, and then sheweth his tail. O how many have been lost, and have perished miserably, by the want of discretion to moderate themselves in their prosperitie! We must therefore either stay our selves, or go forward with a slower pase, if we will enjoy the benefit of our prosperitie, and not hold our selves alwayes in chase and purchase. It is wisdome to know how to settle our own rest, our own contentment, which cannot be where there is no stay, no end. *Siqua finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt: What cannot be determined is beyond wisdome.* 7.

Against all adversitie, these are the generall advisements. In the first place, we must take heed of the common and vulgar opinion, erroneous and alwayes different from true reason: for to discredit and to bring into hatred and horrour all adversitie and afflictions, they call them evils, disasters, mischiefs, although all outward things be neither good nor evil. Never did adversitie make a man wicked, but hath rather served as a means to amend those that are wicked, and are common both to the good and to the wicked. 8. *Of adversity, and that it is no evil.*

Doubtlesse, crosses and heavie accidents are common to all, but they work divers effects, according to that subject whereupon they light. To fools and reprobate persons they serve to drive them into despair, to afflict and enrage them: Perhaps they enforce them 9. *It is common to all, but diversly.*

(if they be heavy and extreme) to stoop, to cry unto God, to look up unto heaven; but that is all: To sinners and offenders they are so many lively instructions, and compulsions to put them in mind of their duty, and to bring them to the knowledge of God: To virtuous people, they are the lists and theaters wherein to exercise their virtue, to win unto themselves greater commendations and a neerer alliance with God: To wise men they are matter of good, and sometimes stages and degrees whereby to pass and mount up to all height and greatness, as we see and may read of divers, who being assailed by such and so great crosses, as a man would have thought them their utter overthrow and undoing, have been raised by the self-same means to the highest pitch of their own desires, and contrariwise without that infelicity, had still remained under hatches; as that great *Athenian* Captain knew well, when he said, *Perieremus nisi periissemus: We should utterly have perished, if we had not perished.* A very excellent example hereof was *Joseph* the son of *Jacob*. It is true that these are blowes from heaven, but the virtue and wisdome of man serveth as a proper instrument; from whence came that wise saying of the Sages, *To make of necessity a virtue*. It is a very good husbandry, and the first property of a wise man, to draw good from evil, to handle his affaires with such dexterity, and so to win the wind, and to set the bias, that of that which is ill, he may make good use, and better his own condition.

10. *It hath three causes, and three effects.*

Afflictions and adversities proceed from three causes, which are the three authors and workers of our punishments: sin the first inventor which hath brought them into nature: the anger and justice of God, which setteth them a work as his Commissaries and executioners: the policy of the world troubled and changed by sin; wherein as a general revolt, and civil tumult, things not being in their due places, and not doing their office, all evils do spring and arise; as in a body the dis-joynting of the members, and dislocation of the bones, bringeth great pain, and much unquietness. These three are not favourable unto us: the first is to be hated of all as our enemy, the second to be feared as terrible, the third to be avoided as an imposture. That a man may the better defend and quit himself from all three, there is no better way then to use their own proper arms, wherewith they punish us, as *David* cut off *Goliahs* head with his own sword, making of necessity a virtue, profit of pain and affliction, turning them against themselves. Affliction is

the

the true fruit or fience of sin, being well taken, is the death and ruine thereof; and it doth that to the author thereof, which the viper doth to his dam that brought him forth. It is the oyl of the Scorpion, which healeth his own sting, to the end it may perish by its own invention: *periit arte suâ: patimur quia peccavimus; patimur ut non peccemus: He perisheth by his own Art: We suffer because we have sinned; we suffer that we should not sin.* It is the file of the soul, which scoureth, purifieth and cleanseth it from all sin. And consequently it appeaseth the anger of God, and freeth us from the prisons and bands of Justice, to bring us into the fair and clear sun-shine of grace and mercy. Finally, it weaneth us from the world, it plucketh us from the dug, and maketh us distaste with the bitterness thereof (like worm-wood upon the teat of the nurse) the sweet milk and food of this deceitful world.

11 *A general advice.*

A great and principal mean for a man to carry himself well in adversity, is to be an honest man. A virtuous man is more peaceable in adversity, then a vicious in prosperity: like those that have a fever, who feel and find more harm and violence in the heat and cold thereof, and in the extremity of their fits, then such as are sound, in the heat and cold of Summer & Winter. And even so they that have their consciences sick, are much more tormented, then they that are sound, that are honest men: For, having the inward part whole and healthful, they can no way be endamaged by the outward, especially opposing against it a good courage.

12. *An advice more special.*

Adversities are of two sorts; some are true, natural, as sickness, griefs, loss of those things we love: others are false and fained, either by a common or particular opinion, and not in verity. That it is so, man hath his spirit and body, as much at command, as before they hapned. To these kind of men, only this one word; That which thou complainest of, is neither painful nor troublesome, but thou makest it such, and makest thy self to believe it.

13. *Natural. To endure is natural and humane.*

As touching the true and natural, the more prompt and popular and more sound opinions are the more natural and more just. First we must remember, that a man indureth nothing against the humane and natural law, since even at the birth of man all these things are annexed, and given as ordinary. In whatsoever doth afflict us, let us consider two things, the nature of that that happeneth unto us, and that which is in our selves: and using things according to nature, we can receive no tediousnesse or offence thereby.

For offence is a maladie of the soul contrary to nature, and therefore should by no means come near unto us. There is not any accident in the world which may happen unto us, wherein nature hath not prepared an aptnes in us to receive it, & to turn it to our contentment. There is no manner of life so strait, that hath not some solace and recreation. There is no prison so strong and dark, that gives not place to a song sometimes to comfort a prisoner. *Jonas* had leisure to make his prayer unto God even in the belly of the Whale, and was heard. It is a favour of nature that it findeth a remedie and ease unto our evils in the bearing of them, it being so that man is born to be subject to all sorts of miseries, *Omnia ad quæ gemimus, quæ expaviſſimus, tributa vitæ ſunt: All things that afflict or grieve us, are the tributes of life.*

14. *It toucheth but the lesser part of man.*

Secondly, we must remember, that there is onely the lesser part of man subject to fortune; we have the principall in our own power, and it cannot be overcome without our own consent. Fortune may make a man poor, sick, afflicted, but not vicious, dissolute, dejected; it cannot take from us probitie, courage, virtue,

15. *It is against reason and justice.*

Afterwards we must come to fidelitie, reason, justice. Many times a man complaineth unjustly, for though he be sometimes surprised with some ill accident, yet he is more often with a good, and so the one must recompense the other. And if a man consider well thereof, he shall find more reason to content himself with his good fortunes, then to complain of his bad: and as we turn our eyes from those things that offend us, and delight to cast them upon green and pleasant colours, so must we divert our thoughts from heavie and melancholick occurrents, and apply them to those that are pleasant and pleasing unto us. But we are malicious, resembling cupping glasses, which draw the corrupt bloud, and leave the good, like a covetous man who selleth the best wine, and drinks the worst, like little children, from whom if you take away one of their play-games, in a fury they cast away all the rest. For if any misfortune happen unto us, we torment our selves, and forget all the rest that may any way comfort us: yea, some there are that for small losses term themselves unfortunate in all things, and forget that they ever received any good, in such sort, that an ounce of adversitie brings them more hearty grief then ten thousand of prosperity, pleasure or delight.

16. *It is little in comparison.*

We must likewise cast our eyes upon those that are of a far worse condition then our selves, who would think themselves happy if they were in our place.

*Cum*

*Cum tibi displiceat rerum fortuna tuarum,*
*Alterius specta, quo sis discrimine pejor.*
*If thou griev'st thou art not such*
*As thy neighbour, over much,*
*Streight reflect upon the poor,*
*Think the rest, and grieve the more.*

It were good and necessary that these complainers did practise the saying and advice of a wise man, that if all the evils that men suffer should be compared with the blessings they enjoy, the division being equally made, they may see by the over-plus of that good they enjoy, the injustice of their complaint. 17.

After all these opinions, we may conclude that there are two great remedies against all evils and adversities, which may be reduced almost to one; Custome for the vulgar and baser sort, and meditation for the wiser. Both of them have their force from time, the common and strongest salve against all evils; but the wise take it before hand, this is his fore-sight, and the feeble and vulgar sort after hand. That custome prevaileth much it doth plainly appear, in that those things that are most tedious and offensive, are made thereby easie and pleasing. *Natura calamitatum mollimentum consuetudinem invenit: Custome mitigateth calamitie.* Slaves weep when they enter into the gallies, and before three moneths be ended they sing. They that have not been accustomed to the sea, are afread, though it be at the calmest, when they weigh anker, whereas the Mariners laugh in the midst of a tempest. The wife groweth desperate at the death of her husband, and before a year be expired she loves another. Time and custome bring all things to passe; that which offendeth us is the novelty of that which happeneth unto us, *Omnia novitate graviora sunt: All new and unexspected crosses, are more intolerable.*

Meditation performeth the same office with wise men, and by the force thereof things are made familiar and ordinary: *Quæ alii diu patiendo levia faciunt, sapiens levia facit diu cogitando: That which some make light by long suffering, a wise man makes light and easie by long cogitation.* He considereth exactly the nature of all things that may offend him, and presenteth unto himself whatsoever may happen unto him most grievous and insupportable, as sickness, povertie, exsile, injuries, and examineth in them all that which is according to nature or contrary to it. For foresight or providence is a great remedie against all evils, which cannot bring any great alteration 18. *Fore-sight or providence.*

alteration or change, happening to a man that attendeth them; whereas contrary they wound and hurt him greatly, that suffereth himself to be surprised by them. Meditation and discourse is that which giveth the true temper to the soul, prepareth it, confirmeth it against all assaults, makes it hard, steely, impenitrable against whatsoever would wound or hurt it. Sudden accidents how great soever, can give no great blow to him that keeps himself upon his guard, and is alwayes ready to receive them. *Præmeditati mali mollis ictus venit: quicquid exspectatum est diu, levius accidit: The hurt is small, if the harm before be known; whatsoever we do long exspect, doth happen the lighter.* Now to attain this foresight, we must first know, that nature hath placed us here as in a thorny and slippery place; that that which is happened unto another, may also light upon us; that that which hangeth over all, may fall upon every one of us; and that in all the affairs that we undertake, we premeditate the inconveniencies and evil encounters which may happen unto us, to the end we be not surprized unawares. O how much are we deceived, and how little judgement have we, when we think, that that which happeneth to others, cannot likewise fall upon us! When we will not be wary and provident, for fear lest we should be thought fearfull, Contrariwise, if we take knowledge of things as reason would have us, we would rather wonder that so few crosses happen upon us, and that those accidents that follow us so near, have stayed so long before they catch us, and having caught us, how they should handle us so mildly. He that taketh heed, and considereth the adversity of another, as a thing that may happen unto himself, before it shall happen is sufficiently armed. We must think of all, and exspect the worst; they are fools and ill-advised, that say, I had not thought it. It is an old saying, That he that is suddenly surprised, is half beaten; and he that is warned is half armed, nay it is two against one. A wise man in time of peace, makes his preparation for war: A good mariner before he go forth of the haven makes provision of what is necessary to resist the violence of a tempest: it is too late to provide against an evil, when it is already come. In whatsoever we are prepared before-hand, we find our selves apt and admirable, what difficulty soever it have; and contrariwise, there is not any thing so easie that doth not hurt and hinder us if we be but novelists therein: *Id videndum nè quid inopinatum fit nobis, quia omnia novitate graviora sunt: We ought to foresee that nothing happen unto us unlooked for, because all novelties are the more*

*more grievous.* Doubtless it seemeth, that if we were so provident as we should and may be, we should wonder at nothing. That which thou sawest before it came, is happened unto thee, why then wondrest thou? Let us then take a course that accidents do not surprize us; Let us ever stand upon our guard and foresee what is to come. *Animus adversus omnia firmandus; ut dicere possimus, Non ulla laborum, O virgo, nova mihi facies inopinâve surgit: Omnia percepi, atque animo mecum ipse peregi. Tu hodie ista denuncias; ego semper denunciavi mihi: hominem paravi ad humana. The mind must be armed for all things, that we may hold nothing tedious or painfull. O virgin, there seems unto me a new and unexspected countenance to appear. I have considered of all things, and am resolved thereof in mind. To day hast thou shewed me all these things, which always I foretold to my self: I have framed man for humane things.*

## CHAP. VIII.

### *To obey and observe the Laws, Customes, and Ceremonies of the Countrey, how and in What sense.*

EVen as a savage and untamed beast, will not suffer himself to be taken, led, and handled by man, but either flieth and hideth himself from him, or armeth himself against him, and with furie assaulteth him, if he approach near unto him; in such sort that a man must use force mingled with art and subtiltie to take and tame him: So folly will not be handled by reason, or wisdome, but striveth and stirreth against it, and addeth folly unto folly: and therefore it must be taken, and lead, like a wild beast, (that which a man is to a beast, a wiseman is to a fool) astonished, feared and kept short, that with the more ease it may be instructed and won. Now the proper mean or help thereunto, is a great authority, a thundering power and gravitie, which may dazle it with splendour of his lightning, *Sola authoritas est quæ cogit stultos ut ad sapientiam festinent: It is onely authoritie that inforceth fools to apply themselves to Wisdome.* In a popular fight or sedition, if some great, wise, ancient, and virtuous personage come in presence, that hath won the publick reputation of honour and virtue, presently the mutinous people being stricken and blinded with the bright splendour of his authority, are quieted, attending what he will say unto them.

I *The beginning, institution and authority of the Laws.*

*August.*

——*Velut*

*—Veluti magno in populo cùm sæpe coorta*
*Seditio est, sævitque animis ignobile vulgus,*
*Jámque faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:*
*Tum pietate gravem ac meritis, si fortè virum quem*
*Conspexêre, silent, arectíque auribus astant,*
*Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*
*Even as when tumults to sedition grow,*
*And Hobhorn mad though cause he none do know*
*Without himself: example so encharms*
*This headlong rout, whose fury gives it arms:*
*As fire-brands, stones, and all things flie about,*
*Their rage encounters: so there is no doubt*
*Of certain harm; unless (as sent from God)*
*Some grave, censorious Cato with his rod*
*Appear in time, at whose authority*
*They silent stand, and hear him speak, well nigh*
*An hour together, till their fury die,*
*So all is hush't: the same that now do sing,*
*Each to his tent, now cry, God save the King.*

There is nothing greater in this world then authority, which is an image of God, a messenger from Heaven: if it be sovereign, it is called Majestie; if subaltern, Authority: and by two things it is maintained, admiration and fear mingled together. Now this Majestie and Authority is first and properly in the person of the Sovereign Prince and Law-maker, where it is lively, actuall, and moving; afterwards in his commandments and ordinances, that is to say, in the Law, which is the head of the work of the Prince, and the image of a lively and original Majestie. By this are fools reduced, conducted, and guided. Behold then of what weight, necessity, and utilitie, Authority and the Law is in the world.

2 *Of Custome.*

The next authority, and that which is likest to the Law, is Custome, which is another powerfull and imperious mistress: It seizeth upon this power, and usurpeth it traiterously and violently; for it planteth this authority by little and little, by stealth, as it were insensibly, by a little pleasing, and humble beginning; having settled and established it self, by the help of time, it discovereth afterwards a furious and tyrannicall visage, against which there is no more liberty or power left, so much as to lift up ones eyes: It taketh its authority from the possession and use thereof, it encreaseth and ennobleth it self by continuance like a river; it is dangerous to bring it back to his originall fountain.

Law

Law and Custome establish their authority diversly, custome by little and little, with long time, sweetly and without force, by the common consent of all, or the greater part & the author thereof are the people. The law springeth up in a moment with authority and power, and taketh his force from him that hath power to command all, yea many times against the liking of the subject, whereupon some compare it to a tyrant, and custome to a King. Again, custome hath with it neither reward nor punishment; the law hath them both, at least punishment, nevertheless they may mutually help and hinder one another. For custome, which is but of sufferance, authorized by the soveraign, is better confirmed: and the law likewise settleth its own authority by possession & use; and contrariwise custome may be cashiered by a contrary law, and the law loseth the force thereof by suffering a contrary custom: but ordinarily they are together, that is, law and custome; wise and spiritual men considering it as a law, and simple men as a custome.

3 *A comparison of them both.*

There is not a thing more strange, then the diversity and strangeness of some laws and customes in the world; Neither is there any opinion or imagination so variable, so mad, which is not established by laws and customs in some place or other: I am content to recite some of them, to shew those that are hard of belief herein, how far this proposition doth go. Yet omitting to speak of those things that belong to religion, which is the subject where the greatest wonderments and grossest impostures are: but because it is without the commerce of men, and that it is not properly a custome, and where it is easie to be deceived, I will not meddle with it. See then a brief of those that for the strangeness are best worth the noting. To account it an office of piety in a certain age, to kill their parents and to eat them. In Innes to pay the shot, by yielding their children, wives and daughters, to the pleasure of the host: publick brothel-houses of males: old men lending their wives unto young: women common: an honour to women to have accompanied with many men, and to carry their locks in the hembes of their garments: daughters to go with their privy parts uncovered, and married women carefully to keep them covered: to leave the daughters to their pleasures, and being great with child to enforce an obort in the sight and knowledg of all men; but married women to keep themselves chaste and faithful to their husbands: woman the first night before they company with their husbands, to receive all the males of the estate and profession of their husbands, invited to the marriage,

4 *Their diversity and strangeness.*

*Of laws and customes in the world.*

marriage, and ever after to be faithful to their husbands: young married women to present their virginity to their Prince, before they lie with their husbands: marriages of males: women to go to war with their husbands: to die and to kill themselves at the decease of their husbands, or shortly after: to permit widows to marry again, if their husbands die a violent death, and not otherwise: husbands to be divorced from their wives without alledging any cause: to sell them if they be barren, to kill them for no other cause but because they are women, and afterwards to borrow women of others at their need: women to be delivered without pain or fear: to kill their children because they are not fair, well featured, or without cause: at meat to wipe their fingers upon their privities and their feet: to live with mans flesh: to eat flesh and fish raw: many men and women to lye together to the number of ten or twelve: to salute one another by putting the finger to the ground, and afterwards lifting it towards heaven: to turn the back when they salute; and never to look him in the face whom a man will honour: to take into the hand the spittle of the Prince: not to speak to the King but at a peep-hole: in a mans whole life never to cut his hair nor nails: to cut the hair on one side, and the nailes of one hand, and not of the other: men to pisse sitting, women standing: to make holes and pits in the flesh of the face, and the dugs, to hang rings and jewels in: to contemn death, to receive it with joy, to sue for it, to plead in publick for the honour thereof, as for a dignity and favour: to account it an honourable burial to be eaten with dogs, birds, to be boyled, cut in pieces and pounded, and their powder to be cast into their ordinary drink.

5. *Examination and judgment.* When we come to judge of these customes, that is the complaint and the trouble: the vulgar sort and pedante, are not troubled herewith; for every seditious rout condemneth as barbarous and beastly whatsoever pleaseth not their palat, that is to say, the common use and custome of their countrey. And if a man shall tell them, that others do speak and judge the same of ours, and are as much offended with ours, as we with theirs; they cut a man short after their manner, terming them beasts and barbarians, which is alwaies to say the same thing. A wise man is more advised, as shall be said, he maketh not such haste to judge, for fear lest he wrong his own judgment: and to say the truth, there are many laws and customes which seem at the first view to be savage, inhumane, and contrary to all reason, which if they were without passion and soundly considered

sidered of, if they were not found to be altogether just and good, yet at the least they would not be without some reason and defence. Let us take amongst the rest for example the two first which we have spoken of, which seem to be both the strangest and farthest off from the duty of piety: to kill their own parents at a certain age, and to eat them. They that have this custome, do take it to be a testimony of piety and good affection, endeavouring thereby first of mere piety to deliver their old parents, not onely unprofitable to themselves and others, but burthensome, languishing and leading a painful and troublesome life, and to place them in rest and ease; afterwards giving them the most worthy and commendable sepulcher, lodging in themselves and their own bowels the bodies and reliques of their parents, in a manner reviving them again, and regenerating them by a kind of transmutation into their living flesh, by the means of the digestion and nourishment. These reasons would not seem over-light to him that is not possessed with a contrary opinion: and it is an easie matter to consider, what cruelty and abomination it had been to these people, to see their parents before their own eyes to suffer such grief and torment, and they not able to succour them, and afterwards to cast their spoiles to the corruption of the earth, to stench and rottenness and the food of worms, which is the worst that can be done unto it. *Darius* made a tryal, asking some Greeks, *for what they would be perswaded to follow the custome of the Indians, in eating their dead fathers.* To whom they answered, *That they would not do it for any thing in the world.* And on the other side assaying to perswade the *Indians* to burn the bodies of their dead parents, as the *Greeks* did, it seemed to them a matter of such difficulty and horrour, as that they would never be drawn unto it. I will add onely one other, which concerneth only matter of decency and comelinesse, and is more light and more pleasant: One that alwaies blew his nose with his hand, being reprehended for incivility, in the defence of himself, asked what priviledg that filthy excrement had, that a man must afford it a fair handkerchief to receive, and afterwards carefully wrap and fold it up, which he thought was a matter of greater loathsomnesse, then to cast it from him. So that we see that for all things there may be found some seeming reason, and therefore we are not suddenly and lightly to condemn any thing.

6 *The authority thereof.*

But who would believe how great and imperious the authority of custome is? He that said it was another nature, did not sufficiently

ently expresse it; for it doth more then nature, it conquereth nature, for hence it is that the most beautifull daughters of men draw not unto love their naturall parents, nor brethren, though excellent in beautie, win not the love of their sisters. This kind of chastitie is not properly of nature, but of the use of lawes, and customes which forbid them, and make of incest a great sinne, as we may see in the fact not onely of the children of *Adam*, where there was an enforced necessitie, but of *Abraham* and *Nachor* brethren; of *Jacob* and *Judas* Patriarchs, *Amram* the father of *Moses*, and other holy men: And it is the law of *Moses* which forbad it in these first degrees; but it hath also sometimes dispensed therewith, not onely in the collaterall line, and betwixt brothers, and their brothers wives, which was a commandment, and not a dispensation: and which is more, between the naturall brother and sister of divers wombs: but also in the right line of alliance, that is to say, of the son with the mother in law; for in the right line of blond, it seemeth to be altogether against nature, notwithstanding the fact of the daughters of *Lot* with their father, which nevertheless was produced purely by nature, in that extreme apprehension and fear of the end of humane kind, for which cause they have been excused by great and learned Doctours. Now against nature there is not any dispensation, if God the onely superiour thereunto give it not. Finally, of casuall incests and not voluntary the world is full, as *Tertullian* teacheth. Moreover, custome doth enforce the rules of nature, witnesse those Physitians who many times leave the naturall reasons of their Art by their own authority, as they that by custome do live and sustain their lives with poyson, Spiders, Emmets, Lyzards, Toads, which is a common practice amongst the people of the West *Indies*. It likewise dulleth our senses, witnesse they that live near the fall of the river *Nilus*, neer clocks, armories, mills, and the whole world according to some Philosophers, with the sound of a heavenly kind of musick, & the continual and divers motions of the heavens dulleth our senses, that we hear not that which we hear. To conclude, (and it is the principall fruit thereof) it overcometh all difficultie, maketh things easie that seem impossible, sweetneth all sowr, and therefore by the means hereof a man lives in all things content, but yet it mastereth our souls, our beliefs, our judgements, with a most unjust and tyrannicall authority. It doth and undoeth, authoriseth and disauthoriseth whatsoever it please, without rhythme or reason, yea many times against all reason: It establisheth

Gen. 11. 20. 29. 35. Exodus 6. Levit. 28.

Deut. 25. 2 Reg. 12. 3 Reg. 2.

*Chrysost. Ambros. August. In Apolog.*

eth

eth in the world against reason and judgement all the opinions, religions, beliefs, observances, manners, and sorts of life most phantasticall and rude, as before hath been said. And contrarily, it wrongfully degradeth, robbeth, beateth down in things that are truly great and admirable, their price and estimation and maketh them base and vile.

*Nil adeo magnum, nec tam mirabile quidquam*
*Principio, quod non cessent mirarier omnes*
*Paulatim.—*
*Nine daies a wonder; nought so Wonderfull*
*At first; but time and frequencie will dull,*
*And so the Rain-bow, Manna Moon and Sun,*
*Have not the same respect, that first Was done.*

So that we see that custome is a thing great and powerfull. *Plato* having reprehended a youth for playing at cob-nut, or cherry-pit, and receiving this answer from him; That he controlled him for a matter of small moment, replyed; My child, custome is not a matter of small moment. A speech well worth the noting for all such as have youth to bring up. But it exerciseth its power with so absolute authoritie, that there is no striving against it, neither is it lawfull to reason, or call into question the ordinances thereof: it enchanteth us in such sort, that it maketh us believe, that what is without the bounds thereof, is without the bounds of reason, and there is nothing good and just, but what it approveth; *ratione non componimur, sed consuetudine abducimur: honestius putamus quod frequentius: recti apud nos locum tenet error, ubi publicus factus: We are not made by reason, but misled by custome; We hold that most honest, that is most used. Errour hath place in us before Right.* This is tolerable with idiots and the vulgar sort, who wanting sufficiencie to look into the depth of things, to trie and to judge, do well to hold and settle themselves to that which is commonly held and received: but to wise men, who play another part, it is a base thing to suffer themselves to be carried with customes. Seneca.

Now the advice which I here give unto him that would be wise, is to keep and observe both in word and deed the lawes and customes which he findeth established in the countrey where he is: and in like manner to respect and obey the magistrates and all superiours; but alwayes with a noble spirit, and after a generous manner, and not servilely, pedantically, superstitiously, and withall not taking offence, nor lightly condemning other strange lawes and cu- 7 *An Advice.*

stomes, but freely and soundly judging and examining the one and the other, as hath been said, and not binding his judgment and belief but unto reason only. Hereof a word or two.

1. *Lawes and customes are to be observed.*

In the first place according to all the wisest, the rule of rules, and the general law of laws, is to follow and observe the laws and customes of the Countrey where he is, νόμοις ἕπεσθαι πάσιν ἐγχώρους κελεύει, avoiding carefully all singularity, and strange extravagant particularity, different from the common and ordinary; for whatsoever it be it alwaies hurteth and woundeth another, is suspected of folly, hypocrisie, ambitious passion, though perhaps it proceed from a sick and weak soul. *Non conturbabit sapiens publicos mores, nec populum in se, novitate vitæ convertet: He that is wise will not seek to alter the manners of the people; neither pull men upon him with his innovations.* We must alwaies walk under the covert of the laws, customes, superiours, without disputation or tergiversation, without undertaking sometimes to dispense with the laws, sometimes like a frugal servant to enhance the price.

2. *Not for their justice and equity.*

But that it be (which is the second rule) out of a good mind, and after a good manner, nobly and wisely, neither for the love nor fear of them, nor for the justice or equity that is in them, nor for fear of that punishment that may follow for not obeying them: to be brief, not of superstition, nor constrained, scrupulous, fearful servitude, *Eadem qua populus, sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito faciet sapiens: A wise man doth those things that other men do; but not in that fashion, nor to the same end,* but freely and simply for publick reverence, and for their authority. Laws and customes are maintained in credit, not because they are just and good, but because they are laws and customes: this is the mystical foundation of their authority, they have no other; and so is it with superiours, because they are superiours: *Quia supra cathedram sedent: Because they sit in the chair of authority,* not because they are virtuous and honest: *quæ faciunt, nolite facere: what they do, do not you.* He that obeyeth them for any other cause, obeyeth them not because he should; this is an evil and a dangerous subject, it is not true obedience, which must be pure and simple, *Unde vocatur depositio discretionis, mera executio, abnegatio sui: From whence it is named, a putting off of his own reason, a mere obedience in the execution, and a denying of himself.* Now to go about to measure our obedience by the justice and goodness of laws and superiours, were by submitting them to their judgment, to serve them with process, and to call

our

our obedience into doubt and disputation, and consequently the state and policie according to the inconstancie and diversity of judgements. How many unjust and strange laws are there in the world, not onely in the particular judgements of men, but of universall reason, wherewith the world hath lived a long time in continuall peace and rest, with as great satisfaction, as if they had been very just and reasonable? And he that should go about to change or mend them, would be accounted an enemy to the Weal-publick, and never be admitted: The nature of man doth accommodate it self to all with the times, and having once caught his fish, it is an act of hostilitie to go about to alter any thing: we must leave the world where it is; these trouble-houses, and new-fangled spirits, under a pretext of reformation, marre all.

*Against Innovators.*

All change and alteration of Laws, Beliefs, Customes, and Observances is very dangerous, and yieldeth alwayes more evill then good; it bringeth with it certain and present evils, for a good that is uncertain and to come. Innovators have alwayes glorious and plausible titles, but they are but the more suspected, and they cannot escape the note of ambitious presumption, in that they think to see more cleerly then others, and that to establish their opinions, the State, Policie, Peace, and publick quiet, must be turned topsie turvie.

3

*Strange things are not ligthly to be condemed*

I will not say for all this that hath been said before, that we must absolutely obey all Laws, all Commandments of Superiours: for such as a man knoweth evidently to be either against God or nature, he is not to obey, and yet not to rebell and trouble the State: how he should govern himself in such a case, shall be taught hereafter, in the obedience due unto Princes: for to say the truth, this inconvenience and infelicity, is rather, and more common in the commandments of Princes, then in the Laws: neither is it sufficient to obey the Laws and Superiours, because of their worth and merit, nor servilely and for fear, as the common and profane sort do; but a wise man doth nothing by force or fear; *Soli hoc sapienti contingit, ut nil faciat invitus; recta sequitur, gaudet officio*: *This is onely incident to wise men, that they do nothing by constraint; they follow the right, and perform their duty*: he doth that which he should, and keeps the Laws, not for fear of them, but for the love of himself, being jealous of his dutie; he hath not to do with the Laws, to do well, that is that wherein he differeth from the common

sort, who cannot do well, nor know what they ought to do, without lawes; *At justo & sapienti non est lex posita: The law was not ordained for the just and righteous.* By right a wise man is above the lawes, but in outward and publick effect, he is their voluntary and free obedient subject. In the third place thereof, it is an act of lightnesse and injurious presumption, yea, a testimonie of weaknesse and insufficiencie, to condemn that which agreeth not with the law and custome of his countrey. This proceedeth either from want of leasure or sufficiencie to consider the reasons and grounds of others; this is to wrong and shame his own judgement, whereby he is enforced many times to recant; and not to remember that the nature of man is capable of all things; It is to suffer the eye of his spirit to be hood-winked, and brought a sleep by a long custome, and preseription to have power over judgement.

4 *wisely to examine all things*

Finally, it is the office of a generous spirit and a Wiseman (whom I here endeavour to describe) to examine all things, to consider apart, and afterwards to compare together all the lawes and customes of the world, which shall come to his knowledge, and to judge of them (not to rule his obedience by them, as hath been said, but to exercise his office, since he hath a spirit to that end) faithfully and without passion, according to the rule of truth and universall reason, and nature, whereunto he is first obliged, not flattering himself, or staining his judgement with errour: and to content himself to yield obedience unto those whereunto he is secondly and particularly bound, whereby none shall have cause to complain of him. It may fall out sometimes, that we may do that, by a second, particular, and municipall obligation (obeying the lawes and customes of the countrey) which is against the first and more ancient, that is to say, universall nature and reason; but yet we satisfie nature by keeping our judgements and opinions true and just according to it. For we have nothing so much ours, and whereof we may freely dispose; the world hath nothing to do with our thoughts, but the outward man is engaged to the publick course of the world, and must give an account thereof; so that many times, we do justly that, which justly we approve not. There is no remedie for so goes the world.

5 *Of Ceremonies.*

After these two mistrisses, Law and Custome, comes the third, which hath no lesse authoritie and power with many, yea, is more rough and tyrannicall to those that too much tie themselves thereunto. This is the ceremony of the world, which to say the truth, is for the

the most part but vanity, yet holdeth such place, and usurpeth such authoritie, by the remisnesse and contagious corruption of the world, that many think that wisdome consisteth in the observation thereof, and in such sort do voluntarily enthrall themselves thereunto, that rather then they will cantradict it, they prejudice their health, benefit, businesse, libertie, conscience and all; which is a very great folly, and the fault and infelicitie of many Courtiers, who above others are the idolaters of Ceremonie. Now my will is, that this my wise man, do carefully defend himself from this captivitie; I do not mean, that out of a kind of loose incivilitie, he abuse a ceremonie, for we must forgive the world in something, and as much as may be outwardly conform our selves to that which is in practice; but my will is, that he tie not, and inthrall himself thereunto, but that with a gallant and generous boldnesse he know how to leave it when he will, and when it is fit, and in such manner, as that he give all men to know, that it is not out of carelesnesse, or delicacie, or ignorance, or contempt, but because he would not seem ignorant how to esteem of it as is fit, nor suffer his judgement and will to be corrupted with such a vanitie, and that he lendeth himself to the world when it pleaseth him, but never giveth himself.

## CHAP. IX.

### *To carry himself well With another.*

THis matter belongeth to the virtue of justice, which teacheth how to live well with all, and to give to every one that which appertaineth unto him, which shall be handled in the book following, where shall be set down the particular and divers opinions according to the diversitie of persons. Here are onely the generall, following the purpose and subject of this book. 1

There is here a twofold consideration (and consequently two parts in this Chapter) according to the two manners of conversing with the world, the one is simple, generall and common, the ordinary commerce of the world, whereunto the times, the affairs, the voyages, and encounters do daily lead, and change acquaintance from those we know, to those we know not, strangers, without our choice, or voluntarie consents: the other speciall is in affected and desired company and acquaintance, either sought after and chosen, or being offered and presented, hath been embraced, and that either for spirituall or corporall profit or pleasure, wherein there is 2

conference, communication, privity, and familiarity: each of them have their advisements apart. But before we enter into them, it shall not be amisse by way of preface, to give you some general and fundamental advice of all the rest.

3 *Facility and universality of humours.*

It is a great vice (whereof this our wise-man must take heed) and a defect inconvenient both to himself and to another, to be bound and subject to certain humours and complexions to one only course; that is, to be a slave to himself, so to be captivated to his proper inclinations, that he cannot be bent to any other, a testimony of an anxious scrupulous mind, and ill bred, too amorous, and too partial to it self. These kind of people hath much to endure and to contest: and contrariwise it is a great sufficiency and wisdome to accommodate himself to all. *Istud est sapere, qui ubicunque opus sit animum possis flectere: It is wisdome to frame the mind, as occasion shall still require.* To be supple and manaible, to know how to rise and fall, to bring himself into order, when there is need. The fairest minds, and the best born, are the more universal, the more common, appliable to all understandings, communicative and open to all people. It is a beautiful quality, which resembleth and imitateth the goodness of God, it is the honour which was given to old *Cato. Huic versatile ingenium, sic pariter ad omnia fuit, ut natum ad id unum diceres, quodcunque ageret: Whose mind was apt for all things; which generally was such, as whatsoever he did, he was said to be born to the same purpose.*

4 *The first part. Advice touching simple and common conversation.*

Let us see the advisements of the first consideration, of the simple and common conversation, I will here set down some, whereof the first shall be, to keep silence and modesty.

5. The second, not to be over-formal, in not applying himself to the follies, indiscretion and lightnesses, which may be committed in his presence: for it is an indiscretion to condem all that pleaseth not our palat.

6 The third, to spare, and thriftily to order that which a man knoweth, and that sufficiency that he hath attained, and to be more willing to hear then to speak, to learn then to teach: for it is a vice to be more ready and forward to make himself known, to talk of himself, and to shew all that is in him, then to learn knowledge of another; and to spend his own stock then to get new.

7 The fourth, not to enter into discourse and contestation against all, neither against great men to whom we owe a duty and respect, nor against our inferiours, where the match is not equal.

The

The fift, to be honestly curious in the enquiry of all things, and knowing them, to order them frugally, to make profit by them. 8

The sixt and principal is, to employ his judgment in all things, which is the chief part which worketh, ruleth, and doth all: without the understanding all other things are blind, deaf, and without a soul, it is least to know the history, the judgment is all. 9

The seventh is, never to speak affirmatively, and imperiously, with obstinacy and resolution; That hurteth and woundeth all. 10

Peremptory affirmation and obstinacy in opinion, are ordinary signs of sensleseness and ignorance. The style of the ancient *Romans* was, that the witnesses deposing, and the Judges determining that which of their own proper knowledge they knew to be true, they expressed their mind by this word, It seemeth (*Ita videtur.*) And if these did thus, what should others do? It were good to learn to use such words as may sweeten and moderate the temerity of our propositions; as, It may be, It is said, I think, It seemeth, and the like; and in answering, I understand it not, What is that to say? It may be, It is true. I will shut up this general part in these few words: To have the countenance and the outward shew open and agreeable to all, his mind and thought covered and hid from all, his tongue sober and discreet, alwaies to keep himself to himself, and to stand on his guard, *frons aperta, lingua parca, mens clausa, nulli fidere: His face open, his tongue silent, his mind secret, and to trust none:* to see and hear much, to speak little, to judge of all, *Vide, audi, judica.* *The conclusion.*

Let us come to the other consideration, and kind of conversation more special, whereof the instructions are these. The first is to seek, to confer, and converse, with men of constancy and dexterity; for thereby the mind is confirmed and fortified, and it is elevated above it self, as with base and weak spirits it is debased, and utterly lost: the contagion herein is, as in the body, and also more. 11 *The second part. Of special conversation.*

The second is, not to be astonished at the opinions of another; for how contrary soever to the common sort, how strange, how frivolous or extravagant they seem, yet they are suitable to the spirit of man, which is capable to produce all things, and therefore it is weakness to be astonished at them. 12.

The third is, not to fear or to be troubled with the rude incivility and bitter speeches of men, whereunto he must harden and accustome himself. Gallant men bear them with courage; this tenderness, and fearful and ceremonious mildnesse, is for women. This 13.

societie and familiaritie must be valiant and manly, it must be couragious both to give hard speeches, and to endure them, to correct and to be corrected. It is a fading pleasure, to have to do with a people that yeild, flatter, and applaud a man in all things.

14. The fourth is, to aim alwayes at the truth, to acknowledge it, ingenuously and chearfully to yield unto it, of what side soever it be, using alwayes and in all things sinceritie, and not as many, especially pedanties, by right or by wrong to defend himself, and to quell his adversary. It is a fairer victorie to range himself according to reason, and to vanquish himself, then to overcome his adversarie, whereunto his own weakness doth many times help, being far from all passion. To acknowledge his fault, to confesse his doubt and ignorance, to yield when there is occasion, are acts of judgement, gentleness, and sinceritie, which are the principall qualities of an honest and wise man; whereas obstinacie in opinion accuseth a man of many vices and imperfections.

15. The fifth is, in disputation not to imploy all the means that a man may have, but such as are best and fittest, that are more pertinent and pressing, and that with brevitie, for even in a good cause a man may say too much, for long discourses, amplifications, and repetitions, are a testimonie of ostention, desire to speak, and tedious to the whole company.

16. The sixth and principall is, in all things to keep a form, order and aptness. O what a troublesome thing it is to dispute and conferre with a fool, a trifler, that uttereth nothing but matter impertinent to the matter! It is the onely just excuse to cut off all coherence: for what can a man gain but torment, that knows not how, nor what to speak as he should? Not to understand the argument that is made, to wed himself to his own opinion, not to answer directly, to tie himself to words, and to leave the principall, to mingle and trouble the conference with vain amplifications, to denie all, not to follow the form of disputation, to use unprofitable prefaces and digressions, to be obstinate in opinion, and to mouth it out, to tie himself to forms, and never to dive into the bottome; are things that are ordinarily practised by pedanties and Sophisters. See here how wisdome is discerned from follie; this is presumptuous, rash, obstinate, assured; that never satisfieth it self, is fearfull, advised, modest: this pleaseth it self, goes forth of the lists merrily and gloriously, as having wonne the victorie, when it never came near it.

The

The seventh if there be place of contradiction, he must take heed that he be not bold, obstinate, bitter; for either of these three makes it unwelcome, and doth more hurt himself, then another. That it may winne good entertainment of the companie, it must arise from that very hour of the controversie that is handled, from the present occasion, and not from elsewhere, not from any former precedent ground; neither must it touch the person, but the matter onely, with some commendation of the person if there be cause. 17.

## CHAP. X.

### *To carry himself wisely in his affairs.*

THis doth properly belong to the virtue of prudence, whereof we shall speak in the beginning of the book following, where shall be set down in particular divers counsels and advisements according to the divers kinds of prudence and occurrents in our affairs. But I will here set down the principall points and heads of wisdome, which are generall and common advisements, to instruct in grosse our disciple, to carry himself well and wisely in the traffick and commerce of the world, and the managing of all affairs; and they are eight.

The first consisteth in understanding, that is, well to know the persons with whom a man hath to deal, their proper and particular nature, their humour, their spirit, inclination, designment, and intention, their proceedings: to know likewise the nature of the businesse which he hath in hand, and which is proposed unto him, not onely in their superficiall and outward appearance, but to penetrate into the inside thereof, not onely to see and know things in themselves, but the accidents and consequents that belong thereunto. The better to do this, he must look into them with all manner of visages, consider them in all senses; for there are some that in one side are very precious and pleasing, and on the other, base and pernicious. Now it is certain, that according to the divers natures of the persons and affairs, we must change our style and manner of proceeding, like a Sea-man, who according to the divers state of the sea, and the diversitie of the winds, doth diversly turn and guide his sails and his oars. For he that in all things shall direct and carry himself after one and the same fashion, would quickly marre all, play the fool, and make himself ridiculous. Now this twofold knowledge 1 *Knowledge of the persons and affairs.*

of

of the persons and affairs is no easie matter, so much is man disguised and counterfeited; but the way to attain thereunto, is to consider them attentively and advisedly, revolving them many times in our minds, and that without passion.

2 *Estimation of of things.*

We must likewise learn to esteem of things according to their true worth, giving unto them that price and place which appertaineth unto them, which is the true office of wisdome and sufficiencie. This is a high point of Philosophie; but the better to attain thereunto, we must take heed of passion, and the judgement of the vulgar sort. There are six or seven things which move and lead vulgar spirits, and make them to esteem of things by false ensigns, whereof wisemen will take heed; which are, noveltie, raritie, strangenesse, difficultie, Art, invention, absence and privation, or denyall, and above all, report, shew, and provision. They esteem not of things if they be not polished by art and science, if they be not pointed and painted out. The simple and naturall, of what value soever they be, they attend not; they escape and drop away insensibly, or at least are accounted plain, base, and foolish, a great testimonie of humane vanitie and imbecilitie, which is paid with wind, with false and counterfeit money, instead of currant, from whence it is, that a man preferreth art before nature, that which is studied and difficult, before that which is easie; vehement motions and impulsions, before complexion, constitution, habit; the extraordinary before the ordinary; ostentation and pomp before true and secret veritie; another mans, and that which is strange, which is borrowed, before that which is proper and naturall. And what greater folly can there be then all this? Now the rule of the wise is, not to suffer themselves by all this, to be caught and carried, but to measure and judge and esteem of things, first by their true, naturall, and essentiall value, which is many times inward and secret, and then by their profit and commoditie; the rest is but deceit or mockery. This is a matter of difficultie, all things being so disguised and sophisticated: many times the false and wicked being more plausible, then the true and good. And *Aristotle* saith, That there are many falshoods, which are more probable, and have a better outward appearance, then verities. But as it is difficult, so is it excellent and divine. *Si separaveris preciosum à vili, quasi os meum eris: If thou wilt separate the precious from those things that are base and vile, thou shalt be as it were my mouth:* And necessary before all works; *quàm necessarium precia rebus imponere? how neces-*

*Not according to the vulgar judgements.*

*But according to the wise.*

*Difficult. Excellent. Necessary. Seneca.*

*sary*

*sary is it to put a price upon things?* for to small purpose doth a man endeavour to know the precepts of a good life, if first he know not in what rank to place things; riches, health, beauty, nobility, science, and so forth, with their contraries. This precedencie and preheminence of things, is a high, and excellent knowledge, and yet difficult, especially when many present themselves: for plurality hindereth, and herein men are never of one accord. The particular tastes and judgements of men are divers, and it is fit and commodious it should be so, to the end that all run not together after one and the same thing, and so be a let or hindrance to another. For example, let us take the eight principall heads of all goods spirituall and corporall, four of each kind, that is to say, *Honestie, Health, Wisdome, Beautie, Ability* or *Aptness, Nobility, Science, Riches*. We do here take the words according to the common sense and use; Wisdome for a prudent and discreet manner of life and carriage with and towards all; Abilitie for sufficiency of affairs; Science for the knowledge of things acquired out of books: the other are clear enough. Now touching the ranging of these eight, how many divers opinions are there? I have told my own, and I have mingled, and in such sort interlaced them together, that after and next unto a spirituall, there is a corporall correspondent thereunto, to the end we may couple the soul and the body together. Health is in the body, that which honestie is in the soul; the health of the soul, is the honestie of the body: *Mens sana in corpore sano*: *A perfect mind in a sound bodie*: Beauty, is as Wisdome, the measure, proportion, and comelinesse of the body; and wisdome a spirituall beauty. Nobility is a great aptness and disposition to virtue. Sciences are the riches of the spirit. Others do range these parts otherwise, some place all the spirituall first, before they come to the first corporall, and the least of the spirit above the greatest of the body: some place them apart, and all diversly, every one aboundeth in his own sense.

*From hence cometh the knowledge of things.*

*Eight principal heads of goods spirituall and corporall.*

3 *Choice and election of things.*

After and from this sufficiencie and part of prudence, to know well how to esteem of things, doth spring and arise another, that is, to know well how to choose, where not onely the conscience, but also the sufficiency and prudence is likewise many times shewed. There are choices very easie, as of a difficulty, and of a vice, of that which is honest, and that which is commodious, of duty and of profit: for the preheminence of the one is so great above the other, that when they come to encounter, honesty alwayes winneth the field, except (it may be) some exception very rare, and with great circumstance,

ſtance, and in publick affairs onely, as ſhall be ſaid hereafter in the virtue of Prudence: but there are other choices far more hard and troubleſome, as when a man is caught and driven into a narrow ſtrait between two vices, as was that Doctor *Origen*, either to become an Idolater, or to proſtitute himſelf to the carnall pleaſure of a baſe impure Ethiopian. The rule is; that when a man findeth himſelf in any doubt or perplexity, touching the choice of thoſe things that are not evil, he muſt chooſe that part that hath moſt honeſtie and juſtice in it: for though it fall out otherwiſe then well, yet it ſhall be alwayes ſome comfort and glory to a man to have choſen the better; and beſides, a man knoweth not (if he had choen the contrary part) what would have happened, or whether he had eſcaped his deſtiny: when a man doubteth which is the better and ſhorteſt way, he muſt take the ſtraighteſt. And in thoſe things that are evil (whereof there is never any choice) a man muſt avoid the more baſe and unjuſt; this is a rule of conſcience, and belongeth to honeſty. But to know which is the more honeſt, juſt, and profitable, which the more diſhoneſt, unjuſt, and unprofitable; it is many times very difficult, and belongeth to prudence and ſufficiency. It ſeemeth that in ſuch like ſtraits and extremities, the ſurer and better way is to follow nature, and to judge that the more juſt and honeſt, which cometh neareſt unto nature, that the more unjuſt and diſhoneſt which is fartheſt from it. Before we leave this diſcourſe of the choice and election of things, in two words let us remove this queſtion: From whence cometh in our ſouls the choice of two indifferent things in all things alike? The *Stoicks* ſay, from an extraordinary, immoderate, ſtrange, and raſh operation of the ſoul. But a man may ſay, That never do two things preſent themſelves unto us, wherein there is not ſome difference or other, be it never ſo little, and that there is alwayes ſomething in the one, which moveth us to that choice, although it be unſenſible, and ſuch as we cannot expreſſe. He that is equally ballanced betwixt two deſires, can never chooſe; for every choice and inclination doth inferre an inequality.

4 *Conſultation.* Another precept in this matter, is to take advice and counſell of another: for, for a man to believe himſelf, and to truſt onely in himſelf, is very dangerous. Now here are required two advertiſements of Prudence, the one is in the choice of thoſe, to whom a man muſt addreſſe himſelf for counſel; for there are ſome whoſe counſel we ſhould rather avoid, and flie from. Firſt, they muſt be

honest and faithfull men (which is here all one); and secondly, men sensible, advised, wise, and of experience. These are the two qualities of good counsellours, honesty, and sufficiency. A man may add a third, and that is, That neither they, nor their neerest and inward friends have any particular interest in the business: for although a man may say, that this cannot hinder them to give good counsel, being, as is said, honest men: yet I may answer, that besides that this so great and philosophicall honestie, which is no way touched with its own proper interest, be very rare, it is also a great point of folly to bring it into doubt and anxietie, and as it were to put the finger betwixt two stones. The other advertisement is, well to hear and entertain the counsels, receiving them without attending the event, with judgement and gentleness, delighting in the free delivery of the truth. Having entertained and followed it as good, and coming from a good hand and a friendly, he must not repent himself of it, although it succeed not well, and according to expectation. Many times good counsels have bad events. But a wise man must rather content himself to have followed good counsel, which hath brought forth bad effects, then bad counsel which hath had a happy event, as *Marius*; *Sic correcti Marii temeritas gloriam ex culpa invenit: So the rashness and temerity of Marius, received glory and honour even from his fault:* and not to do like fools, who having advisedly deliberated and chosen, think afterwards to have chosen the worse, because they weigh onely the reasons of the contrary opinion, never counterpoising them with those which first induced them thereunto. Thus much briefly be said of those that seek counsel: of those that give it, we shall speak in the virtue of Prudence, whereof the counsel is a great and sufficient part. Lib. 3. cap. 2. art. 17.

5 *Temperature betwixt fear and assurance*

The fifth advice which I here give, to carry himself well in his affairs, is a temperature and mediocrity betwixt too great a confidence and distrust, fear and assurance. To trust and secure himself, doth many times hurt, and to distrust, offendeth; he must take speciall heed of making any shew of distrust, even when there is cause; for it displeaseth, yea offendeth much, and many times maketh a friend an enemie. But yet a man is not to be over-credulous, and confident, except it be of his best assured friends; he must alwayes keep the bridle in his hands, holding it neither too loose nor too strait. He must never speak all, and let that which he speaketh be ever true. He must never deceive, but yet let him take heed he be not deceived. He must ever temper and moderate that columbine inno-

innocency and simplicity, in not offending any man with his serpentine wisdome and subtilty, and keeping himself upon his guard, and preserving himself from the deceits, treasons, and ambushments of another. Subtilty to defend, is as commendable, as it is dishoneſt to offend. He must never therefore advance and engage himself so far, but that he have alwayes a mean when he will, and when it shall be necessary to retire himself without great damage or dislike. He must never forsake his own hold, nor so much despise another, and presume of himself, that he fall into a kind of presumption and carelesnes of his affairs, like those that think that no man sees so clear as themselves, that look that every man should yield unto them, that no man should dare to entertain a thought to displease them, and by that means become dissolute, and cast away care, and in the end they are blinded, surprised, and deceived.

6 *To take time and occasion. Against precipitation.*

Another advice and very important, is to take all things in their times and seasons, and to good purpose, and for that cause, he must above all things avoid precipitation, an enemie to wisdome, the step-mother of all good actions, a vice much to be feared in young and youthfull people. It is in truth the work of a skilfull and active man, to apply every thing to his true end, well to manage all occasions and commodities, to make use both of the times & the means. All things have their seasons, and even the good, which a man may do without purpose. Now too much speed and precipitation is contrary hereunto, which troubleth, marreth, and confoundeth all: *Canis festinans cæcos facit catulos: A forward bitch bringeth forth blind whelps*; It proceedeth commonly from that passion which carrieth us; *Nam qui cupit, festinat: qui festinat, evertit: unde festinatio improvida & cæca: duo adversissima rectæ menti, celeritas & ira: For whoso desires, doth hasten; who hasteth, destroyeth: hastines therefore is improvident and blind: hastines and angeu are two of the greatest adversaries to a discreet mind:* and often enough from insufficiency. The contrary vice, lazines, sloth carelesnes, which seemeth sometimes to have some air of maturity and wisdome, is likswise pernicious and dangerous, especially in the execution. For it is said, That it is lawfull to be slow and long in deliberation and consultation, but not in the execution; and therefore the wisest say, That a man must consult slowly, execute speedily, deliberate with leasure, and with speed accomplish. It falleth out sometimes that the contrary is practised with good successe, and that a man is happie in the event, though he have been sudden and rash in his deliberation;

*Idlenesse.*

ration; *Subiti consiliis, eventu felices: Sudden counsels, happie events.* But this is very seldome, and by chance or fortune, according to which we must not rule and direct our selves, but take heed lest envie and emulation overtake us; for commonly a long and unprofitable repentance is the reward of headlong hastinesse. Behold then two rocks and extremities which we must equally avoid; for it is as great a fault to take occasions before they be ready, whilest they be green and raw, as to suffer them to grow till they be overripe, and past the taking. The first fault, young men and forward hot-spurrs commit, who for want of patience, give no leisure to time and the heavens to do any thing for them; they run, but they catch nothing: The second, heavie, lasie, and dull-spirited men do commonly fall into. To know the occasion, and to take it, a man must know his spirit valiant and vigilant, and likewise patient: he must foresee it, watch, attend it, see it coming, and prepare for it, and so take it just at that instant when it is ready.

7 *Industry and Fortune.*

The seventh advice is, well to carry himself with these two Masters and Superintendents of the affairs of the world, which are Industry or virtue, and Fortune. It is an ancient question which of these two hath the most credit, force, and authority: for it is out of all doubt, that both have; and it is clearly false, that one onely doth all, and the other nothing: It were perhaps to be wished that it were true, and that one onely had the whole empire, the business would go the better, a man would wholly attend that, whereby it would be the more easie; the difficulty is to joyn them together, and to attend them both. Commonly, they that settle themselves unto the one, contemn the other; the younger and bolder sort respect and trust to fortune, hoping much good from it, and many times by them it worketh great matters, insomuch that it seems to favour them; the more ancient and staid, trust to their industry; and these of the two have the more reason. If we should compare them, and chuse one of the two, industry is the more honest, the more certain, glorious; for though fortune be contrary to it, and shall make all industry and diligence vain, yet nevertheless there remaineth great contentment, in that a man hath not kept holy day, hath performed his office or duty, hath carried himself like a man of courage. They that follow the other part, are in danger to attend in vain, & though perhaps things succeed according to their own desires, yet they want that honour and glorie that the former hath. Now the advice of wisdome is not wholly, and so much

to

to settle our selvs to the one, that we contemn, & exclude the other; for they have both a good part, yea many times they help, and do mutually attend one the other. A wise man then must carry himself with them both, but yet unequally, for the advantage and prehemi-nence must be given, as hath been said, to virtue, industry; *Virtute duce, comite fortunâ: Virtue the guide, fortune the companion, the follower.* This advice likewise is required, to keep discretion, which seasoneth and giveth a taste or relish to all things: this is not a particular quality, but common, which mingleth it self in all: Indiscretion marreth all, and taketh away the grace from the best actions, whether it be to do good to another, for all gratifications are not well bestowed upon all sorts of people; or to excuse himself, for inconsiderate excuses serve for accusations; or to play the part of an honest and courteous man, for a man may exceed and degenerate into rusticity; or whether it be to offer, or to accept.

## CHAP. XI.

### *To keep himself alwayes ready for death, a fruit of Wisdome.*

1. *The day of death.*

THe day of death is the master-day, and Judge of all other daies, the trial and touch-stone of all the actions of our life. Then do we make our greatest assay, and gather the whole fruit of all our studies. He that judgeth of the life of a man, must look how he carrieth himself at his death: for the end crowneth the work, and a good death honoureth a mans whole life, as an evil defameth and dishonoureth it: A man cannot well judge of any, without wronging of him, before he hath played the last act of his Comedy, which is without all doubt the most difficult. *Epaminoudas* one of the wise men of *Greece*, being demanded whom of three men he esteemed most, himself, *Chabrias*, or *Ephicrates*, answered; We must first see all three die, before we resolve that question: the reason is, because in all the rest a man may be masked, but in this last part, it is to no purpose to dissemble,

*Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo*
*Eiiciuntur, & eripitur persona, manet res.*
*Then only, only then, and then no doubt*
*Do men unmask, and now the truth comes out.*

Fortune from far seemeth to watch, and lie in wait for us, against this last day, as a day long since named and appointed, to shew her

her power, and in a moment overthrow all that we have built, and gathered together in many years, and to make us cry out with *Laberius*; *Nimirum hac die una plùs vixi mihi, quàm vivendum fuit: Surely I have lived more to my self in this one day, then in all the time before.* And so was it well and wisely said of *Solon* to *Crœsus*; *Ante obitum nemo beatus: Before death no man is happy.*

It is an excellent thing to learn to die, it is the studie of wisdome, which aimeth wholly at this end: he hath not spent his life ill that hath learned to die well; and he hath lost his whole time, that knows not well how to end it. *Male vivit, quisquis nescit bene mori: non frustra nascitur qui bene moritur: nec inutiliter vixit, qui feliciter desiit: Mori totâ vitâ discendum est, & præcipuum ex vitæ officiis est. He liveth badly, that knoweth not how to die well; he was not born in vain, that dieth well; neither hath he lived unprofitably, that departeth happily: To die, is the studie and learning of all our life, and the chiefest thing, and duty of life.* He shoots not well, that looks not on the mark; and he cannot live well that hath not an eye to his death. To be brief, the science of dying is the science of libertie, the way to fear nothing, to live well, contentedly and peaceably; without this knowledge there is no more pleasure in life, then in the fruition of that thing which a man feareth alwayes to lose. 2. *To know how to die.* Seneca.

First, and above all, we must endeavour that our sinnes die before our selves: Secondly that we be alwayes ready and prepared for death. O what an excellent thing is it for a man to end his life before his death, in such sort, that at that hour he have no other thing to do, but to die! that he have no more need of any thing, not of time, not of himself, but sweetly and contentedly departeth this life, saying: 3

*Vixi, & quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi:*
*I have done, my task is set: or*
*Scilicet videlicet,*
*To live's a gift; to die's a debt.*

Thirdly, we must endeavour, that our death be voluntary; for to die well, is to die willingly.

It seemeth that a man may carry himself in death five divers wayes: He may fear and flie it, as a very great evil; attend it sweetly and patiently, as a thing naturall, inevitable, reasonable; contemn it is a thing indifferent, and of no great importance; desire and seek after it, as the onely haven of rest from all the torments of this life, 4 *A five-fold manner of carriage in death.*

yea, a very great gain; give it to himself, by taking away his own life. Of these five, the three middle most are good, befitting a good and and settled soul, although diversly, and in a different condition of life; the two extremes are vitious and out of weakness, though it be with divers visages. A word or two of them all.

5 *To fear death.*

The first is not approved by men of understanding, though by the greater part it be practised: a testimony of great weakness. Against these kind of men, and for your better comfort, either against your own death, or the death of another, thus much briefly. There is not a thing that men fear more, or have more in horrour then death: nevertheles, there is not a thing where there is lesse occasion or matter of fear, or that contrarily yieldeth greater reasons to perswade us with resolution to accept of it. And therefore we must say, that it is a mere opinion, and a vulgar errour that hath wonne the world thus to think of it. *It is opinion.* We give too much credit to the inconsiderate vulgar sort, who tell us. That it is a very great evil, and to little credit to wisdome it self which teacheth us, that it is a freedome from all evils and the haven of life. Never did a present death do hurt to any man; and some that have made triall, and partly knew what it is, complain not of it: and if death be counted an evil, it is of all the evils the onely that doth no harm, that hath no evil in it: it is the imagination onely of death before it come, that maketh us to fear it when it is come. It is then but opinion, not verity; and it is truly where opinion bandeth it self most against reason, and goeth about to deface it in us, with the mask of death: there cannot be any reason to fear it, because no man knows what it is, that he should fear it: for why, or how should a man fear that he knoweth not? And therefore wisely said he, that of all others was accounted the wisest, that to fear death is to make shew of greater understanding and sufficiencie then can be in a man, by seeming to know that that no man knoweth: and what he spake he practised himself; for being solicited at his death by his friends, to plead before the Judges, for his justification, and for his life, this oration he made unto them: My masters and friends, if I should plead for my life, and desire you that I may not die, I doubt I may speak against my self, and desire my own loss and hinderance, because I know what it is to die, nor what good or what ill there is in death: they that fear to die presume to know it; as for my self, I am utterly ignorant what it is, or what is done in the other world; perhaps death is a thing indifferent, perhaps a good thing, and to be desired.

desired. Those things that I know to be evil, as to offend my neighbour, I fly and avoid; those that I know not to be evil, as death, I cannot fear. And therefore I commit my self unto your selves; and because I cannot know whether it is more expedient for me to die, or not to die, determine you thereof as you shall think good.

6 *It is weakness.*

For a man to torment himself with the fear of death, it is first great weakness and cowardliness: There is not a woman that in few daies is not appeased and content with the death, yea the most painful that may be, either of her husband or her child. And why should not reason and wisdome do that in an hour, at an instant (as we have a thousand examples) which time performeth in a fool, in the weakest sex? What use is there of wisdome and constancy in man; to what end serve they, if they speed him not in a good action, if he can do no more with their help, then a fool with his folly? From this weakness it is, that the most part of men dying, cannot resolve themselves, that it is their last hour, and there is not any thing where this deceitful hope doth more busie man, which, it may be, doth likewise proceed from this, that we account our death a great matter, and that all things have an interest in us, and at our death must suffer with us, so much do we esteem our selves.

7 *Injustice.*

Again, a man sheweth himself herein unjust; for if death be a good thing, as it is, why doth he fear it? If an evil thing, why doth he make it worse, and add unto death evil upon evil, sorrow and grief where there is none? like him that being robbed of a part of his goods by the enemy, casteth the rest into the sea, to let men know how little he is grieved with his losses.

8 *To be enemy to his own life.*

Finally, to fear death, is for a man to be an enemy to himself, and to his own life: for he can never live at ease and contentedly, that feareth to die. This man is onely a free-man, which feareth not death: and contrarily, life is but a slavery, if it were not made free by death: For death is the only stay of our liberty, the common and ready receptacle of all evils: It is then a misery (and miserable are all that do it) to trouble our life with care and fear of death, and our death with the care of life.

9

But to say the truth, what complaints and murmuring would there be against nature, if death were not, if we should have continued here, will we, nill we, with and against our own wills? doubtless men would have cursed nature for it. Imagine with thy self how much more insupportable, and painful, a durable life would have been, then a life with a condition to leave it. *Chiron* refused

immortalitie, being informed of the conditions thereof by the god of Time, *Saturn* his father. Doubtlesse death is a very beautifull and rich invention of nature: *Optimum naturæ inventum, nusquam satis laudatum*: *The best invention of nature, never sufficiently to be praised*; and a very proper and profitable, necessary to many things; If it were quite taken from us, we should desire it more then now we fear it; yea, thirst after it more then life it self; such a remedie is it against so many evils, such a mean to so many goods. What were it on the other side, if there were not mingled with death some little bitternesse? doubtlesse men would run unto it with great desire and indiscretion. To keep therefore a moderation, that is, that men might neither love life too much, nor flie it; fear death, nor run after it, both of them, sweetnesse and sharpnesse, are therein temperated together.

10 *Remedies not to fear death.*

The remedie that the vulgar sort do give herein, is too simple; and that is, never to think or to speak thereof. Besides that, such a kind of carelesnes cannot lodge in the head of a man of understanding, it would likewise at the last cost him dear: for death coming unawares, and unexspected, what torments, out-cries, furies, and despairs are there commonly seen? Wisdome adviseth much better, that is, to attend and exspect death with a constant foot, and to encounter it: and the better to do this, it giveth us contrary counsel to the vulgar sort, that is to have it alwaies in our thoughts; to practise it, to accustome our selves unto it, to tame it, to present it unto us at all hours, to exspect it, not onely in places suspected and dangerous, but in the midst of feasts and sports: that the burden of our song be, *Remember thy end*, that others are dead, that thought to have lived as long as our selves; that that which happened then to them, may happen now to us; following herein the custome of the *Egyptians*, who in their solemn banquets placed the image of death before their eyes; and of the Christians and all other, who have their Church-yards near their temples and other publick and frequented places, that men might alwayes (as saith *Lycurgus*) be put in mind of death. It is uncertain in what place death attends us, and therefore let us attend death in all places, and be alwayes ready to receive it.

*Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum,*
*Grata superveniet quæ non sperabitur hora,*
*Think every day thy last; each ready be,*
*And so th' uncertain hour shall welcome thee.*

But

But let us consider the excuses and grievances that these poor people alleadge to cover and colour their complaints, which are all vain and frivolous: It grieveth them to die young, and they complain as well in regard of others as themselves, that death preventeth them and cutteth them off in the flower and strength of their years. The complaint of the vulgar sort, who measure all by the ell, and account nothing precious, but that which is long and durable; whereas contrarily, things exquisite and excellent are commonly thin, fine, and delicate. It is the mark of a skilfull work-master to enclose much in a little space: and a man may say, that it is fatall to great and glorious men, not to live long: Great virtue, and great or long life do seldome or never meet together. Life is measured by the end, provided that that be good, and all the rest hath a portion thereunto: the quantitie is nothing to make it more or lesse happie, no more then the greatnesse of a circle makes the circle more round then the lesse; the figure here doth all: a little man is as perfect a man as a greater: Neither men nor their lives are measured by the ell. 11

*The grievances and excuses of fearfull men answered.*

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Again, it troubleth them to die farre from their friends, or to be slain, and to remain unburied; they desire to die in peace, in their beds, amongst their friends being comforted by them, and comforting them. All they that follow the warrs, and ride post to be in the battell, are not of this mind: these men run willingly to their end, and seek a tombe amongst the dead bodies of their enemies. Little children fear men when they are masked; discover their faces and they fear them no more: And even so believe it, fire and sword astonish us, when we think of them; take off their mask, the death wherewith they threaten us, is but the same death wherewith women and children die. 2

They are troubled to think they must leave all the world. And why? They have seen all, one day is like another, there is no other light, nor other night, nor other Sun, nor other course of the world. One year telleth us that all things grow every year worse and worse, they have seen the childhood, the youth, the virility, the old age of the world: there is no art, no way to begin again. 3

Yea but they leave their parents and their friends. Where they go they shall find more, and such as they have never yet seen, and those they leave behind them and desire so much, shall shortly follow them. 4

But what shall become of their small children and orphans left 5

without guide, without support? As if those their children were more theirs then Gods, or as if they could love them more then he that is their first and their truest father: and how many such so left, have risen to higher place and greater ability then other men?

6 But it may be they fear to go alone. This is great simplicitie, so many people dying with them, and at the self-same hour.

7 Finally, they go into a place where they shall not desire this life. How desire it? If it were lawfull to resume it, they would refuse it; and if a man were worthy to know what it is before he receive it, he would never accept of it: *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus: No man would accept of life, if he knew what he received.* Why, or how should they desire it, since they are either wholly nothing, as miscreants believe, or in far better state then before, as the wisest of the world do affirm? why then are they offended with death, since it quits them of all grief? The self-same journey they have made from death, that is to say, from nothing to life, without passion, without fear, they make again from life unto death, *Reverti unde veneris, quid grave est? To return from whence thou camest, What burden, what grief is it?*

8 But it may be that the spectacle of death displeaseth them, because they that die look gastly. It is true, but this is not death, but the mask of death, that which is hid under it, is very beautifull, for death hath nothing in it that is fearfull: we have sent idle and poor spies to know it; who report not what they have seen, but what they have heard, and what they fear.

9 But it taketh out of our hands so many things, or rather taketh us from them, and us from our selves; it taketh us from that we know, and have been accustomed unto, and bringeth us to an estate unknown: *At horremus ignota: But we abhor things unknown*; it taketh us from the light, to bring us into darkness; and to conclude, it is our end, our ruine, our dissolution. These are the weightiest objections: whereunto in a word a man may answer, That death being the inevitable law of nature (as shall be said hereafter) we need not dispute so much thereof; for it is a folly to fear that which a man cannot avoid. *Dementis est timere mortem, quia certa exspectantur, dubia metuuntur, mors habet necessitatem aequam & invictam: It is mere folly to fear death, because things certain are exspected; doubtfull things are feared; the necessity of death is most just and invincible.* But these kind of people make not their count well; for it is quite contrary to that which they say; for in stead of taking

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any thing from us, it giveth us all; in stead of taking us from our selves, it sets us in libertie, and makes us free to our selves; in stead of bringing us into darknesse, it taketh it from us, and puts us into the light; and it doth the same to us, that we do to all fruits, spoiling them of their barks, their shels, their foldings, their speres, their skinns to bring them into sight, use, nature; *Ità solet fieri, pereunt semper velamenta nascentium: So it was wont to be done, for alwayes the veil and covering of every thing doth perish.* It taketh us from a strait, incommodious, rhewmatick, dark place, where we see but a small part of the heavens, and the light but a farre off, through the two narrow holes of our eyes, to bring us into an open libertie, an assured health, a perpetuall light; into such a place, such an estate, where we may wholly see the whole heavens, and the light in his naturall place. *Æqualiter tibi splendebit omne cœli latus, totam lucem suo loco propè totus aspicies quam nunc per angustissimas oculorum vias procul intueris & miraris: Every part of heaven shall together shine upon thee, who wholly shall behold all the glory thereof in his due place, which now throw the straight and narrow passage of the sight, thou dost but see and discern a far off.* To conclude, It taketh us from that death, which began in the wombe of our mother, and now endeth; to bring us to that life which shall never end. *Dies iste quem tanquam extremum reformidas, æterni natalis est: This day which thou feareſt as thy last, is the birth day of Eternitie.*

The second manner of the carriage of men in this matter of death, is of a good, sweet, and moderate soul, and is justly practised in a common and peaceable life, by those that with reason make account of this condition of life, and content themselves to endure it but governing themselves according to reason, and accepting of death when it cometh. This is a well tempered mediocrity, suitable to such a condition of life, between the extremities (which are to desire and fear, to seek and to flie, vicious and faulty: *Summum nè metuas diem, nec optes (mortem concupiscentes, & timentes æquè objurgat Epicurus): Fear not thy last day, neither wish for it (for both to desire death, and to fear it, is alike condemned by Epicurus)*: if they be not covered and excused by some reason, not common and ordinary, as shall be said in his place. To seek and desire death is ill; it is injustice to desire death without a cause, and to be out of charitie with the world, which our lives may be beneficiall unto. It is to be unthankfull to nature, to contemn it, and not to make the best

11 *To attaud death is good.*

use thereof: to be over anxious and scrupulous, and not to endure that estate that is not burthensome, and we are called unto. To flie and fear death on the other side, is against nature, reason, justice, and all duty.

13. *Death is naturall.*

For to die, it is a thing naturall, necessary, and inevitable, just, and reasonable: Naturall, for it is a part of the order of the whole Universe, and of the life of the world: wilt thou then that the world be ruinated, and a new made for thy self? Death holdeth a high place in the policie and great common-wealth of the world, and it is very profitable for the succession and continuance of the works of nature: the fading or corruption of one life, is the passage to a thousand others: *Sic rerum summa novatur:* And it is not onely a part of this great whole Universe, but of our particular essence, not lesse essentiall then to live, to be born. In flying death, thou flieſt thy self; thy essence is equally parted into these two, life and death, it is the condition of thy creation. If it grieveth thee to die, why wert thou born? Men come not into the world with any other purpose but to go forth again, and therefore he that is not willing to go forth, let him not come in. The first day of thy birth bindeth thee, and setteth thee as well in the way to death, as to life.

*Nascentes morimur, finisque ab origine pendet.*
*Man born to die, doth oftentimes do so,*
*Even (if he could) before he can say, no:*
*His birth and death, concurring so together,*
*As do a dogs two ends in coldest weather.*

*Sola mors jus æquum est generis humani, vivere noluit qui mori non vult; vita cum exceptione mortis data est; tam stultus qui timet mortem, quàm qui senectutem: Death onely is mans due right; he should not desire to live, that would not desire to die; life is given to us with exception of death; As foolish is he that feareth to die, as to be old.*

To be unwilling to die, is to be unwilling to be a man, for all men are mortall: and therefore a wise man said, and that without passion, having received news of the death of his sonne; I knew I begot, and bred him up a mortall man. Death being then a thing so naturall and essentiall, both for the world in grosse, and for thy self in particular, why should it be horrible unto thee? Thou goest against nature, the fear of grief and pain is naturall, but not of death: for being so serviceable to nature, and nature having instituted

cuted it, to what end should it imprint in us a hatred and horrour thereof? Children and beasts fear not death, yea, many times they suffer it chearfully: it is not then nature that teacheth us to fear it, but rather to attend and receive it, as being sent by it.

Secondly, it is necessary, fatall, inevitable, and this thou knowest, that feareſt and weepeſt. What greater folly can there be, then for a man to torment himself for nothing, and that willingly and of purpose, to pray and importune him, whom he knows to be inexorable; to knock at that door that cannot be opened? What is there more inexorable and deaf then death? We must therefore fear things uncertain; do our best endeavours in things that are not remediless; but such as are certain, as death, we must attend, and grow resolute in things past remedie. The fot feareth and flieth death; the fool seeks and runnes after it; the wise man attendeth it: It is folly to grieve at that, that cannot be mended; to fear that, that cannot be avoided: *Feras non culpes, quod vitari non potest? Wilt thou not bear the blows thou canst not avoid?* The example of *David* is excellent, who understanding of the death of his dear child, put on his best apparell, and made himself merry, saying to those that wondered at this kind of carriage, that whilest his sonne lived, he importuned God for his recovery; but being dead, that care was ended, and there was no remedie. The fool thinks he maketh a better answer, to say, that that is the cause of his grief, and that he tormenteth himself, because there is no remedie; but he doubleth and perfecteth his own folly thereby. *Scienter frustra niti extremæ dementiæ est: It is extreme madnesse to labour wittingly, and on set purpose in vain.* Now death being so necessary and inevitable, it is not onely to no purpose to fear, but making of necessitie a virtue, we must welcome it and receive it kindly; for it is better for us to go to death, then that death should come to us; to catch that, before that catch us. 14. *Necessary.*

Thirdly, to die is a thing reasonable and just, it is reason to arive to that place, towards which we are alwayes walking; and if a man fear to come thither, let him not walk, but stay himself or turn back again, which is impossible to do. It is reason that thou give place to others, since others have given place to thee; If thou have made thy commoditie of this life, thou must be satisfied and be gone, as he that is invited to a banquet, takes his refection and departeth. If thou have not known how to make use and profit thereof, what needest thou care if thou lose it? or to what end wouldest thou 15. *Just and reasonable.*

thou keep it? It is a debt that must be paid, a pawn that must be restored, whensoever it is demanded. Why pleadest thou against thy own schedule, thy faith, thy duty? It is then against reason to spurn against death, since that thereby thou acquittest thy self of so much, and discharged thy self of so great an account. It is a thing generall and common to all, to die; why then troublest thou thy self? Wilt thou have a new priviledge, that was yet never seen, and be a lone man by thy self? Why fearest thou to go whither all the world goeth? where so many millions are gone before thee, and so many millions shall follow thee? Death is equally certain to all, and equality is the first part of equity; *Omnes eodem cogimur: omnium versatur urna; serius ocyus sors exitura, &c. We all are driven thereunto: men dayly die, even as their lot fals forth, &c.*

1. *To contemn death is good, if it be for a thing that deserves it.*

The third is the part of a valiant and generous mind, which is practised with reason, in a publick, elevated, difficult, and busie condition of life, where there are many things to be preferred before life, and for which a man should not doubt to die. In such a case howsoever matters go, a man must more account thereof then of his life, which is placed upon the stage and scaffold of this world: he must runne his race with resolution, that he may give a lustre to his other actions, and perform those things that are profitable and exemplary. He must lay down his life, and let it runne his fortune. He that knoweth not how to contemn death, shall never not onely perform any thing of worth, but he exposeth himself to divers dangers; for whilest he goeth about to keep his life safe and sure, he layeth open open and hazardeth his devoir, his honour, his virtue and honestie. The contempt of death is that which produceth the boldest, and most honourable exploits whether in good or evil. He that feareth not to die fears nothing; he doth whatsoever he will, he makes himself a master both of his own life, and of anothers: the contempt of death, is the true and lively source of all the beautifull and generous actions of men: from hence are derived the brave resolutions and free speeches of virtue uttered by so many great personages. *Elvidius Priscus*, whom the Emperour *Vespasian* had commanded not to come to the Senate, or coming to speak as he would have him, answered, That he was a Senatour, it was fit he should be at the Senate; and if being there, he were required to give his advice, he would speak freely that which his conscience commanded him. Being threatned by the same

same man, that if he spake he should die; Did I ever tell you (saith he) that I was immortal? Do you what you will, and I will do what I ought: it is in your power to put me unjustly to death, and in me to die constantly. The *Lacedemonians* being threatned much hard dealing, if they did not speedily yield themselves to *Philip* the father of *Alexander*, who was entred into their countrey with a great power; one for the rest answered, *What hard dealing can they suffer that fear not to die?* And being told by the same *Philip* that he would break and hinder all their designments; What, say they, will he likewise hinder us from dying? Another being asked by what means a man may live free, answered, *By contemning death.* And another youth being taken and sold for a slave, said to him that bought him *Thou shalt see what thou hast bought, I were a fool to live a slave whilest I may be free, and whilest he spake, cast himself down from the top of the house.* A wise man said unto another, deliberating with himself how he might take away his life, to free himself from an evil that at that time pressed him sore; Thou dost not deliberate of any great matter; it is no great thing to live: thy slaves, thy beasts do live, but it is a great matter to die honestly, wisely, constantly. To conclude and crown this article, Our religion hath not had a more firm and assured foundation, and wherein the author thereof hath more insisted, then the contempt of this life. But many there are that make a shew of contemning death, when they fear it. Many there are that care not to be dead, yea they wish they were dead, but it grieveth them to die: *Emori nolo, sed me esse mortuum nihil æstimo: I would not die, but I make little account of death.* Many deliberate in their health and soundest judgments to suffer death with constancy, nay to murther themselves, a part played by many, and for which end *Heliogabalus* made many sumptuous preparations; but being come to the point, some were terrified by the bleeding of their nose, as *Lucius Domitius*, who repented that he had poisoned himself. Others have turned away their eyes and their thoughts, as if they would steal upon it, swallowing it down insensibly as men take pills, according to that saying of *Cesar*, *That the best death was the shortest*: and of *Pliny*, *That a short death was the happiest hour of a mans life.* Now no man can be said to be resolute to die, that feareth to confront it, and to suffer with his eyes open, as *Socrates did*, who had thirty whole daies to ruminate & to digest the sentence of his death, which he did without any passion or alteration, yea without any shew of endeavour, mildly

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and chearfully. *Pompon. Atticus, Tullius, Marcellinus* Romanes, *Cleantes* the Philosopher, all three almost after one manner: for having assaied to die by abstinence, hoping thereby to quit themselves of those maladies that did torment them; but finding themselves rather cured thereby, nevertheless they would not desist till they had ended that they went about, taking pleasure by little and little to pine away, and to consider the course and progresse of death. *Otho* and *Cato* having prepared all things fit for their death, upon the very point of the execution settled themselves to sleep, and slept profoundly, being no more astonished at death, then at any other ordinary and light accident.

17 *To desire death*

The fourth is the part of a valiant and resolute mind, practised in former times by great and holy personages, and that in two cases, the one the more naturall and lawfull, is a painfull and troublesome life, or an apprehension of a farre worse death. To be brief, a miserable estate which a man cannot remedie. This is to desire death as the retrait and onely haven from the torments of this life, the sovereign good of nature, the onely stay and pillar of our libertie. It is imbecillity to yield unto evils, but it is folly to nourish them. It is a good time to die, when to live is rather a burthen then a blessing, and there is more ill in life then good; for, to preserve our life to encrease our torment, is against nature. There are some that say, that we should desire to die, to avoid those pleasures that are according to nature; how much more then to flie those miseries that are against nature? There are many things in life farr worse then death, for which we should rather die and not live at all, then live. And therefore the *Lacedemonians* being cruelly threatned by *Antipater*, if they yielded not to his demand, answered, If thou threaten us with any thing that is worse then death, death shall be welcome unto us. And the wisest were wont to say, *That a wise man liveth as long as he should, not so long as he can*, death being more at his command and in his power, then life. Life hath but one entrance, and that too dependeth upon the will of another. Our death dependeth on our own wils, and the more voluntary it is, the more honourable; and there are a thousand wayes unto it. We may want means whereby to live, but not to die. Life may be taken away from every man, by every man, but not death; *Ubique mors est, optimè hoc cavit Deus, eripere vitam nemo non homini potest, at nemo mortem: mille ad hanc aditus patent: Death is every where: God best foresaw this; one man may bereave an other of life, but of death*

*death no man; whereunto there are infinite wayes and means:* The most favourable present that nature hath bestowed upon us, and that taketh away from us all means of complaint, is, that it hath left unto us the key of the closet, liberty to die when we will. Wherefore complainest thou in this world? it holdeth thee not; if thou live in pain, thy idleness and fear is the cause; for to die, there is nothing necessary, but a will.

The other case is a lively apprehension and desire of the life to come, which maketh a man to thirst after death, as after a great gain, the seed of a better life, the bridge unto Paradise, the way to all good, and an earnest penny of the resurrection. A firm belief and hope of these things is incompatible with the fear and horrour of death: it perswadeth us rather to be weary of this life, and to desire death, *Vitam habere in patientia, & mortem in desiderio; To endure our life with patience, but rather to desire death:* To have life in affliction, and death in affection: their life is a cross, their death a comfort, and therefore their vowes and their voices are; *cupio dissolvi: mihi mors lucrum: quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus? I desire to be dissolved: for death is profitable unto me: who shall then free me from death?* And for this cause those Philosophers and Christians have been justly reproached (which is to be understood of those that are weak and idle, and not of all) that play the publick dissemblers, and do not in verity believe that which they so much talk of, and so highly commend, touching that happy immortality, and those unspeakable pleasures in the second life, since they doubt, and fear death so much, the necessary passage thereunto.

18 *To kill himself.*

The fift and last, is the execution of this precedent desire, which is for a man to be his own executioner, and the author of his own death. This seemeth to proceed from virtue and the greatness of a mans courage, having been anciently practised by the greatest and most excellent men & women of every nation and religion, *Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Persians, Medes, French, Indians.* Philosophers of all sects, *Jews*, witness that good old man *Razis*, called the father of the *Jews* for his virtue; and his wives, who under *Antiochus*, having circumcised their children, cast themselves head-long from the rock with them: And Christians too, witness those two canonized Saints, *Pelagius* and *Sophronia*; whereof the first, with his mother and sisters, cast himself into the river, and the other killed her self with a knife, to avoid the violence of *Maxentius* the Emperour:

Emperour: Yea witness divers people and whole cities, as *Capona* in *Italy*, *Astupa*, *Numantia* in *Spain* besieged by the *Romans*; the *Abideens* enforced by *Philip* a city in *India* besieged by *Alexander*. But this resolution hath been likewise approved and authorized by many common-weals, by laws and rules established thereupon, as at *Marseilles*, in the Ile of *Cea*; in *Nigropont*, and other nations, as in the *Hyperborean* Ilands; and justified by many great reasons, drawn from the precedent article, which is of the just desire of death. For if it be permitted to desire, to ask, to seek after death, why should it be an ill act to give it unto our selves? If a mans own death be just in the will, why should it not be as just in the hand, and the execution? Why should I expect that from another, which I can do my self? and why should it not be better to give it, then to suffer another to give it; to meet, then to attend it? for the fairest death is the more voluntary. Finally, I offend not the law made against thieves and robbers, when I take but my own goods, and cut but my own purse; neither am I guilty of the lawes made against murtherers by taking away my own life. But this opinion is reproved by divers, not only Christians, but Jewes, as *Josephus* disputeth against his Captains in the cave *du Puis*: and Philosophers; as *Plato*, *Scipio*, who held this proceeding not onely for a vice of cowardlines and impatiencie, for it is for a man to hide himself from the blowes of fortune. Now a true and lively virtue must never yield, for evils and crosses are nourishments thereunto, and it is greater constancy well to use the chain wherewith we are tied, then to break it; and more settled resolution in *Regulus*, then in *Cato*.

*Rebus in adversis facile est contemnere vitam,*
*Fortius ille facit, qui miser esse potest.*
*Si fractus illabatur orbis*
*Impavidum ferient ruinæ.*
*'Tis no virtue to despise.*
*A life long led in miseries:*
*But to smile in fortune rude,*
*Is the mot of fortitude.*
*The ruinous world, should it on this man fall,*
*Kill him it may, daunt him it never shall.*

But also for a fault of desertion; for a man ought not to abandon his charge without the expresse commandement of him that gave it him, we are not here for our selves, not our own masters. This then

then is not a matter beyond all doubt or disputation.

It is first beyond all doubt, that we are not to attempt this last exploit without very great and just cause, (nay I cannot see how any cause should be great and just enough) to the end that it be as they say, εὐλογος εἰσαγωγὴ, an honest and reasonable departure. It must not then be for any light occasion, whatsoever some say, that a man may die for light causes, since they that hold us in life are not weighty. It is ingratitude to nature, not to accept and use her present, it is a sign of lightness to be too anxious and scrupulous, to break company for matters of no moment, and not for such as are just and lawful, if there be any such. And therefore they had not a sufficient excuse, and just cause of their death, of whom I made mention before, *Pomponius*, *Atticus*, *Marcellinus* and *Cleantes*, who would not stay the course of their death, for this only reason, because they were already neer unto it. The wives of *Petus*, of *Scaurus*, of *Labio*, of *Fulvius* the friend of *Augustus*, of *Seneca*, and divers others, who died only to accompany their husbands in death, or rather to encourage them therein. *Cato* and others, who died because their business succeeded not well, and because they would not fall into the hands of their enemies, notwithstanding they feared no ill usage at their hands. They that have murthered themselves because they would not live at the mercy, and by the grace and favour of those whom they hated; as *Gravius Silvanius*, and *Statius Proximus*, being pardoned by *Nero*. They that die to recover a shame and dishonour past, as that Roman *Lucretia*, *Sparzapizes* the son of Queen *Tomyris*, *Boges* the Lievtenant of King *Xerxes*. They that for no particular cause, but only because they see the weal-publick in a bad and declining estate, murther themselves, as *Nerva* that great Lawyer, *Vibius Virgus*, *Jubellicus*, in the taking of *Capona*. They that are weary with living, or for private cause loath to live any longer. Neither is it sufficient that the cause be great and just, but that it be necessarily and remedilesse, and that all manner of means to preserve life be first put in practice. For precipitation and anticipated despair is very vicious, as in *Brutus* and *Cassius*, who killing themselves before the time and occasion, lost the reliques of the Roman liberty whereof they were protectors. A man, saith *Cleomenes*, must manage his life, and make use thereof to the uttermost: for to take it away, a man never wants time, it is a remedy which he hath alwaies in his own hands; but the state of things may change and grow better. *Joseph* and divers others have to their great

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great benefit practised this counsell: things that seem altogether desperate, do many times change, and have a happy succesſe; *Aliquis carnifici ſuo ſuperſtes fuit: Some men have out-lived their miseries.*

*Multa dies variſque labor mutabilis ævi*
*Retulit in melius.*
*Have patience man, and be content to live:*
*That which a day denies, a day may give.*

A man must carry himself in his place and calling as a defendant against him that assaileth him: *Cum moderamine inculpatæ tutelæ: With the government of blameleſſe protection*: he must trie all manner of means before he come to this extremity. Secondly, and without doubt it is far better, and more commendable to suffer, and to continue constant and firm to the end, then fearfully and cowardly to flie or die: but forasmuch as it is a gift not given unto all, no more then continence is: *Non omnes capiunt verbum iſtud, unde melius nubere quàm uri: All men like not this saying, Better to marry then to burn:* the question is, whether an insupportable and remedileſſe evil happening, which may utterly undo and turn topsie turvey our whole resolution, and drive us into despair, despight, and murmuring against God, it be more expedient, or a lesse evill for a man courageously to deliver himself, having his senses sound and settled, then by standing to it, for fear of failing in his duty, expose himself to the danger of sinking, and being utterly lost. It is not a lesse evil to quit the place, then to be obstinate and perish, to flie, then to be taken. It is true, that it seemeth by all humane and philosophicall reason to be practised, as hath been said, by so many famous people of all countreys and climates. But Christianity doth no way approve it, nor alloweth therein any dispensation.

Finally, it is a great point of wisdome to learn to know the point and period, to choose a fit hour to die: Every man hath his time and season to die; some prevent it, others prolong it: there is weakneſſe and valour in them both, but there is required discretion. How many men have survived their glory, and by a desire to lengthen their life but a little, have darkened it again, and lived to help to bury their own honour? And that which lastly sticketh by them, hath no reliſh or feeling of what is past, but continueth like an old filthy clout sowed to the hem of a rich and beautifull ornament. There is a time to gather fruit from the tree, which if it hang too long, it rotteth and grows worse and worse; and the losse

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is as great too, if it be gathered too soon. Many Saints and holy men have fled from death, because they are yet profitable to the Church and weal-publick, though in respect of their own particular they could be content to die. It is an act of charity to desire to live for the benefit of another; *Si populo tuo sum necessarius, non recuso laborem: If I am needful to thy people, I refuse not labour.*

Death hath divers forms, some more easie then other, and taketh divers qualities according to the fantasie of every one. Among those that are natural, they that proceed from weakness and a numness of the members are the sweetest and the easiest: among those that are violent, the best is the shortest, and the least premeditated. Some desire to make an exemplary and demonstrative death of constancy and sufficiency; this is to consider another thing, and to seek their own reputation: but this is vanity, for this is no act of society, but of one only person, who hath enough to do with himself, to minister to himself inward comfort, and hath no need to trouble himself with what belongeth to another especially all the interest he hath in his reputation ceasing with his death. That is the best death which is well recollected in it self, quiet, solitary, and attendeth wholly to that, which at that time is fittest. That great assistance of parents and friends, bringeth a thousand discommodities, it oppresseth and smothereth him that is dying, one tormenteth his ears, another his eyes, another his mouth, their cries and complaints, if they be true, stifle the heart; if fained, afflict and torment it. Many great personages have sought to die far from their friends, to avoid this inconvenience, accounting it a childish thing, & a foolish humor, to be willing by their miseries to move sorrow and compassion in their friends; we commend constancy to suffer bad fortune, we accuse and hate it in our friends, and when it is our own case, it is not sufficient that they suffer with us, but they must afflict themselves too: A wise man that is sick, should content himself with the setled countenance of his assistants.

1. *Forms of death divers.*

## CHAP. XII.

*To maintain himself in true tranquillity of spirit, the fruit and crown of wisdome, and the conclusion of this Book.*

THe tranquillity of the spirit is the soveraign good of man. This is that great and rich treasure, which the wisest seek by sea and 1

by land, on foot, and a horseback; all our care should tend thereunto, it is the fruit of all our labours and studies, the crown of wisdome. But lest a man should mistake himself herein, you must know that this tranquillity is not a retrait or vacation from all affairs, a delightful solitarinesse and corporally pleasant, or a profound carelesnesse of all things: if it were so, many women, idle, dissolute and voluptuous persons, would at their pleasure enjoy as great a good as the wisest can aspire unto with all their study: Neither multitude nor scarcity of businesse doth any thing herein. It is a beautiful, sweet, equal, just, firm and pleasant estate of the soul, which neither businesse nor idlenesse, nor good accidents, nor ill, nor time, can any way trouble, alter, mend, or depress; *Vera tranquillitas non concuti: Nothing troubles true tranquillity.*

2. The means to attain thereunto, to get and preserve it, are the points that I have handled in this second Book, whereof this is a brief collection. They consist in freeing and disfurnishing of a man from all lets & impediments, and furnishing him with those things that entertain and preserve it. The things that do most hinder and trouble the rest and tranquillity of the spirit, are common and vulgar opinions, which for the most part are erroneous; and secondly desires and passions, which ingender in us a kind of delicacy and difficulty: which are the cause that a man is never content, and these are kindled and stirred in him by those two contrary fortunes, prosperity and adversity, as with two violent and mighty winds: and finally, that vile and base captivity, wherewith the spirit (that is to say, the judgment and will) is enthralled like a beast under the yoke of certain local and particular rules and opinions. Now he must emancipate and free himself from the stocks and unjust subjections, and bring his spirit into liberty, restore himself to himself, free, universal, open, seeing into all; and wandring through the beautiful and universal circuit of the world and of nature. *In commune genitus, mundum ut unam domum spectans, toti se inferens mundo, & in omnes ejus actus contemplationem suam mittens: He that is begotten generally, holds this world but as one house, applying himself to the whole world, and exercising his contemplation in all the actions thereof.*

3 The places being thus trimmed and made ready, the first foundations that are to be laid, are a true honesty, and to live in such an estate and vocation whereunto a man is fit. The principall parts wherewith he must raise, assure, and settle this building, are first true piety,

piety, whereby, with a soul not astonished, but settled, pure, free, devout, a man contemplateth God, the great, sovereign, and absolute work-master of all things, who can neither be seen, nor known: but yet he must be known, adored, worshipped, served with the whole heart, from whom he is to hope for all manner of good, and to fear no evil: afterwards he must walk roundly in simplicity and truth, according to the laws and customes, live with a heart open both to the eyes of God and the world; *Conscientiam suam aperiens, semperq; tanquam in publico vivens, se magis veritus, quàm alios: Shewing his conscience, and alwayes living as it were in publick, more afeard of himself, then of others.* Again, he must keep in himself and with others, and general in all things, in his thoughts, speeches, designments actions, a moderation the mother or nurse of tranquillity, laying aside all pomp and vanity, rule his desires, content himself with a mediocrity and sufficiency: *Quod sit esse velit, nihilque malit: Would be as he is, and rather nothing then so*; rejoyce in his fortunes. A tempest hath a great deal less force, and doth less hurt when the sailes are taken down, then when they are hoised up, and laid open to the winds. He must be constant against whatsoever may wound or hurt him, raise himself above & beyond all fear, contemning all the blows of fortune, of death, holding it as the end of all evils, and not the cause of any; *Contemptor omnium, quibus torquetur vita, supra omnia quæ contingunt accidunt q. eminens, Imperturbatus, intrepidus: A contemner or despiser of all things, wherewith mans life may be afflicted, raising himself above all things that may chance or happen, without perturbation, without fear.* And so hold himself firm unto himself, agree with himself, live at ease without any pain or inward contention, full of joy, of peace, of comfort and content in himself: *Sapiens plenus gaudio, hilaris, placidus cum diis ex pari vivit: Sapientiæ effectus gaudii æqualitas, solus sapiens gaudet: A wise man is full of joy, merry, peaceable, liveth in equal pleasure with the gods: the effect of Wisdome is the equality of joy, Wherein only a Wise man delighteth.* He must I say entertain himself, and continue content in himself, which is the proper fruit and effect of wisdome: *Nisi sapienti sua non placent: omnis stultitia laborat fastidio sui. Non est beatus, esse se qui non putat: No man, but a wise man is content with his own: every fools travels dislike him. No man is happy, but he that so thinks himself.*

To conclude, to this tranquillity of spirit two things are necessary, innocency and a good conscience; this is the first and princi-

pal part which doth marvellously arm and confirm him with assurance; but this is not alwaies sufficient, in the force of the tempest, as it is many times seen in divers that are troubled and lost: *Erit tanta tribulatio ut seducantur justi*: *There shall be so great tribulation, that even the righteous shall be seduced.* And therefore the other is likewise necessary, which is force and constancy of courage, as likewise this alone were not sufficient: for the force and resistance of the conscience is marvellous, it makes us to betray, to accuse our selves, and for want of other witnesses, it is as a thousand witnesses against us.

*Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum.*
*Shaking a double relish with a Whip*
*That strikes the soul, whereas the devils skip.*

It frameth an enditement, condemneth and executeth us, there is no closet close enough for wicked men, saith *Epicurus*, because they never can assure themselves to be hid, their own conscience alwaies discovering them to themselves. *Prima est hæc ultio, quod se judice nemo nocens absolvitur: This is the first revenge of sin, that every man being his own Judge, no sinner is quit.* So likewise neither a weak and fearful soul, be it never so holy, nor a strong and couragious, if it be not sound and pure, can never enjoy this so rich and happy tranquillity; but he that hath them all worketh wonders; as *Socrates, Epaminondas, Cato, Scipio*, of whom there are three admirable exploits touching this subject. These two Romans being publickly accused, made their accusers to blush, won the Judges, and the whole assembly being strucken with an admiration.

He had a heart too great by nature, saith *Titus Livius* of *Scipio*, to know how to be faulty, and to debase himself so much, as to defend his own innocencie.

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*FINIS.*

# OF VVISEDOME, the third Book.

## Wherein are handled,

*The particular adviſements of Wiſedome, by the four morall virtues.*

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### *THE PREFACE.*

Forasmuch as our purpoſe in this book, as by piece-meal to inſtruct unto Wiſdome, and to give the particular adviſements after the generall, handled in the ſecond Book; that we may the better hold a certain courſe and order therein, we have thought that we cannot do better, then to follow the four Miſtreſſes and morall virtues, *Prudence*, *Juſtice*, *Fortitude*, and *Temperance*: for in theſe four, almoſt all the duties of our life are comprehended. *Prudence*, is as a generall guide and conduct of the other virtues, and of our whole life, though properly it be exerciſed in the affairs that belong thereunto, *Juſtice* concerneth the perſons of men; for it is to give unto every one that which belongeth unto him. *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, concern all accidents good and evil, pleaſant and painfull, good and ill fortune, Now in theſe three, perſons, affairs, and accidents,

accidents, is contained all our life and humane condition, and the traffick of this world.

## *Of Prudence, the first virtue.*

### CHAP. I.

### *Of Prudence in general.*

1 *The excellency thereof.* PRudence is with reason put in the first rank, as the general Queen, superintendent, and guide of all other virtues, *Auriga virtutum*; without which there is nothing good, beautiful, fit, and decent; it is the salt of our life, the lustre, the ornament, the sauce or seasoning of our actions, the square and rule of our affairs, and in a word, the art of our life, as physick the art of our health.

2. *The definition.* It is the knowledg and choice of those things we must either desire or flie; it is the just estimation or trial of things; it is the eye that seeth all, that directeth and ordaineth all. It consisteth in three things, which are all of one rank; to consult and deliberate well, to judge and resolve well, to conduct and execute well.

3 *It is universal.* It is an universal virtue, for it extendeth it self generally to all humane things, not onely in gross, but by piece-meal to every particular thing, and is as infinite, as are the individuals.

4 *Difficult.* Senec. It is very difficult, both by reason of the aforesaid infiniteness, for the particulars are without knowledg, as without number; *Siquæ finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt: Things infinite and that cannot be defined, are beyond wisdome:* And of the great uncertaintie and inconstancy of humane things, which are the greater by reason of their accidents, circumstances, appurtenances, dependancies, times, places, persons; in such sort, that in the change of one only, and that the least circumstance, the whole thing it self is altered: And likewise in the office thereof, which is the gathering together, and temperature of contrary things, the distinction and trial of those that are like one another; the contrariety and resemblance hindreth much.

5 *Obscure.* Plin. in paneg. It is very obscure, becaus̃e the causes and jurisdictions of things are unknown, the seeds and roots are hidden, and such as the nature of man cannot find, nor ought to seek after, *Occultat eorum semina Deus, & plerumque bonorum malorúmque causa sub diversa specie latent: Their seeds God keepeth unknown, and for the most part the causes of good and evill lie hid under divers similitudes.* Moreover, fortune,

fortune, deſtiny, (uſe what words you will) a ſoveraign, ſecret, and unknown power and authority, hath alwaies the advantage, and maintaineth it againſt all counſels, foreſights and preventions whatſoever: whereby it many times comes to paſs, that the beſt counſels have the worſt iſſues, that one and the ſame counſel doth very happily ſucceed to one, unhappily to another, in one and the ſame caſe, and with one and the ſame man, things went luckily yeſterday, unluckily to day. It is an opinion juſtly received, that we ought not to judge of counſels, nor of the ſufficiency and capacity of perſons by the events. And therefore one anſwered thoſe well that marvelled and were aſtoniſhed at the ill ſucceſs of their buſineſs, conſidering with how wiſe and mature deliberation they were undertaken, That they were maſters of their deliberations, not of the ſucceſs of their affairs; for that was in the power of fortune, which ſeemeth to ſport it ſelf with all our faireſt deſignments and counſels, overthroweth in a moment that which hath a long time been projected and deliberated, and ſeemeth to be ſtrongly fortified, chocking, as they ſay, our artillery. And indeed, fortune to ſhew its authority in all things, and to abate our preſumption not being able to make men wiſe, that are not apt thereunto, maketh them nevertheleſs happy in deſpight of virtue, whereby it many times comes to paſs, that ſimple men bring to a happy end great matters, both publick and private. Prudence then is a ſea without either bottome or brink, and which cannot be limited and preſcribed by precepts and adviſements. It doth but compaſs things and goeth about them, like a dark cloud, many times vain and frivolous.

6 *Neceſſary.*

Nevertheleſs it is of ſuch weight and neceſſity, that alone and of it ſelf, it can do much, and without it all the reſt is nothing, no not riches, means, force: *Vis conſilii expers mole ruit ſuâ: mens una ſapiens plurium vincit manus: Et multa quæ naturâ impedita ſunt, conſilio expediuntur: Strength void of counſel falleth to ruine even of it ſelf; One wiſe mind overcometh the hands of many: And many things that are hindred by nature, are ended by counſel.* And the principal cauſe of this neceſſity is the perverſe nature of man, the roughеſt and hardeſt to tame of all other creatures; *Impatiens æqui, nedum ſervitutis; Impatient of equity, much more of ſervitude*; and which muſt be handled with art and induſtry, for it doth not more willingly ſet it ſelf againſt any, then againſt thoſe that would contemn it. Now prudence is the art to handle it, and a gentle bridle, that holdeth it within the compaſs of obedience.

Horat. 3. od. Euripid. Livius.

Senec. 1. de clement.

Xenophon in pœdag.

7 *The acquisition thereof.*

Now though the seed of Prudence, as of other virtues, be in us by nature, yet it is acquired and learnt more then any other, and that in some sort by precepts and advisements; this is the Theorick: but much more and principally (though with more time) by experience and practice, which is twofold: the one, and the true, is that which is proper and personall, whereof it takes the name; this is the knowledge of those things which we have seen and handled: the other is strange by the act of another, this is history which we know by relation or by reading. Now experience and use is more firm and more assured; *Usus efficacissimus omnium rerum magister: Use and experience is a most effectuall master of all things*, the father and mistress of all the Arts, but more long; it is old. *Seris venit usus ab annis: Experience cometh in a mans latter dayes*; more difficult, painfull, rare. The knowledge of historie, as it is lesse firm and assured, so is it more easie, more frequent, open and common to all. A man is made more resolute and assured at his own charges, but it is more easie at the charge of another. Now from these two properly, Experience, and History, doth Prudence arise: *Usus me genuit, mater peperit memoria, seu memoriæ anima & vita historia: Experience begat me, my mother memory bare me; the soul and life of memory is history.*

8 *The distinction*

Now Prudence may and must be diversly distinguished according to the persons and the affairs. In regard of the persons there is private prudence, whether it be solitary and individuall, which can hardly be termed prudence; or sociable and Oeconomical, among a small company, and prudence publick and politick. This more high, excellent, difficult, and unto which those aforesaid qualities do properly belong, and it is twofold, Peaceable and Military.

In regard of the affairs, forasmuch as they are of two sorts, the one ordinary, easie; the other extraordinary. These are accidents which bring with them some new difficultie and ambiguity. A man may likewise say, that there is an ordinary and easie prudence, which walketh according to the laws, customes, and course already established; another extraordinary and more difficult.

Hesiod. Livius. Cicero.

There is likewise another distinction of prudence, both in respect of the persons, and of the affairs, which concerneth rather the degrees, then the kinds thereof: that is to say, proper prudence, whereby a man is wise, and taketh counsell of himself: the other borrowed, whereby a man followeth the counsel of another. The wise say, that there are two sorts and degrees of wise men: the first and

and chiefeſt is of thoſe that have a clear inſight into all things, and know of themſelves how to find the remedies and helps: but where are theſe to be found? Doubtleſſe they are rare and ſingular. The other is of thoſe that know how to take, to follow, to make uſe of the good counſels of another, for they that know neither how to give, nor to take counſel, are fools.

The generall and common adviſements, which belong to all ſorts of prudence, all ſorts of perſons and affairs, hath been touched and briefly delivered in the ſecond Book, and they are eight: firſt, knowledge of the perſons and affairs; ſecondly, eſtimation of things; thirdly, choice and elections; fourthly, from them to take counſel upon all; fifthly, temperature between fear and aſſurance, confidence and diffidence; ſixthly, to take all things in their ſeaſon, and to ſeiz upon the occaſion; ſeventhly, to carry himſelf well, with induſtry and fortune; laſtly, diſcretion in all. We muſt now handle the particulars, firſt of publick wiſdome, which reſpecteth the perſons, afterwards of that which reſpecteth the affairs. 9 Chap. 10.

## *Of the Politick Prudence of a Sovereigne to govern States.*

### THE PREFACE.

THis doctrine belongeth to Sovereignes and Governours of States. It is uncertain, infinite, difficult, and almoſt impoſſible to be ranged into order, to be limited and preſcribed by rules and precepts: but we muſt endeavour to give ſome ſmall light, and brief inſtruction thereof. We may referre this whole doctrine to two principall heads, which are the two duties of a Sovereign. The one comprehendeth and intreateth of the props and pillars of a State, principall and eſſentiall parts of Publick government, as the bones and ſinews of this great body, to the end that a Sovereign may provide for himſelf and his ſtate; which are ſeven principall, that is to ſay, knowledge of the ſtate, virtue, manners and faſhions, counſels, treaſure, forces and arms, alliances. The three firſt are in the perſon of the Sovereign, the fourth in him and near him, the three latter without him. The other is to act, well to employ and to make uſe of the foreſaid means, that is to ſay, in groſſe, and in a word, well to govern and maintain himſelf in authority, and the love both of his ſubjects and of ſtrangers, but diſtinctly; this part is twofold, peaceable and military. Behold here ſummarily

and

and grossely the work cut out, and the first great draughts that are to be handled hereafter. We will divide then this politick matrer, and of state, into two parts; the first shall be of provision, that is to say, of the seven necessary things; the second, and which presupposeth the first, shall be of the action of the Prince. This matter is excellently handled by *Lipsius*, according as he thought good: the marrow of his book is here. I have not taken, nor wholly followed his method, nor his order, as you may already see in this generall division, and more you shall hereafter: I have likewise left somewhat of his, and added something of mine own, and other mens.

## CHAP. II.

### *The first part of this politick prudence and goverment of state, which is of provision.*

1 *The chief point of this provision, to know the state.*

THe first thing that is required before all others, is the knowledge of the state: for the first rule of all prudence consisteth in knowledge, as hath been said in the second Book. The first in all things is to know with whom a man hath to deal. For inasmuch as this ruling and moderating prudence of states, which is a knowledge and sufficiency to govern in publick, is a thing relative, which is handled between the Sovereign and the subjects; the first duty and office thereof, is in the knowledge of the two parts, that is, of the people, and the Sovereignty, that is to say, of the state. First, then the humours and natures of the people must be known. This knowledge formeth, and giveth advice unto him that should govern them. The nature of the people in generall hath been described at large in the first Book, (light, inconstant, mutinous, vain, a lover of novelties, fierce and insupportable in prosperity, cowardly and dejected in adversitie) but it must likewise be known in particular; so many cities and persons, so many divers humours. There are people cholerick, audacious, warriers, fearfull, given to wine, subject to women, some more then others:

Senec. *Noscenda natura vulgi est, & quibus modis temperanter habeatur: The nature of the vulgar sort is to be known, and by what means it may be temperately ruled.* And in this sense is that saying of the wise to be understood: He that hath not obeyed, cannot tell how to command. *Nemo bene imperat, nisi qui ante paruerit imperio.* Not becaus Sovereignes should or can alwayes take upon them the name

name of ſubjects; for many are born kings and princes, and many ſtates are ſucceſſive: but that he that will well command, ſhould acquaint himſelf with the humours and wills of his ſubjects, as if himſelf were of their rank, aud in their place. He muſt likewiſe know the nature of the ſtate, not onely in generall, ſuch as it hath been deſcribed; but in particular, that which he hath now in hand, the form, eſtabliſhment, birth thereof, that is to ſay, whether it be old or new; fallen by ſucceſſion, or by election; obtained by the laws, or by arms; of what extent it is, what neighbours, means, power it hath: for according to theſe and other circumſtances, he muſt diverſly manage the ſcepter, looſe and ſtraiten the rains of his goverment.

2

*The ſecond head of this proviſion is virtue.*

After this knowledge of the ſtate, which is as a preamble, the firſt of thoſe things that are required, is virtue, neceſſary in a Sovereign, as well for himſelf, as for the ſtate. It is firſt neceſſary and convenient that he that is above all ſhould be better then all, according to the ſaying of *Cyrus*: and then it ſtandeth him upon for his credit and reputation. For common fame and report gathereth & ſpreadeth abroad the ſpeeches and actions of him that governeth. He is in the eie of all, and can no more hide himſelf then the ſun: and therfore what good or ill ſoever he doth, ſhall not want means to blazon it, ſhall be talked of enough. And it importeth him much, both in reſpect of himſelf and his ſtate, that his ſubjects have a good opinion of him. Now a Sovereign ought not onely in himfelf, and in his life and converſation to be virtuous, but he muſt likewiſe endeavour that his ſubjects be like unto himſelf. For as all the wiſeſt of the world have ever taught, a ſtate, a city, a compeny cannot long continue nor proſper, where virtue is baniſhed; and they do groſſely equivocate, who think that Princes are ſo much the more aſſured in their ſtates, by how much the more wicked their ſubjects are, becauſe, ſay they, they are more proper, and as it were born to ſervitude and the yoke; *Patientiores ſervitutis, quos non decet niſi eſſe ſervos: very patient of ſervitude, whō it becometh not to be other then ſervants.* For contrarily, wicked men bear their yoke impatiently; & they that are good & debonair fear much more thē their cauſe is, *Peſſimus quiſq; aſperrimè rectorē patitur: contrà facile imperium in bonos qui metuentes magis quàm metuendi: the moſt wicked are moſt impatient of authority: contrarily the beſt men are moſt obedient fearing others more then they are feared themſelves.* Now the moſt powerful means to induce them, & to form them unto virtue, is the example of the Prince; for as experience

Saluſt. ad Cæſ.

Plin. Pan.

Saluſt. ad Cæſ.

telleth us, all men do frame themselves to the pattern and modell of the Prince. The reason is, because example presseth more then law. It is a mute law which carrieth more credit then a command, *nec tam imperio nobis opus quàm exemplo: & mitiùs jubetur exemplo: Neither do we so much need commandment, as example; and it is more gentle to command by example.* Now the eyes and thoughts of the lesser are alwayes upon the great; they admire and simply believe, that all is good and excellent that they do: and on the other side, they that command, think they sufficiently enjoyn and bind their inferiours to imitate them by acting onely. Virtue then is honourable and profitable in a sovereign, yea, all virtue.

Plin. Paneg.

3. *Especially four virtues.*

But especially and above all, Pietie, Justice, Valour, Clemencie. These are the four principal and princely virtues in principalitie. And therefore that great Prince *Augustus* was wont to say, that pietie and justice did deifie princes. And *Seneca* saith, that clemency agreeth better with a prince, then any other. The pietie of a Sovereign consisteth in his care for the maintenance and preservation of religion, as the protectour thereof. This maketh for his own honour, and preservation of himself: for they that fear God dare not attempt, nay think of any thing either against their Prince, who is the image of God upon earth, or against the state. For as *Lactantius* doth many times teach, it is religion that maintaineth humane societie, which cannot otherwise subsist, and would soon be filled with all manner of wickednesse and savage cruelties, if the respect and fear of religion did not bridle men and keep them in order. The state of the Romans did increase and flourish more by religion, saith *Cicero* himself, then by all other means. Wherefore a Prince must take care and endeavour that religion be preserved in its purity, according to the ancient lawes and ceremonies of the countrey, and hinder all innovation, and controversies therein, roughly chastising those that go about to break the peace thereof. For doubtlesse change in religion, and a wrong done thereunto, draweth with it a change and a declination of the Common-wealth, as *Mecenas* well discourseth to *Augustus*.

Dion.

4 *Justice.*

After pietie cometh justice, without which states are but robberies, which a Prince must keep and practise both in himself and others: In himself, for he must detest all those tyrannicall and barbarous speeches, which dispense with sovereigns, quitting them from all lawes, reason, equitie, obligation; which tell them that they are not bound unto any other dutie, then to their own wills and pleasures,

ſures, that there is no law for them; that all is good and juſt that ſerveth their turns; that their equitie is their force, their duty is in their power. *Principi leges nemo ſcripſit: licet, ſi libet. In ſumma fortuna, id æquius quod validius: nihil injuſtum quod fructuoſum: Sanctitas, pietas, fides, privata bona ſunt: qua juvat reges eant:* Plin. Pan. Tacitus. Senec. in tra. *None hath written lawes for the Prince: his will is his law. In the higheſt degree of fortune, that is moſt juſt, which is of moſt force: Nothing is unjuſt which is profitable: Sanctitie, piety, faith, are private goods, and go that way that may benefit the Prince.* And he muſt oppoſe againſt them thoſe excellent and holy counſels of the wiſe, that he hath moſt power in him to break lawes, ſhould take moſt care to keep them, and live moſt in order. The greateſt power ſhould be the ſtraighteſt bridle, the rule of power is duty; *minimum decet liberè; cui nimium licet, non fas potentes poſſe, fieri quod nefas: he that hath power to do too much, ought to be leaſt free; It is not lawfull that mighty men ſhould do that, which is unlawfull to be done.* Senec. Euripides. The Prince then muſt firſt be juſt, keeping well and inviolably his faith, the foundation of juſtice, to all and every one whoſoever he be. Then he muſt cauſe that his juſtice be kept and maintained in others, for it is his proper charge, and for that cauſe he is inſtalled. He muſt underſtand the cauſes and the perſons, give unto every one that which appertaineth to him, juſtly according to the lawes, without delay, labyrinths of ſuits and controverſies, involution of proceſſe, aboliſhing that villanous and pernicious myſtery of pleading, which is an open Fair, or merchandize, a lawfull and honourable robbery, *conceſſum latrocinium*; avoiding the multiplicitie of lawes and ordinances, a teſtimony of a ſick Common-wea', *Corruptiſſimæ reipublicæ plurimæ leges: The moſt corrupted Common-wealths abound with moſt lawes;* Colum. Tacit. Plin. Pan. as medicines and plaiſters of a body ill diſpoſed: and all this, to the end that that which is eſtabliſhed by good lawes be not deſtroyed by too many lawes. But you muſt know, that the juſtice, virtue, and probitie of a ſovereign goeth after another manner, then that of private men: it hath a gate more large and more free by reaſon of the great weight and dangerous charge which he carrieth and ſwayeth, for which cauſe it is fit to march with a paſe, which ſeemeth to others uneaſie and irregular, but yet it is neceſſary and lawfull for him. He muſt ſometimes ſtep aſide, and go out of the way, mingle prudence with juſtice, & as they ſay, cover himſelf with the skin of the Lion, if that of the Fox ſerve not the turn. But this is not alwayes to be done, and in al caſes, *An advertiſement.*

but

but with these three conditions, that it be for the evident & important necessitie of the weal-publick, (that is to say, of the State and of the Prince, which are things conjoyned) unto which he must run; this is a naturall obligation, and not to be dispensed with: and to procure the good of the common-weal, is but to do his duty.

*For the weal-publick.*

*Salus populi suprema lex esto.*

*Princes counsels, love and hate,*
*Do homage to the Law of state,*
*That peoples safety have no mate.*
*Other lawes do very well,*
*But peoples safety bears the bell.*

*For defence and conservation.*

That it be to defend, and not to offend; to preserve himself, and not to increase his greatnesse, to save and shield himself either from deceits and subtilties, or from wicked and dangerous enterprises, and not practise them. It is lawfull by subtiltie to prevent subtiltie, and among Foxes to counterfeit the Fox. The world is full of Art and malicious cozenage, and by deceits and cunning subtilties, states are commonly overthrown, saith *Aristotle*. Why then should it not be lawfull, nay why should it not be necessary to hinder, and to divert such evil, and to save the weal publick by the self-same means that others would undermine and overthrow it? Alwayes to deal simply and plainly with such people, and to follow the streight line of true reason and equitie, were many times to betray the state, and to undo it.

5 *Discreetly without wickednesse.*

Thirdly, it must be with discretion, to the end that others abuse it not, and such as are wicked take from thence occasion to give credit and countenance to their own wickednesse. For it is never permitted to leave virtue and honestie, to follow vice and dishonestie. There is no composition or compensation betwixt these two extremities. And therefore away with all injustice treachery, treason, and disloyaltie. Cursed be the doctrine of those, who teach (as hath been said) that all things are good and lawfull for sovereigns: but yet it is sometimes necessary and required, that he mingle profit with honestie, and that he enter into composition with both. He must never turn his back to honestie, but yet sometimes go about and coast it, employing therein his skill and cunning, which is good, honest and lawfull, as saith that great S. *Basil*, καλὴν καὶ ἐπαινετὴν πανουργίαν; and doing for the weal-publick like as mothers and physicians, who feed their children and sick, with fair speeches, and deceive them for their health. To be brief, doing that closely

cloſely which he may not do openly. joyn wiſdome to valour, art and ſpirit, where nature and the hand ſufficeth not; be, as *Pindarus* ſaith, a Lion in his blows, a Fox in his counſel; a Dove and a Serpent, as divine verity ſpeaketh.

And to this matter more diſtinctly, there is required in a ſovereign, diſtruſt, and that he keep himſelf cloſe, yet ſo, as that he be ſtill virtuous and juſt. Diſtruſt which is the firſt, is wholly neceſſary, as the contrary, which is credulitie, and a careleſſe truſt or confidence, is vicious, and very dangerous in a ſovereign. He watcheth over all, and muſt anſwer for all, his faults are not light, and therefore he muſt be well adviſed. If he truſt much, he diſcovereth himſelf, and is expoſed to ſhame and many dangers, *opportunus fit injuriæ*, yea, he encourageth ſuch as are falſe and treacherous, who may with little danger, and much recompence commit great wickedneſſe, *Aditum nocendi perfido præſtat fides: Truſt maketh way for the treacherous to do miſchief.* It is neceſſary therefore that he cover himſelf with this buckler of diſtruſt, which the wiſeſt have thought to be a great part of prudence, and the ſinews of wiſdome, that is to ſay, that he watch, believe nothing, take heed of all: and hereunto doth the nature of the world induce him, wholly compoſed of lies, coloured, counterfeit, and dangerous, namely ſuch as are near unto him in the court and houſes of great perſonages. He muſt then truſt but few, and thoſe known by long experience and often tryals: Neither is it neceſſary that he abandon them, and in ſuch ſort leave all the cord, that he ſtill hold it not by one end, and have an eye unto them: But he muſt cover and diſguiſe his diffidence, yea, when he diſtruſteth, he muſt make a ſhew and countenance of great truſt and confidence. For open diſtruſt wrongeth, and inviteth as much to deceive, as an over-careleſſe confidence; and many by making too great a ſhew of fear to be deceived, ſhew the way how they may be deceived. *Multi fallere docuerunt dum timent falli: Many have taught to deceive, whileſt they fear to be deceived:* as contrarily a profeſſed and open truſt hath taken away the deſire to deceive, hath obliged to loyaltie, and ingendred fidelitie; *Vult quiſque ſibi credi, & habita fides ipſam plerumque obligat fidem: Every man would be believed, and to be credited for the moſt part bindeth truſt the more.*

6 *Diſtruſt required in a Prince.*

Seneca.

Epichar. Euripid. Cicero.

Senec.

From diſtruſt comes diſſimulation the ſcience or ſeed thereof; for if that were not, and that there were truſt and fidelity in all, diſſimulation which openeth the front, and covereth the thought, could have

7 *And diſſimulation.*

have no place. Now dissimulation which is vicious in private persons, is very necessary in Princes, who otherwise could not know how to reigne, or well to command: And they must many times dissemble not onely in warre, with starngers and enemies; but also in time of peace, and with their subjects, though more sparingly. Simple and open men, and such as carry (as they say) their hearts in their foreheads are not in any sort fit for this mysterie of commanding, and betray many times both themselves and their state: But yet he must play this part with art and dexterity, and to the purpose, neither so openly or so simply as that it may be discerned. For to what purpose dost thou hide and cover thy self, if a man may see thee obliquely or side-wayes? Wily devices and cunning subtilties, are no more deceits and subtilties, when they are known and vented out. A Prince then the better to cover his art, must make profession of loving simplicitie, must make much of free and open minded men, as being enemies to dissimulation: and in matters of lesse importance, he must proceed openly, to the end he may be taken for such as he seemeth.

8 *Practice.* All this is in omission, in retaining himself, not acting: but it is likewise required sometimes, that he passe farther, and come to action, and this is twofold. The one is to make and frame secret practices and intelligences, cunningly to win and draw unto him the hearts and services either of the officers, servants, and trustiest friends of other Princes and forrein Lords or of his own subjects. This is a subtiltie which is much in request and authority, and verie common among Princes, and a great point of prudence saith *Cicero*. It is wrought in some sort by perswasion, but especially by presents and pensions, means so powerfull, that not onely the Secretaries, the chief of the Councel, the most inward friends and favourites, have been thereby drawn to give advice, and to divert the designments of their Master; yea, great Captains to give their helping hand in the warre; but also wives have been won to discover the secrets of their husbands. Now this subtil policie is all allowed and approved by many, without difficulty or scruple. And to say the truth, if it be against an enemy, against a subject whom he suspecteth, and likewise against any stranger, with whom he hath no alliance nor league of fidelitie and amity, it is not greatly to be doubted: But against his alliance, his friends and confederates, it cannot be good; and it is a kind of treachery, which is never permitted.

9 *Subtilties.* The other is to win some advantage, and to obtain his purpose, by

by cloſe and covert means, by equivocations and ſubtilties, to circumvent by fair ſpeeches and promiſes, letters, ambaſſages, working and obtaining by ſubtil means, that which the difficultie of times and affairs will not permit him otherwiſe to do, and to do that cloſely which he cannot do openly. Many great and wiſe men ſay, that this is lawfull and to be permitted: *Crebrò mendacio & fraude uti imperantes debent ad commodum ſubditorum. Decipere pro moribus temporum prudentia eſt:* Great commanders ought to uſe lying and fraud for the commoditie of their ſubjects. To deceive according to the ſtate and condition of time, is Wiſedome. Plato. Plin. Val. Max. It were over-boldneſs ſimply to affirm that it is permitted. But a man may ſay, that in caſe of great neceſſity, in a troubleſome and tumultuous time, when it is not onely to procure the great good, but to divert a great miſchief from the ſtate and againſt ſuch as are wicked and traiterous, that it is no great fault, if it be a fault.

10 *Injuſtice profitable to the weal publick.*

But there is a greater doubt and difficultie in other things, becauſe they have a ſmell of much injuſtice in them. I ſay much, and not wholly, becauſe with their injuſtice there are mingled in them ſome grain of juſtice. That which is wholly and apparently unjuſt, is reproved of all, even of the wicked, at leaſtwiſe in word and ſhew, if not in earneſt and indeed. But of theſe actions ill mingled, there are ſo many reaſons and authorities on the one ſide and the other, that a man hardly knoweth how to reſolve himſelf. I will reduce them here to certain heads. To diſpatch, and ſecretly to put to death, or otherwiſe without form of juſtice, ſome certain man that is troubleſome and dangerous to the ſtate, and who well deſerveth death, but yet cannot without trouble and danger be enterpriſed & repreſſed by an ordinary courſe: herein there is nothing violated but the form: and the Prince, is he not above the form?

To cut the wings, and to leſſen the great means of any one that ſhall raiſe and fortifie himſelf too much in the ſtate, and maketh himſelf fearfull to his Sovereign; not ſtaying till he be invincible, and able to attempt any thing againſt the ſtate, and the head of his Sovereign when it pleaſeth him.

To take by authority the riches of the richeſt in a great neceſſitie and povertie of the ſtate.

To weaken and cancel the laws and priviledges of ſome ſubjects, who hold them to the prejudice and diminution of the authoritie of the Sovereign.

To take by prevention, and to poſſeſſe himſelf of a place, city, ro-

province, very commodious for the state, rathen then to suffer another strong and fearfull neighbour to take and possesse it, to the great hurt, sujection, and perpetuall alarum of the said state.

All these things are approved as just and lawfull by many great and wise men, provided that they succeed well and happily, of whom these are the sayings and sentences: *To do justice in great matters, a man may sometimes go astray in small:* and, *To execute justice in grosse, it is permitted to do wrong by retail:* for commonly the greatest actions and examples have some injustice, which satisfieth particular men, by the profit which ariseth to all in generall: *Omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod adversus singulos utilitate publicâ rependitur.* That a prudent and wise Prince should not onely know how to command according to the Laws, but also the Laws themselves, if necessity require; and they must make the Laws to will it, when they cannot do that they would. In confused and desperate affairs, a Prince must not follow that which may be well spoken of, but that which is necessary to be executed. Necessity, a great support and excuse to humane fragility, infringeth all law, and therefore he is not very wicked, that doth ill by constraint: *Necessitas magnum imbecillitatis humanæ patrocinium, omnem legem frangit: non est nocens quicunque non sponte est nocens.* If a Prince cannot be wholly good, it sufficeth if he be half good, and that he be not wholly wicked; That it cannot possibly be, that good princes should commit no injustice. To all this I would add for their justification, or diminution of their faults, that Princes finding themselves in such extremities, they ought not to proceed in such actions, but with great unwillingnes and grief of mind, acknowledging that it is an infelicity and a disfavour from heaven, & so carrying themselves therein as a father, when he is enforced to cauterise or cut off a member of his child, to save his life, or to pluck out a tooth to purchase ease. As for other speeches more bold, which refer all to profit, which they either equall or prefer before honestie, an honest man must ever abhor them.

Plutarch. Tacit.

Plutarch. in Flam.

Senec.

Aristot. in Politico. Democrit.

We have staied long upon this point of the virtue of justice, because of the doubts and difficulties that arise from the accidents and necessities of states, and which do many times hinder the most resolute and best advised.

11

*Valour.*

After Justice cometh Valour; I mean that military virtue; wisdome, courage, and sufficiency to play the warriour; necessary in a Prince for the defence and safetie of himself, the state, his subjects,

of

of the publick peace and liberty, and without which he can hardly deserve the name of a prince.

But let us come to the fourth princely virtue, which is Clemency, a virtue which inclineth the Prince to a sweet kind of mildnesse and lenity, whereby he lesseneth and qualifieth the rigour of justice with judgement and discretion, it moderateth, and sweetly manageth all things, delivereth those that are faulty, relieveth those that are fallen, saveth those that are like to be lost. It is that in a Prince, which humanity is in a common person. It is contrary to cruelty, & extreme rigour, not to justice, from which it differeth not much, but it sweetneth and moderateth it. It is necessary by reason of our humane infirmitie, the frequency of offences, the facillity to offend: for an over-great and continuall rigour and severity, ruinateth all, and maketh chastisements contemptible; *Severitas amittit assiduitate authoritatem*: It stirreth malice and rancor, moveth rebellions, and men by despight are made wicked. For fear, that keepeth men in their duty, must be sweet and temperate; if it be too sharp and continuall, it is changed into rage and revenge: *Temperatus timor est qui cohibet, assiduus & acer in vindictam excitat: Temperate fear is that which restraineth, but continuall stirreth up revenge.* It is likewise very profitable to a Prince and State, it winneth the love and good will of his subjects, and consequently confirmeth and assureth the state, *Firmissimum id imperium quo obedientes gaudent: That Empire is most firm, where the subjects so obey, as they rejoyce*, as shal be said hereafter. It is likewise very honourable to a Sovereign, for his subjects will honour and adore him as a god, as their tutour, their father; and in stead of fearing him, they will fear all for him, least any ill happen unto him. This then shall be the lesson of the Prince, to know all that passeth, not to believe all; yea, many times to dissemble, wishing rather to be thought to have found good subjects, then to have made them such; to pardon light faults, to lessen the rigour of the great; not to be over-straight and exact in punishing, (which is as great a dishonour and infamy to a Prince, as to a Physician many patients that die under his hand) to content himself many times with repentance as a sufficient chastisement.

12 *Clemencie.*

Senec.

Senec.

Tit. Livius cap. 3. in the beginning.

Tacit. Agricol.

——*ignoscere pulchrum*
*Jam misero, pœnæque genus vidisse precantem.*
*'Tis foul and fair enough, for them and thee,*
*To pardon, where the Lord afflicts, not we.*

And let him not fear that which some object very untruly, that it

debaseth, vilifieth, and weakneth the authoritie of the sovereign and of the state, for contrarily it fortifieth it, and gives credit and vigour thereunto: And a Prince beloved, shall do more by love, then by fear, which makes men fear and tremble, but not obey: and as *Salust* discourſed to *Cesar*, those states that are governed with fear, are never durable. No man can be feared by many, but he must likewise fear many, and that fear which he would put upon all, falleth upon his own head. That life is doubtfull wherein a man neither before nor behind, nor on any side is covered, but is alwayes in agitation, in danger, in fear. It is true, as hath been said in the beginning, that it must be with judgement; for, as tempered and well conducted it is very venerable, so being too loose, too remisse, it is very pernicious.

Saluſt. ad Cæſar.

13 *After which are required also liberality.*

After these four principall and royall virtues, there are also others though lesse worthy and necessary, yet in a second place very profitable, and requisite in a sovereign; that is to say, liberalitie, so fit and necessary for a Prince, as it is lesse befitting him to be vanquished by arms, then by magnificence. But yet there is herein required a great discretion, otherwise it will be more hurtfull then commodious.

*Liberality twofold.*

There is a twofold liberalitie, the one consisteth in charge and shew, and this serves to small purpose. For it is an idle thing in sovereigns, and to little end, to endeavour by great and excessive charges to make shew of themselves, or to increase their credit, especially with their subjects, where they have power to do what they list. It is a testimonie of pusillanimitie, and that they understand not what they are, and besides that, it seemeth to their subjects, the spectatours of these triumps, that they make this glorious shew with their own spoils, that they feast it at their charges, that they feed their eyes with that, that should feed their bellies. And again a Prince should think that he hath nothing properly his: he oweth himself to another. The other liberality, consisteth in gifts bestowed upon another, and this is farre more commodious and commendable, but then it must be well governed, and he must be well advised to whom, how, and how much he must give. He must give to those that have deserved it, that have done service to the weal publick, that have run their fortunes, and spent themselves in the warres. No man will envy them, if they be not very wicked. Whereas contrarily, great gifts, bestowed without respect & merit, shame the giver, and purchase envy to the receiver, and is received without

without thankfulnes and acknowledgement. Some tyrants have been sacrificed to the malice of the people, even by those whom they have advanced, railing on them with the rest of the people, and securing their goods, by making known how much they contemn and hate him, from whom they received them. Again, this liberality must be with measure; for if it be not, and that he gave unto all, and upon all occasions, the ruine of the state and Sovereigne must needs ensue: This is to play and to loose all. For men will never be satisfied, but be as excessive in asking, as the Prince shall be in giving, framing themselves not according to reason, but example; so that when the common treasury shall fail, he shall be enforced to lay hands upon the goods of another, and supply by injustice, that which ambition and prodigality did dissipate, *quod ambitione exhaustum, per scelera supplendum.* Now it is far better not to give at all, then to take away to give: for a man shall never enjoy in so high a degree the love and good will of those whom he hath clothed, as the hatred and ill will of those whom he hath robbed and spoyled. And again, this liberality without measure, worketh the ruine of himself: for a fountain drieth up, if it be over-much drawn. *Liberalitate liberalitas perit: By liberality liberalitie perisheth.* Liberality likewise must be spun with a gentle thread by little and little and not altogether: for that which is done over-speedily, be it never so great, is in a manner insensible, and soon forgotten. Pleasant and pleasing things must be exercised with ease and leasure, that a man may have time to tast them: Things rude and cruel (if they must needs be done) must contrarily be executed speedily. There is then Art and Prudence in giving, and in the practice of liberality. *Falluntur quibus luxuria specie liberalitatis imponit: perdere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt. They are deceived whom riot blindeth in shew of liberality: many know how to waste, but not how to give.* And to say the truth, liberality is not droperly any of the royal virtues; for it agreeth and carrieth it self well with tyrannie it self. And such as are the governours of young Princes do wrong, in working so strong an impression of this virtue of bounty in their minds and wills, that they should refuse no means to put it in practice, and think nothing well employed, but that which they give (this is their common language) but they do it either for their own benefit, or else they know not to whom they speak it. For it is a dangerous thing to imprint liberality in the mind of him that hath means to furnish himself as much as he will at the charges of another.

Hieronym.

Tacit.

ther. A prodigall or liberall Prince without discretion and measure, is worse then a covetous: but if this liberality be well ruled and ordered, as hath been said, it is well beseeming a Prince, and very profitable both to himself and the state.

14 *Magnanimitie and moderation of choler.* Senec.

Another virtue requisite in a Prince, in a second degree, is magnanimity, and greatnesse of courage, to contemn injuries and bad speeches, and to moderate his choler; never to vex himself for the outrages and indiscretions of another: *Magnam fortunam magnus animus decet; injurias & offensiones superne despicere, indignas Cæsaris iræ. A great mind becometh a great fortune; and highly to despise injuries, and offences, which be unworthy the anger of Cesar.* For a man to afflict himself, and to be moved, is to confesse himself to be faultie, whereas by neglect and light account it easily vanisheth. Tacit. *Convitia si irascere, agnita videntur; spreta exolescunt. Thou seemest to confesse those accusations being angry; which contemned, either vanish of themselves, or return upon the Author.* And if there be fit place, and a man must be angry, let it be openly and without dissimulation, in such sort that he give not occasion to suspect a hidden, grudge and purpose of revenge: this is a token of a bad and incurable nature, and best befitting the baser sort: Tacit. *Obscuri & irrevocabiles reponunt odia: Sævæ cogitationis indicium secreto suo satiari. Base persons and unrecoverable do conceal their hatreds: It is a token of a barbarous and cruell mind, to be glutted with secret grudge.* It doth better become a great personage to offend, then to hate. The other virtues are lesse royall and more common.

*The third head of this provision. The manners of the Prince.*

After virtue come the manners, carriages, and countenances that become and belong unto Majestie, very requisite in a Prince. I will not stand upon this point: I onely say as it were passing by, that not onely nature helpeth much hereunto, but also art and study. Hereunto do appertain the good and beautifull composition of the visage, his port, pase, speech, habilliments. The generall rule in all these points, is a sweet, moderate, and venerable gravitie, walking betwixt fear and love, worthy of all honour and reverence. There is likewise his residence, and conversation or familiarity. Touching his residence or abode, let it be in some glorious, magnificent, and eminent place, and as near as may be in the middle of the whole state, to the end he may have an eye over all, like the Sun which from the middle of heaven giveth light to all: for keeping himself at one end, he giveth occasion to those that are fartherst from him to rise against him, as he that standeth upon one end of the table,

maketh

maketh the other end to rise up. His conversation and company, let it be rare; for to shew and to communicate himself too much, breedeth contempt and dejecteth majestie: *Continuus aspectus minùs verendos magnos homini ipsa satietate facit: Majestati major ex longinquo reverentia, quia omne ignotum pro magnifico est. Often and dayly aspect causeth great men the lesse to be feared: But the rarenesse of their presence procures the greater reverence, because all strange and unknown things seem stately and magnificent.* Lucius. Tacit.

After these three things, knowledge of the state, virtue and manners, which are in the person of the Prince, come those things which are near and about the Prince: That is to say, in the fourth place Counsell, the great and principall point of this politick doctrine, and so important, that it is in a maner all in all. It is the soul of the state, and the spirit that giveth life, motion and action to all the other parts: and for that cause it is said, that the managing of affairs consisteth in prudence. Now it were to be wished that a Prince had in himself counsell and prudence sufficient to govern and to provide for all, which is the first and highest degree of wisdome, as hath been said; and if so it were, the affairs would go far better: but this is rather to be wished then hoped for, whether it be for want of good nature, or a good institution; and it is almost impossible that one onely head should be sufficiently furnished for so many matters. *Nequit princeps suâ scientiâ cuncta complecti, nec unius mens tanta molis est capax. The Prince cannot comprehend all things by his own knowledge, neither is the mind of one alone capable of so much greatnesse.* A lone man seeth and heareth but little. Now Kings have need of many eyes, and many ears; and great burdens, and great affairs have need of great helps. And therefore it is requisite that he provide and furnish himself with good counsell, and such men as know how to give it: for he whosoever he be, that will take all upon himself, is rather held to be proud, then discreet or wise. A Prince then had need of faithfull friends and servitours to be his assistants, *quos assumat in partem curarum, whom he may take to bear part of his cares.* These are his true treasures, and profitable instruments of the state: In the choice whereof he should especially labour and employ his whole judgement, to the end he may have them good. There were two sorts of them; the one aid the Prince with their duty, counsell, and tongue, and are called Counsellors; the other serve him with their hands and actions, and may be called Officers. The first are farre more honourable: For

16 *The fourth head of this provision, Counsell.*

Chap. 1.

Tacit.

Tit. Livius. Tacit.

Plin.

the two greatest Philosophers say, that it is a sacred and divine thing, well to deliberate, and to give good counsel.

7 *The condition of good counsellers, Fidelity.* Plin. *Sufficiency.*

Now Counsellers must be first faithful, that is to say in a word, honest men: *Optimum quemque fidelissimum puto: Every man that is truly honest, I hold to be most faithful.* Secondly, they must be sufficient in this point, that is to say, skilful in the state, diversly experimented and tryed (for difficulties and afflictions are excellent lessons and instructions; *Mihi fortuna multis rebus ereptis usum dedit bene suadendi: Fortune having taken from me many things, hath given me the faculty of well perswading.*) And in a word, they must be wise and prudent, indifferent quick, and not over-sharp: for such kind of men are too moveable; *novandis quàm gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa ignea: These fiery wits are fitter for innovation, then administration.* And that they may be such, it is requisite, that they be old and ripe, for besides that, young men by reason of the soft and delicate tenderness of their age, are easily deceived, they do as easily believe and receive every impression. It is good that about Princes there be some wise, some subtile; but much more such as are wise, who are required for honour and for all times, the subtile onely sometimes for necessity. Thirdly, it is necessary that in proposing and giving good and wholesome counsel, they carry themselves freely and couragiously, without flattery, or ambiguity, or disguisement, not accommodating their language to the present state of the Prince; *Ne cum fortuna potius principis loquantur quàm cum ipso: Lest they speak rather with the fortune of the Prince then with himself*; but without sparing the truth, speak that which is fit and requisite. For although liberty, roundness of speech and fidelity, hurt and offend for the time, those against whom it opposeth it self, yet afterwards it is reverenced and esteemed. *In præsentia quibus resistis, offendis; deinde illis ipsis suspicitur laudaturque: For the present thou offendest them whom thou contradictest, but afterwards thou art even of them respected and praised.* And fourthly, constantly, without yielding, varying and changing at every meeting to please and follow the humour, pleasure, and passion of another, but without opinative obstinacy, and a spirit of contradiction, which troubleth and hindereth all good deliberation, he must sometimes change his opinion, which is not inconstancy, but prudence. For a wise man marcheth not alwaies with one and the same pase, although he follow the same way, he changeth not, but accommodateth himself;

Curtius.

*Liberty.*

Tacit.

*Non*

*Non semper in uno gradu, sed una via; non se mutat, sed aptat*: As a good mariner ordereth his sailes according to the times, and the wind, it is necessary many times to turn and wind, and to arrive to that place obliquely, by fetching a compass, when he cannot do it directly, and by a straight line. Again, a religious dexterity to keep secret the counsels and deliberations of Princes, is a thing very necessary in the managing of affaires; *Res magnæ sustineri nequeunt ab eo cui tacere grave est*: *Great affaires cannot be sustained by him, who cannot be secret.* And it sufficeth not to be secret, but he must not pry and search into the secrets of his Prince, this is an ill, and a dangerous thing; *Exquirere abditos principis sensus illicitum & anceps*: yea he must be unwilling and avoid all means to know them. And these are the principal good conditions and qualities of a counsellor, as the evil which they must warily avoid, are presumptuous confidence, which maketh a man to deliberate and determine over boldly and obstinately; for a wise man in deliberating, thinketh and rethinketh, redoubting whatsoever may happen, that he may be the bolder to execute. *Nam animus vereri qui scit, scit tutò aggredi*: *For the mind that knoweth how to fear, knoweth how with safety to execute.* Contrarily the fool is hardy and violent in his deliberation: but when he comes to the issue, his nose falls a bleeding: *Consilia calida & audacia prima specie læta sunt, tractatu dura, eventu tristia*: *Hasty and audacious counsels at the first shew are plausible, but in the managing prove hard, and in the end full of discontent.* Secondly, all passion of choler, envy, hatred, avarice, concupiscence, and all private and particular affection, the deadly poison of judgment, and all good understanding: *Privatæ res semper offecere, officientque publicis consiliis, pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum sui cuique utilitas*: *Private affaires have ever been hurtful, and do hinder the publick counsels and every mans particular profit is the worst poison of true affection and judgment.* Lastly, precipitation an enemy to all good counsel, and onely fit to do mischief. And thus you see what manner of men good Counsellors ought to be.

Senec. *Silence.* Curtius. Tacit. *The vices that counsellors must avoid.* *Presumptuous confidence.* Tit. Livius. *Passion.* Tacit. *Precipitation.* See l. 2 cap. 10. Tacit.

Now a Prince must make choice of such as are good, either by his own knowledg and judgment, or if he cannot so do by their reputation, which doth seldome deceive, whereupon one of them said to his Prince, Hold us for such as we are esteemed to be. *Nam singuli decipere & decipi possunt*: *nemo omnes neminem omnes fefellerunt*: *For every one may deceive and be deceived*: *no man all*; *all* have

18 *The duty of the Prince in choosing good counsellors.*

*have deceived none*: And let him take heed that he chooſe not his minions and favourites, courtiers, flatterers, ſlaves, who ſhame their maſters and betray them. There is nothing more dangerous then the counſel of the cabinet. And having choſen and found them, he muſt wiſely make uſe of them, by taking counſel of them at due times and houres, not attending the event and execution, and loſing the time whileſt he hearkeneth to them; and this muſt he do with judgment, not ſuffering himſelf to be carried over-looſly by their counſels, as that ſimple Emperour *Claudius* was; and with mildneſſe, without roughneſſe, being more reaſonable, as that wiſe *Marc. Antonius* was wont to ſay, to follow the counſel of a good number of friends, then ſuch as are conſtrained to bend unto his will. And making uſe of them, do it with an indifferent authority, neither rewarding them with preſents for their good counſel, leſt by the hope of the like preſents he draw ſuch as are wicked unto him, nor uſe
Curtius. them over-roughly for their bad counſels; for he ſhall hardly find any to give him counſel, if there be danger in giving it: and again, many times bad counſel hath a better ſucceſs then good, by the provident care and direction of the ſovereign. And ſuch as give good counſel, that is to ſay, happy and certain, are not therefore alwaies the beſt, and moſt faithful ſervitors, not for their liberty of ſpeech neither, which he ſhould rather agree unto, looking into ſuch as are fearful and flatterers with a wary eye. For miſerable is that
Tacit. Prince with whom men hide or diſguiſe the truth. *Cujus aures ita formatæ ſunt, ut aſpera quæ utilia, & nil niſi jucundum & læſurum accipiant*: *Whoſe ears are ſo framed, that they will not hearken to profitable things that are harſh, nor any thing but what is pleaſing though hurtful.* And laſtly, he muſt conceal his own judgment and
Veget. reſolution, ſecrecie being the ſoul of counſel: *Nulla meliora conſilia, quàm quæ ignoraverit adverſarius antequam fierent*: *They are the beſt counſels which the adverſary knoweth not before they be effected.*

19 *Of Officers.* As touching officers which are in the next place, and who ſerve the Prince and State in ſome charge, he muſt make choice of honeſt men, of good and honeſt families. It is to be thought that ſuch as ſerve the Prince, are the beſt ſort of people, and it is not fit that baſe people ſhould be neer him, and command others, exept they raiſe themſelves by ſome great and ſingular virtue, which may ſupply the want of nobility: but by no means let them be infamous, double, dangerous, and men of ſome odious condition. So likewiſe they ſhould be men of underſtanding, and employed according to their natures.

natures. For some are fit for the affairs of the war, others for peace. Some are of opinion, that it is best to choose men of a sweet carriage, and indifferent virtue, for these excellent surpassing spirits, that keep themselves alwaies upon the point, and will pardon nothing, are not commonly fit for affairs; *Ut pares negotiis, neque supra: sint recti, non erecti: Men sufficient for their employment, not fastidious; equal in their affaires, and not much above them.*

20 *The fifth head of provision, Treasure.*

After counsel, we place treasure, a great and puissant mean. This is the sinews, the feet, the hands of the state. There is no sword so sharp and penetrable, as that of silver, nor master so imperious, nor oratour that winneth the hearts and wills of men, or conquers castles and cities, as riches. And therefore a Prince must provide that his treasury never fail, never be dryed up. This science consisteth in three points, to lay the foundation of them, to employ them well, to have alwaies a reservation, and to lay up some good part thereof for all needs and occasions that may happen. In all these three a Prince must avoid two things, injustice, and base niggardlines, in preserving right towards all, and honour for himself.

*Exchequer knowledge in three points.*

21 1. *To lay the foundation.*

Touching the first, which is to lay the foundation, and to increase the treasury, there are divers means, and the sources are divers which are not all perpetual, nor alike assured, that is to say, the demain and publick revenue of the State, which must be managed and used, without the alienating of it in any sort, forasmuch as by nature it is sacred and inalienable. Conquests made upon the enemy, which must be profitably employed, and not prodigally dissipated, as the ancient *Romans* were wont to do, carrying to the Exchequer very great sums, and the treasuries of conquered cities and countreys, as *Livie* reporteth of *Camillus Flaminius, Paulus Emilius,* of the *Scipioes, Lucullus, Cesar*; and afterwards receiving from those conquered countries, whether from their natural countreys left behind them, or from colonies sent thither, a certain annual revenue. Presents, gratuities, pensions, free donations, tributes of friends, allies, and subjects, by testaments, by donations among the living, as the Lawyers term it, or otherwise. The entrance, coming and going, and passages of merchandize, into docks, havens, rivers, as well upon strangers as subjects, a means just, lawful, ancient, general, and very commodious with these conditions: Not to permit the traffick and transportation of things necessary for life, that the subjects may be furnished, not of raw unwrought wares, to the end the subject may be set on work, and gain the profit of his own

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own labours. But to permit the traffick of things wrought and dreſſed, and the bringing in of ſuch wares as are raw, and not of ſuch as are wrought; and in all things to charge the ſtranger much more then the ſubject. For a great forrein impoſition encreaſeth the treaſure, and comforteth the ſubject; to moderate nevertheleſs the impoſts upon thoſe things that are brought in, neceſſary for life. Theſe four means are not onely permitted, but juſt, lawfull, and honeſt. The fifth, which is hardly honeſt, is the traffick which the Sovereign uſeth by his factors, and is practiſed in divers manners more or leſſe baſe; but the vileſt and moſt pernicious is of honours, eſtates, offices, benefices. There is a mean that cometh near to traffick, and therefore may be placed in this rank, which is not very diſhoneſt, and hath been practiſed by very great and wiſe Princes, which is, to employ the coin of the Treaſure or Exchequer to ſome ſmall profit, as five in the hundred, and to take good ſecurity for it, either gages, or ſome other ſound and ſufficient aſſurance. This hath a threefold uſe, it encreaſeth the treaſure, giveth means to particular men to traffick, and to make gain; and which is beſt of all, it ſaveth the publick Treaſure, from the paws of our thieving Courtiers, the importunate demands and flatteries of favourites, and the overgreat facility of the Prince. And for this onely cauſe, ſome Princes have lent their publick treaſure without any profit or intereſt, but onely upon pain of a double forfeiture, for not payment at the day. The ſixth and laſt is in the lones and ſubſidies of ſubjects, whereunto he muſt not come but unwillingly, and then when other means do fail, and neceſſity preſſeth the State. For in this cauſe it is juſt according to that rule, *That all is juſt that is neceſſary*. But it is requiſite, that theſe conditions be added after this firſt of neceſſity,

Anton Pius. Severus. Auguſtus.

1 To levie by way of lone (for this way will yield moſt ſilver, becauſe of the hope men have to recover their own again, and that they ſhal loſe nothing, beſides the credit they receive by ſuccouring the weal-publick) and afterwards the neceſſity being paſt, and the warres ended to repay it again, as the *Romanes* did, being put to an ex-

2 tremitie by *Hannibal*. And if the common treaſury be ſo poor that it cannot repay it, and that they muſt needs proceed by way of impoſition; it is neceſſary that it be with the conſent of the ſubjects, making known unto them the poverty and neceſſitie, and preaching the word of that King of kings, *Dominus iis opus habet: The Lord hath need of them*: inſomuch that they make them ſee, if need be, both the receit, and the charge. And if it may be, let

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perſwaſion prevail without conſtraint; as *Themiſtocles* ſaid, *Impetrare melius, quàm imperare: It is better to obtain by requeſt, then by command.* It is true, that the prayers of ſovereigns are commandements; *Satis imperat qui rogat potentiâ: armatæ ſunt preces regum: He commandeth ſufficiently that intreateth with power: the requeſts of Kings are armed:* but yet let it be in the form of a free donation, at the leaſt that they be extraordinary moneys, for a certain prefixt time, and not ordinary; and never preſcribe this law upon the ſubjects, except it be with their own conſent. Thirdly, that ſuch impoſitions be levied upon the goods, and not the heads of men, (capitation being odious to all honeſt people) the real and not perſonal (being unjuſt that the rich, the great, the nobles, ſhould not pay at all, and the poorer people of the countrey ſhould pay all). Fourthly, that they be equally upon all. Inequality afflicteth much, and to theſe ends theſe moneys muſt be beſtowed upon ſuch things as the whole world hath need of, as ſalt, wine, to the end that all may contribute to the preſent neceſſity. Well may a man, and he ought, to lay ordinary impoſts and great, upon ſuch merchandize and other things as are vicious, and that ſerve to no other end, then to corrupt the ſubjects, as whatſoever ſerveth for the increaſe of luxury, inſolency, curioſity, ſuperfluity in viands, apparel pleaſures, and all manner of licentious living, without any other prohibition of theſe things. For the denial of a thing ſharpneth the appetite.

The ſecond point of this ſcience, is well to employ the treaſure. 22
And theſe in order are the articles of this imployment and charge; *To employ the treaſure.*
The maintenance of the Kings houſe, the pay of men of war, the wages of officers, the juſt rewards of thoſe that have deſerved well of the Common-weal, penſions and charitable ſuccours to poor, yet commendable perſons. Theſe five are neceſſary; after which come thoſe that are very profitable, to repair cities, to fortifie and to depend the frontiers, to amend the high-wayes, bridges, and paſſages, to eſtabliſh Colledges of honour, of virtue and learning; to build publick houſes. From theſe five ſorts of reparations, fortifications, and foundations, cometh very great profit, beſides the publick good: Arts and Artificers are maintained; the envy and malice of the people becauſe of the levy of monies ceaſeth, when they ſee them well employed: and theſe two plagues of a common-weal, idleneſſe and poverty, are driven away. Contrarily, the great bounties, and unreaſonable gifts, to ſome particular favourites; the great,

proud,

proud, and unnecessary edifices, superfluous and vain charges, are odious to the subjects, who murmur that a man should spoil a thousand to cloath one; that others should brave it with their substance, build upon their bloud and their labours.

23 *3. To make spare and reservation.*

The third point consisteth in the reservation, which a man must make for necessitie, to the end he be not constrained at a need, to have recourse to ready, unjust, and violent means, and remedies: this is that which is called the treasury or exchequer. Now as to gather together too great abundance of treasure of gold and silver, though it be by honest and just means, is not alwayes the best; because it is an occasion of warre active or passive; either by breeding envy in others to see it done, when there is no cause, there being plenty of other means; or else becaufe it is a bait to allure an enemy to come, and it were more honourable to employ them as hath been said: So to spend all and leave nothing in the Exchequer is far worse, for this were to play to lose all; wise Princes take heed of this. The greatest treasuries that have been in former times, are that of *Darius* the last King of the *Persians*, where *Alexander* found fourscore millions of gold. That of *Tiberius* 67. millions; of *Trajan* 55. millions kept in *Egypt*. But that of *David* did farre exceed all these (a thing almost incredible in so small a state) wherein there were six score millions. Now to provide that these great treasuries be not spent, violated or robbed, the ancients caused them to be melted, and cast into great wedges and bowls, as the *Persians* and *Romanes*: or they put them into the temples of their gods, as the safest places; as the *Greeks* in the temple of *Apollo*, which nevertheless hath been many times pilled and robbed; the *Romanes* in the temple of *Saturn*. But the best and securest way and most profitable is, as hath been said, to lend them with some small profit to particular persons, upon good gages, or sufficient security. So likewise for the safer custodie of the treasures from thieves and robbers, the managing of them, and the exchequer offices must not be sold to base and mechanicall persons, but given to gentlemen, and men of honour, as the ancient *Romanes* were accustomed to do, who chose out young men from amongst their nobles and great houses, and such as aspired to the greatest honours and charges of the common-wealth.

Esay 30.

2 Paralyp.

24 *The sixth head of this provision.*

After counsell and treasure, I think it not amisse to put arms, which cannot subsist, nor be well and happily levied and conducted without these two. Now an armed power is very necessary for

*An armed power.*

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a Prince to guard his perſon and his ſtate: for it is an abuſe to think to govern a ſtate long without arms. There is never any ſurety between the weak and the ſtrong; and there are alwayes ſome that will be ſtirring either within or without the ſtate. Now this power is either ordinary at all times, or extraordinary in times of warre. The ordinary conſiſteth in the perſons and places; The perſons are of two ſorts; the guard for the body and perſon of the ſovereign, which ſerve not onely for the ſurety and conſervation, but alſo for his honour and ornament: for that good ſaying of *Ageſilaus* is not perpetually true, and it were too dangerous to try and truſt unto it, That a Prince may live ſafely enough without guard, if he command his ſubjects, as a good father doth his children (for the malice of men ſtayeth not it ſelf in ſo fair a way.) And certain companies, maintained and alwayes ready for thoſe neceſſities and ſudden occurrences that may fall out. For at ſuch times to be buſied in levying powers is great imprudencie. Touching the places, they are the fortreſſes and citadels in the frontiers, in place of which, ſome, and they ancient too, do more allow of the colonies. The extraordinary force conſiſteth in arms, which he muſt levie and furniſh in times of warre. How he ſhould govern himſelf therein, that is to ſay, enterpriſe and make warre, it belongeth to the ſecond part, which is of the action: this firſt belongeth to proviſion. Onely I here ſay, that a wiſe Prince ſhould beſides the guard of his body, have certain people alwayes prepared, and experienced in arms, either in great number or leſſe, according to the extent or largeneſſe of his ſtate, to repreſſe a ſudden rebellion or commotion, which may happen either without or within his ſtate, reſerving the raiſing of greater forces, untill he muſt make warre, either offenſive or defenſive, willingly and of purpoſe: and in the mean time keeping his arſenals and ſtore-houſes well furniſhed, and provided with all ſorts of offenſive and defenſive arms, to furniſh both foot and horſmen, as likewiſe with munitions, engines, and inſtruments for warre. Such preparation is not onely neceſſary to make warre (for theſe things are not found and prepared in a ſhort time) but to let and hinder it. For no man is ſo fool-hardie as to attempt a ſtate, which he knoweth to be ready to receive him, and thorowly furniſhed. A man muſt arm himſelf againſt warres, to the end he may not be troubled with it: *Qui cupit pacem, paret bellum: He that deſireth peace, let him provide for warre.*

*In the Chapter following.*

After

25 *The seventh head of this provision. Alliance or leagues. With whom.*

After all these necessary and essential provisions, we will lastly put alliances or leagues, which is no small prop and stay of a State. But wisdome is very necessary in the choice thereof, to build well, and to take heed with whom and how he joyn in alliance; which he must do with those that are neighbours and puissant: For if they be weak and far off, wherewith can they give aid? It is rather likely, that if they be assaulted, that from their ruine ours may follow. For then are we bound to succour them, and to joyn with them because of this league whosoever they be. And if there be danger in making this alliance openly, let it be done secretly, for it is the part of a wise man to treat of peace and alliance with one, in the view and knowledg of all, with another secretly; but yet so, as that it be without treachery and wickedness, which is utterly forbidden, but not wisdome and policy, especially for the defence and surety of his State.

2. *How.*

Finally, there are many sorts and degrees of leagues and alliances: the lesser and more simple is for commerce and traffick onely, but commonly it comprehendeth amity, commerce, and hospitality; and it is either defensive only, or defensive and offensive together, and with exception of certain Princes and States, or without exception. The more strait and perfect is that which is offensive and defensive towards all, and against all; to be a friend to his friends, and an enemy to his enemies: and such it is good to make with those that are strong and puissant, and by equal alliance. Leagues are likewise either perpetual, or limited to certain times; commonly they are perpetual, but the better and surest is to limit it to certain times, to the end he may have means to reform, to take away, or add to the articles, or wholly to depart if need be, as he shall see it most expedient. And though a man would judge them to be such, as should be perpetual, yet it is better to renew them (which a man may and must do before the time be expired) then to make them perpetual. For they languish and grow old, and whosoever findeth himself aggrieved, will sooner break them, if they be perpetual, then if they be limited, in which case he will rather stay the time. And thus much of these seven necessary provisions.

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

### *The second part of this politick prudence, and government of the state, which concerneth the action and government of the Prince.*

HAving discoursed of the provision, and instructed a sovereign with what and how he should furnish and defend himself and his state, let us come to the action, and let us see how he should employ himself, and make use of these things, that is to say, in a word, wel to command and govern. But before we come to handle this distinctly, according to the division which we have made, we may say in grosse that well to govern and to maintain himself in his state, consisteth in the acquisition of two things, good will, and authority. Good will is a love and affection toward the Sovereigne and his state. Authority is a great and good opinion, and honourable esteem of the Sovereign and his state. By the first, the Sovereign and the state is loved; by the second, feared. These are not contrary things, but different, as love and fear. Both of them respect the subjects and strangers, but it seemeth that more properly, Benevolence belongeth to the subject, and authority to the stranger; *Amorem apud populares, metum apud hostes quarat: The Prince must seek love from his own, fear from enemies.* To speak simply and absolutely, authoritie is the more strong and vigorous, more large and durable. The temperature and harmonie of both is a perfect thing, but according to the diversitie of states of peoples, their natures and humours, the one is more easie and more necessary in some places then in others. The means to attain them both, are contained and handled in that which hath been said before, especially of the manners and virtue of a Sovereigne: nevertheless of each we will speak a little.

1 *A summarie description of the action of the Prince.*

*Benevolence, Authority, two pillars of a Prince and state.*

Tacit.

Benevolence or good will (a thing very profitable and almost wholly necessary, insomuch that of it self it prevaileth much, and without it all the rest hath but little assurance) is attained by three means, gentleness or clemencie, not onely in words and deeds, but much more in his commands, and the administration of the state; for so do the natures of men require, who are impatient both of serving wholly, and maintaining themselves in entire liberty, *Nec totam servitutem patitur, nec totam libertatem: Neither to endure wholly servitude, nor altogether liberty:* They obey willingly as sub-

2 *Benevolence is attained by clemency.*

Tacit.

jects, not as slaves, *Domiti ut pareant, non ut serviant.* And to say the truth, a man doth more willingly obey him which commandeth gently and mildly; *Remissius imperanti melius paretur; qui vult amari languida regnet manu: He that will be beloved, let him reign with a soft hand.* Power (saith *Cesar*, a great Doctor in this matter) indifferently exercised preserverh all; but he that keepeth not a moderation in his commands, is never beloved nor assured. But yet it must not be an over loose, and soft effeminate mildnesse, lest a man thereby come into contempt, which is worse then fear. *Sed incorrupto ducis honore: The leaders honour being both wayes intemerate.* It is the part of wisdome to temper this, neither seeking to be feared by making himself terrible, nor loved by too much debasing himself.

Senec.

Tacit.

3 *Beneficence.*

The second mean to attain benevolence is beneficence, I mean first towards all, especially the meaner people, by providence and good policie, whereby corn and all other necessary things for the sustenance of this life may not be wanting, but sold at an indifferent price, yea may abound if it be possible, that dearnesse and dearth afflict not the subject. For the meaner sort have no care for the publick good, but for this end, *Vulgo una ex republica annona cura: The onely care the vulgar fort have of the common-wealth, is the provision of victuall, and other necessaries.*

Tacit.

4 *Liberality.*

The third mean is liberalitie (beneficence more speciall) which is a bait, yea an enchantment, to draw, to winne, and captivate the wills of men; So sweet a thing is it to receive, honourable to give. In such sort, that a wise man hath said, That a state did better defend it self by good deeds, then by arms. This virtue is alwayes requisite, but especially in the entrance, and in a new state. To whom, how much, and how liberality must be exercised, hath been said before. The means of benevolence have been wisely practised by *Augustus*; *Qui militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit: Who won the souldiers with gifts, the people with provision of victuals, and all with the sweetnesse of rest and peace.*

Chap. 2. art. 23.

Tacit.

5 *Authority.*

Authority is another pillar of state; *Majestas imperii, salutis tutela: The majestie of Empire, is the guardian of safetie.* The invincible fortresse of a Prince, whereby he bringeth into reason all those that dare to contemn or make head against him: Yea because of this they dare not attempt, and all men desire to be in grace and favour with him. It is composed of fear and respect, by which two a Prince and his state is feared of all, and secured. To attain this autoritie, besides the provision of things above named, there are three means which

By what it is acquired.

which must carefully be kept in the form of commanding.

The first is severity, which is better, more wholesome, assured, durable, then common lenitie, and great facility: which proceedeth first from the nature of the people, which as *Aristotle* saith, is not so well born and bred, as to be ranged into duty and obedience by love, or shame, but by force and fear of punishment: and secondly, from the generall corruption of the manners, and contagious licentiousnesse of the world, which a man must not think to mend by mildnesse and lenitie, which doth rather give aid to ill attempts. It engendreth contempt, and love of impunity, which is the plague of Common-weals and States: *Illecebra peccandi maxima spes impunitatis*: *Hope of impunity is the greatest allurement to offend*, It is a favour done to many, and the whole Weal-public, sometimes well to chastise some one. And he must sometimes cut off a finger, least the gangrene spread it self through the whole arm, according to that excellent answer of a King of *Thrace*, whom one telling that he played the mad man, and not the King, answered, That his madnesse made his subjects sound and wise. Severity keepeth officers & magistrates in their devoir, driveth away flatterers, courtiers, wicked persons, impudent demanders, and petty tyrannies. Whereas contrariwise, too great facility openeth the gate to all these kind of people, whereupon followeth an exhausting of the treasuries impunity of the wicked, impoverishing of the people, as rheums and fluxes in a rheumatick and diseased body, fall upon those parts that are weakest. The goodnesse of *Pertinax*, the licentious liberty of *Heliogabalus*, are thought to have undone and ruinated the Empire: The severity of *Severus*, and afterwards of *Alexander*, did reestablish it, and brought it into good estate. But yet this severitie must be with some moderation, intermission, and to purpose to the end that rigour towards a few, might hold the whole world in fear; *Ut pœna ad paucos, metus ad omnes*: *That as the punishment lights upon a few, so the fear may invade all.* And the more seldome punishments serve more for the reformation of a state saith an ancient Writer, then the more frequent. This is to be understood, if vices gather not strength, and men grow not opinatively obstinate in them; for then he must not spare either sword or fire: *Crudelem medicum intemperans æger facit*: *An intemperate sick person, maketh a cruell Physician.*

6 *Severity.*

Cicero.

The second is constancie, which is a stayed resolution, whereby the Prince marching alwaies with one and the same pase, without

7 *Constancy.*

out altering or changing, maintaineth alwaies, and enforceth the observation of the ancient laws and customs. To change and to be re-advised, besides that it is an argument of inconstancy and irresolution, it bringeth both to the laws and to the sovereign, and to the state, contempt and siniſter opinion. And this is the reason why the wiser sort do so much forbid the change, and rechange of any thing in the laws and customes, though it were for the better: for the change or remove bringeth alwaies more evil and discommodity, besides the uncertainty and the danger, then the novelty can bring good. And therefore all innovators are suspected, dangerous, and to be chased away. And there cannot be any cause or occasion strong and sufficient enough to change, if it be not for a very great, evident, and certain utility, or publick necessity. And in this case likewise he must proceed as it were stealingly, sweetly and slowly, by little and little, and almost insensibly, *leviter & lentè*.

8 The third is to hold alwaies fast in the hand the stern of the State, the rains of government, that is to say, the honour and power to command and to ordain, and not to trust or commit it to another, referring all things to his counsel, to the end that all may have their eye upon him, and may know that all dependeth upon him. That Sovereign that loseth never so little of his authority marreth all. And therefore it standeth him upon; not over-much to raise and make great any person, *Communis custodia principatûs, neminem unum magnum facere*: *The common and sureſt guard of principality is to make no one man too great.* And if there be already any such, he must draw him back, and bring him into order, but yet sweetly and gently; and never make great and high charges and offices perpetual, or for many years, to the end a man may not get means to fortifie himself against his master, as it many times falleth out. *Nil tam utile, quàm brevem poteſtatem eſſe, quæ magna ſit. Nothing so profitable, as short authority, if it be great.*

Ariſtot.

Senec.

9 Behold here the just and honest means in a Sovereign to maintain with benevolence and love his authority, and to make himself to be loved and feared altogether: for the one without the other is neither secure nor reasonable. And therefore we abhor a tyrannical authority, and that fear that is an enemy to love and benevolence, and is with a publick hate, *Oderint quem metuant*: *They will hate whom they fear*, which the wicked seek after abusing their power. The conditions of a good Prince and of a tyrant, are nothing alike, and easily distinguished. They may be all reduced to these two points,

*Against unjust authority and tyranny.*

points, the one to keep the laws of God and of nature, or to trample them under foot; the other to do all for the publick good and profit of the subject, or to employ all to his particular profit and pleasure. Now a Prince that he may be such as he should, must alwaies remember, that, as it is a felicity to have power to do what a man will, so it is true greatness to will that a man should; *Cæsari cùm omnia licent, propter hoc minus liceat: ut felicitatis est posse quantum velis, sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis, vel potius quantum debeas. Seeing all things are lawful for Cesar to do, it is therefore the lesse lawful for him to do it: As it is a felicity to be able to do whatsoever thou wilt, so it is a point of greatnesse to will what thou shouldest, or rather what thou oughtest.* The greatest infelicity that can happen to a Prince, is to believe that all things are lawfull that he can, and that pleaseth him. So soon as he consenteth to this thought, of good he is made wicked. Now this opinion is settled in them by the help of flatterers, who never cease alwaies to preach unto them the greatness of their power; and very few faithful servitors there are, that dare to tell them what their duty is. But there is not in the world a more dangerous flattery, then that wherewith a man flattereth himself, when the flatterer and flattered is one and the same; there is no remedy for this disease. Nevertheless it falleth out sometimes in consideration of the times, persons, places, occasions, that a good King must do those things which in outward appearance may seem tyrannical, as when it is a question of repressing another tyranny, that is to say, of a furious people, the licentious liberty of whom, is a true tyrannie: or of the noble and rich, who tyrannize over the poor and meaner people: or when the King is poor and needy, not knowing where to get silver, to raise loans upon the richest. And we must not think that the severity of a Prince is alwaies tyrannie, or his guards and fortresses, or the majesty of his imperious commands, which are sometimes profitable, yea necessary, and are more to be desired then the sweet prayers of tyrants.

Plin. de Traia.

These are the two true stayes and pillars of a Prince, and of a State, if by them a Prince know how to maintain and preserve himself from the two contraries, which are the murtherers of a Prince and State, that is to say, hatred and contempt, whereof the better to avoid them, and to take heed of them, a word or two. Hatred contrary to benevolence, is a wicked and obstinate affection of subjects against the Prince and his State: It ordinarily proceedeth from

10 *Hate and contempt, two murtherers of a Prince.*

Arist. lib. 5. Pol.

*Hatred*

from fear of what is to come, or desire of revenge of what is past, or from them both. This hatred when it is great, and of many, a prince can hardly escape it; *Multorum odiis nullæ opes possunt resistere: No power or riches can resist the hatred of many.* He is exposed to all, and there needs but one to make an end of all. *Multæ illis manus, illi una cervix: They have many hands, he but one neck.* It standeth him upon therefore to preserve himself, which he shall do by flying those things that ingender it, that is to say, crueltie and avarice, the contraries to the aforesaid instruments of benevolence.

Cicero.

11 *Hatred proceedeth from cruelty.* Cap. 2. art. 12.

He must preserve himself pure and free from base crueltie, unworthy greatnesse, very infamous to a prince: But contrarily he must arm himself with clemencie, as hath been said before, in the virtues required in a prince. But forasmuch as punishments, though they be just and necessary in a state, have some image of crueltie, he must take heed to carry himself therein with dexteritie, and for this end I will give him this advice: Let him not put his hand to the sword of justice, but very seldome and unwillingly: *Libenter damnat qui cito: ergo illi parsimonia etiam viliſſimi sanguinis: He condemneth willingly that doth it hastily; therefore he is to be sparing even of the baseſt bloud.* 2. Enforced for the publick good, and rather for example, and to terrifie others from the like offence: 3. That it be to punish the faulty, and that without choler, or joy, or other passion: And if he must needs shew some passion, that it be compassion: 4. That it be according to the accustomed manner of the countrey, and after a new, for new punishments are testimonies of cruelty: 5. Without giving his assistance, or being present at the execution: 6. And if he must punish many, he must dispatch it speedily, and all at a blow; for to make delayes, and to use one correction after another, is a token that he taketh delight, pleaseth and feedeth himself therewith.

*An advice for punishments.* Senec.

12 *Avarice.*

He must likewise preserve himself from avarice, a sinne ill befitting a great personage. It is shewed either by exacting and gathering overmuch, or by giving too little. The first doth much displease the people, by nature covetous, to whom their goods are as their bloud and their life. The second, men of service and merit, who have laboured for the publick good, and have reason to think that they deserve some recompence. Now how a Prince should govern himself herein, and in his treasure and exchequer affairs, either in laying their foundation, or spending or preserving them, hath been

been more at large discoursed in the second Chapter. I will here onely say, That a Prince must carefully preserve himself from three things: First from resembling, by over-great and excessive impositions these tyrants, subject-mongers, Cannibals; *Qui devorant plebem sicut escam panis* δημόβοροι, *quorum erarium spoliarium civium cruentarúmque prædarum receptaculum*; *Who devour the people as a morsel of bread, and whose store-house is the receptacle of the spoils of the citizens, and bloudy preys:* for this breeds danger of tumult, witnesse so many examples, and miserable accidents: Secondly, from base unhonest parsimonie, as well in gathering together, (*indignum lucrum ex omni occasione odorari; & ut dicitur, etiam à mortuo auferre*; *To smell unworthy gain out of every occasion, and as it is said, to take away even from the dead:* and therefore he must not serve his turn herein with accusations, confiscations, unjust spoils) as in giving nothing, or too little, and that mercinarily, and with long and importunate suit: Thirdly, from violence in the levie of his provision, and that if it be possible, he never seiz upon the movables and utensils of husbandrie. This doth principally belong to receivers and purveyers, who by their rigorous courses, expose the Prince to the hatred of the people, and dishonour him; a people subtil, cruell, with six hands and three heads, as one saith. A Prince therefore must provide that they be honest men, and if they fail in their duties, to correct them severely, with rough chastisement, and great amends, to the end they may restore and disgorge like spunges, that which they have sucked and drawn unjustly from the people.

Let us come to the other worse enemie, contempt; which is a sinister, base, and abject opinion of the Prince, and the state: This is the death of a state, as authoritie is the soul and life thereof. What doth maintain one onely man, yea an old and worn man, over so many thousands of men, if not authoritie and the great esteem of his person? which if it be once lost by contempt, the Prince and state must necessarily fall to the ground. And even as authority, as hath been said, is more strong and large then benevolenc, so contempt is more contrary and dangerous then hatred, which dareth not any thing, being held back by fear, if contempt which shaketh off fear, arm it not, and giveth courage to execute. It is true that contempt is not so common, especially if he be a true and lawfull Prince, except he be such a one, as doth wholly degrade and prostitute himself. *Et videatur exire de imperio; And seem to give over his* Plin. in Pan.

13 *Contempt.*

*Art.* 5.

*Empire.* Nevertheleſs we muſt ſee from whence this contempt doth come, that we may the better know how to avoid it. It proceedeth from things contrary to thoſe means that win and get authoritie, and eſpecially from three, that is to ſay, from too looſe, effeminate, milde, languiſhing, and careleſs, or very light form of government, without any hold or ſtay; this is a ſtate without a ſtate; under ſuch Princes the ſubjects are made bold, and inſolent, all things being permitted, becauſe the Prince takes care of nothing. *Malum principem habere, ſub quo nihil ulli liceat: pejus ſub quo omnia omnibus: It is an evil thing to have a Prince, under whom nothing is lawfull for any man: But worſe to have him, under whom all things are lawfull for all men.* Secondly, from the ill hap and infelicity of the Prince, whether it be in his affairs which ſucceed not well; or in his line and iſſue, if he have no children, who are a great prop and ſtay to a Prince; or in the uncertainty of his ſucceſſors, whereof *Alexander* the great complained: *Orbitas mea quòd ſine liberis ſum, ſpernitur: Munimen aulæ regii liberi: My want of children maketh me to be deſpiſed: Royall children are a defence to the kings houſe.* Thirdly, from manners, eſpecially diſſolute, looſe, and voluptuous, drunkenneſs, gluttony, as alſo ruſticity, childiſhneſs, ſcurrillity.

*An ill form of government.*

*Infelicity.*

*Manners.*

14. Thus in groſſe have I ſpoken of the action of a Prince. To handle it more diſtinctly and particularly, we muſt remember, as hath been ſaid in the beginning, that it is twofold, peaceable and military; by the peaceable I here underſtand that ordinarie action, which is every day done, and at all times of peace and of warre; by the military, that which is not exerciſed, but in time of war.

*The diſtinction of the action of a Prince.*

*Of the peaceable.*

*An advice*

The peaceable and ordinary action of a Sovereign, cannot be wholly preſcribed; it is an infinite thing, and conſiſteth as well in taking heed to do, as to do. We will here give the principall and more neceſſary adviſements. Firſt therefore a Prince muſt provide that he be faithfully and diligently advertiſed of all things. This all things may be reduced to two heads, whereupon there are two ſorts of advertiſements and advertiſers, who muſt be faithfull and aſſured, wiſe and ſecret, though in ſome there be required a greater libertie and conſtancy then in others. Some are to advertiſe him of his honour, and duty, of his defects, and to tell him the truth. There are no kind of people in the world, who have ſo much need of ſuch friends, as Princes have; who neither ſee nor underſtand, but by the eyes and ears of another. They maintain and hold up a publick life, are to ſatisfie ſo many people, have ſo many things hid from them,

that

that before they be aware, they fal into the hatred & detestation of their people, for matters that would be easily remedied and cured, if they had been in time advertised of them. On the other side free advertisements, which are the best offices of true amity, are perillous about Soveraigns, though Princes be over-delicate, and shew great infirmity, if for their good and profit, they cannot endure a free advertisement, which enforceth nothing, it being in their power, whatsoever they hear, to do what they list. Others are to advertise the Prince of whatsoever passeth, not onely amongst his subjects, and within the circuit of his state, but with his bordering neighbours. I say, of all, that concerneth either a far off, or near at hand, his own state or his neighbours. These two kind of people answer in some sort to those two friends of *Alexander*, *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, of whom the one loved the King, the other *Alexander*; that is to say, the one the state, the other the person.

15

Secondly, a Prince must alwayes have in his hand a little book or memorial containing three things: first & principally a brief register of the affairs of the state; to the end he may know what he must do, what is begun to be done, and that there remain nothing imperfect, and ill executed: A catalogue or bed-roll of the most worthy personages that have well deserved, or are likely to deserve well of the Weal-publick: A memoriall of the gifts which he hath bestowed, to whom, and wherefore; otherwise without these three, there must necessarily follow many inconveniences. The greatest Princes and wisest Politicians have used it, *Augustus*, *Tiberius*, *Vespasian*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, the *Antonies*.

2. *To have a memorial of the* 1. *Affairs.*

2. *Persons.*

3. *Gifts.*

16

Thirdly, inasmuch as one of the principall duties of a Prince, is to appoint and order both rewards and punishments, the one whereof is favourable, the other odious, a Prince must retain unto himself the distribution of rewards, as estates, honours, immunities, restitutions, graces and favours; and leave unto his Officers, to execute and pronounce condemnations, forfeitures, confiscations, deprivations, and other punishments.

3. *To appoint rewards and punishments.*

17

Fourthly, in the distribution of rewards, gifts, and good deeds, he must alwayes be ready and willing to give them before they be asked, if he can, and not to look that he should refuse them: and he must give them himself, if it may be, or cause them to be given in his presence. By this means gifts and good turns shall be better received, and given to better purpose, and he shall avoid two great and common inconveniences, which deprive men of honour and worth

4. *To distribute rewards.*

worth of those rewards that are due unto them: the one is a long pursuit, difficult and chargeable, which a man must undergo, to obtain that which he would, and thinketh to have deserved, which is no small grief to honourable minds, and men af spirit. The other, that after a man hath obtained of the Prince a gift, before he can possesse it, it costeth the one half, and more, of that it is worth, and many times comes to nothing.

18 *Of the military action which consisteth in three points. To enterprise, where two things are required.*

Let us come to the military action, wholly necessary for the preservation and defence of a Prince, of the subjects, and the whole state, let us speak thereof briefly. All this matter or subject may be reduced to three heads. To enterprise, make, finish war. In the enterprise, there must be two things, justice and prudence, and an avoidance of their contraries, injustice and temerity. First, the war must be just, yea justice must march before valour, as deliberation before execution. These reasons must be of no force, yea abhorred, *That right consisteth in force; That the issue or event decideth it; That the stronger carrieth it away.* But a Prince must look into the cause, into the ground and foundation, and not into the issue: Warre hath its Laws and Ordinances as well as Peace. God favoureth just warres, and giveth the victory to whom it pleaseth him; and therefore we must first make our selves capable of this favour, by the equity of the enterprise. Warre then must not be begun and undertaken for all causes, upon every occasion: *Non ex omni occasione quærere triumphum: Not to seek triumph for every occasion.* And above all a Prince must take heed that ambition, avarice, choler, possesse him not, and carry him beyond reason, which are alwayes, to say the truth, the more ordinary motives to warre: *Una & ea vetus causa bellandi est profunda cupido imperii & divitiarum: maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putant: Rupere fœdus impius lucri furor, & ira præceps: One, and that an ancient cause of war is, the greedy desire of rule and of riches: they esteem the greatest glory in the greatest command: the wicked rage of gain, breaketh leagues, and stirs up wrath.*

Plin. in Pan.

Salust.

19 *Three things make an enterprise just.*

That a war may be in all points just, three things necessary, that it be denounced and undertaken by him that hath power to do it, which is onely the Sovereign.

20

That it be for a just cause, such as a defensive war is, which is absolute just, being justified by all reason amongst the wise by necessity amongst the barbarians, by nature amongst beasts: I say defensive, of himself, that is, of his life, his liberty, his parents, his countrey: of his

Cic. pro Milo.

his allies and confederates, in regard of that faith he hath given: of such as are unjustly oppressed. *Qui non defendit, nec obsistit, si potest, injuriæ; tam est in vitio, quàm si parentes, aut patriam, aut socios deserat: He that defendeth not, nor resisteth injury, if he can, is as much in fault, as if he betrayed his parents, his countrey, or his friends.* In officiis. These 3. heads of defence are within the bounds of justice, according to S. *Ambrose*; *Fortitudo, quæ per bella tuetur à barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel à latronibus socios, plena justitiæ est: Is is fortitude full of justice, which by wars defendeth the countrey from barbarians, or protecteth the weak, or companions or friends from robbers.* Salust. Another more briefly, divideth it into two heads, faith and health; *Nullum bellum à civitate optima suscipitur, nisi aut pro fide, aut pro salute: No war is undertaken by any worthy city, but either for faithfulnesse, or for safety*; and to offensive war he puts two conditions; that it proceed from some former offence given; as outrage or usurpation, and having redemanded openly by a Herald that which hath been surprised and taken away (*post clarigationem*) and sought it by way of justice, which must ever go foremost. For if men be willing to submit themselves unto justice, and reason, there let them stay themselves; if not, the last, and therefore necessary, is just and lawful: *Justum bellum quibus necessarium; pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes: That war is just, to whom it is necessary; armes are honest and righteous to them, that have no other hope or refuge left but only in arms.* Plin. l. 22. nat. hist. cap. 2. Livius.

Thirdly, to a good end, that is to say, peace and quietnesse. *Sapientes pacis causâ bellum gerunt, & laborem spe otii sustentant: ut in pace sine injuria vivant: Wise men wage war for peace sake, and sustain labour in hope of rest: that they may live in peace without injury.*

22 *Prudence.*

After justice cometh prudence, whereby a man doth advisedly deliberate, before by sound of trumpet he publisheth the war. And therefore, that nothing be done out of passion, and over-rashly, it is necessary that he consider of the points; of forces and means, as well his own, as his enemies: secondly, of the hazzard and dangerous revolution of humane things, especially of arms, which are variable, and wherein fortune hath greatest credit, and exerciseth more her Empire then in any other thing, wherein the issue may be such, that in an hour it carrieth all: *Simul parta ac sperata decora unius horæ fortuna vertere potest: The fortune of one hour may overthrow all honour both gotten and hoped for.* Livius.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, of those great evils, infelicities, and publick and particular miseries, which war doth necessarily bring with it, and which be such as the only imagination is lamentable. Fourthly, of the calumnies, maledictions, and reproaches that are spread abroad against the authors of the war, by reason of those evils and miseries that follow it. For there is nothing more subject to the tongues and judgments of men then war. But all lighteth upon the Chieftain. Tacit. *Iniquissima bellorum conditio hæc est, prospera omnes sibi vendicant adversa uni imputantur: This is a most unjust condition of war, When all do challenge to themselves the prosperous events, and the unhappy successes are imputed to one alone.* All these things together make the justest war that may be detestable, saith S. *Augustine*; and therefore it standeth a Sovereign upon, not to enter into wars but upon great necessity, as it is said of *Augustus*; and not to suffer himself to be carried by those incendiaries and firebrands of warr, who for some particular passion, are ready to kindle and inflame him, Pindar. *quibus in pace durius servitium est, in id nati, ut nec ipsi quiescant, neque alios sinant: They to whom service is hard in peace, are born to this, that neither themselves can be quiet, nor yet suffer others.* And these men are commonly such, whose noses do bleed when they come to the fact it self. *Dulce bellum inexpertis: War is sweetest to them that have not known it.* A wise Sovereign will keep himself in peace, neither provoking, nor fearing war, neither disquieting either his own state, or anothers, betwixt hope and fear, nor comeing to those extremities of perishing himself, or making others to perish.

23 *The second head to make war, whereunto three things are required. Provision, and munition.*

The second head of military action, is to make war, whereunto are required three things, Munitions, Men, Rules of war. The first is provision and munition of all things necessary for war, which must be done in good time and at leisure, for it were great indiscretion in extremities to be employed about the search and provision of those things which he should have alwaies ready; *Diu apparandum est, ut vincas celeriùs: It must be long preparing, that thou mayest the speedier overcome.* Now of the ordinary and perpetual provision required for the good of the Prince and the State at all times, hath been spoken in the first part of this Chapter, which is wholly of this subject. The principal provisions and munitions of war are three, Money, which is the vital spirit, and sinews of war, whereof hath been shewed in the second Chapter. 2. Arms both offensive and defensive, whereof likewise heretofore. These two are ordinary,

nary, and at all times. 3. Victuals, without which a man can neither conquer, nor live, whole armies are overthrown without a blow strucken, souldiers grow licentious and unruly, and it is not possible to do any good, *Disciplinam non servat jejunus exercitus*: *A fasting and hungry army observeth no discipline.* But this is an extraordinary provision, and not perpetual, and is not made but for war. It is necessary therefore that in the deliberating of war, there be great store-houses made for victuals, corn, poudered flesh, both for the army which is in the field, and for the garrisons in the frontiers, which may be besieged. Cassiod.

24 *Men.*

The second thing required to make war, are men fit to assail and to defend; we must distinguish them. The first distinction is, into souldiers, and leaders or captains, both are necessary. The souldiers are the body, the captains the soul, the life of the army, who give motion and action: we will speak first of the souldiers who make the body in gross. There are divers sorts of them: There are footmen and horsemen; natural of the same countrey, and strangers; ordinary and subsidary. We must first compare them all together, to the end we may know which are the better, and to be preferred, and afterwards we will see how to make our choice, and lastly, how to govern and discipline them.

25 *Rather foot then horse.*

In this comparison all are not of one accord. Some, especially rude and barbarous people, prefer horsemen before footmen; others quite contrary. A man may say, that the foot are simply and absolutely the better, for they serve both thorowout the war, and in all places, and at all occasions; whereas in hilly, rough, craggie, and straight places, and in sieges, the cavalrie is almost unprofitable. They are likewise more ready and less chargeable: and if they be well lead and armed, as it is fit they should, they endure the shock of the horsemen. They are likewise preferred by such as are Doctors in this Art. A man may say that the cavalry is better in combat, and for a speedy dispatch; *Equestrium virium proprium, citò parare, citò cedere victoriam: It is proper to the troops of horsemen quickly to get, and quickly to lose the victory.* For the foot are not so speedy, but what they do, they perform more surely.

26 *And natural then strangers.*

As for for natural souldiers and strangers, divers men are likewise of divers opinions touching their precedency; but without all doubt the naturall are much better, because they are more loyal then mercenary strangers.

*Vena-*

*Venalesq; manus, ubi fas, ubi maxima merces.*
*These mercenary hands that use to fight,*
*For greatest wages, not for greatest right.*

More patient and obedient, carrying themselves with more honour and respect towards their leaders, more courage in combats, more affection to the victorie and good of their countrey: They cost lesse, and are more ready then strangers, who are many times mutinous, yea in greatest necessities, making more stirre, then doing service, and the most part of them are importunate, and burdensome to the Common-weal, cruell to those of the countrey whom they forrage as enemies. Their coming and departure is chargeable, and many times they are exspected and attended with great losse and inconvenience. If in some extremitie there be need of them, be it so, but yet let them be in farre lesse number then the naturall, and let them make but a member and part of the armie, not the bodie. For there is danger, that if they shall see themselves equall in force, or more strong then the naturall, they will make themselves their masters that called them, as many times it hath fallen out. For he is master of the state, that is master of the forces. And again if it be possible, let them be drawn from allies and confederates, who bring with them more trust and service then they that are simple strangers. For to make more use of strangers, or to employ them more then naturall subjects, is to play the tyrants, who fear their subjects, and because they handle them like enemies, they make themselves odious unto them, whereby they fear to arm them or to employ them in the warres.

27 *As well ordinary as subsidiary.*

As touching ordinary souldiers and subsidiaries, both are necessary, but the difference between them is, that the ordinary are lesse in number, are alway afoot and in arms, both in peace and in warre: and of these we have spoken in the provision, a people wholly destinated and confined to the warres, formed to all exercise of arms, resolute. This is the ordinary force of the Prince, his honour in peace, his safeguard, in warre: such were the *Romane* legions. These should be divided by troups in times of peace, to the end they raise no commotions. The subsidiaries are in farre greater number, but they are not perpetuall, and wholly destinated to warre: they have other vocations: At a need and in times of warre, they are called by the sound of a trumper, enrolled, mustred, and instructed to the warres; and in times of peace they return, and retire themselves to their vocations.

We

28

We have understood their distinctions and differences, we must now consider of the good choice of them: A matter whereof we must be carefully advised, not to gather many, and in great numbers, for number winneth not the victorie, but valour; and commonly they are but few that give the overthrow. An unbridled multitude doth more hurt then good. *Non vires habet sed pondus, potiùs impedimentum quàm auxilium: It is not of force, but a burden; a hinderance rather then a help.* Victorie then consisteth not in the number but in the force and valour; *Manibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus: In warre there is need of hands, not of many names.* There must therefore be a great care in the choice of them (not pressing them pell mell) that they be not voluntary adventurers, ignorant of warre, taken forth of cities, corrupt, vicious, dissolute in their manners, arrogant boasters, hardie and bold to pillage, far enough off from blows, leverets in dangers; *Assueti latrociniis bellorum, insolentes, galeati lepores, purgamenta urbium, quibus ob egestatem & flagitia maxima peccandi necessitudo: Accustomed to pillage, and the robberies of the warres, insolent, armed hares, the offscum of the citie, on whom want and the crimes they be subject unto, have brought a necessitie of offending.*

*Well to chuse.*

29

To chuse them well, there needs judgement, attention and instruction, and to this end five things must be considered of, that is to say, the place of their birth and education. They must be taken out of the fields, the mountains, barren and hard places, countries neer adjoyning to the sea, and brought up in all manner of labour. *Ex agris supplendum præcipuè robur exercitus, aptior armis rustica plebs sub dio & in laboribus enutrita, ipso terræ suæ solo & cœlo acrius animantur. Et minus mortem timet, qui minus deliciarum novit in vita: The strength of the army is chiefly to be supplied out of the field; country people are fitter for arms, being trained up abroad in the air, and in labours, are more eagerly encouraged by the soyl, and open air of the fields. And he feareth death least, who hath least tasted of delights in his life.* For they that are brought up in cities, in the pleasant shadow and delights thereof, in gain, are more idle, insolent, effeminate; *Vernacula multitudo, lasciviæ sueta, laborum intolerans, The home-bred multitude, used to sloath and wantonnesse, are impatient of labour.* Secondly, the age, that they be taken young, at eighteen years of age, when they are most pliant and obedient: the elder are possessed with many vices, and not fit for discipline, Thirdly, the bodies, which some will have to be of great stature,

*Election of souldiers consisteth in five things.*

1. *Country.* Veget.

Tacit.

3 *Bodies.*

as

as *Marius* and *Pirrhus*: but though it be but indifferent, so the body be strong, drie, vigorous, sinewie, of a fierce look, it is all one. *Dura corpora, stricti artus, minaci vultus, major animi vigor. Hard bodies, well knit joynts, a fierce and threatning countenance, great courage and vigour of spirit.*

4 *Spirit*
5 *Condition.*

Fourthly, the spirit which must be lively, resolute, bold, glorious, fearing nothing so much as dishonour and reproach. Fifthly, the condition, which importeth much; for they that are of a base and infamous condition, or dishoneſt qualities, or such as are mingled with effeminate Arts, serving for delicacie and for women, are no way fit for this profession.

30
*Well disciplined.*
Veget.

After the choice and elections cometh discipline: for it is not enough to have chosen those that are capable, and likely to prove good souldiers, if a man make them not good; and if he make them good, if he keep and continue them not such. Nature makes a few men valiant, it is good institution and discipline that doth it. Now it is hard to say how necessary and profitable good discipline is in warre: This is all in all, it is this that made *Rome* to flourish, and that wonne it the signorie of the world: yea, it was in greater account, then the love of their children. Now the principall point of discipline is obedience, to which end served that ancient precept, That a souldier must more fear his Captain, then his enemy.

31
*Discipline hath two parts.*
*1 Valour which is attained by exercise.*

Now this discipline must tend to two ends; to make the souldiers valiant, and honeſt men: and therefore it hath two parts, valour, and manners. To valour three things are required; dayly exercise in arms, wherein they must alwayes keep themselves in practice without intermission; and from hence cometh the Latine word *Exercitus*, which signifieth an armie. This exercise in arms, is an instruction to manage and use them well, to prepare themselves for combats, to draw benefit from arms, with dexteritie to defend themselves, to discover and present unto them whatsoever may fall out in the fight, and come to the triall, as in a ranged battell: to propose rewards to the more and active, to enflame them. Secondly, travell or pains, which is as well to harden them to labour, to sweatings, to dust, *Exercitus labore proficit, otio conseneſcit, An army profiteth by labour, and decayeth with ease and idleneſſe*, as for the good and service of the army, and fortification of the field, whereby they must learn to digge, to plant a pallisade, to order a barricado, to runne, to carry heavy burthens. These are necessary things, as well to defend themselves, as to offend and surprise the enemy.

*2 Travell.*

enemy. Thirdly, order, which is of great uſe, and muſt be kept in warre for divers cauſes, and after a divers manner. Firſt, in the diſtribution of the troups, into battallions, regiments, enſignes, camerades. Secondly, in the ſituation of the camp, that it be diſpoſed into quarters with proportion, having the places, entries, iſſues, lodgings fitted both for the horſemen and footmen, whereby it may be eaſie for every man to find his quarter, his companion. Thirdly, in the march in the field and againſt the enemy, that every one hold his ranck; that they be equally diſtant the one from the other, neither too near, nor too farre from one another. Now this order is very neceſſary and ſerves for many purpoſes. It is very pleaſing to the eye cheareth up friends, aſtoniſheth the enemy, ſecureth the army, maketh all the removes and the commands of the Captains eaſie; in ſuch ſort, that without ſtirre, without confuſion the Generall commandeth, and from hand to hand his intents and purpoſes come even to the leaſt. *Imperium ducis ſimul omnes copiæ ſentiunt; & ad nutum regentis ſine tumultu reſpondent. All the army tother know their Leaders command; and anſwer without tumult the will of the Generall.* To be brief, this order well kept maketh an army almoſt invincible; and contrarily, many have loſt the field for want of this order, and good intelligence. 3 *Order.*

The ſecond part of this miltary diſcipline concerneth manners, which are commonly very diſſolute and in arms hardly ordered, *Aſſidue dimicantibus difficile morum cuſtodire menſuram: It is a hard matter for ſouldiers that are in continuall employment to keep a meaſure in their manners.* Nevertheleſſe there muſt be pains taken, and eſpecially to enſtall (if it may be) three virtues; Continencie, whereby all gluttony, drunkenneſſe, whoredome, and all manner of diſhoneſt pleaſures are chaſed away, which do make a ſouldier looſe and licentious. *Degenerat à robore ac virtute miles aſſuetudine voluptatum; A ſouldier degenerateth from courage and virtue, by cuſtome of ſenſuall pleaſures;* witneſſe, *Hannibal*, who by delicacie and delights in a winter was effeminated, and he by vice was vanquiſhed, that was invincible, and by arms vanquiſhed all others. Modeſty in words, driving away all vanity, vain boaſting, bravery of ſpeech; for true valour ſtirreth not the tongue but the hands, doth not ſpeak but execute. *Viri nati militiæ factis magni, ad verborum linguæq; certamina rudes: diſcrimen ipſum certaminis differunt: viri fortes in opere acres, ante id placidi. Men that are born for warfare be ſtout in deeds, and rude in words: prolong the danger* 32 *Manners the ſecond part of diſcipline.* *Continencie.* Tacit. *Modeſty.*

*of the conflict: valiant men are fierce in execution.* And contrarily great speakers are smal doers. *Nimii verbis, lingua feroces.* Now the tongue is for counsel, the hand for combat, saith *Homer*; Modesty in action, (that is, a simple and ready obedience, without merchandizing or contradicting the commands of the Captains:) *Hæc sunt bonæ militiæ, velle, vereri, obedire: These things are fit in good souldiers, to stand in fear, and ready to obey.* Abstinencie, whereby souldiers keep their hands clean from violence, forraging, robbery. And this is a brief summe in the military discipline; that which the Generall must strengthen by rewards and recompences of honour towards the good and valorous, and by severe punishments against offenders: for indulgence undoeth souldiers.

*Abstinencie.*

33

*Of Captains.*

Let this suffice of souldiers: Now a word or two of Captains, without whom the souldier can do nothing: they are a body without a soul, a ship with oars without a Master to hold the stern: There are two sorts, the Generall and first, and afterwards the subaltern, the Master of the Camp, Collonels: But the Generall (who must never be but one, under pain of losing all) is all in all. And therefore it is said, that an army can do as much as a Generall can do; and as much account must be made of him as of all the rest: *Plus in duce repones, quàm in exercitu: Repose more in the Generall, then in the army.* Now this Generall is either the Prince himself and sovereign, or such as he hath committed the charge unto, and made choice of. The presence of a Prince is of great importance to the obtaining of a victory; it doubleth the force and courage of his men; and it seemeth to be requisite when it standeth upon the safeguard and health of his state, and of a Province. In warres of lesse consequence he may depute another; *Dubiis prœliorum exemptus summæ rerum & imperii seipsum reservet: In a doubtfull battle he may exempt himself from the danger, and reserve himself for the securitie of himself and state.* Finally, a Generall must have these qualities; he must be and experienced in the Art military, having seen and suffered both fortunes; *Secundarum ambiguarumq; rerum sciens eoq; interritus; Having tasted both good and bad fortune, and therefore fearlesse.* Secondly, he must be provident and well advised; and therefore staid, cold, and settled; farre from all temeritie, and precipitation, which is not onely fooliſh, but unfortunate. For faults in warre cannot be mended: *Non licet in bello bis peccare; Faults may not twice be committed in warre.* And therefore he must rather look back, then before him; *Ducem oportet potiùs*

*Of the Generall.*

*Tacit.*

*Tacit.*

*Tacit.*

*Sertori, in Plut.*

*ns respicere, quàm prospicere.* Thirdly, he must be vigilant and active, and, by his own example, teaching his souldiers to do his will. Fourthly, happie; good fortune comes from heaven, but yet willingly it followeth and accompanieth these three first qualities.

After the munitions and men of warre, let us come to the rules and generall advisements to make warre. This third point is a very great and necessary instrument of warre, without which both munitions and men, are but phantasies; *Plura consilio quàm vi perficiuntur: More things are brought to passe by counsel then by force.* Now to prescribe certain rules and perpetuall, it is impossible: For they depend of so many things that are to be considered of, and whereunto a man must accommodate himself, whereupon it was well said, That men give not counsel to the affairs, but the affairs to men, that a man must order his warre by his eye. A man must take his counsel in the field, *Consilium in arena:* for new occurrents yield new counsels. Nevertheless there are some so generall, and certain, that a man cannot fail in the delivery and observation of them. We will briefly set down some few of them, whereunto a man may adde as occasions shall fall out. Some are to be observed throughout a warre, which we will speak of in the first place, others are for certain occasions and affairs. 34 *The third head of the rules and counsels to make warre.*

1 The first is carefully to watch and to meet the occasions: not to lose any, nor to permit, if it be possible, the enemy to take his: occasion hath a great place in all humane affairs, especially in warre, where it helpeth more then force. *Rules for the whole time of warre.*

2 To make profit of rumours and reports that run abroad, for whether they be true or false, they may do much, especially in the beginning, *Fama bella constant, fama bellum conficit, in spem metúmve impellit animos. By fame or report wars continue, fame endeth Warre, and moveth mens minds either to hope or fear.*

3 But when a man is entred his course, let not reports trouble him: he may consider of them, but let them not hinder him to do that he should, and what he can, and let him stand firm to that which reason hath counselled him.

4 Above all, he must take heed of too great a confidence and assurance, whereby he grows into contempt of his enemy, and thereby becomes negligent and careless; it is the most dangerous evil that can fall out in warre. He that contemneth his enemie, discovereth and betrayeth himself, *Frequentissimum initium calami-*

*tatis securitas. Nemo celerius opprimitur quàm qui non timet. Nil tutò in hoste despicitur: quem spreveris, valentiorem negligentiâ facies: Security is the most common beginning of calamity. No man is sooner evercome, then he that feareth not: Nothing safely is to be despised in an enemy: thou wilt make by thy negligence him whom thou despisest, more strong and valiant.* There is nothing in warre that must be despised: for therein there is nothing little, and many times that which seemeth to a man to be of small moment, yieldeth great effects. *Sæpe parvis momentis magni casus: ut nihil timendi, sic nihil contemnendi: From things of smal moment oftentimes arise great events: As nothing is to be feared, so nothing to be contemned.*

5 To enquire very carefully, and to know the estate and affairs of the enemie, especially these points: 1. The nature, capacity, and designments of the Chieftain. 2. The nature, manners, and manner of life of his enemies. 3. The situation of the places, and the nature of the Countrey where he is. *Hannibal* was excellent in this.

35 *For the fight.* 6 Touching the fight or main battell, many things are advisedly to be considered of; when, where, against whom, and how, to the end it be not to small purpose. And a man must not come to this extremity, but with great deliberation, but rather make choice of any other mean, and seek to break the force of his enemie by patience, and to suffer him to beat himself with time, with the place, with the want of many things, before he come to this hazzard. For the issue of battels is very uncertain, and dangerous: *Incerti exitus pugnarum: Mars communis, qui sæpe spoliantem & jam exsultantem evertit, & perculit ab abjecto: The issue and event of warre is uncertain: Mars is common to all, who often overthroweth him that spoileth, and now triumpheth, and confundeth and striketh him by the abject, and by him that was vanquished.*

*When.* 7 A man then must not come to the battel, but seldome, that is to say, in great necessities, or for some great occasion. In necessity, as if the difficulties grow on his part; his vians, his treasure faileth; his men begin to distast the wars, and will be gone, and he cannot long continue; *Capienda rebus in malis præceps via est: In extremities a sudden course is to be taken;* upon great occasions, as if his part be clearly the stronger, that the victory seemeth to offer it self, that the enemie is weak and will shortly be stronger, and will offer the battell, that he is out of doubt and fear, and thinketh his enemy far off; that he is weary and faint, revictualeth himself; his horses feed upon the litter.

8 He

8. He must consider the place, for this is a matter of great consequence in battels. In general, he must not attend (if he may prevent it) his enemy, till he enter within his own territories. He must go forth to meet him, or at least stay him in the entrance. And if he be already entred, not hazzard the battel: before he have another army in readiness, to make a supply; otherwise he puts his State in hazzard. More particularly he must consider the field where the battel is to be fought, whether it be fit for himself, or his enemy: for the field many times gives a great advantage. The plain champion is good for the cavalry; strait and narrow places, set with piles, full of ditches, trees, for the infantry. *Where.*

9. He must consider with whom he is to fight, not with the strongest, I mean not the strongest men, but the strongest and stoutest courages. Now there is not any thing that giveth more heart and courage, then necessity, an enemy invincible. And therefore I say, that a man must never fight with such as are desperate. This agreeth with the former, that is, not to hazzard a battel within his own countrey; for an enemy being entred fighteth desperately, knowing if he be vanquished, he cannot escape death, having neither fortress, nor any place of retreat or succour; *Unde necessitas in loco, spes in virtute. salus ex victoria: When necessity is in place, hope is in courage, and resolution, and safety out of victory.* *With and against whom.*

10. The manner of fight that brings best advantage with it, whatsoever it be, is the best: whether it be surprise, subtilty, close and covert faining to bear, to the end he may draw the enemy, and catch him in his gin; *Spe victoriæ inducere, ut vincantur: To bring him into hope of victory, that he may be vanquished*; to watch and mark his over-sights and faults, that he may the better prevail against him, and give the charge. *How.*

For ranged battels these things are required. The first and principal is a good and comely ordering of his people. 2. A supply and succour alwaies ready, but close and hidden, to the end that coming suddenly and unawares, it may astonish and confound the enemy. For all sudden things though they be vain and ridiculous, bring fear and astonishment with them. 36 *Rules for ranged battels.*

*Primi in omnibus prœliis oculi vincuntur & aures.*
*In skirmishes and battels all,*
*The eyes and ears are first that fall.*

3. To be first in the field, and ranged in battel ray. This a General doth with so much the more ease, and it much increaseth the

courage of his souldiers, and abateth his enemies; for this is to make himself the assailant, who hath alwayes more heart then the defendant. 4. A beautifull, gallant, bold, resolved countenance, of the Generall and other Leaders. 5. An oration to encourage the souldiers, and to lay open unto them the honour, commodity, and security that there is in valour; That dishonour, danger, death, are the reward of cowards: *Minus timoris minus periculi audaciam pro muro esse. effugere mortem, qui eam contemnit: The less fear, the lesse danger; courage is a wal of defence, he avoideth death that comtemns it.*

Being come to hand-strokes, if the army waver, the Generall must hold him firm, do the duty of a resolute Leader, and brave man at arms, run before his astonished souldiers, stay them recoyling, thrust himself into the throng, make all to know, both his own, and his enemies, that his head, his hand, his tongue trembleth not.

37 *Having joyned battle.*

And if it fall out that he have the better, and the field be his, he must stay and with-hold them, lest they scatter and disband themselves, by too obstinate a pursuit of the vanquished. That is to be feared, which hath many times come to passe, that the vanquished gathering heart, make use of despair, gather to a head, and vanquish the vanquishers, for this necessity is a violent school-mistris. *Causis ex desperatione crescit audacia: & cùm spei nihil est, sumit arma formido: The courage of them that are inclosed groweth out of despair: and when there is no hope, fear taketh arms.* It is better to give passage unto them, & to remove all lets and hindrance that may stay their flight. Much lesse must a Generall suffer himself or his men to attend the bootie, or to be allured thereby over hastily, if he be conquerour. He must use his victory wisely, lest the abuse thereof turn to his own arm. And therefore he must not defile it with crueltie, depriving the enemy of all hope, for there is danger in it. *Ignaviam necessitas acuit; sæpe desperatio spei causa est, gravissimi sunt morsus irritatæ necessitatis: Necessity sharpneth cowardise; despair is oftentimes the cause of hope, most bitter are the bitings of urged necessitie.* But contrarily, he must leave some occasion of hope, and overture unto peace, not spoiling and ransacking the countrey which he hath conquered; for fury and rage are dangerous beasts. Again he must not stain his victory with insolencie, but carry himself modestly, and alwayes remember the perpetuall flux and reflux of this world, and that alternative revolution, whereby from adversity springeth prosperity, from prospe-

ritie

ritie adverſitie. There are ſome that cannot digeſt a good fortune: *Magnam felicitatem concoquere non poſſunt: fortuna vitrea eſt, tunc cum ſplendet, frangitur: O infidam fiduciam! & ſæpe victor victus: They cannot digeſt great felicitie: fortune is brittle, and ſlipperie, when it ſhineth it breaketh: O faithleſſe confidence! that often the victor is vanquiſhed.* If he be vanquiſhed, wiſdome is neceſſary well to weigh and conſider of his loſſe, it is ſottiſhneſſe to make himſelf believe that it is nothing, & to feed himſelf with vain hopes, to ſuppreſſe the news of the overthrow. He muſt conſider thereof as it is at the worſt, otherwiſe how ſhall he remedie it: And afterwards with good courage hope for better fortunes, renew his forces, make a new levie, ſeek new ſuccours, put good and ſtrong garriſons into his ſtrongeſt places. And though the heavens be contrary unto him, as ſometimes they ſeem to oppoſe themſelves to holy and juſt arms; it is nevertheleſſe never forbidden to die in the bed of honour, which is far better then to live in diſhonour.

38 *A queſtion of the ſtratagem of warre.*

And thus we have ended the ſecond head of this ſubject, which is to make warre, except one ſcruple that remaineth: That is to ſay, whether it be lawfull to uſe ſubtily, policie, ſtratagems, in warre. There be ſome that hold it negatively, that it is unworthy men of honour and virtue, rejecting that excellent ſaying; *Dolus, an virtus quis in hoſte requirat? Whether deceit or courage is moſt requiſite in an enemy? Alexander* would take no advantages of the obſcurity of the night, ſaying, that he liked not of thieving victories; *Malo me fortunæ pigeat, quàm victoriæ pudeat: I had rather be ſorry for my fortune, then victorie ſhould ſhame me.* So likewiſe the firſt Romanes ſent their ſchoolmaſter to the Phaliſcians; ſo *Pyrrhus* his traiterous Phyſician, making profeſſion of virtue, diſavowing thoſe of their countrey that did otherwiſe, reproving the ſubtiltie of the Greeks and Affricans, and teaching that true victorie is by virtue; *Quæ ſalvâ fide & integrâ dignitate paratur, Which is gotten with a ſafe faith and true honour*; That which is gotten by wit and ſubtilty, is neither generous, nor honourable, nor ſecure. The vanquiſhed hold not themſelves to be well vanquiſhed, *non virtute, ſed occaſione & arte ducis ſe victos rati. Ergò non fraude neque occultis ſed palam & armatum hoſtes ſuis ulciſci. Think not themſelves to be conquered by courage, but by occaſion, and by the cunning and ſubtilty of the Generall: Therefore they would not be revenged on their enemies by deceit, or ſecret fraud, but openly and by force of arms.* Now all this is well

said and true, but to be understood in two cases, in private quarrels, and against private enemies, or where faith is not given, or a league and alliance made. But without these two cases, that is to say in war, and without the prejudice of a mans faith, it is permitted by any means whatsoever to conquer the enemy that is already condemned. This, besides the judgment of the greatest Warriers, (who contrarily have preferred the victory gotten by occasion, and by subtile stratagems, before that which is won by open force; whereupon to that they have ordained an oxe for a sacrifice, to this only a cock) is the opinion of that great Christian Doctor, *Cùm justum bellum suscipitur, ut aperte pugnet quis aut ex insidiis, nihil ad justitiam interest. When a just war is undertaken, it is no prejudice to justice whether any fight openly, or by lying in wait and by wiles.* War hath naturally reasonable priviledges, to the prejudice of reason. In time and place it is permitted to make use and advantage of the sottishness of an enemy, as well as of his weakness or idleness.

Polyb. Plut. in Marc. Vlp. lib. 1. de Prob. August. quæst. sup. Josue.

39 *The third head of this military subject, to finish war.*

Let us come to the third head of this military matter more short and pleasing then the rest, which is to finish the war by peace. The word is sweet, the thing pleasant, and good in all respects: *pax optima rerum quas homini novisse datum est. Pax una triumphis innumeris potior: Peace is the best thing that is given to man: one peace is better then innumerable triumphs.* And very commodious to both parts, the conquerours and conquered. But first to the vanquished, who are the weaker; to whom I do first give this counsel, To continue armed, to make shew of security, assurance and resolution. For he that desireth peace must be alwaies ready for war, whereupon it hath been said, That treaties of peace do well and happily succeed when they are concluded under a buckler. But this peace must be honest, and upon reasonable conditions; otherwise, though it be said, that a base peace is more profitable then a just war, yet it is better to die freely and with honour, then to serve dishonourably. And again, it must be pure and free, without fraud and hypocrisie, which finisheth the war, differreth it not: *Pace suspectâ tutius bellum: War is more safe then a doubtfull and suspicious peace.* Nevertheless in times of necessity a man must accommodate himself as he may. When a Pilot feareth a shipwrack, he casteth himself into the Sea to save himself; and many times it succeedeth well, when a man committeth himself to the discretion of a generous adversary: *Victores qui sunt alto animo secundæ res in*

*Of peace in respect of the vanquished.*

*In respect of the vanquishers.*

*miserationem*

*miserationem ex ira vertunt*: *Fortunate and good successe turneth the mind of a noble and generous conquerour from wrath to mercy.* To the vanquishers I give this counsel, That they be not over-hardly perswaded to peace; for though perhaps it be less profitable unto them, then to be vanquished, yet some commodity it bringeth, for the continuance of war is odious and troublesome. And *Lycurgus* forbiddeth to make war often against one and the same enemies, because they learn thereby to defend themselves, and in the end to assail too. The bitings of dying beasts are mortal; *Fractis rebus violentior ultima virtus*: *The last courage is more violent in a state overthrown.* And again, the issue is alwaies uncertain; *Melior tutiórque certa pax speratâ victoriâ illa in tua, hæc in deorum manu est*: *Better, and more safe is a certain peace, then a hoped for victory, the one is in thine own hand, the other in the hand of God.* And many times the poison lieth in the tail, and the more favourable fortune is, the more it is to be feared; *Nemo se tutò diu periculis offerre tam crebris potest*: *No man can with safety present himself long to open dangers.* But it is truly honourable, it is a glory having a victorie in his hands, to be facil and easily perswaded unto peace: it is to make known that he undertaketh a war justly, and doth wisely finish it. And contrarily, to refuse it, and afterwards by some ill success to repent the refusal, it is very dishonourable, and will be said that glory hath undone him. He refuseth peace, and would have honour, and so hath lost them both. But he must offer a gracious and a debonair peace, to the end it may be durable. For if it be over-rough and cruel, at the first advantage that may be offered, the vanquished will revolt; *Si bonam dederitis, fidam & perpetuam, si malam haud diuturnam*: *If thou shalt grant a good peace, it will be faithful and perpetual, if evil, it will not last long.* It is as great greatness to shew as much lenity towards the suppliant vanquished, as valour against the enemy. The Romans did very well put this in practice, and it did them no harm.

*Honourable.*

*S. Bernard.*

Livius.

CHAP.

## CHAP. IIII.

*Of that prudence which is required in difficult affaires, and ill accidents publick and private.*

### *THE PREFACE.*

HAving ſpoken of that politick prudence required in a Sovereign, for the carriage of himſelf and his good government, we will here ſeverally ſpeak of that prudence that is neceſſary for the preſervation of himſelf, and the remedying of thoſe affaires, and difficult and dangerous accidents, which may happen either to himſelf, or his particular ſubjects.

*The diviſion of this matter by diſtinction of the accidents.*

Firſt, theſe affairs and accidents are very divers: they are either publick or particular: either to come, and ſuch as threaten us, or preſent and preſſing us: the one are only doubtful and ambiguous, the other dangerous and important, becauſe of their violence: And they that are the greater and more difficult, are either ſecret and hid; and they are two, that is to ſay, conſpiracy againſt the perſon of the Prince, or the State, and treaſon againſt the places and companies: or manifeſt and open, and theſe are of divers ſorts. For they be either without form of war, and certain order, as popular commotions for ſmall and light occaſions, factions and leagues between ſubjects of the one againſt the other, in ſmall and great number, great or little: ſeditions of the people againſt the Prince or Magiſtrate, rebellion againſt the authority and head of the Prince: or they are ripe and formed into a war, and are called civil wars: which are of ſo many kinds, as the above-named troubles and commotions, which are the cauſes, foundations and ſeeds of them: but have grown and are come into conſequence and continuance. Of them all we will ſpeak diſtinctly, and we will give advice and counſel, as well to Sovereigns, as particular perſons, great and ſmall, how to carry themſelves wiſely therein.

### *I. Of the evils and accidents that do threaten us.*

IN thoſe croſs and contrary accidents, whereunto we are ſubject, there are two divers manners of carriage: and they may be both good, according to the divers natures both of the accidents, and of

of those to whom they happen. The one is strongly to contest, and to oppose a mans self against the accident to remove all things that may hinder the diverting thereof; or at least to blunt the point, to dead the blow thereof, either to escape it, or to force it. This requireth a strong and obstinate mind, and hath need of hard and painfull care. The other is incontinently to take and receive these accidents at the worst, and to resolve himself to bear them sweetly and patiently, and in the mean time to attend peaceably whatsoever shall happen, without tormenting himself, or hindring it. The former studieth how to range the accidents, this himself. That seemeth to be more couragious, this more sure. That continueth in suspense, is tossed between fear and hope; this putteth himself in safety, and lieth so low, that he cannot fall lower. The lowest march is the surest, and the seat of constancy. That laboureth to escape, this to suffer: and many times this maketh the better bargain. Oftentimes it falleth out, that there is greater inconvenience and losse in pleading and contending, then in losing; in flying for safety, then in suffering. A covetous man tormenteth himself more then a poor, a jealous then a cuckold. In the former, prudence is more requisite, because he is in action; in this, patience. But what hindereth, but that a man may perfofm both in order: and that where prudence and vigilancy can do nothing, there patience may succeed? doubtlesse in publick evils a man must assay the first; which such are bound to do, as have the charge and can do it; in particular let every one choose the best.

## II. *Of evils and accidents present, pressing, and extreme.*

THe proper means to lighten evils, and to sweeten passions, is not for a man to oppose himself, for opposition enflameth and encreaseth them much more. A man by the jealousie of contention and contradiction sharpeneth and stirreth the evil: but it is either in diverting them elsewhere, as Physicians use to do, who knowing not how to purge, and wholly to cure a disease, seek to divert it into some other part lesse dangerous, which must be done sweetly and insensibly. This is an excellent remedy against all evils, and which is practised in all things, if a man mark it well, whereby we are made to swallow the sowrest morsels, yea death it self, and that insensibly; *Abducendus animus est ad alia studia, curas, negotia, loci denique mutati-*

*tatione, tanquam ægroti non convaleſcentes ſæpe, curandus eſt: The mind is to be led away to their ſtudies, cares, buſineſſe; laſtly, With change of place, like ſick perſons not recovering, is often cured.* As a man counſelleth thoſe that are to paſſe ouer ſome fearful deep place, either to ſhut or to divert their eyes. When a man hath occaſion to launce a ſore in a child, he flattereth him, and withdraweth his mind to ſome other matter. A man muſt practiſe the experiment and ſubtilty of *Hypomenes*, who being to run with *Atalanta*, a damoſel of excellent beauty, and to loſe his life if he loſt the goal, to marry the damoſel if he won it, furniſhed himſelf with three fair apples of gold, which at divers times he let fall, to ſtay the courſe of the damoſel whileſt ſhe took them up, and ſo by diverting her, got the advantage of her, and gained her ſelf: ſo if the conſideration of ſome preſent unhappy accident, or the memory of any that is paſt do much afflict us; or ſome violent paſſion, which a man cannot tame, do move and torment us; we muſt change and turn our thoughts to ſome thing elſe, & ſubſtitute unto our ſelves ſome other accident and paſſion leſſe dangerous. If a man cannot vanquiſh it, he muſt eſcape it, go out of the way, deal cunningly, or weaken and diſſolve it, with other thoughts and alienations of the mind, yea break it into many pieces; and all this by diverſions. The other advice, in the laſt and more dangerous extremities that are in a manner paſt hope, is a little to caſt down the head, to lean unto the blow, to yield unto neceſſitie; for there is great danger, that by too much obſtinacy in not relenting at all, a man giveth occaſion to violence to trample all under foot. It is better to make the laws to will that they can, ſince they cannot do that they would. It was a reproach unto *Cato*, to have been over-rough in the civil wars of his time, and that he rather ſuffered the Common-weal to run into all extremities, then ſuccoured it, by tying himſelf over-ſtrictly to the laws. Contrarily, *Epaminondas* in a neceſſitie, continued his charge beyond his time, though the law upon the pain of his life did prohibit him: and *Philopœmenes* is commended, that being born to command, he did not onely know how to govern according to the laws, but alſo commanded the laws themſelves, when publick neceſſitie did require it. A Leader at a neceſſity muſt ſtoop a little, apply himſelf to the occaſion, turn the table of the law, if not take it away, go a little out of the way, that he loſe not all; for this is prudence, which is no way contrary either to reaſon or juſtice.

*III. Doubt-*

### *III. Doubtfull and ambiguous affairs.*

IN things doubtfull, where the reasons are strong on all parts, and the inabilitie to see and choose that which is most commodious, bringeth with it uncertainty and perplexitie, the best and safest way is to lean to that part where there is most honesty and justice: for notwithstanding it fall not out happily, yet there shall alwayes remain an inward content, and an outward glory, to have chosen the better part. Besides, a man knoweth not, if he had taken the contrary part, what would have happened, and whether he had escaped his destiny. When a man doubteth which is the better and the shorter way, let him take the straiter.

### *IIII. Difficult and dangerous affairs.*

IN difficult affars, as in agreements, to be over-carefull to make them over-sure, is to make them lesse firm, lesse assured; because a man employeth therein more time, more people are hindered, more things, more clauses are mingled and interposed, then are needfull, from whence arise all differences. Adde hereunto, that a man seemeth hereby to scorn fortune, and to exempt himself from her jurisdiction, which cannot be, *Vim suorum ingruentem refringi non vult: He will not weaken their approaching force.* It is better to make them briefly and quietly with a little danger, then to be so exact and curious.

In dangerous affairs a man must be wise and couragious, he must foresee and know all dangers, make them neither lesse nor greater then they are by want of judgement, think that they will not all happen, or shall not all have their effects; that a man may avoid many by industry, or by diligence, or otherwise; what they are from whom he may receive aid and succour, and thereupon take courage, grow resolute, not fainting for them in an honest enterprise. A wise man is couragious; for he thinketh, discourseth, and prepareth himself for all, and a couragious man must likewise be wise.

### *V. Conjurations.*

VVE are come now to the greatest, most important, and dan- 1
gerous accidents, which we will handle in order, expressely *Description.*
describing them one after the other, giving afterwards in every one

of

of them some advisements fit for a Sovereign, and in the end for every particular person.

Conjuration is a conspiracy and enterprise of one or many against the person of the Prince or the State: It is a dangerous thing, hardly avoided or remedied, because it is close and hidden. How should a man defend himself against a covert enemie, such an one as carrieth the countenance of a most officious friend? How can a man know the will and thoughts of another? And again, he that contemneth his own life, is master of the life of another, *Contemnit omnes ille, qui mortem priùs: He contemneth all men that first contemneth death.* In such sort that the Prince is exposed to the mercy of a private man whosoever he be.

*Machiavel* setteth down at large, how a man should frame and order, and conduct a conspiracy; we, how it may be broken, hindered, prevented.

2 *Remedies and advisements.*

1. The counsels and remedies hereupon are, first a privie search and countermine by faithfull and discreet persons fit for such a purpose, who are the eyes and ears of the Prince: These must discover whatsoever is said and done, especially by the principall officers. Conspirators do willingly here and there defame the Prince, or lend their ears to those that blame and accuse him. Their discourse and conference then touching the Prince must be known, and a Prince must not stick to be bountifull in his rewards and immunities to such discoverers: But yet he must not over-lightly give credit to all reports: He must lend his eare to all, not his belief; and diligently examine, to the end he oppresse not the innocent, and so purchase unto himself, the hatred and hard speech of the people.

2. The second advice is, that he endeavour by clemency and innocency to win the love of all, even of his enemies, *fidissima custodia Principis innocentia: Innocency is the most faithfull safeguard of the Prince.* By offending no man, a man taketh a course to be offended by none: And it is to small purpose for a man to shew his power by wrongs and out-rages, *Malè vim suam potestas, aliorum contumeliis experitur: power doth il make proof of its force, by the contempt of others*

3. The third is to make a good shew, to shew a good countenance according to the accustomed manner, not changing or depressing any thing; and to publish in all places, that he is well perswaded of those meetings and assemblies that men appoint, and to make them believe that he hath them not in the wind, that he descrieth not their plots and purposes. This was an experiment which *Denys* the tyrant made

made good use of against an enemy of his, which cost him dear.

4. The fourth is to attend without astonishment & trouble whatsoever may happen unto him. *Cesar* did well put in practice these three latter means, but not the first. It is better, saith he, to die once, then to live (nay to die) alwayes in a trance and a continuall fever of an accident, which is past remedy, and must be wholly referred unto God. They that have taken another course, and have endeavoured to prevent it by punishments and revenge, have very seldome found it the best way, and have not for all that escaped the danger, as many Romane Emperours can well witnesse.

3 *Punishment of conspirators. and the advise thereupon.*

But the conspiracy being discovered, the truth found out, what is to be done? The conspirators must rigorously be punished: to spare such people, is cruelly to betray the Weal-publick. They are enemies to the liberty, good, and peace of all: Justice requireth it. But yet wisdome and discretion is necessary herein; & he must not alwaies carry himself after one and the same manner. Sometimes he must execute suddenly, especially if the number of the conspirators be small. But whether the number be little or great, he must not seek by tortures to know the confederates (if otherwise & secretly he may know them, and to make as though he knew them not, is good) for a man seeketh that which he would not find. It is sufficient that by the punishment of a smal number, good subjects are contained in their duty, and they diverted from their attempts, that either are not, or think not themselves bewraied. To know all by tortures doth perhaps stir up mens hearts against him. Sometimes he must delay the punishment, but yet never be slow in procuring his safety. But yet the conspirators may be such, and the treason discovered at such a time, that a man must not dissemble, and to punish them instantly is to play and lose all. The best way of all others is, to prevent the conspiracy, to frustrate it, faining nevertheless not to know the conspirators, but so to carry himself, as if he would provide for another thing as the *Carthaginians* did to *Hannon* their Captain. *Optimum & solum sæpe insidiarum remedium, si non intelligantur: The best, and oftentimes the onely remedy of treachery is, that a man seem not to know them.* And which is more, a Prince must sometime pardon, especially if he be a great man, that hath deserved wel of the Prince and state, & to whom they are both in some sort bound, whose children, parents, friends are mighty. For what should he do? how should he break this band? If with safety he may, let him pardon, or at least lessen the punishment. Clemency in this case is sometimes not onely glorious to a Prince, *Nil glo ri-*

Justin. lib. 1. Tacit.

*glorioſius Principe impunè læſo*, but it helpeth much for ſafetie to come, diverteth others from the like deſignments, and worketh either ſhame in them or repentance; the example of *Auguſtus* towardt *Cinna* is very excellent.

## *VI. Treaſon.*

1 *Deſcription.* TReaſon is a ſecret conſpiracie or enterpriſe againſt a place, or a troop or company: it is as a conjuration, a ſecret evil, dangerour and hardly avoided: for many times a traitor is in the middle and boſome of the company, or place, which he ſelleth aud betrayeth. To this unhappy myſterie are willingly ſubject ſuch as are covetous, light ſpirits, hypocrites: and this is commonly in them, that they make a fair ſhew of truſt and fidelity, they commend and keep it carefully in ſmall matters and by that means endeavouring to cover, they diſcover themſelves. It is the mark whereby to know them.

2 *Adviſements and remedies.* The adviſements are alwayes the ſame that belongs to conjurations: except in the puniſhments, which here muſt be ſpeedie grievous, and irremiſſible: for they are a kind of people ill born and bred, incorrigible, pernicious to the world, whom to pitie it is crueltie.

## *VII. Commotions of the people.*

1 THere are many ſorts, according to the diverſity of the cauſes; perſons, manner and continuance, as we ſhall ſee hereafter: faction, confederacie, ſedition, tyrannie, civill wars. But we will

2 *Adviſements and remedies.* ſpeak here ſimply and in generall of thoſe that are raiſed in a heat, as ſudden tumults, that endure not long. The adviſements and remedies, are to procura ſome one or other to ſpeak, and ſhew himſelf unto them, that is of authority, virtue, and ſingular reputation, eloquent, having gravitie mingled with grace, and induſtry with mooth ſpeech to win the people: for at the preſence of ſuch a man, as at a ſudden lightning, the people grow calm and quiet:

*——Veluti magno in populo cùm ſæpe coorta*
*Seditio eſt, ſævitque animis ignobile vulgus,*
*Jámque faces, & ſaxa volant: furor arma miniſtrat.*
*Tum pietate gravem, ac meritis ſi fortè virum quem*
*Conſpexêre, ſilent, arrectiſque auribus adſtant:*
*Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*

When

*When as the Commons in tumultuous guise*
*With furious rage do in sedition rise,*
*Then stones and fire, and all things flie about,*
*as furie fills the hands of that base rout:*
*And if by chance a man both grave and sage,*
*of good desert, and reverenc'd for his age,*
*They hap to see, then silent straight they stand,*
*with listning ears his words to understand:*
*He with sweet words their anger doth asswage,*
*rules their stout minds, and doth appease their rage.*

Sometimes the Captain himself must undertake this businesse. But it must be done with an open front, a strong assurance, having his mind free and pure from all imagination of death, and the worst that may happen unto him: for to go amongst them with a fearfull and unconstant countenance, with flattery and humble carriage, is to wrong himself, and to do little good. This *Cesar* did excellently put in practice, upon those mutinous legions and armies that rose up against him.

*——stetit aggere fulti*
*Cespitis intrepidus vultu, meruitque timeri*
*Nil metuens.——*
*On high upon a heap of turfs y rear'd,*
*Undaunted stood, as in his looks appear'd,*
*And fearless shew'd him worthy to be fear'd.*

And *Augustus* did as much to his *Actiac* legions, saith *Tacitus*. There are then two means to quiet and appease a moved and furious people: the one is by rough usage, and pure authority and reason. This is the better and more noble, and becometh a Captain, if it stand him upon; but yet he must take heed how he do it, as hath been said. The other more ordinary is by flattery and fair speeches, for he must not make an open resistance. Savage beasts are never tamed with blows: and therefore a man must not be sparing of good words, and fair promises. In this case the wise have permitted a man to lie, as men use to do with children and sick folk. Herein *Pericles* was excellent, who won the people, by the eyes, the ears, and the belly; that is to say, by Shews, Comedies, Feasts, and hereby did what he list. This means more base and servile, but yet necessary, must be practised by him whom the Captain sendeth, as *Menenius Agrippa* did at *Rome*. For if he think to win them by main force, when they are without the bounds of reason, no

way yielding unto them, as *Appius*, *Coriolanus*, *Cato*, *Phocion*, endeavoured to do, he is mistaken, and deceiveth himself.

## *VIII. Faction and Confederacy.*

1 *The description.*

FAction or confederacy is a complotment and association, of one against another between the subjects; whether it be between the great or the small, in great numbers or little. It ariseth sometimes from the hatreds that are between private men, and certain families; but for the most part from ambition (the plague of states) every one coveting the first rank. That which falleth out between great personages, is more pernitious. There are some that stick not to say, That it is in some sort profitable for a Sovereign; and it doth the self same service to a Common-weal, that brawls of servants do in families, saith *Cato*. But that cannot be true, except it be in tyrants, who fear lest their subjects should agree too well; or in small and light quarrels between Cities, or between Ladies of the Court to know news. But not important factions, which must be extinguished in their first birth, with their marks, names, habiliments, which are many times the seeds of villanous effects, witnesse that great deflagration, and those bloudy murthers happened in *Constantinople*, for the colours of green and blue, under *Justinian*.

2. *The advisements and remedies.*

The advisements hereupon are, That if the factions be betwixt two great personages, the Prince must endeavour by good words or threatnings to make peace and atonement betwixt them, as *Alexander* the Great did betwixt *Ephestion* and *Craterus*, and *Archidamus* betwixt two of his friends. If he cannot do it, let him appoint arbitrators, such as are free from suspition and passion. The like he should do, if the faction be betwixt divers subjects, or cities, and communities. And if it fal out that it be necessary that he speak himself, he must do it with counsel, being called, to avoid the malice and hatred of those that are condemned. If the faction be between great multitudes, and that it be so strong, that it cannot be appeased by justice, the Prince is to employ his force for the utter extinguishment thereof. But he must take heed that he carry himself indifferent, not more affectioned to one then to another; for therein there is great danger, and many have undone themselves. And to say the truth, it is unworthy the greatness of a Prince, and he that is master of all, to make himself a companion to the one, and an enemie to the other: And if some must needs be punished, let it light upon those that are the principall heads, and let that suffice.

*IX. Se-*

## IX. Sedition.

SEdition is a violent commotion of a multitude against a Prince or a Magistrate. It ariseth or groweth either from oppression or fear: For they that have committed any great offence, fear punishment; others think and fear they shall be oppressed, and both of them by the apprehension of an evil, are stirred to sedition to prevent the blow. It likewise springeth from a licentious liberty, from want and necessity, in such sort, that men fit for this business, are such as are indebted, male-content, and men ill accommodated in all things, light persons, and such as are blown up, and fear justice. These kind of people cannot continue long in peace: peace is war unto them, they cannot sleep but in the midst of sedition, they are not in libertie but by the means of confusion. The better to bring their purposes to passe, they confer together in secret, they make great complaints, use doubtfull speeches, afterwards speak more openly, seem zealous of their liberty, and of the publick good, and ease of the people, and by these fair pretences, they draw many unto them. The advisements and remedies are: First, the self same that served for popular commotions, to cause such to shew themselves and to speak unto them that are fit for such a purpose; as hath been said. Secondly, if that profit not, he must arm and fortifie himself, and for all that, not proceed against them, but rather give them leasure and time to put water in their wine, to the wicked to repent, to the good to reunite themselves. Time is a great Physician, especially in people more ready to mutiny and rebel, then to fight. *Ferocior plebs ad rebellandum, quàm bellandum; tentare magis quàm tueri libertatem: The common people are more stout for rebellion, then for battell; apter to assay, then to defend their libertie.* Thirdly, he must in the mean time try all means to shake & dissolve them, both by hope and fear; for these are the two wayes; *Spem offer, metum intende: Offer mercy, and intend judgement.* Fourthly, endeavour to disjoyn them, and to break the course of their intelligence. Fifthly, he must win and draw unto him under hand, some few amongst them by fair promises and secret rewards, wherby some of them withdrawing themselves from their company, and coming unto him, others remaining with them to serve him, and to give intelligence of their carriages and purposes, they may the better be brought a sleep, & their heat be somewhat allayed. Sixthly, to draw and winne the rest, by yielding unto them some part of that which

1 *The description.*

2 *Advisements and remedies.*

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they demand, and that with fair promises and doubtfull terms. It shall afterwards be easie, justly to revoke that, which they have unjustly by sedition extorted, *Irrita facies quæ per seditionem expressérint*, and to make all whole with lenitie and clemencie. Lastly, if they return unto reason and obedience, and become honest men, they must be handled gently, and a man must be contented with the chastisement and correction of some few of the principall authours and fire-brands, without any further enquiry into the rest of the confederates, that all may think themselves in safety, and in grace and favour.

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## X. *Tyrannie and rebellion.*

*The description.*

TYrannie, that is to say, a violent rule or domination against the laws and customs, is many times the cause of great and publick commotions, from whence cometh rebellion, which is an insurrection of the people against the Prince, because of his tyrannie, to the end they may drive him away and pluck him from his throne. And it differeth from sedition in this, they will not acknowledge the Prince for their master; whereas sedition proceedeth not so farre, being raised onely from a discontent of the government, complaining and desiring an amendment thereof. Now this tyrannie is practised by people ill bred, cruell, who love wicked men, turbulent spirits, tale-bearers; hate and fear men of honestie, and honour; *Quibus semper aliena virtus formidolosa, nobilitas, opes, omissi gestiq; honores pro crimine, ob virtutes certissimum exitium: & non minùs ex magna fama quàm mala: To whom other mens virtue is ever fearfull, nobility, riches, honours, are accounted for crimes; for virtues they render most assured destruction; and no lesse out of good as evil report.* But they carrie their punishment with them; being hated of all, and enemies to all. They live in continual fear and apprehension of terrour; they suspect all things; they are pricked and gauled inwardly in their consciences, and at last die an evil death, and that very soon; For an old tyrant is seldome seen.

The advisements and remedies in this case, shall be set down at large hereafter in his proper place. The counsels are reduced to two: at his entrance to stay and hinder him, lest he get the mastrie; being enstalled and acknowledged, to suffer and obey him. It is better to tolerate him, then to move sedition and civil warre; *Pejus deteriúsque tyrannide, sive injusto imperio bellum civile; Civil War is worse then tyrannie or unjust government*; for there is nothing

Chap. 16. Plutarch. in Bruto.

gotten

gotten by rebelling or spurning against him, but it rather incenseth wicked Princes, and makes them more cruel: *Nihil tam exasperat fervorem vulneris, quàm ferendi impatientia: Nothing so much exasperateth the heat of the wound, as impatience in suffering it.* Modestie and obedience allayeth and pacifieth the fierce nature of a Prince; for the clemencie of a Prince, saith that great Prince *Alexander*, doth not onely consist in their own natures, but also in the natures of their subjects, who many times by their ill carriage and bad speeches, do provoke a Prince, and make him far worse: *Obsequio mitigantur imperia; & contrà, contumaciâ inferiorum lenitatem imperitantis diminui; contumaciam cum pernicie quàm obsequium cum securitate malunt: Sovereign authorities are mitigated by dutifull service; and contrariwise, the mildnes's of the Sovereign is diminished by the contumacy of subjects: They rather love disobedience with destruction, then dutifulnesse with security.* Curt. Tacit.

## *XI. Civil Warres.*

VVHen one of these forenamed publick commotions, popular insurrections, faction, sedition, rebellion, comes to fortifie it self, and continue until it get an ordinary train and form, it is a civill warre: which is no other thing, but a presse and conduct of armies by the subjects; either amongst themselves, and this is a popular commotion, or faction and confederacie; or against the Prince, the state, the Magistrate, and this is sedition or rebellion. Now there is not a mischief more miserable, nor more shamefull; it is a sea of infelicities. And a wise man said very well, *That it is not properly warre, but a maladie of the State, a fiery sickness and phrensie.* And to say the truth, he that is the author thereof, should be put out from the number of men, and banished out of the borders of humane nature. There is no kind of wickedness that it is freed from, impiety and cruelty between parents themselves, murthers with all manner of impunity: *Occidere palam, ignoscere non nisi fallendo licet, non ætas, non dignitas quenquam protegit; nobilitas cum plebe perit, latéque vagatur ensis: It is lawfull to kill openly, but not to pardon but in deceiving: No age, no dignity protecteth any man; the nobilitie perisheth with the common people, and the sword wandereth far and wide.* All kind of disloyalty, discipline abolished; *In omne fas, nefásq; avidos aut venales, non sacro, non profano abstinentes: Greedy and mercenary in all mischief, abstaining neither from sacred nor profane.* The inferiour and basest sort are companions with the best. 1 *The description.*

best. *Rheni mihi Cæsar in undis dux erat, hîc socius. Facinus quos inquinat, æquat: Cæsar was both my Captain and Companion on the river of Rhine. Them whom mischief defileth, it maketh equal.* He dareth not to open his mouth, for he is of the same profession, though he approve it not; *Obnoxiis ducibus & prohibere non ausis: The Leaders being guilty of the same crimes, dare not forbid them.* It is an horrible confusion; *Metu ac necessitate huc illuc mutantur: With fear & necessity they are changed hither & thither.* To conclude, it is nothing but misery: but there is nothing so miserable as the victory. For though it fall into the hand of him that hath the right on his side; yet there followeth this inconveniencie, that it maketh him insolent, cruel, inhumane; yea, though he were before of a mild and generous nature. So much doth this intestine war flesh a man in bloud; yea, it is a poyson that consumeth all humanity, Neither is it in the power of the Captains to with-hold the rest.

2 *The causes.* There are two causes to be considered of civil wars: The one in secret, which as it is neither known nor seen, so it cannot be hindred or remedied: It is destiny, the will of God, who will chastise or wholly dispeople a state. *In se magna ruunt, lætis hunc numina rebus Crescendi posuere modum. They bring great ruins to themselves; God hath set his stop to their growing prosperity.* The other is well understood by the wise, and may be happily remedied, if men will, and they to whom it appertaineth, set to their helping hand. This is the dissolution and generall corruption of manners, whereby men of no worth, and that have nothing to do, endeavour to turn all topsie turvey, to put all into combustion, cover their wounds with the hurt of the state; for they love better to be over-whelmed with the publick ruin, then their own particular. *Miscere cuncta, & privata vulnera reipublicæ malis operire: nam ità se res habet, ut publica ruina quisque malit quàm sua proteri. & idem passurus minus conspici: They confound all things, and cover private wounds by the evils of the common-wealth: for the case so stands, that every one had rather be trodden down in the publick ruine, then in his own, and to be least seen when they suffer the same.*

3 *The counsels and remedies.* Now the advisements and remedies for this mischief of civil war, are to end it assoon as may be, which is done by two means, agreement and victory. The first is the better, although it be not such as a man desireth, time will help the rest. A man sometimes must suffer himself to be deceived, to the end he may end a civil war, as it is said of *Antipater, Bellum finire cupienti, opus erat decipi: He that*

*that desireth to end the warre, had need to be deceived.* Victory is dangerous because it is to be feared that the Conquerour will abuse it, whereby a tyrannie may ensue. To the end a man may carry himself well herein, he must quit himself of all the authors of troubles, and other commotions, and such like bloud-suckers, as well on the one part, as the other, whether it be by sending them far off with some charge, or under some fair pretext, and so dividing them; or by employing them against the stranger, and handling the meaner sort with lenity and gentlenesse.

### *XII. Advisements for particular persons touching the foresaid publick divisions.*

THus we have seen many kinds of publick troubles and divisions, for which and every one of them, we have given counsels and remedies in respect of the Prince: It remaineth that we now give them for particular persons. This cannot be determined in a word. There are two questions; the one, whether it be lawfull for *Two questions.* an honest man to joyn himself to one part, or to remain quiet and indifferent; the second, how a man must carry himself in both cases, that is to say, being joyned to one part, or not joyned to either. Touching the first point, it is proposed for such as are free, and are *The first.* not yet engaged to any part; for if they be, this first question belongs not to them, but we send them to the second. This I say, because a man may joyn himself to the one part, not of purpose and by election; yea, to that part which he approveth not; but onely because he findeth himself carried and bound with strong and puissant bands, which he may not easily break, which carry with them a sufficient excuse, being naturall and equivalent. Now the first question hath contrary reasons and examples. It seemeth on the one side, that an honest man cannot do better then to keep himself quiet; for he knoweth not how to betake himself to either part without offence, because all these divisions are in their own natures unlawfull, and cannot be carried, nor subsist without inhumanitie and injustice. And many good people have abhorred it, as *Asinius Pollio* answered *Augustus*, who desired him to follow him against *Marc. Antony.* On the other side, is it not a thing reasonable for a man to joyn with the good, and such as have right on their side? Wise *Solon* hath judged affirmatively, yea roughly chastised him, and retireth himself and taketh not part. The professor of virtue *Cato*, hath likewise put in practice, not being content to take

one part but commanding it. To determine this doubt, it ſeemeth that men of worth and renown, who have both publick charge and credit, and ſufficiencie in the ſtate, may and ought to range themſelves in that part which they ſhall judge the better: for they muſt not abandon in a tempeſt the ſtern of that ſhip which in a calm ſea they are content to govern; eſpecially being an honourable part to provide for the ſafety of the ſtate; And ſecondly that private men, and ſuch as are of a lower degree in the charge of the ſtate, ſhould ſtay and retire themſelves into ſome peaceable and ſecure place, during the diviſion: and both of them ſo to carry themſelves as ſhall be ſaid hereafter. Finally, touching the choice of the part ſometimes there is no difficultie, for the one is ſo unjuſt, and ſo unfortunate, that a man cannot with any reaſon joyn himſelf thereunto: But at another time the difficultie is very great, and there are many things to be thought of beſides the juſtice and equity of the parts.

*The ſecond.* Let us come to the other point, which concerneth the carriage of all. This is determined in a word, by the counſel and rule of moderation, following the example of *Atticus*, ſo renowned for his modeſtie and prudence in ſuch tempeſts, alwayes held to favour the good part, yet never troubling, nor intangling himſelf with arms, and without the offence of the contrary part.

*Outragious. Moderate.* 1. For they that are known to be of one part, muſt not be moved over-much, but carry themſelves with moderation, not buſying themſelves with the affairs, if they be not wholly carried and preſſed unto it, and in this caſe carrie themſelves in ſuch order and temperature, that the tempeſt being paſſed over their heads without offence they have not any part in theſe great diſorders and inſolencies, that are committed, but contrarily ſweetening and diverting them as they can. 2. They that are not ingaged to any part (whoſe condition is ſweeteſt and beſt) though, it may be, inwardly and in affection they incline rather to one then another, muſt not remain as neuters, that is, taking no care of the iſſue, and of the ſtate of either the one or the other, living to themſelves, and as ſpectators in a Theater, feeding upon the miſeries of other men. Theſe kind of men are odious to all, and at the laſt they run a dangerous fortune, as we read of the *Thebanes* in the warre of *Xerxes*, and of *Jabes Gilead*; *Neutralitas nec amicos parit; nec inimicos tollit*: *Neutrality neither getteth friends, nor taketh away enemies*. Neutrality is neither fair nor honeſt, if it be not with conſent of parts, as *Ceſar*, who held neuters for

*Neuters.*

Judg. 21.
Tit. Liv.

for his friends, contrary to *Pompey*, who held them for enemies; or that he be a stranger, or such a one, as for his greatness and dignity ought not to mingle himself with such a rout, but rather reclaim them if he can, arbitrating and moderating all. Much lesse must men in such a case be inconstant, wavering mungrels, *Proteus's*, far more odious then neuters, and offensive to all. But they must (continuing partakers in affection if they will, for thought and affection is wholly our own) be common in their actions, offensive to none, officious and gracious to all, complaining of the common infelicitie. These kind of people neither get enemies, nor lose their friends. They are fit to be mediators, and loving arbitrators, who are better then the common. So that of such as are not partakers, who are four, two are evil, neuters and inconstant persons; two good, common, and mediators; but alwaies the one more then the other, as of partakers there are two sorts, heady, outragious, and moderate.

*Inconstant.*

*Common.*

*Mediators.*

### *XIII. Of private troubles and divisions.*

IN private divisions a man may commodiously and loyally carry himself between enemies, if not with equal affection, yet in such a temperate manner, as that he engage not himself so much to one more then to another, as that either part may think they have more interest in him, and so contenting himself with an indifferent measure of their grace, report nothing but indifferent things, and such as are known, or that serve in common to both parts, speaking nothing to the one that he may not lay to the other in its due time, changing only the accent and the form thereof.

## *Of Justice the second Virtue.*

## CHAP. V.

### *Of Justice in general.*

JUstice is to give to every one that which appertaineth unto him, to himself first, and afterwards to others: so that it comprehendeth all the duties and offices of every particular person: which are two-fold, the first to himself, the second to another, and they are contained in that general commandment, which is the summary of all justice; *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self*: which doth not only set down the duty of a man towards another in the second place,

1 *The description.*

place, but it sheweth and ruleth it according to the pattern of that duty and love he oweth towards himself: for as the *Hebrews* say, a man must begin charity with himself.

2 *The first and original justice.*

The beginning then of all justice, the first and most ancient commandment, is that of reason over sensualitie. Before a man can well command others, he must learn to command himself, yieldeth unto reason the power of commanding, and subduing the appetite, and making it pliant to obedience. This is the first originall, inward, proper, and most beautifull justice that may be. This command of the Spirit over the brutall and sensuall part, from whence the passions do arise, is compared to an Esquire or Horseman, who by reason that he keepeth his horse and mounteth him often, and is ever in the saddle, he turneth and manageth him at his pleasure.

3 *The distinction of justice.*

To speak of that justice which is outwardly practised and with another, we must first know that there is a two-fold justice; the one naturall, universall, noble, philosophicall; the other after a sort artificiall, particular, politick, made and restrained to the necessitie of policies and states. That hath better rules, is more firm, pure and beautifull, but it is out of use, unprofitable to the world, such as it is. *Veri juris germanæq; justitiæ solidam & expressam effigiem nullam tenemus; umbris & imaginibus utimur: We hold no sound and true image of right and perfect justice; we onely use the shadow and imaginations thereof:* it is not in a manner capable thereof, as hath been said. That is the rule of *Polycletus* inflexible, invariable. This is more loose and flexible, accommodating it self to humane weakness, and vulgar necessitie. It is the leaden Lesbian rule, which yieldeth and bendeth it self as there is need, and as the times, persons, affairs, and accidents do require. This permitteth upon a necessity, and approveth many things, which That wholy rejecteth and condemneth. It hath many vices lawfull, and many good actions unlawfull. That respecteth wholly and purely reason, honestie; This profit, joyning it as much as may be with honestie. Of that, which is but an *Idea*, and in contemplation we shall not need to speak.

4 *Justice in practise distinguished.*

The usuall justice, and which is practised in the world, is first two-fold, that is to say, equal, bound, and restrained to the terms of the law; according to which Judges and Magistrates are to proceed: the other just and conscionable, which not enthralling it self to the words of the Law, marcheth more freely, according to the exigencie of the case, yea, sometimes against the words of the law.

Now

Now to speak better, it handleth and ruleth the law as need requireth. And therefore saith a wise man, the lawes themselves and justice have need to be ordered and handled justly, that is to say, with equitie; *Quæ expositio & emendatio legis est, exponit sensum, emendat defectum: Which is an exposition and amending of the law, expoundeth the meaning and amendeth the defect.* This is the fine flour of justice, which is in the hand of those that judge in sovereigntie. Again, to speak more particularly, there is a two-fold justice; the one commutative, betwixt private men, which is handled and practised by Arithmatick proportion; the other distributive, publickly administred by Geometricall proportion: it hath two parts, reward, and punishment.

Now this usuall and practised justice, is not truly and perfectly justice: humane nature is not capable thereof no more then of all other things in their puritie. As humane justice is mingled with some grain of injustice, favour, rigour, too much, or too little, and and there is no pure and true mediocritie; from whence have sprung these ancient proverbs, That he is enforced to do wrong by retail that will do justice in grosse: and injustice in small things that will do justice in great. Lawyers to give course and passage to commutative justice, do covertly and silently suffer themselves to deceive one another, and that in a certain measure, so that they passe not the moitie of the just price; and the reason is, because they know not how to do better. And in distributive justice, how many innocents are apprehended and condemned? how many guilty quit and set at libertie? and that without the fault of the Judges, never dreaming either of that too much, or too little, which is alwayes perpetual in the purest justice? Justice is a let or hinderance to it self, and humane sufficiencie cannot see and provide for all. And here we may take notice among other matters, of a great defect in distributive justice, in that it punisheth only and rewardeth not: although these are the two parts and the two hands of justice: but as it is commonly practised, it is lame, and inclineth wholy unto punishment. The greatest favour that a man receiveth from it, is indemnitie, which is a pay too short for such as deserve better then the common sort. But yet this is not all; for if a man be falsly accused, and upon that accusation committed, he is sure to endure punishment sufficient: at the last his innocencie being known, he escapeth perhaps his uttermost punishment, but without amends of that wrongfull affliction he hath endured, even such perhaps as shall never

5 *There is no true justice in the world.*

never leave him. And the accuser in the mean time, be the colour and ground of his accusation never so light (which is easie to do) escapeth without punishment; so sparing is justice in rewarding, as that it consisteth wholly in chastisement, whereof that common speech ariseth, that to do justice, and to be subject unto justice, is alwaies to be understood of punishment. And it is an easie matter for any man that will, to bring another man into danger of punishment, even to such an estate, as that he shall never know which way to get forth, but with losse.

6 *The division of this matter.* Of justice and duty there are three principal parts: for man is indebted to three, to God, to himself, to his neighbour: to one above himself, to himself, and to others beside himself: if his duty towards God, which is piety and religion, hath sufficiently been spoken before. It remaineth that we now speak of his duty towards himself, and his neighbour.

L. 2. c. 5.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of the justice and duty of a man towards himself.*

THis is sufficiently contained in this whole work; in the first book which teacheth a man to know himself, and all humane condition; in the second, which teacheth a man to be wise, and to that end giveth advisements and rules; and in the rest of this book, especially in the virtues of fortitude and temperance. Nevertheless I will here summarily set down some advisement, more expres and formal.

The first and fundamental advice is, to resolve not to live carelesly, after an uncertain fashion, and by chance and adventure, as almost all are accustomed to do, who seem to mock and deceive themselves, and not to live in good earnest, nor leading the life seriously and attentively, but living from day to day, as it falleth out. They taste not, they possess not, they enjoy not their life: but they use it to make use of other things. Their designments and occupations do many times trouble, and hurt their life more then do it service. These kind of people do all things in good earnest, except it be to live. All their actions, and the lesser parts of their life are serious, but the whole body thereof passeth away as if they thought not thereof: it is a bare supposition, that is not worth the thinking of. That which is but an accident is principal unto them, and the principal as an accessary. They affect and incline themselves to all things,

things, some to get knowledge, honours, dignities, riches: others to take their pleasure, to hunt, to sport themselves, to pass away the time: others to speculations, imaginations, inventions: others to manage and order affairs: others to other things; but to live is the least they think of. They live as it were insensibly, being wholly addicted and fastening their thoughts upon other things. Life is unto them but as a tearm, and and a procrastination or delay to employ it about other things. Now all this is very unjust, it is an infelicity and treason against a mans self: it is for a man to lose his life, and to go against that which every man should do, that is, live seriously, attentively, and cheerfully, *bene vivere & lætari: sibi semper valere & vivere doctum: To live well and cheerfully: ever to do good to himself, and to live learned*, to the end he may live well, and well die: it is the fault of every man. A man must lead and order his life, as if it were a business of great weight and consequence, and as a bargain made whereof he must give an account exactly by parts and parcels. It is our greatest business, in respect whereof all the rest are but toies, things accessary and superficial. There are some that deliberate and purpose to do it, but it is when they must live no longer, wherein they resemble those that put off their buying and selling till the market be past, and when they see their folly, they complain, saying, Shall I never have leisure to make my retreat, to live unto my self? *quàm serum est incipere vivere cùm desinendum est? quàm stulta mortalitatis oblivio? dum differtur, vita transcurrit. How late is it to begin to live, when a man must cease to live? how foolish is it to forget our mortality? Whilest it is deferred, life passeth away.* And this is the reason why the wise cry out unto us, well to use the time, *tempori parce.* That we have not need of any thing so much as time, saith *Zenon.* For life is short, and Art is long: not the Art to heal, but rather to live, which is wisdome. To this first and principal advice, these following do serve. See lib. 1. cap. 36.

To learn to dwell, to content, to delight himself alone, yea to quit himself of the world, if need be: the greatest thing is for a man to know how to be himself; virtue is content with it self: let us win so much of our selves, as to be able in good earnest and willingly, to live alone, and to live at our ease. Let us learn to quit our selves of all those bands that fasten and bind us to another, and that our contentment depend of our selves, neither seeking nor disdaining or refusing company, but cheerfully to go on, with or without company, as either our own, or anothers need do require: but yet not so

so to shut up our selves, and to settle and establish our pleasure, as some that are half lost being alone. A man must have within himself wherewith to entertain and content himself, *& in sinu suo gaudere, And to rejoyce within himself.* He that hath won this point pleaseth himself in all places and in all things. He must carry a countenance conformable to the company and the affairs that are in hand and present themselves, and accommodate himself unto another; be sad if need be, but inwardly to keep himself one and the same: this is the meditation, and consideration, which is the nourishment and life of the spirit, *cujus vivere est cogitare: Whose life is cogitation.* Now for the benefit of nature, there is not any business which we do more often, continue longer, that is more easie, more natural, and more our own, then to meditate and to entertain our thoughts. But this meditation is not in all after one manner, but very divers, according to the diversity of spirits. In some it is weak, in others strong; in some it is languishing idleness, a vacancy and want of other business. But the greater spirits make it their principal vacation and most serious study, whereby they are never more busied, or less alone, (as it is said of *Scipio*) then when they are alone, and quitting themselves of affaires, in imitation of God himself, who liveth and feedeth himself with his eternal thoughts and meditations. It is the business of the gods, (saith *Aristotle*) from whence doth spring both their and our blessedness.

3 *To know and culture himself.*

Now this solitary imployment, and this cheerful entertainment of a mans self, must not be in vanity, much less in any thing that is vicious; but in study and profound knowledg, and afterwards in the diligent culture of himself. This is the price agreed, the principal, first and plainest travel of every man. He must alwaies watch, taste, sound himself; never abandon, but be alwaies neer, and keep himself to himself: and finding that many things go not well, whether by reason of vice and defect of nature, or the contagion of another, or other casual accidents that troubleth him, he must quietly and sweetly correct them, and provide for them. He must reason with himself, correct and recal himself couragiously, and not suffer himself to be carried away either with disdain or carelesness.

4 *To keep himself in exercise.*

He must likewise in avoiding all idleness, which doth but rust and marre both the soul and body, keep himself alwaies in breath, in office and exercise, but yet not over-bent, violent and painful, but above all, honest, virtuous and serious, And that he may the better

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ter do it, he must quit himself of other business, and propose unto himself such designments as may delight him, conferring with honest men, and good books, dispencing his time well, and well ordering his hours, and not live tumultuously and by chance and hazzard.

Again, he must well husband, and make profit of all things that are presented unto him, done, said, and make them an instruction unto him, apply them unto himself, without any shew or semblance thereof.

5 *To make use of all things.*

And to particularize a little more, we know that the duty of man towards himself consisteth in three points, according to his three parts; to rule and govern his spirit, his body, his goods. Touching his spirit (the first and principal, whereunto especially do belong these general advisements which we are to deliver) we know that all the motions thereof are reduced to two, to think, and to desire, the understanding and the will; whereunto do answer science and virtue, the two ornaments of the spirit. Touching the former, which is the understanding, he must preserve it from two things, in some sort contrary and extreme, that is sottishness and folly, that is to say, from vanities and childish follies, on the one side; this is to bastardize and to loose it: it was not made to play the novice or baboun, *non ad jocum & lusum genitus, sed ad severitatem potius*; *Not born to sport and play, but rather for gravitie*: and from phantastical, absurd, and extravagant opinions on the other side; this is to polute and debase it. It must be fed and entertained with things profitable and serious, and furnished and indued with sound, sweet, and natural opinions: and so much care must not be taken to elevate and mount it, to extend it beyond the reach, as to rule, and order it. For order and continencie is the effect of wisdom, and which giveth price to the soul and above all to be free from presumption and obstinacy in opinion, vices very familiar with those that have any extraordinary force and vigor of spirit; and rather to continue in doubt and suspence, especially in things that are doubtful, and capable of oppositions and reasons on both parts, not easily digested and determined. It is an excellent thing, and the securest way, well to know how to doubt, and to be ignorant, and the most noble Philosophers have not been ashamed to make profession thereof, yea it is the principal fruit and effect of science.

6 *To govern his spirit, that is his judgment.*

Touching the will, it must in all things be governed and submit it self to the rule of reason, which is the office of vertue, and

not

not unto fleeting inconstant opinion, which is commonly false, and much lesse unto passion. These are the three that move and govern our souls. But yet this is the difference, that a wise man ruleth and rangeth himself according to nature and reason, regardeth his duty, holdeth for apocryphal, and suspects whatsoever dependeth upon opinion, or passion: and therefore he liveth in peace, passeth away his life cheerfully and pleasingly, is not subject to repentance, recantations, changes; because whatsoever falleth out, he could neither do, nor choose better, and therefore he is never kindled nor stirred; for reason is alwaies peaceable. The fool that suffereth himself to be led by these two, doth nothing but wander and war with himself, and never resteth. He is alwaies re-advising, changing, mending, repenting, and is never contented; which to say the truth, belongeth to a wise man, who hath reason and virtue to make himself such a one. *Nulla placidior quies nisi quam ratio composuit. No rest more pleasing, then that which reason hath settled.* An honest man must govern and respect himself, and fear his reason and his conscience, which is his *bonus genius*, his good spirit, in such sort that he cannot without shame stumble in their presence: *rarum est, ut satis se quisque vereatur: It is a rare thing, that any man should sufficiently be afraid of himself.*

8 As touching the body, we owe thereunto assistance, and conduct or direction. It is folly to go about to separate and sunder these two principall parts the one from the other; but contrarily it is fit and necessary they be united and joyned together. Nature hath given us a body as a necessary instrument to life: and it is fit that the spirit as the principal should take upon it the guardianship and protection of the body. So far should it be from serving the body, which is the most base, unjust, shameful, and burthensome servitude that is, that it should assist, counsel it, and be as a husband unto it. So that it oweth thereunto care, not service: It must handle it as a Lord, not as a Tyrant; nourish it, not pamper it; giving it to understand, that it liveth not for it, but that it cannot live here below without it. This is an instruction to the work-man, to know how to use, and make use of his instruments. And it is likewise no small advantage to a man, to know how to use his body, and to make it a fit instrument for the exercise of virtue. Finally, the body is preserved in good estate by moderate nourishment and orderly exercise. How the spirit must have a part and bear it company in those pleasures that belong unto it, hath been said before, and shall hereafter

after be set down in the virtue of temperance.

Touching goods and the duty of every man in this case there are many and divers offices; for to gather riches, to keep them, to husband them, to employ them, to yield unto them all that is fit, are different sciences. One is wise in the one of them, that in the other understandeth nothing, neither is it fit he should. The acquisition of riches hath more parts then the rest. The employment is more glorious and ambitious. The preservation and custody, which is proper to the women, is the arbour to cover them. 9

These are the two extremities alike vitious, to love and affect riches; to hate and reject them. By riches I understand that which is more then enough, and more then is needfull. A wise man will do neither of both, according to that wish and prayer of *Solomon: Give me neither riches nor povertie:* but he will hold them in their place, esteeming them as they are, a thing of it self indifferent, matter of good and evil, and to many good things commodious.

The evils and miseries that follow the affecting and hating of them, have been spoken of before. Now in five words we set down a rule touching a mediocritie therein. 1. To desire them, but not to love them. *Sapiens non amat divitias, sed mavult: A wise man doth not love riches, but would willingly have them.* As a little man and weak of body, would willingly be higher and stronger, but this his desire is without care or pain unto himself, seeking that without passion, which nature desireth, and fortune knoweth not how to take from him. 2. And much lesse to seek them at the cost and dammage of another, or by art, and bad and base means, to the end no man should complain or eavie his gains. 3. When they come upon him, entring at an honest gate, not to reject them, but chearfully to accept them, and to receive them into his house, not his heart; into his possession, not his love, as being unworthy thereof. 4. When he possesseth them, to employ them honestly and discreetly, to the good of other men; that their departure may, at the least, be as honest as their entrance. 5. If they happen to depart without leave, be lost or stollen from him, that he be not sorrowfull, but that he suffer them to depart with themselves, without any thing of his. *Si divitiæ effluxerunt, non auferent nisi semetipsas: If riches passe away, let them carry nothing with them but themselves.* To conclude, he deserveth not to be accepted of God, and is unworthy his love, and the profession of virtue, that makes account of the riches of this world.

*Aude hospes contemnere opes, & te quoque dignum finge Deo:*
*Be bold to set at naught base trash and pelf,*
*And worthy of a God frame thou thy self.*

## *Of the justice and duty of man towards man.*

### *An Advertisement.*

THis duty is great, and hath many parts, we will reduce them to two great ones. In the first we will place the generall, simple, and common duties required in all and every one, towards all and every one, whether in heart, word, or deed; which are amitie, faith, veritie, and free admonition, good deeds, humanitie, liberalitie, acknowledgement or thankfulnesse. In the second shall be the speciall duties required for some speciall and expresse reason and obligation between certain persons, as between a man and his wife, parents and children, masters and servants, princes and subjects, magistrates, the great and powerfull, and the lesse.

### *The first part, which is of the generall and common duties of all towards all, and first*

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of love or friendship.*

1 *The description.* AMitie is a sacred flame, kindled in our breasts first by nature, and hath expressed its first heat between the husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters; and afterwards growing cold hath recovered heat by Art, and the invention of alliances, companies, fraternities, colleges, and communities. But forasmuch as in all things being divided into many parts, it was weakned, and mingled with other profitable and pleasant considerations, to the end it might restrengthen it self and grow more fervent, it hath recollected it self, and united its own forces into a narrow room, betwixt two true friends. And this is perfect amitie, which is so much more fervent and spirituall then other, by how much the heart is hotter then the liver, and the bloud then the veins.

2 Amitie is the soul and life of the world, more necessary (say the

the wise) then fire and water: *Amicitia, necessitudo, amici necessarii: Friendship, familiaritie, are necessary friends.* It is the summe, the staff, the salt of our life; for without it all is darknesse, and there is no joy, no stay, no taste of life: *Amicitia justitiæ consors, naturæ vinculum, civitatis præsidium, senectutis solatium, vitæ humanæ portus: eâ omnia constant, discordiâ cadunt: Friendship is the companion of Justice, the bond of nature, the defence of a citie, the comfort of old age, and the quiet harbour of mans life: By it all things consist, and by discord decay.* And we must not think that friendship is profitable and delightfull to private men onely, for it is more commodious to the weal-publick: it is the true nursing mother of humane societie, the preserver of states and policies. Neither is it suspected, nor displeaseth any but tyrants and monsters, not because they honour not it in their hearts, but because they cannot be of that number, for onely friendship sufficeth to preserve the world. And if it were every where in force, there would be no need of a law, which hath not been ordained but as a help, and as a second remedie for want of friendship, to the end it might enforce and constrain by the authoritie thereof that which for love and friendship should be freely and voluntary; but howsoever the law taketh place farre below friendship. For friendship ruleth the heart, the tongue, the hand, the will, and the effects, the law cannot provide for that which is without. This is the reason why *Aristotle* said, that good law-makers have ever had more care of friendship, then of justice: And because the law and justice do many times lose their credit, the third remedie and least of all hath been in arms and force, altogether contrary to the former, which is friendship. Thus we see by degrees the three means of publick government. But love or friendship is worth more then the rest, for second and subsidiary helps are no way comparable to the first and principall.

3 *How necessary to the weal-publick.*

The diversitie and distinction of friendship is great: That of the ancients into four kinds, Naturall, Sociable, Hospitall, Venerous, is not sufficient. We may note three; The first is drawn from the causes which ingender it, which are four; nature, virtue, profit, pleasure, which sometimes go together in troops; sometimes two, or three, and very often one alone: But virtue is the more noble and the stronger, for that is spirituall, and in the heart as friendship is: Nature in the bloud, profit in the purse, pleasure in some part, or sense of the body. So likewise virtue is more liberall, more free, and

4 *The first distinction of the causes.*

pure, and without it the other causes are poor, and idle, and frail. He that loveth for virtue, is never weary with loving, and if friendship be broken, complaineth not: He that loveth for profit, if it fail, complaineth, and it turneth to his reproach, that when he hath done all he can, he hath lost all: He that loveth for pleasure, if his pleasure cease, his love ceaseth with it, and without complaint estrangeth himself.

5 The second distinction which is in regard of the persons, is in
2 *Of persons.* three kinds: The one is in a straight line, between superiours and in-
1 feriours; and it is either naturall, as between parents and children, uncles and nephews; or lawfull, as between the Prince and the subjects, the Lord and his vassals, the master and his servants, the Doctor and the disciple, the Prelate or governour and the People. Now this kind to speak properly is not friendship, both because of the great disparitie that is betwixt them, which hindereth that inwardnesse and familiaritie and entire communication, which is the principall fruit and effect of friendship, as likewise because of the obligation that is therein, which is the cause why there is lesse liberty and lesse choice and affection therein. And this is the reason why men give it other names then of friendship: for in inferiours, there is required of them honour, respect, obedience; in superiours, care
2 and vigilancie, over their inferiours. The second kind of friendship in regard of the persons, is in a collaterall line between equals, or such as are near equals. And this is likewise two-fold, for either it is naturall, as between brothers, sisters, cousins, and this comes nearer to friendship then the former, because there is lesse disparity. But yet there is a bond of nature, which as on the one side it knitteth and fastneth, so on the other it looseth: for by reason of goods, and divisions, and affairs, it is not possible but brothers and kinsfolks must sometimes differ: Besides that many times the corresponcie and relation of humours and wills, which is the essence of friendship, is not found amongst them; He is my brother or my kinsman, but yet he is a wicked man, a fool: Or it is free and voluntarie, as between companions and friends, who touch not in bloud, and hold of nothing but onely of friendship and love: and this is properly and truly friendship.

3. 3 The third kind of friendship in regard of the persons, is mixt, and as it were compounded of the other two, whereby it is, or it should be more strong, this is matrimonial of married couples,

which

which holdeth of love or friendſhip in a ſtraight line becauſe of the ſuperioritie of the husband, and the inferioritie of the wife; and of collaterall friendſhip, being both of them companions joyned together by equall bands. And therefore the wife was not taken out of the head, nor foot, but the ſide of man. Again, ſuch as are married, in all things and by turns exerciſe and ſhew both theſe friendſhips; that which is in a ſtraight line in publick, for a wiſe woman honoureth and reſpecteth her husband; that which is collaterall in private, by private familiaritie. The matrimoniall friendſhip is likewiſe after another faſhion double and compounded; for it is ſpirituall and corporall, which is not in other friendſhip, ſave onely in that which is reproved by all good laws, and by nature it ſelf. Matrimoniall friendſhip then, is great, ſtrong, and puiſſant. There are nevertheleſſe two or three things that ſtay and hinder it, that it cannot attain to the perfection of friendſhip: The one, that there is no part of marriage free but the entrance, for the progreſſe and the continuance thereof is altogether conſtrained, enforced, I mean in Chriſtian marriages; for every where elſe it is leſſe enforced, by reaſon of thoſe divorcements which are permitted: The other is the weakneſſe and inſufficiencie of the wife, which can no way correſpond to that perfect conference and communication of thoughts and judgements: her ſoul is not ſtrong and conſtant enough to endure the ſtraitneſſe of a knot ſo faſt, ſo ſtrong, ſo durable: it is as if a man ſhould ſow a ſtrong and courſe piece of cloth to a ſoft and delicate. This filleth not the place, but vaniſheth, and is eaſily torn from the other. Again, this inconvenience followeth the friendſhip of married couples, that it is mingled with ſo many other ſtrange matters, children, parents of the one ſide and the other, and ſo many other diſtaff buſineſſes that do many times trouble and interrupt a lively affection.

The third diſtinction of friendſhip reſpecteth the force and intention, or the weakneſſe and diminution of friendſhip. According to this reaſon, there is a two-fold friendſhip, the common and imperfect, which we may call good will, familiaritie, private acquaintaince: and it hath infinite degrees, one more ſtrict, intimate and ſtrong then another: and the perfect, which is inviſible, and is a Phenix in the world, yea hardly conceived by imagination. 7 *Of degrees.*

We ſhall know them both by confronting them together, and by knowing their differences. The common may be attained in a ſhort time. Of the perfect it is ſaid, that we muſt take long time 8 *The difference. Of friendſhip common and perfect.*

to deliberate, and they must eat much salt together before it be perfected.

2 The common is attained, built, and ordered by divers profitable and delightfull occasions and occurrents; and therefore a wise man hath set down two means to attain unto it, to speak things pleasant, and to do things profitable; the perfect is acquired by an onely true and lively virtue reciprocally known.

3 The common may be with and between divers: the perfect is with one onely, who is another self, and between two onely, who are but one. It would intangle and hinder it self amongst many, for if two at one time should desire to be succoured, if they should request of me contrary offices; if the one should commit to my secrecie a thing that is expedient for another to know, what course, what order may be kept herein? Doubtlesse, division is an enemy to perfection, and union her cousin-germane.

4 The common is capable of more and lesse, of exceptions, restraints, and modifications; it is kindled and cooled, subject to accession and recession, like a fever, according to the presence or absence, merits, good deeds, and so forth. The perfect not so, alwaies the same, marching with an equal pase, firm, haughtie, and constant.

5 The common receiveth and hath need of many rules and cautions given by the wise; whereof one is, to love without respect of piety, verity, virtue, *Amicus usq; ad aras*. Another, so to love as that a man may hate; so to hate, as that he may likewise love, that is, to hold alwaies the bridle in his hand, and not to abandon himself so profusely, that he may have cause to repent, if the knot of friendship happen to untie.

Again, to aid and succour at a need without intreaty: for a friend is bashfull, and it costs him dear to request that that he thinks to be his due. Again, not to be important to his friends, as they that are alwayes complaining after the manner of women. Now all these lessons are very wholsome in ordinary friendships, but have no place in this sovereign and perfect.

9 *The description of perfect friendship.*

We shall know this better by the portrait and description of perfect friendship, which is a very free, plain, and universall confusion of two souls. See here three words. 1. A confusion, not onely a Conjunction, and joyning together, as of solid things, which howsoever they be fastned, mingled, and knit together, may be separated

rated and known apart. For the souls of men in this perfect amity are in such sort plunged and drowned the one within the other, that they can no more be divided, neither would they then things liquid that are mingled together. 2. Very free, and built upon the pure choice and liberty of the will, without any other obligation, occasion, or strange cause. There is nothing more free and voluntary then affection. 3. Universall, without any exception of all things, goods, honours, judgements thoughts, wils, life. From this universall and full confusion it proceedeth, that the one cannot lend or give to the other; and there is no speech betwixt them of good turns, obligations, acknowledgements, thankfulnesse, and other the like duties, which are the nourishers of common friendships, but yet testimonies of division & difference, as I know not how to thank my self for the service I do unto my self, neither doth that love which I bear unto my self increase by those succours and helps I give unto my self. And in marriage it self, to give some resemblance of this divine knot, though it come farre short thereof, donations are forbid between the husband and the wife: and if there were place for the one to give unto the other, he is the giver that gives cause to his friend to expresse and imploy his love; and he receiveth the good turn, that by giving binds his companion: for the one and the other seeking above all things even with a greedy desire to do good to one another, he that giveth the occasion and yieldeth the matter, is he that is liberall, giving that contentment to his friend, to effect that which he most desireth.

Of this perfect friendship and communion, antiquity yieldeth some examples. *Blosius* taken for a good friend of *Tiberius Gracchus* then condemned to die, and being asked what he would do for his sake, and he answering that he would refuse nothing, it was demanded what he would do if *Gracchus* should intreat him to fire the Temples? To whom he answered, that *Gracchus* would never intreat such a matter at his hands, but if he should he would obey him. A very bold and dangerous answer. He might boldly have said, that *Gracchus* would never have required such a matter, and that should have been his answer; for according to this our description a perfect friend doth not onely fully know the will of his friend, which might have sufficed for an answer, but he holdeth in his sleeve, and wholly possesses it. And in that he added, that if *Gracchus* would have required it, he would have done it, it is as if he had said nothing, it neither alters nor hurteth his first answer concerning 10 *Examples.*

that assurance that he had of the will of *Gracchus*. This of Wills and Judgements. 3. Touching goods, There were three friends (this word three is some impeachment to our rule, and may make us think that this was no perfect amity) two rich, and one poor, charged with an old mother, and a daughter to marry, this man dying made his Will, wherein he bequeathed to one of his friends his mother to be fed and maintained by him; to the other his daughter, to be married by him, enjoyning him withall to bestow upon her the best dowry that his abilitie would afford; and if it should happen that the one of them should die, he should substitute the other. The people made themselves merry with his Will or Testament, the Legetaries accepted of it with great contentment, and each of them received unto them their legacie; but he that hath taken the mother, departing this life within five dayes after, the other surviving and remaining the sole universall inheritour, did carefully entertain the mother, and within a few daies after, he married in one day his own and only daughter, and her that was bequeathed unto him, dividing betwixt them by equal portions al his goods. The wise, according to this description, have judged that the first dying, expressed greatest love, and was the more liberall, making his friends his heirs, and giving them that contentment, as to employ them for the supply of his wants. 4. Touching life; that history is sufficiently known of those two friends, whereof the one being condemned by the tyrant, to die at a certain day and hour, he requested, that giving bail, he might in the mean time go and dispose of his domesticall affairs, which the tyrant agreeing unto upon this condition, that if he did not return by that time, his bail should suffer the punishment: The prisoner delivered his friend, who entred into prison upon that condition: and the time being come, and the friend who was the bail resolving to die, his condemned friend failed not to offer himself, and so quit his friend of that danger. Whereat the tyrant being more then astonished, and delivering them both from death, desired them to receive, and to adopt him in their friendship as their friend.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of faith, trust, treachery, secresie.*

1 *The dignity of fidelity.*

ALl men, yea the most treacherous know and confesse that faith is the band of humane societie, the foundation of all justice,

stice, and that above all things it ought to be religiously observed; *Nihil augustius fide quæ justitiæ fundamentum est, nec ulla res vehementius rempublicam continet & vitam: Sanctissimum humani pectoris bonum*: *Nothing is more excellent then faith, which is the foundation of Justice; neither doth any thing more mightily bridle and rule the Common-Wealth, and the life of man. It is the most sacred good in the breasts of men.*

*Ante Jovem genera ta, decus divúmque hominúmque,* Cic.
*Qua sine non tellus pacem, non æquora nôrunt,*
*Justitiæ consors, tacitúmque in pectore numen.*
*Born before Jupiter, of gods and men the grace,*
*Without which neither land nor seas for peace have place,*
*Consort to justice, in mans breast,*
*A God-head not to be expresst.*

2 *Fidelity rare.*

Nevertheless the world is full of treacheries. There are but few that do well and truly keep their faith. They break it divers wayes and they perceive it not. So they find some pretext and colour thereof, they think they are safe enough. Others seek corners evasions, subtilties; *Quærunt latebras perjurio.* Now to remove all the difficulties that are in this matter, and truly to know how a man should carry himself, there are four considerations, whereunto all the rest may be referred: The persons, as well he that giveth faith, as he that receiveth it; the subject whereof the question is made, and the manner according to which the faith is given.

*The division of this matter.*

3 *He that giveth faith.*

As touching him that giveth faith, it is necessary that he have power to do it: If he be subject to another, he cannot give it, and having given it without the leave and approbation of his master, it is of no effect, as it did well appear in the Tribune *Saturnine* and his complices, who coming forth of the Capitol (which they had taken by rebellion) upon the faith given by the Consuls, subjects, and officers of the Common-weal, were justly slain. But every free man must keep his faith, how great and honourable soever he be; yea, the greater he is, the more he is bound to keep it, because he is the more free to give it. And it was well said, *That the simple word of a Prince should be of as great force, as the oath of a private man.*

4 *He that receiveth it.*

As touching him to whom faith is given, whosoever he be, it must carefully be kept, and there are but two exceptions, which are clear enough; the one if he received it not, and were not contented with it, but demanded other caution and assurance. For faith is a sacred thing,

thing, muſt ſimply be received; otherwiſe it is no more faith, nor truſt, when hoſtages are demanded, ſureties are given; to take gages or cautions with faith, is a thing ridiculous. He that is held under the guard of men, or walls, if he eſcape and ſave himſelf, is not faultie. The reaſon of that Romane is good; *Vult ſibi quiſq; credi, & habita fides ipſam ſibi obligat fidem: fides requirit fiduciam, & relativa ſunt: Every one would have himſelf to be credited, and faith given, bindeth faith unto him: faith requireth truſt, and they have relation the one to the other.* The other, if having accepted it, he firſt brake it; *Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem: quando tu me non habes pro Senatore, nec ego te pro Conſule: With him that breaketh faith, let faith alſo be broken: When thou holdeſt not me for a Senator, I will not hold thee for a Conſul.* A treacherous man deſerveth not by the law of nature that faith ſhould be kept unto him, except it be after an agreement, which covereth the treachery, and maketh revenge unlawfull. Now theſe two caſes excepted, a man muſt keep his faith to whomſoever, to his ſubject as ſhall be ſaid. 2. To an enemy, witneſſe the act of *Attilius Regulus*; the proclamation of the Senate of *Rome* againſt all thoſe that had been licenſed by *Pyrrhus* upon their faith given to depart; and *Camillus*, who would not ſo much as make uſe of the treachery of another, but re-ſent the children of the *Faliſſians* with their maſter. 3. To a thief and publick offender, witneſs the fact of *Pompey* to the pirats and robbers; and of *Auguſtus* to *Crocotas*. 4. To the enemies of religion, according to the example of *Joſua* againſt the *Gabaonites*. But faith ought not to be given to theſe two latter, thieves and hereticks, or apoſtata's, nor taken of them: for we ought not to capitulate, nor to treat wittingly of peace and alliance with ſuch kind of people, except it be in extreme neceſſity, or for the winning of them to the truth, or for the publick good; but being given, it ought to be kept.

Chap. 14.

5 *The ſubject of faith.*

As touching the thing ſubject, if it be unjuſt or impoſſible, a man is quit: and being unjuſt, it is well done to flie from it, and a double fault to keep it. All other excuſes beſides theſe two, are of no account, as loſſe, dammage, diſpleaſure, diſcommodity, difficulty; as the *Romanes* have many times practiſed, who have rejected many great advantages, to avoid the breach of faith, *Quibus tantâ utilitate fides antiquior fuit: With whom faith was better accounted then ſo much profit.*

Livie.

6 *The manner of giving faith.*

Touching the manner of giving faith, there is ſome doubt; for many

ny think, that if it have been extorted either by force and fear, or by fraud and ſudden ſurpriſe, a man is not bound unto it; becauſe in both caſes, he that promiſeth hath not a wil, whereby all things are to be judged. Others are of a contrary opinion; and to ſay the truth, *Ioſua* kept his faith and promiſe to the *Gabaonites*, though it were extorted from him by a great ſurpriſe, & falſe intelligence, and it was afterwards declared, that he did therein what he ought to do. And therefore it ſeemeth that a man may ſay, That where there is onely a ſimple word and promiſe paſt, a man is not bound, but if faith or promiſe given be confirmed and authoriſed by an oath, as the fact of *Ioſua*, he is bound to perform it in regard of the name of God: but yet that he is afterwards in judgment to ſeek means to right himſelf of that either deceit or violence. Faith given with an oath, and the interpoſition of the name of God, bindeth more then a ſimple promiſe; and the breach thereof which includeth perjurie with treachery, is far worſe. But to think to give aſſurance of faith by new and ſtrange oaths, as many do, is ſuperfluous amongſt honeſt men, and unprofitable, if a man will be diſloyall. The beſt way is to ſwear by the eternall God, the revenger of thoſe that vainly uſe his name, and break the faith.

7 *Treachery injurious to God*

Treachery and perjury is in a certain ſenſe, more baſe and execrable then Atheiſme. The Atheiſt that believeth there is no God, is not ſo injurious againſt him in thinking there is no God, as he that knoweth him, believeth in him, and in mockery and contempt doth perjuriouſly abuſe his name. He that ſweareth to deceive, mocketh God, and feareth man. It is a leſſe ſin to contemn God, then to mock him. The horror of treachery and perjury cannot be better deciphered, then it was by him that ſaid, It was to give a teſtimony of the contempt of God, and the fear of men. And what thing is more monſtrous then to be a coward with men, and reſolute and valourous with God? Treachery, is ſecondly, the traytor and capital enemy of humane ſociety. For it breaketh and deſtroyeth the band thereof, and all commerce which dependeth upon the word and promiſes of men, which if it fail we have nothing elſe to ſtick unto. *To man.*

8 *To keep ſecrets*

To the keeping of faith belongeth the faithfull guard of the ſecrets of another, which is a charge full of inconvenience, eſpecially of great perſonages, which though it may wiſely be performed, yet it is good to flie the knowledge of them, as ſometimes that Poet did the ſecrets of *Lyſimachus*. He that takes into his cuſtody the ſecrets of another, draws a greater trouble upon him, then he dreams of:

for

for besides the care that he takes unto himself, to keep them well, he binds himself to fain, and to denie his own thoughts, a thing very irksome to a noble and generous heart. Nevertheless he that takes that charge upon him, must keep it religiously: and to the end he may do it well, and play the good secretary, he must be such a one by nature not by art and obligation.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Veritie and free admonition.*

1 *An excellent thing.*

FRee and hearty admonition is a very wholsome and excellent medicine, and the best office of amitie. For to wound and offend a little, to profit much, is to love soundly. It is one of the principall and most profitable Evangelical commandments: *Si peccaverit in te frater tuus, corripe illum, &c. If thy brother sin against thee, reprove him, &c.*

2 *To whom profitable.*

All have sometimes need of this remedie, but especially all those that are inprosperity, for it is a very hard thing to be happie and wise together. And Princes who lead a life so publick and are to furnish themselves with so many things, and have so many things hid from them, cannot see nor understand, but by the eyes and ears of another. And therefore they have great need of advertisements: otherwise they may chance to runne strange and hard fortunes, if they be not very wise.

3 *Rare, difficult, dangerous.*

This office is undertaken by very few: There are required thereunto (as the wise affirm) three things, judgement or discretion, couragious libertie, amitie and fidelitie. These are tempered and mingled together, but few there are that do it, for fear of offending, or want of true amitie, and of those that do it, few there are that know how to do it well. Now if it be ill done, like a medicine ill applyed, it woundeth without profit, and produceth almost the same effect with grief, that flattery doth with pleasure. To be commended and to be reprehended unfittingly and to small purpose, is the self-same wound, and a matter a like faultie in him that doth it. Veritie how noble soever it be, yet it hath not this priviledge, to be imployed at all hours and in all fashions. A wholsome holy reprehension my be vitiously applyed.

4 *The rules of true admonition.*

The counsels and cautions for a man well to govern himself herein (it is to be understood where there is no great inwardnesse, familiaritie, confidence, or authoritie and power, for in these cases there

there is no place for the carefull observation of these rules following) are these: 1. To observe place and time; that it be neither in times nor places of feasting and great joy; for that were (as they say) to trouble the feast: nor of sorrow and adversitie; for that were a point of hostility, and the way to make an end of all; that is rather a fit time to succour and comfort a man. *Crudelis in re adversa objurgatio, damnare est objurgare, cùm auxilio est opus: Chiding is cruel in adversity, to chide is to condemn, when help is needfull.* King *Perseus* seeing himself thus handled by two of his familiar friends, killed them both. 2. Not to reprehend all things indifferently: not small and light offences; this were to be envious, and an importunate, ambitious reprehender; not great and dangerous which a man of himself doth sufficiently feel, and fear a worse punishment to come; this were to make a man think he lies in wait to catch him. 3. Secretly, and not before witness; to the end he make him not ashamed, as it happened to a young man, who was so much abashed that he was reprehended by *Pythagoras*, that he hanged himself. And *Plutarch* is of opinion, that it was for this cause that *Alexander* killed his friend *Clitus*, because he reprehended him in company: but especially, that it be not before those whose good opinion he that is reprehended desireth to retain, and with whom he desires to continue his credit, as before his wife, his children, his disciples. 4. Out of a simple careless nature and freedome of heart, without any particular interest, or passion of the mind, be it never so little. 5. To comprehend himself in the same fault, and to use generall terms, as, We forget our selves; What do we think of? 6. To begin with commendations, and to end with proffers of service and help; this tempereth the tartnesse of correction, and gives a better entertainment. Such and such a thing becomes you well, but not so well such and such a thing. 7. To expresse the fault with better words then the nature of the offence doth require, as, You have not been altogether well advised; in stead of, You have done wickedly: Receive not this woman into your company, for she will undo you; in stead of, Allure her not, perswade her not to yield to your desires, for thereby you will undo your self: Enter not into dispute with such a man; in stead of, Quarrell not, envy not such a man. 8. The admonition being ended, be not presently gone; but stay and fall into some other common and pleasant discourse.

CHAP.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of flattery, lying, and dissembling.*

1 *Flattery a pernicious and villanous thing.*

FLattery is a very dangerous poyson to every particular person and almost the onely cause of the ruine of a Prince and the State: it is worse then false witness, which corrupteth not the Judge, but deceiveth him onely, causing him to give a wicked sentence against his will and judgement: but flattery corrupteth the judgement, enchanteth the spirit, and makes him unapt to be further instructed in the truth. And if a Prince be once corrupted by flattery, it necessarily followeth, that all that are about him, if they will live in grace and favour, must be flatterers. It is therefore a thing as pernicious as truth is excellent, for it is the corruption of truth. It is also a villanous vice of a base beggerly mind, as foul and ill beseeming a man, as impudencie a woman. *Ut matrona meretrici dispar erit atque discolor, infido scurrae distabit amicus: Look how different and unlike a modest matron is to an impudent harlot, so far distant is a friend from a faithless jester.* Flatterers are likewise compared to harlots, sorcerers, oyl-sellers, to wolves; and another saith, That a man were better fall among crows then flatterers.

2 *Especially to two sorts of people.*

There are two sorts of people subject to be flattered, that is to say, Such as never want people to furnish them with this kind of merchandize, and easily suffer themselves to be taken by it; that is to say, Princes, with whom wicked men get credit thereby; and women, for there is nothing so proper and ordinary to corrupt the chastity of women, as to feed and entertain them with their own commendations.

3 *Hardly avoided.*

Flattery is hardly avoided, and it is a matter of difficulty to be preserved from it, not onely to women by reason of their weakness, and their natures full of vanity, and desirous of praise; and to Princes, because they are their kinsfolk, friends, and principal officers, whom they cannot avoid, that professe this mystery: (*Alexander* that great King and Philosopher could not defend himself from it, and there is not any private man that would not yield much more unto it, then Kings, if he were daily assaulted and corrupted by such base rascal sort of people as they are) But generally unto all, yea, to the wisest, both by reason of the sweetnesse thereof, in such sort, that though a man withstand it, yet it pleaseth; and though he oppose himself against it, yet he never shutteth it quite out

out of doors: *Unde sæpe exclusa noviſſimè accipitur: Though often rejected, yet at laſt received:* and becauſe of the hypocriſie thereof, whereby it is hardly diſcovered: for it is ſo well counterfeited and covered with the viſage of amitie, that it is no eaſie matter to diſcern it.

It uſurpeth the offices, it hath the voice, it carrieth the name and counterfeit thereof ſo artificially, that you will ſay that it is the ſame. It ſtudieth to content and pleaſe, it honoureth and commendeth: It buſieth it ſelf much, and takes much pains to do ſervice; it accommodateth it ſelf to the wills and humours of men. What more? It takes upon it even the higheſt and moſt proper point of amity, which is to chide, and freely to reprehend. To be brief, A flatterer will ſeem to exceed in love him that he flattereth; whereas contrariwiſe, there is nothing more oppoſite unto love, not detraction, not injurie, not profeſſed enmity. It is the plague and poiſon of true amitie; they are altogether incompatible; *Non potes me ſimul amico & adulatore uti: Thou canſt not uſe me together both for a friend and a flatterer.* Better are the ſharp admonitions of a friend, then the kiſſes of a flatterer. *Meliora vulnera diligentis, quàm oſcula blandientis.*

*It imitateth & reſembleth amity, but it is the plague thereof.*

Wherefore, not to miſtake it, let us by the true picture thereof, find out the means to know it, and to diſcern it from true amitie. 1. Flattery reſpecteth for the moſt part its own particular benefit, and thereby it is known; but true friendſhip ſeeketh not the good of it ſelf. 2. The flatterer is changeable and divers in his judgement, like wax, or a looking-glaſſe, that receiveth all forms. He is a Chameleon, a *Polypus*; fain to praiſe and diſpraiſe, and he will do the like, accommodating himſelf to the mind of him he flattereth. A friend is firm and conſtant. 3. He carrieth himſelf too violently and ambitiouſly in all that he doth, in the view and knowldge of him he flattereth, ever praiſing and offering his ſervice. *Non imitatur amicitiam, ſed præterit: He doth not imitate friendſhip, but paſſe by it.* He hath no moderation in his outward actions, and contrariwiſe, inwardly he hath no affection; which are conditions quite contrary to a true friend. 4. He yieldeth and alwayes giveth the victory to him he flattereth, alwayes applauding him, having no other end then to pleaſe, in ſuch ſort that he commendeth all, & more then all; yea ſometimes to his own coſt, blaming and humbling himſelf like a wreſtler that ſtoopeth, the better to over throw his companion. A friend goes roundly to work, cares not whether he have the

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*The deſcription and antitheſis of flattery and amity*

the first or the second place, and respecteth not so much how he may please, as how he may profit, whether it be by fair means, or by foul, as a good Physician useth to do to cure his patient. 5. A flatterer sometimes usurpeth the liberty of a friend to reprehend; but it is with the left hand and untowardly. For he stayes himself at small and light matters that are not worthy reprehension, faining want of knowledge of any greater; but yet he will be rude and rough enough in the censuring of the kinred and servants of him he flattereth, as failing much in that duty they should do unto him. Or he faineth to have understood some light accusations against him, and that he could not be quiet until he knew the truth thereof; and if it fall out that he that is flattered deny them, or excuse himself, he taketh occasion to commend him the more: I was must astonished at it (saith he) and I could not believe it, for I see the contrary. For how should I think that you will take from another man, when you give all that is your own, and take more care to give then to take? Or at leastwise he will make his reprehension to serve his turn, that he may flatter the better; telling him that he takes not care enough of himself, he is not sparing enough of his person and presence, so necessary to the Common-weal, as once a Senator did to *Tiberius* in a full Senate, but with an ill sent, and as bad successe. 6. Finally, to conclude in a word, a friend alwayes respecteth, procureth, and attempteth that which is reason, and honesty, and duty; the flatterer that which belongs to passion and pleasure, and that which is already a maladie in the mind of him that is flattered. And therefore he is a proper instrument for all things that belong to pleasure and licentious liberty, and not for that which is honest or painful and dangerous. He is like an ape, who being unfit for any other service, as other beasts are, serves for a play-game and to make sport.

5 *Of lying, the foulnesse and hurt thereof.*

A neer neighbour and alliance to flattery is lying, a base vice; and therefore said an ancient Philosopher, *That it was the part of slaves to lie, of free men to speak the truth.* For what greater wickednesse is there, then for a man to belie his own knowledge? The first step to the corruption of good manners, is the banishment of truth; as contrarily, saith *Pindarus*, *To be true is the beginning of virtue.* It is likewise pernicious to humane society. We are not men, neither can we knit and joyn together in humane societie, as hath been said, if this be wanting. Doubtless silence is more sociable, then untrue speech. If a lie had but one visage as truth hath, there were some reme-

remedy for it; for we would take the contrary to that which a lyar ſpeaketh to be the certain truth. But the contrary to truth hath a hundred thouſand figures, and an indeffinite and unlimited field. That which is good, that is to ſay, virtue and verity, is finite and certain, becauſe there is but one way to the mark: That which is evil, that is to ſay, vice and errour, and lying, is infinite and uncertain, becauſe there are a thouſand waies to miſs the mark. Doubtleſſe if men knew the horror of lying, they would purſue it with ſword and fire. And therefore ſuch as have the charge of youth are with all inſtance and dilligence to hinder it, and to withſtand the firſt birth and progreſs of this vice, as likewiſe of opinative obſtinacie, and that in time, for they never leave growing.

6 *Of hypocriſie.*

There is likewiſe a covered and diſguiſed lye, which is hypocriſie and diſſimulation (a notable quality of Courtiers, and in as great credit amongſt them as virtue) the vice of licentious and baſe minds: for a man to diſguiſe and hide himſelf under a mask, as not daring to ſhew himſelf to be that which he is, is a cowardly and ſervil humour.

7 *The difficulty thereof.*

Now he that makes profeſſion of this goodly myſtery, lives in great pain, for it is a great unquietneſs for a man to endeavour to ſeem other then that he is, and to have an eye unto himſelf, for fear leſt he ſhould be diſcovered. It is a torment for a man to hide his own nature: to be diſcovered, a confuſion. There is no ſuch pleaſure as to live according to his nature, and it is better to be leſſe eſteemed and to live openly, then to take ſo much pains to counterfeit and live under a canopie; ſo excellent and ſo noble a thing is freedom.

9 *The dicommoditie.*

But the myſtery of theſe kinde of men is but poor; for diſſimulation continues not long undiſcovered, according to that ſaying: Things fained and violent dure not long: and the reward of ſuch people is, that no man will truſt them, nor give them credit when they ſpeak the truth, for whatſoever comes from them is held for apocryphal and mockery.

8 *The counſel hereupon.*

Now here is need of indifferencie and wiſdom. For if nature be deformed; vicious and offenſive to another, it muſt be conſtrained, and to ſpeak better, corrected. There is a difference between living freely and careleſly. Again, a man muſt not alwayes ſpeak all he knows, that is a follie, but that which he ſpeaketh, let it be that which he thinketh.

10 *Diſsimulation befitting women.*

There are two ſorts of people in whom diſſimulation is excuſable,

cusable, yea sometimes requisite; but yet for divers reasons, that is to say, in the Prince for the publike benefit, and the good and peace of himself, or the state, as before hath been said; and in women for the conveniencie thereof, because an overfree and bold liberty becomes them not, but rather inclines to impudencie. Those small disguisements, fained carriages, hypocrisies, which well befit their shamefastnes and modestie, deceive none but fools, beseem them well and defend their honours. But yet it is a thing which they are not to take any great pains to learn, because hypocrisie is natural in them. They are wholly made for it, and they all make use of it, and too much: their visage, their vestments, their words, countenance, laughter, weeping; and they practise it not onely towards their husbands living, but after their death too. They fain great sorrow, and many times inwardly laugh. *Jactantius mœrent quæ minus dolent: They morn in shew, that grieve but little.*

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of benefits, obligation and thankfulnes.*

THe science and matter of benefits or good turns, and the thankful acknowledgment of the obligation, active and passive is great, of great use, and very subtile. It is that wherein we fail most. We neither know how to do good, nor to be thankful for it. It should seem that the grace as well of the merit, as of the acknowledgment is decayed, and revenge and ingratitude is wholly in request, so much more ready and ardent are we thereunto. *Gratia oneri est, ultio in quæstu habetur: altiùs injuriæ quàm merita descendunt: Thankfulnes is a burthen, revenge is accounted for gain: Injuries sink deeper then deserts.* First then we will speak of merit and good deeds, where we will comprehend humanity, liberality, almes-deeds, and their contraries, inhumanity, cruelty; and afterwards of obligation, acknowledgment, and forgetfulnes, or ingratitude and revenge.

Tacit. Senec.

1 *An exhortation to good works by divers reasons.*

God, nature, and reason, do invite us to do good, and to deserve well of another; God by his example, and his nature, which is wholly good; neither do we know any better means how to imitate God; *Nullâ re propius ad Dei naturam accedimus, quàm beneficentiâ. Dei est mortalem succurrere mortali. In nothing we come nearer to nature of God, then in doing good. It is of God that one mortal*

*tal man ſuccoureth another.* Nature witneſſeth this one thing, that every one delighteth to ſee him, to whom he hath done good: it beſt agreeth with nature; *nihil tàm ſecundùm naturam, quàm juvare conſortem naturæ: Nothing is more agreeable to nature, then to help him that partaketh of the ſame nature.* It is the work of an honeſt and generous man to do good, and to deſerve well of another, yea to ſeek occaſions thereunto, *Liberalis etiam dandi cauſas quærit: It is a part of a liberal man even to ſeek occaſions of giving.* Ambroſ. And it is ſaid, that good bloud cannot lie, nor fail at a need. It is greatneſs to give, baſeneſs to take; *Beatius eſt dare quàm accipere. It is better to give then to receive.* He that giveth honoreth himſelf, makes himſelf maſter over the receiver; he that takes, ſells himſelf. He (ſaith one) that firſt invented benefits or good turns, made ſtocks and manacles to tie and captivate another man. And therefore divers have refuſed to take, leſt they ſhould wound their liberty, eſpecially from thoſe whom they would not love, and be beholding unto, according to the counſel of the wiſe, which adviſeth a man not to receive any thing froma wicked man, leſt he be thereby bound unto him. *Ceſar* was wont to ſay, that there came no ſound more pleaſing unto his ears then prayers and petitions: It is the mot of greatneſs, Ask me; *Invoca me in die tribulationis, eruam te & honorificabis me: Call upon me in the day of tribulation, and I will deliver thee, and thou ſhalt glorifie me.* It is likewiſe the moſt noble, and honourable uſe of our means or ſubſtance, which ſo long as we hold and poſſeſs them privately, they carry with them baſe & abject names; horſes, lands, money: but being brought into light, and employed to the good and comfort of another, they are ennobled with new and glorious titles, benefits, liberalities, magnificencies. It is the beſt, and moſt commodious imployment that may be; *Ars quæſtuoſiſſima, optima negotiatio,* whereby the principal is aſſured, and the profit is very great. And to ſay the truth, a man hath nothing that is truly his own, but that which he gives; for that which he retains, and keeps to himſelf, benefits neither himſelf, nor another: and if he imploy them otherwiſe, they conſume and diminiſh, paſs thorow many dangerous accidents, and at laſt death it ſelf. But that which is given, it can never periſh, never wax old. And therefore *Mark Anton* being beaten down by fortune, and nothing remaining to him, but his power to die, cried out that he had nothing, but that which he had given: *Hoc habeo quodcunque dedi,* And therefore this ſweet, debonair, and ready will to do good unto all, is a

right excellent and honourable thing in all respects: as contrarily, there is not a more base and detestable vice, more against nature, then cruelty, for which cause it is called inhumanitie; which proceedeth from a contrary cause, to that of bounty and benefits, that is to say dastardly cowardlines, as hath been said.

4 *The distinction of benefits.*

There is a two-fold manner of doing good unto another, by profiting and by pleasing him: for the first a man is admired and esteemed; for the second beloved. The first is far the better, it regardeth the necessity and want of a man, it is to play the part of a father and a true friend. Again, there are two sorts of bounties or good turns; the one are duties, that proceed out of a natural or lawful obligation: the other are merits and free, which proceed out of pure affection. These seem the more noble: nevertheles if the other be done with attention and affection, though they be duties, yet they are excellent.

3 *Inward and outward benefits.*

The benefit and the merit is not properly that, that is given, is seen, is touched; this is but the grosse matter, the mark, the shew thereof, but it is the good will. That which is outward is many times but small that which is inward very great; for this hath commonly with it a kinde of hunger and affection, and is alwaies seeking occasions to do good; It giveth so much as it can, and what is needful, forgetting its own benefit, *In beneficio hoc suspiciendum quod alteri dedit, ablaturus sibi, utilitatis suæ oblitus: In a benefit this is to be considered that which he giveth to another, he taketh away from himself, being forgetful of his own profit.* Contrarily, where the gift is great, the grace may be small; for it is commonly given with an ill will; with an exspectation of much intreaty, and leasure enough to consider whether he may give it or no. This is to make too great preparation thereunto, and too great use thereof, to give it rather to himself; and his ambition, then to the good and necessity of the receiver. Again that which is outward may incontinently vanish, that which is inward remain firm: The libertie, health, honour, which is to be given, may all at an instant, by someaccident or other, be taken away, the benefit nevertheles remaining entire.

4 *Rules of benefits.* 1. *To whom.*

The advisements whereby a man should direct himself, in his bounties and benefits he bestoweth, according to the rules and instruction of the wise, are these: First, to whom must he give? to all? It seemeth that to do good unto the wicked and unworthy, is at one instant to commit many faults, for it brings an all name upon the giver, entertaineth and kindleth malice, gives that which

which belongs to virtue and merit, to vice alſo. Doubtleſſe free and favourable graces are not due, but to the good and worthy; but in a time of neceſſity, and in a generality all in common. In theſe two caſes the wicked and ungratefull have a part, if they be in neceſſitie, or if they be in ſuch ſort mingled with the good, that the one can hardly receive without the other. For it is better to do good to thoſe that are unworthy for their ſakes that are good, then to deprive the good for their ſakes that are evil. So doth God good unto all, he ſuffereth the ſunne to ſhine, and the rain to fall indifferently upon: But yet his ſpeciall gifts he giveth not but to thoſe whom he hath choſen for his; *Non eſt bonum ſumere panem filiorum, & projicere canibus: multum refert utrùm aliquem non excludas an eligas: It is not good to take the childrens bread, and caſt it unto dogs. There is a great difference between not excluding and chuſing.* At a need therefore, in a time of affliction and neceſſitie we muſt do good unto all; *Hominibus prodeſſe natura jubet, ubicunque homini beneficio locus: Nature commandeth to do good unto men, whenſoever oportunity is offered to benefit them.* Nature and humanity teach us, to regard and to offer our ſelves unto them, that ſtretch out their arms unto us, and not unto thoſe that turn their backs towards us: rather unto thoſe to whom we may do good, then to thoſe that are able to do good unto us. It is the part of a generous mind, to take part with the weaker ſide, to ſuccour the afflicted, and to help to abate the pride and violence of the conqueror; as *Chelonis* once did, the daughter and wife of a king, whoſe father and husband being at variance and wars one againſt another, whenſoever the husband had got the better againſt her father, like a good daughter ſhe followed and ſerved her father in all things in his afflictions; but the chance turning, and her father getting the maſtery, like a good wife, ſhe turned to her husband, and accompanied him in his hardeſt fortune.

Secondly, he muſt do good willingly and cheerfully; *Non ex triſtitia aut neceſſitate; hilarem datorem diligit Deus: Bis eſt gratum, quod opus eſt, ſi ultrò offeras: Not with diſcontent, or out of neceſſitie: God loveth a chearfull giver: that is twice acceptable, that is needfull, and offered of thine own accord:* not ſuffering himſelf to be over-intreated, and importuned; otherwiſe it will never be pleaſing: *Nemo libenter debet quod non accipit, ſed expreſſit: No man receiveth with that thankfulneſſe when it is not willingly given, but wrung out by importunity.* That which is yielded by force, and en- 5 2. *Willingly.*

treaty and prayers, is dearly sold; *Non tulit gratis, qui accipit rogans. imò nihil charius emitur quàm quod precibus: He hath it not freely, which receiveth by entreaty: yea nothing is dearer bought, then that which is had by earnest suit.* He that prayeth and entreateth, humbleth himself, confesseth himself an inferiour, covereth his face with shame, honoureth him whom he entreateth; whereupon *Cesar* was wont to say after he had overcome *Pompey*, That he lent not his ears more willingly, nor took so much content in any thing, as to be entreated; whereby he gave a kind of hope unto all, even his enemies, that they should obtain whatsoever they should request. Graces are silken vestments, transparent, free, and not constrained.

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3. *Speedily.*

Thirdly, speedily and readily. This seems to depend upon the former, for benefits are esteemed according to the will wherewith they are bestowed. Now he that stayes long before he succour and give, seems to have been a long time unwilling to do it; *qui tardè fecit, diu noluit.* As contrarily, a readinesse herein doubleth the benefit; *Bis dat, qui celeriter: He giveth twice that giveth quickly.* That indifferencie and careless regard, whether it be done, or not done, that is used herein, is not approved by any, but impudent persons. Diligence must be used in all points. Herein then there is a five-fold manner of proceeding, whereof three are reproved; to refuse to do a good turn, and that slowly too, is a double injury: to refuse speedily, and to give slowly, are almost one: and some there are that are lesse offended with a quick denial; *Minùs decipitur cui negatur celeriter: he is lesse deceived that is soon denied.* The best way then is, to give speedily: but that which is most excellent, is, to anticipate the demand, to prevent the necessitie and the desire.

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4. *Without hope of restitution.*

Fourthly, without hope of restitution, this is that wherein the force and virtue of a benefit doth principally consist. If it be a virtue, it is not mercenary: *Tunc est virtus, dare beneficia non reditura: Then it is virtue to bestow benefits, when they expect no requital.* A benefit is lesse richly bestowed, where there is a retrogradation and reflection; but when there is no place for requital; yea, it is not known from whence the good turn cometh, there it is in its true lustre and glory. If a man look after the like, he will give slowly and to few. Now it is far better to renounce all such hopes of two returns, then to cease to merit, and to do good; for whilest a man seeketh after that strange & accidentall payment he depriveth himself of the true and naturall, which is that inward joy and comfort he receiveth in doing good. Again, he must not be twice entreated

for

for one thing. To do wrong, is in it self a base and abominable thing, and there needs no other thing to disswade a man from it: so to deserve well of another, is an excellent and honourable thing, and there needs no other thing to enflame a man to it. And in a word, It is not to do good, to look after the like return; it is to make merchandize and profit thereof; *Non est beneficium quod in quæstum mittitur: That is not a benefit that is given for gain.* And a man should not confound and mingle together actions so divers; *demus beneficia, non fœneremus: Let us give benefits, but not for usury.* It is pitie but such men should be deceived that hope after such requitals: *Dignus est decipi, qui de recipiendo cogitaret, cùm daret: He is worthy to be deceived, who looketh for a recompence of that he gave.* She is no honest woman who either for fear, or the better to enflame, or to draw a man on, refuseth: *Quæ quia non licuit non dedit, ipsa dedit: She who hath not given her consent because she could not fitly do it, hath notwithstanding consented.* So he deserves nothing that doth good, to receive good again. Graces are pure virgins, without hope of return, saith *Hesiodus.*

8

Fifthly, to do good in a proportion answerable to the desire of a man, and as it may be acceptable to him that receiveth it, to the end he may know and find, that it is truly intended and done unto him. Concerning which point you are to know, that there are two sorts of benefits; the one are honourable to the person that receiveth, and therefore they should be done publickly: The other are commodious, such as succour the want, weakness, shame, or other necessitie of the receiver. These are to be done secretly, yea, if need be, that he onely may take notice that receiveth them; and if it be fit, the receiver should not know from whence they come (because it may be he is bashfull, and the knowledge thereof may discourage him from taking, though his needs be great) it is good and expedient to conceal it from him, and to suffer the benefit to drop into his hand, as it were unawares. It is enough the benefactor know it, and his own conscience serve him for a witness, which is better then if he had a thousand lookers on.

*5. According to the desire of the receiver.*

9

Sixthly, without the hurt and offence of another, and the prejudice of justice: to do good not doing evil: To give to one at the charge of another, is to sacrifice the sonne in the presence of the father, saith a wise man.

*6. Without the offence of another.*

10

Seventhly, wisely. A man may be sometimes hindered from answering demands and petitions, from refusing or yielding unto them.

*7. Wisely.*

them. This difficultie proceedeth from the evil nature of man, especially of the petitioner, who vexeth himself too much in the induring of a repulse, be it never so just and reasonable. And this is the reason why some promise and agree to all (a testimony of weakness) yea, when they have neither power, nor will to perform, and referring the avoiding of this difficultie to the very point of the execution, they hope that many things may happen that may hinder and trouble the performance of their promise, and so think to quit themselves of their obligation: or if it fall out there be question made thereof, they finde excuses and avoidances; and so for that time content the petitioner. But none of all this is to be allowed for a man ought not to agree to any thing, but to that which he can, will, and ought to perform. And finding himself between these two straights and dangers; either of a bad promise, because it is either unjust, or ill befitting; or an absolute denial, which may stir up some sedition, or mis-conceit; the counsel is, that he salve this matter either by delaying the answer, or in such sort composing the promise, in such general and doubtful terms, that they binde not a man precisely to the performance thereof. But here is craft and subtiltie, far different from true freedom, but this iniquity of the petitioner is the cause thereof, and he deserveth it.

11
8 *From a hearty affection.*

Eightly, it must proceed from a manly heart, and hearty affection, *Homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto: I am a man, and I think nothing belonging unto man strange unto me*; especially towards those that are afflicted in want, and this is that which we call mercy. They that have not this affection, ὠμοφυεῖς & *immanes*, are inhumane, and carry the marks of dishoneſt men. But yet this must proceed from a strong, constant, and generous, not a soft, effeminate, and troubled minde: for that is a vitious passion, and which may fall into a wicked minde, whereof in this place we have already spoken: for there is a good and evil mercy. A man must succour the afflicted, not afflicting himself, and applying the evil unto himself, detract nothing from equity, and honour: for God saith that we must not have pity of the poor in judgment: and so God and his Saints are said to be merciful and pitiful.

12
9 *Without boasting.*

Ninthly, it must be without boasting, and shew, or publike proclamation thereof, for this is a kinde of reproach: These kinde of vaunts do not onely take away the grace, but the credit, and make a benefit odious, *hoc est in odium beneficia perducere.* And in this sense it is said, that a benefactor must forget his good deeds.

He

He must continue them, and by new benefits confirm, and renew the old, (this inviteth the whole world to love him, and to seek his love) and never repent himself of the old, howsoever it may seem, that he hath cast his seed upon a barren and unthankful ground, *beneficii tui etiam infelicitas placeat, nusquam hac vox, vellem non feciſſe. Let even the ill ſucceſſe of thy good deeds pleaſe thee: never have this in thy mouth, I would I had not done it.* An unthankful man wrongs none but himself, and a good turn is not lost by his ingratitude; it is a holy consecrated thing that cannot be violated, nor extinguished by the vice of another. And it is no reason because another is wicked, that therefore a man should cease to be good, or discontinue his office: and that which is more, the work of a noble and generous heart is to continue to do well, to break and to vanquish the malice and ingratitude of another man, and to mend his manners: *optimi viri & ingentis animi eſt tam diu ferre ingratum donec feceris gratum: vincit malos pertinax bonitas. The beſt men and generous mindes will bear ſo long with an ungrateful perſon, untill with their goodneſſe they ſhall make him gratefull, perſevering goodneſſe overcometh the evil.* 13 *To Continue them without repentance.*

Lastly, not to trouble, or importune the receiver in the fruition thereof, as they who having given an honour, or an office to a man, will afterwards execute it themselves; or at leastwise procure them one good, that they may reap another themselves. He that is the receiver, ought not to endure this, and therefore is not unthankfull; and the benefactor defaceth the benefit, and cancelleth the obligation. One of our Popes denying a Cardinall an unjust boon which he demanded, alledging unto him that he was the cause why he was made Pope, answered him, Why then give me leave to be Pope, and take not that from me that thou hast given me. 14 *Not to remove or trouble a good turn.*

After these rules and advisements concerning good deeds; we must know that there are some benefits more acceptable and welcome then others, and which are more or lesse binding. They are best welcome, that proceed from a friendly hand, from those whom a man is inclined to love without this occasion; and contrarily it is a grief to be obliged unto him, whom a man likes not, and to whom he would not willingly be indebted. Such benefits also are welcome, that come from the hand of him that is any way bound to the receiver: for here is a kind of Justice, and they bind lesse. Those good deeds that are done in necessities, and great extremities, carry with them 15 *Distinction of benefits.*

them a greater force, they make a man forget all injuries, and offences paſt, if there were any and binde more ſtrongly; as contrarily the denial, in ſuch a caſe, is very injurious and makes a man forget al benefits paſt. Such benefits likewiſe, as may be requited with the like, are more gladly received, then their contraries, which ingender a kinde of hate; for he that findeth himſelf wholly bound, without any power or poſſibility of repayment, as often as he ſeeth his benefactor, he thinks he ſees a teſtimony of his inability or in gratitude, and it is irkſome to his heart. There are ſome benefits, the more honeſt and gracious they are, the more burthenſome are they to the receiver, if he be a man of credit, as they that tye the conſcience and the will, for they lock faſter, keep a man in his right memory, and ſome fear of forgetfulneſs, and failing his promiſe. Aman is a ſafer priſoner under his word, then under lock and key. It is better to be tied by civil and publick bands, then by the law of honeſty, and conſcience: two notaries are better then one. I truſt your word, and your faith, and conſcience: here is more honour done to the receiver; but yet conſtraint faſtneth, ſoliciteth, and preſſeth much more, and here is more ſafety to the lender, and a man carrieth himſelf more careleſly, becauſe he doubteth not but that the law, and thoſe outward ties will awaken him when the time ſhall ſerve. Where there is conſtraint, the wil is more looſe: where there is leſſe conſtraint, the will hath leſſe liberty: *Quod me jus coget vix à voluntate impetram: I can hardly requeſt of my will, that which the law conſtraineth me unto*

16 *Obligation the mother and daughter of a benefit or good turn.*

From a benefit proceeds an obligation, and from it a benefit; and ſo it is both the childe and the father, the effect and the cauſe, and there is a two-fold obligation, active and paſſive. Parents, Princes, and ſuperiours, by the duty of their charge, are bound to do good unto thoſe that are comitted and commended unto them, either by law or by nature; and generally all men that have means are bound to relieve thoſe that are in want, or any affliction whatſoever, by the comand of nature. Behold here the firſt obligation, afterwards from benefits or good turns, whether they be due and ſpringing from this firſt obligation, or free & pure merits, ariſeth the ſecond obligation, and diſcharge, whereby the receivers arebound to an acknowledgment & thankful requital. All this is ſignified by *Heſiodus*, who hath made the Graces three in number, holding each other by the hands.

17 *The firſt obligation and mother.*

The firſt obligation is diſcharged by the good offices of every one that is in any charge, which ſhall preſently be diſcourſed of in the ſecond part, which concerneth particular duties: but yet this obligation

gation is ſtrengthened, and weakned and leſſened accidentally, by the conditions and actions of thoſe that are the receivers. For their offences, ingratitudes, and unworthineſs do in a manner diſcharge thoſe, that are bound to have care of them; and a man may almoſt ſay as much of their natural defects too. A man may juſtly, with leſſe affection love that childe, that kinſman, that ſubject, that is not onely wicked and unworthy, but foul, miſ-ſhapen, crooked, unfortunate, ill born; God himſelf hath abated him much, from their natural price and eſtimation: but yet a man muſt in this abatement of affection, keep a iuſtice, and a moderation; for this concerneth not the helpes and ſuccours of neceſſity, and thoſe offices that are due by publick reaſon, but onely that intention, and affection, which is in the inward obligation.

18

*The ſecond obligation which is thankfulneſs*

The ſecond obligation, which ariſeth from benefits, is that which we are to handle, and concerning which, we muſt at this time ſet down ſome rules: Firſt, the law of dutiful acknowledgment and thankfulneſs is natural, witneſs beaſts themſelves, not onely private and domeſtical, but cruel and ſavage, among whom there are many excellent examples of this acknowledgment, as of the Lyon towards the Roman ſlave. *Officia etiam feræ ſentiunt: Even wilde beaſts have a feeling of good offices done unto them.* Secondly, it is a certain act of virtue, and a teſtimony of a good minde, and therefore it is more to be eſteemed then bounty or benefit, which many times proceeds from abundance, from power, love of a mans proper intereſt, and very ſeldom from pure virtue, whereas thankfulneſs ſpringeth alwaies from a good heart; and therefore howſoever the benefit may be more to be deſired, yet kind acknowledgment is far more commendable. Thirdly, it is an eaſie thing, yea a pleaſant, and that is in the power of every man. There is nothing more eaſie, then to do according to nature, nothing more pleaſing then to be free from bands, and to be at liberty.

19

*Of ingratitude*

By that which hath been ſpoken, it is eaſie to ſee how baſe and villanous a vice forgetfulneſs and ingratitude is, how unpleaſing and odious unto all men; *Dixeris maledicta cuncta cùm ingratum hominem dixeris: Thou ſpeakeſt all the evil that may be ſaid, when thou nameſt an ungrateful man.* It is againſt nature; and therefore *Plato* ſpeaking of his diſciple *Ariſtotle*, calleth him an ungrateful mule. It is likewiſe without all excuſe, and cannot come but from a wicked nature; *Grave vitium, intolerabile, quod diſſociat homines: A grievous vice and intolerable, which breaketh the ſociety of*

Sen.

*men*

*men.* Revenge which followeth an injurie, as ingratitude a good turn, it much more ſtrong and preſſing (for an injurie enforceth more then a benefit): *Altius injuriæ quàm merita deſcendunt: Injuries ſink deeper into the mind, then then deſerts.* It is a very violent paſſion, but yet nothing ſo baſe, ſo deformed a vice as ingratitude. It is like thoſe evils that a man hath, that are not dangerous, but yet are more grievous and painfull, then they that are mortall. In revenge there is ſome ſhew of juſtice, and a man hides not himſelf, to work his will therein; but in ingratitude there is nothing but baſe diſhoneſty and ſhame.

20 Thankfulneſs or acknowledgement, that it may be ſuch as it
*Rules of thankfulneſs.* ſhould be, muſt have theſe conditions. Firſt, he muſt graciouſly receive a benefit, with an amiable and cheerfull viſage and ſpeech:
Senec. *Qui gratè beneficium accepit, primam ejus penſionem ſolvit: He which receiveth a benefit thankfully, diſchargeth the firſt payment ther-*
Idem. *of.* Secondly, he muſt never forget it. *Ingratiſſimus omnium qui oblitus, nuſquam etiam gratus fieri poteſt, cui totum beneficium elapſum eſt: He that forgetteth a benefit is of all other moſt ingratefull; for in no reſpect can he be made thankfull, that hath utterly forgotten*
Plin. *a good turn.* The third office is to publiſh it; *Ingenui pudoris eſt fateri per quos profecerimus, & hæc quaſi merces authoris: It is the part of an honeſt mind, to confeſſe by whom we have received profit, and this is as it were a reward to the author.* As a man hath found the heart, and the hand of another, open to do good; ſo muſt he have his mouth open to preach and publiſh it; and to the end the memorie thereof may be more firm and ſolemn, he muſt name the benefit, and that by the name of the benefactor. The fourth office is to make reſtitution, wherein he muſt obſerve theſe four conditions: That it be not too ſpeedy, nor to curiouſly; for this carries an ill ſent with it, and it bewrays too great an unwillingneſs to be in debt, and too much haſte to be quit of that band. And it likewiſe giveth an occaſion to the friend or benefactor, to think that his courteſie was not kindly accepted of; for to be too careful and deſirous to repay, is to incurre the ſuſpicion of ingratitude. It muſt therefore follow ſometime after; and it muſt not be too long neither, leſt the benefit grow too ancient, (for the Graces are painted young) and it muſt be upon ſome apt and good occaſion, which either offereth it ſelf, or is taken, and that without noiſe and rumour. That it be with ſome uſury, and ſurpaſſe the benefit, like fruitfull ground: *Ingratus eſt qui beneficium reddit ſine uſura. He*

*is*

*is unthankfull, who reſtoreth a benefit without profit*; or at leaſt equal it with all the ſhew and acknowledgement that may be, of great reaſon, of a farther requitall, and that this is not to ſatisfie the obligation, but to give ſome teſtimonie that he forgetteth not how much he is indebted. That it be willingly and with a good heart: 3
*Ingratus eſt, qui metu gratus eſt: He is ungratefull, who is gratefull for fear.* For if it were ſo given; *Eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur; errat ſi quis beneficium libentiùs accepit, quàm reddit: A benefit ought to be reſtored with the ſame mind wherewith it was given: he is to be blamed whoſoever he be, that receiveth a benefit more willingly then he reſtoreth it.* Laſtly, if his inability be ſuch, as that 4
he cannot make preſent reſtitution, yet let his will be forward enough, which is the firſt and principall part, and as it were the ſoul, both of the benefit and acknowledgement; though there be no other witneſſe hereof then it ſelf; and he muſt acknowledge not onely the good he hath received, but that likewiſe that hath been offered, and might have been received, that is to ſay, the good will of the benefactor, which is, as hath been ſaid, the principall.

## The ſecond Part.

### *Which concerneth the ſpeciall duties of certain men, by certain and ſpeciall obligation.*

### *THE PREFACE.*

BEing to ſpeak of ſpeciall and particular duties, differing according to the diverſity of the perſons and their ſtates, whether they be unequall, as ſuperiours and inferiours, or equal: we will begin with married folks, who are mixt, and hold with both equalitie and inequality. And ſo much the rather, becauſe we are firſt to ſpeak of private and domeſticall juſtice and duties, before publick, becauſe they are before them; as families and houſes are before common-weals, and therefore that private juſtice which is obſerved in a family, is the image, and ſource, and model of a Common-weal. Now theſe private and domeſticall duties are three; that is to ſay, between the husband and the wife, parents and children, maſters and ſervants, and theſe are the parts of a houſhold or family, which taketh the foundation from the husband and the wife, who are the maſters and authors thereof. And therefore firſt of married folk.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XII.

### *The duty of married folk.*

1 *Common duties*

ACcording to those two divers considerations that are in marriage, as hath been said, that is to say, equality and inequality; there are likewise two sorts of duties and offices of married folk, the one common to both, equally reciprocall, of like obligation, though according to the custome of the world, the pain, the reproach, the inconvenience, be not equal: that is to say, an entire loyaltie, fidelity, community, and communication of all things, and a care and authority over their family, and all the goods of their house. Hereof we have spoken more at large in the first book.

2 *Particular duties of the husband.*

The other are particular and different, according to that inequality that is betwixt them: for those of the husband are; 1. To instruct his wife with mildness in all things that belong unto her duty, her honour, and good, whereof she is capable. 2. To nourish her, whether she brought dowry with her or no. 3. To cloath her. 4. To lie with her. 5. To love and defend her. The two extremities are base and vitious, to hold her under like a servant, to make her mistresse by subjecting himself unto her: And these are the principall duties. These follow after, to comfort her being sick, to deliver her being captive, to bury her being dead, to nourish her living, and to provide for his children he hath had by her, by his Will and Testament.

3 *Of the wife.*

The duties of the wife, 1. Are to give honour, reverence, and respect to her husband, as to her master and lord; for so have the wisest women that ever were, termed their husbands, and the Hebrew word *Baal* signifieth them both, husband and lord. She that dischargeth her self of this duty, honoureth her self more then her husband; and doing otherwise, wrongs none but her self. 2. To give obedience in all things just and lawfull, applying and accommodating her self to the manners and humours of her husband, like a true looking glasse, which faithfully representeth the face; having no other particular designment, love, thought, but as the dimensions and accidents, which have no other proper action or motion, and never move but with the body, she apply her self in all things to her husband. 3. Service, as to provide either by her self or some other his viands, to wash his feet. 4. To keep the house, and therefore she is compared to the Tortois, and is painted having her feet naked, and especially in the absence of her husband. For her husband being

being far from her, she must be as it were invisible, and contrary to the Moon (which appeareth in her greatness when she is fartheſt from the Sun) not appear, but when she comes neer her Sun. 5. To be silent, and not to speak but with her husband, or by her husband: and forasmuch as a silent woman is a rare thing, and hardly found she is said to be a precious gift of God. 6. To employ her time in the practice and study of housewifery, which is the most commodious and honourable science and occupation of a woman; this is her speciall mistris-qualitie, and which a man of mean fortune, should especially seek in his marriage. It is the onely dowry, that serveth either to ruinate, or preserve families, but it is very rare. There are divers that are covetous, few that are good housewives, We are to speak of them both, of houshold husbandry presently by it self. Eccluſ. 26.

4 *An advisement upon the acquaintance of married folk.*

In the private acquaintance and use of marriage, there must be a moderation, that is, a religious and devout band; for that pleasure that is therein, must be mingled with some severity; it must be a wise and conscionable delight. A man must touch his wife discreetly and for honesty, as it is said, and for fear, as *Aristotle* saith, lest provoking her desires too wantonly, the pleasure thereof make her to exceed the bounds of reason, and the care of health: for too hot and too frequent a pleasure altereth the seed, and hindreth generation. On the other side, to the end she be not over-languishing, barren, and subject to other diseases, he must offer himself unto her, though seldom. *Solon* saith, thrice in a moneth; but there can no certain law or rule be given hereof. Plutarch, in Solon.

The doctrine of houshold husbandry doth willingly follow, and is annexed unto marriage.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Houshold husbandry.*

1 HOushold husbandry is an excellent, just, and profitable occupation. It is a happy thing, saith *Plato*, for a man to go through his private affairs without injustice. There is no thing more beautifull then a houshold well and peaceably governed.

2. It is a profession which is not difficult, for he that is not capable of any thing else, is capable of this; but yet it is carefull and painfull, and troublesome, by reason of the multitude of affairs, which though they be small and of no great importance, yet forasmuch

much as they are common and frequent, and never at an end, they do much annoy and weary a man. Domeſticall thorns prick, becauſe they are ordinary; but if they come from the principall perſons of the familie, they gaul and exulcerate, and grow remedileſſe.

3. It is a great happineſs, and a fit mean to live at eaſe, to have one whom a man may truſt, and upon whom he may repoſe himſelf; which that he may the better do, he muſt chooſe one that is true and loyall, and afterwards bind him to do well by that truſt and confidence he putteth in him. *Habita fides ipſam obligat fidem; multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli; & aliis jus peccandi, ſuſpicando dederunt: Faith being given, binds faith again; many have taught to deceive, whilſt they fear to be deceived, and have given occaſion unto others of offending, by ſuſpecting them.*

4. The principall precepts and counſels that belong to frugality, or good husbandry, are theſe: 1. To buy and ſell all things at the beſt times and ſeaſons, that is, when they are beſt and beſt cheap. 2. To take good heed leſt the goods in the houſe be ſpoyled or miſcarry, be either loſt or carried away. This doth eſpecially belong to the woman, to whom *Ariſtotle* gives this authority and care. 3. To provide firſt and principally for theſe three; neceſſitie, cleanlineſſe, order: and again, if there be means ſome adviſe to provide for theſe three too; but the wiſer ſort wiſh no great pains to be taken therein: *Non ampliter, ſed munditer convivium; plus ſalis quàm ſumptus: A feaſt muſt not be coſtly, but cleanly; more mirth then coſt.* Abundance, pomp, and preparation, exquiſite and rich faſhion. The contrary is many times practiſed in good houſes, where you ſhall have beds garniſhed with ſilk, embroydered with gold, and but one ſimple coverlid in winter, which were a commodity far more neceſſary. And ſo of the reſt.

4. To rule and moderate his charge, which is done by taking away ſuperfluities, yet providing for neceſſity, and that which is fit and beſeeming. A ducket in a mans purſe will do a man more honour and honeſty, then ten pridigally ſpent, ſaith one. Again (but this requires induſtry and good ſufficiency) to make a great ſhew with a little charge; and above all, not to ſuffer the expence to grow above the receit and the income.

5. To have a care and an eye over all: The vigilancy and preſence of the Maſter, ſaith the Proverb, fatteth the horſe and the land. And in any caſe the maſter and miſtreſſe muſt take a care to con-

conceal their ignorance and insufficiency in the affairs of the house, and much more their carelesnesse, making a shew as if they attended and thought of nothing else. For if officers and servants have an opinion, that their masters look not unto them, they may chance to make his hair grow through his hood.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *The duty of Parents and children.*

THe dutie of parents and children is reciprocall, and reciprocally naturall: if that of children be more strait, that of parents is more ancient, parents being the first authors and cause, and more important to a Common-weal: for to people a state, and to furnish it with honest men and good citizens, the culture and good nourishment of youth is necessary, which is the seed of a Common-wealth. And there comes not so much evil to a Weal-publick, by the ingratitude of children towards their parents, as by the carelesnes of parents in the instruction of their children: and therefore with great reason in *Lacedemon*, & other good and politick States, there was a punishment and a penalty laid upon the parents, when the children were ill conditioned. And *Plato* was wont to say, that he knew not in what a man should be more carefull and diligent, then to make a good sonne. And *Crates* cryed out in choler, To what end do men take so much care in heaping up goods, and so little care of those to whom they shall leave them? It is as much as if a man should take care of his shoo, and not of his foot. What should he do with riches that is not wise, and knows not how to use them? It is like a rich and beautifull saddle upon a Jades back. Parents then are doubly obliged to this duty; both because they are their children, and because they are the tender plants and hope of the Common-weal: This is to till his own land, together with that of the Weal-publick.

Now this office or duty hath four successive parts, according to those four goods or benefits that a child ought to receive successively from his parents; Life, Nourishment, Instruction, Communication. The first regardeth the time when the infant is in the womb, untill his coming into the world inclusively: the second, the time of his infancy in his cradle, untill he know how to go and to speak: the third, all his youth; this part must be handled more at large, and more seriously: the fourth concerneth their affection, com-

2 *The division of the office of parents.*

munication and carriage towards their children now come to mans state, touching their good, thoughts, designments.

3. *The first part of the office of parents.*

The first, which regardeth the generation and fruit in the womb, is not accounted of and observed with such diligence as it ought, although it have as much part in the good or evil of a child (as well of their bodies as their souls) as their education and instruction after they are born, and come to some growth. That is that that giveth the subsistance, the temper and temperature, the nature; the other is artificiall and acquired: and if there be a fault committed in this first part, the second and third can hardly repair it, no more then a fault in the first concoction of the stomach, can be mended in the second or third. We men go unadvisedly and headlong to this copulation, onely provoked thereunto by pleasure, and a desire to disburthen our selves of that which tickleth and presseth us thereunto: if a conception happen thereby, it is by chance; for no man goeth to it warily, and with such deliberation and disposition of body as he ought, and nature doth require. Since then men are made at adventure, and by chance, it is no marvell if they seldome fall out to be beautifull, good, sound, wise, and well composed. Behold then briefly, according to Philosophy the particular advisements touching this first point, that is to say, the begetting of male-children, sound, wise, and judicious: for that which serveth for the one of these qualities, serves for the other. 1. A man must not couple himself with a woman that is of a vile, base, and dissolute condition, or of a naughty and vitious composition of body. 2. He must abstain from this action and copulation seven or eight dayes. 3. During which time he is to nourish himself with wholsome victuals, more hot and dry then otherwise, and such as may concoct well in the stomach. 4. He must use a more then moderate exercise. All this tendeth to this end and purpose, that the seed may be well concocted and seasoned, hot and dry, fit and proper for a masculine, sound and wise temperature. Vagabonds, idle and lazie people, great drinkers, who have commonly an ill concoction, ever beget effeminate, idle, and dissolute children (as *Hippocrates* recounteth of the *Scythians*.) Again, a man must apply himself to this encounter after one manner, a long time after his repast, that is to say, his belly being empty, and he fasting (for a full panch performs nothing good either for the mind or for the body) and therefore *Diogenes* reproached a licentious young man, for that his father had begotten him being drunk. And the law of the *Carthaginians* is commended

mended by *Plato*, which enjoyned a man to abstain from wine that day that he lay with his wife. 6. And not near the monethly terms of a woman, but six or seven dayes before, or as much after them. 7. And upon the point of conception and retention of the seed, the woman turning and gathering her self together upon the right side, let her so rest for a time. 8. This direction touching the viands and exercise must be continued during the time of her burthen. Lib. 2. de leg.

4 *The second part of the office of parents.*

To come to the second point of this office after the birth of the infant, these four points are to be observed. 1. The infant must be washed in warm water, somewhat brinish, to make the members supple and firm, to cleanse and dry the flesh & the brain to strengthen the sinews, a very good custome in the Eastern parts, and among the Jews. 2. The nurse, if she be to be chosen, let her be young, of a temperature or complexion the least cold and moist that may be, brought up in labour, hard lodging, slender diet, hardened against cold and heat. I say, if she be to be chosen, because according to reason, and the opinion of the wisest, it should be the mother, & therefore they cry out against her, when she refuseth this charge, being invited and as it were bound thereunto by nature, who to that end hath given her milk and dugs, by the example of beasts; and that love and jealousie that she ought to have of her little ones, who receive a very great hurt by the change of their aliment, now accustomed in a stranger and perhaps a bad one too, of a constitution quite contrary to the former, whereby they are not to be accounted mothers, but by halfs. *Quod est hoc contra naturam, imperfectum, ac dimidiatum matris genus peperisse, & statim ab se abjecisse, aluisse in utero sanguine suo nescio quid quod non videret: non alere autem nunc suo lacte, quod videat jam viventem, jam hominem, jam matris officia implorantem: It is a thing against nature, imperfect, and by halfs for a mother to bring forth a child, and presently to cast it from her; to nourish in her womb With her own bloud, I know not What, which she saw not; & not nurse With her milk that which she seeth already living, a man, & imploring the duties of a mother.* Aul. Gell. l. 12. c. 1. 3. The nourishment besides the dug should be goats milk, or rather cream, the most subtil and aery part of the milk, sod with honey and a little salt. These are things very fit for the body and the mind, by the advice of all the wise and great Physicians, Greeks and Hebrews. *Butyrum & mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum, & eligere bonum: Let him eat butter and honey, untill he be able to refuse the evill, and choose the good.* Galen. multis locis. Homer. 10. Iliad, Esay 7. The quality of milk or cream is very temperate, and full of good Ezech. 16.

nouriſhment; the drineſſe of the honey and ſalt conſumeth the too great humidity of the brain, and diſpoſeth it unto wiſdome. 4. The infant muſt by little and little be accuſtomed and hardened to the air, to heat and cold: and we are not to be fearfull thereof; for in the Northern parts of the world, they waſh their children ſo ſoon as they come out of the wombe of their mothers, in cold water, and are never the worſe.

5 The two firſt parts of the office of parents we have ſoon diſpatched; whereby it appeareth, that they are not true fathers that have not that care, affection, and diligence in theſe matters that is fit; for they are the cauſe and occaſion, either by careleſneſſe, or otherwiſe, of the death and untimely birth of their children; and when they are born they care not for them, but expoſe them to their own fortunes; for which cauſe they are deprived by law of that fatherly power over them that is due unto them; and the children to the ſhame of their parents, are made ſlaves by thoſe that have nouriſhed them, and brought them up, who are far from taking care to preſerve them from fire and water, and all other croſſes and afflictions that may light upon them.

6 *The third part of the office of parents.* *An inſtruction very important* The third part which concerneth the inſtruction of children, we are to handle more ſeriouſly. So ſoon as this infant is able to go, and to ſpeak, and ſhall begin to employ his mind and his body, and that the faculties thereof ſhall be awakened and ſhew themſelves, the memory, imagination, reaſon, which begin at the fourth or fifth year, there muſt be a great care and diligence uſed, in the well forming thereof: for this firſt tincture and liquor wherewith the mind muſt be ſeaſoned, hath very great power. It cannot be expreſſed how much this firſt impreſſion and formation of youth prevaileth, even to the conquering of Nature it ſelf. Nurture, ſaith one, excelleth Nature. *Lycurgus* made it plain to all the world, by two little dogs of one litter, but diverſely brought up, to whom preſenting before them in an open place, a pot of pottage and a hare, that which was brought up tenderly in the houſe fell to the pottage; the other that had been ever trained up in hunting, forſook the pottage, & ran after the hare. The force of this inſtruction proceeds from this, Quint. Sen. that it entreth eaſily, and departeth with difficulty: for being the firſt that entreth, it taketh ſuch place, and winneth ſuch credit as a man will, there being no other precedent matter to conteſt with it, or to make head againſt it. This mind then wholly new and neat, ſoft and tender, doth eaſily receive that impreſſion that a man will give unto it, and afterwards doth not eaſily loſe it. Now

Now this is not a thing of ſmall importance, but a man may rather ſay, it is the moſt difficult and important that may be. For, who ſeeth not that in a State all depends upon this ? Nevertheleſſe ( and it is the greateſt, moſt dangerous and lamentable fault that is in our policies, noted by *Ariſtotle* and *Plutarch*) we ſee that the conduct and diſcipline of youth is wholly left unto the charge and mercy of their parents, what kind of men ſoever they be, many times careleſs, fooliſh, wicked, and the publick ſtate regardeth it not, cares not for it, whereby all goes to ruine. Almoſt the onely States that have given to the laws the diſcipline of children, were that of *Lacedemon* and *Creet* : But the moſt excellent diſcipline of the world for youth, was the *Spartan* ; and therefore *Ageſilaus* perſwaded *Xenophon* to ſend his children thither, for there (ſaith he) they may learn the moſt excellent ſcience of the world, and that is to command and to obey well, and there are formed good Lawyers, Emperours at arms, Magiſtrates, Citizens. This youth and their inſtruction they eſteemed above all things; and therefore *Antipater* demanding of them fifty children for hoſtages, they anſwered him, that they had rather give him twice as many men at their ripeſt years. 7

Now before we enter into this matter, I will here give an advertiſement of ſome weight. There are ſome that take great pains to diſcover the inclinations of children, and for what employment they ſhall be moſt fit; but this is a thing ſo obſcure, and ſo uncertain, that when a man hath beſtowed what coſt, and taken what pains he can, he is commonly deceived. And therefore not to tie our ſelves to theſe weak and light divinations and prognoſtications drawn from the motions of their infancy, let us endeavour to give them an inſtruction univerſally good and profitable, whereby they are made capable, ready and diſpoſed to whatſoever. This is to go upon a ſure ground and to do that which muſt alwayes be done. This ſhall be a good tincture, apt to receive all others. 8

To make an entrance into this matter, we may refer it unto three points, the forming of the ſpirit, the ordering of the body, the ruling of the manners. But before we give any particular counſell touching theſe three, there are generall adviſements that belong to the manner of proceeding in this buſineſſe, that ſhew us how to carry our ſelves worthily and happily therein, which muſt be firſt known as a preamble to the reſt. 9 *The diviſion of this matter.*

The firſt is carefully to guard his ſoul, and to keep it neat and free 10

*The first generall advice touching instruction. To guard the ears.*

from the contagion and corruption of the world, that it receive not any blot nor wicked attainture. And the better to do this, he must diligently keep the gates, which are the ears especially, and then the eyes; that is to say, give order, that not any, no not his own father, come near unto him, to buz into his ears any thing that is evil. There needs no more but a word, the least discourse that may be; to make an evil almost past reparation, Guard thine ears above all, and then thine eyes. And for this cause *Plato* was of opinion that it was not fit that servants and base persons should entertain children with discourse, because their talk can be no better then fables, vain speeches and fooleries, if not worse. This were to train up and to feed those tender years with follies and fooleries.

II *The second general advice touching the choice of instructors, conference, books.*

The second advice concerneth nor onely the persons that must have charge of this child, but the discourse and conference wherewith he must be entertained, and the books he must read. Touching the persons, they must be honest men, well born, of a sweet and pleasing conversation, having their head well framed, fuller of wisdome then of science, and that they agree in opinion together; lest that by contrary counsels, or a different way in proceeding, the one by rigour, the other by flattery, they hinder one another, and trouble their charge and designments. Their books and communication must not be of small, base, sottish, frivolous matters, but great and serious, noble and generous; such as may rule and enrich the understanding, opinions, manners, as they that instruct a man in the knowledge of our humane condition, the motions and mysteries of our minds, to the end he may know himself and others: such, I say, as may teach him what to fear, to love, to desire; what passion is, what virtue, how he may judge betwixt ambition and avarice, servitude and subjection, liberty and licentiousnes. He is deceived that thinketh that there is a greater proportion of spirit required to the understanding of those excellent examples of *Valerius Maximus*, and all the Greek and Romane Histories (which is the most beautifull science and knowledge of the world) then to understand *Amadis* of *Gaul*, and other like vain and frivolous discourses. That child that can know how many hens his mother hath, and who are his uncles and his cosens, will as easily carry away how many Kings there have been, and how many *Cesars* in *Rome*. A man must not distrust the capacity and sufficiency of his mind, but know how to conduct and manage it.

12 The third is, to carry himself towards him, and to proceed not after

after an austere, rude, and severe manner, but sweetly, mildly, and chearfully. And therefore we do here altogether condemn that custome which is common in all places, to beat, and to box, and with strange words and out-cries to hazen children, and to keep them in fear and subjection, as the manner is in free-schools and colledges. For it is a custome too unjust, and as foul a fault, as when a Judge or Physician shall be moved with choler against an offender and patient: prejudiciall and quite contrary to that purpose that a man hath, which is to stir up a desire in them, and to bring them in love with virtue, wisdome, science, honesty. Now this imperious and rude carriage, breeds in children a hatred, horror, and detestation of that they should love; it provoketh them, makes them headstrong, abateth and taketh away their courage, in such sort that their minds become servile, base, and slavish, like their usage; *Parentes nè provocetis ad iracundiam filios vestros, nè dispondeant animum*: *Parents provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged.* For seeing themselves thus handled, they never perform any thing of worth, but curse their master and their apprentiship. If they do that which is required at their hands, it is because the eye of the master is alwayes upon them, it is for fear, and not cheerfully and nobly, and therefore not honestly. If they fail and perform not their task, to save themselves from the rigour of the punishment, they have recourse to base unlawfull remedies, lies, false excuses, tears of despight, flights, truentings, all worse then the fault they have committed.

*The third generall advice. Instruction mild and free.*

Coloss. 3.

*Dum id rescitum iri credit, tantisper cavet;*
*Si sperat fore clàm, rursum ad ingenium redit.*
*Ille, quem beneficio adjungas, ex animo facit;*
*Studet par referre, præsens absénsque idem erit.*

Terent.

*The shame keeps knowledge, knowledge keeps the sin*
*In aw, which did in secresie begin:*
*Whom good turns with love have got*
*To be thy friend, repose thy lot.*
*Beest thou there or beest thou not.*

My will is that they be handled freely and liberally, using therein reason, and sweet and mild perswasions, which ingender in their hearts the affections of honour and of shame. The first will serve them as a spurre to what is good, the second as a bridle to check and with-draw them from evill. There is something, I know not what, that is servile and base in rigour and constraint, the enemy

to honour and true libertie. We muſt clean contrary fat their hearts with ingenuity, liberty, love, virtue and honour.

*Pudore & liberalitate liberos retinere*
Teren. *Satius eſſe credo, quàm metu.*
*Hoc patrium eſt potiùs conſuefacere filium*
*Suâ ſponte rectè facere, quàm alieno metu.*
*Hoc Pater ac Dominus intereſt: hoc qui nequit*
*Fateatur ſe neſcire imperare liberis.*
*I hold it better children up to rear*
*With modeſty and bounty; then by fear,*
*T' enure a child 'tis rather fathers law*
*To do well of himſelf, then others aw.*
*A Father and a Maſter differ ſo;*
*So who can not, to rule ſons doth not know.*

Blows are for beaſts that underſtand not reaſon: injuries and brawls are for ſlaves. He that is once accuſtomed thereunto is mar'd for ever. But reaſon, the beauty of action, the deſire of honeſty and honour, the approbation of all men, cheerfulneſſe and comfort of heart, and the deteſtation of their contraries, as brutiſhneſs, baſeneſs, diſhonour, reproach, and the improbation of all men, theſe are the arms, the ſpurs, and the bridles of children well-born, and ſuch as a man would make honeſt men. This is that which a man ſhould alwayes ſound in their ears; and if theſe means cannot prevail, all other rigour and roughneſſe ſhall never do good. That which cannot be done with reaſon, wiſdome, endeavour, ſhall never be done by force; and if haply it be done, yet it is to ſmall purpoſe. But theſe other means cannot be unprofitable, if they be employed in time, before the goodneſſe of nature be ſpent and ſpilt. But yet for all this, let no man think that I approve that looſe and flattering indulgence, and ſottiſh fear to give children cauſe of diſcontent and ſorrow, which is another extremity as bad as the former. This were like the Ivie, to kill and make barren the tree which it embraceth; or the Ape, that killeth her young with culling them; or like thoſe that fear to hold him up by the hair of the head that is in danger of drowning, for fear of hurting him, and ſo ſuffer him to periſh. Againſt this vice the wiſe Hebrew ſpake much. Youth muſt be held in obedience and diſcipline, not bodily like beaſts and madmen, but ſpirituall, humane, liberall, according to reaſon.

Eccleſ. 30.

13 We come now to the particular and more expreſſe adviſements of this inſtruction. The firſt head of them is, as we have ſaid, to ex-

exercise, sharpen and form the minde. Whereupon there are divers precepts, but the first principal and fundamental of all others, which respecteth the end of instruction, and which I most desire to inculcate, because it is least embraced and followed, and every man runneth after the contrary, which is a common and ordinary errour, is, to have much more, and the chief and principal care to exercise, to husband and manure, to use the proper good, and much lesse to get and endeavour the attainment of that which is strange; to strive and studie more for wisdom, then for Science and Art; rather well to form the judgement, and by consequence the will, and the conscience, then to fill the memory, and to inflame the imagination. These are the three mistriss parts of a reasonable soul: But the first is the judgement, as before hath been discoursed, to which place I resend the Reader. Now the custome of the world is quite contrary, which runneth wholly after Art, Science, and what is acquired. Parents to the end they may make their children wise, are at great charge, and their children take great pains. *Ut omnium rerum, sic literarum intemperantiâ laboremus: We are troubled with an immoderate desire of learning, as of all things else.* And many times all is lost. But to make them wise, honest, apt and dexterous, which is a matter of small charge or labour, they take no care at all. What greater folly can there be in the world, more to admire science, that which is acquired, then memory, then wisdom, then nature? Now all commit not this fault with one and the same minde; some simply carried by custom, think that wisdom and science are not things different, or at leastwise, that they march alwaies together, and that it is necessary a man have the one to attain the other: these kinde of men deserve to be taught: others go out of malice, and think they know well enough what they do, and at what price soever it be they will have Art and Science: For this is a mean in these daies in the occidental parts of Europe to get fame, reputation, riches. These kinde of people make of Science, an Art and marchandise, science mercinary, pedantical, base and mechanical. They buy Science to sell it again. Let us leave these merchants as uncurable. Contrariwise, I cannot here but blame the opinion and fashion of some of our Gentlemen of France, (for in other Nations this fault is not so apparent) who have knowledg or Art in such disdain and contempt, that they do less esteem of an honest man onely for this, because he hath studied: they discard it as a thing that seemeth in some sort to impeach their nobility. Wherein they shew themselves

*Particular advisements touching the mind.*

Lib. 1. cap. 7.

Tacit.

ſelves what they are, ill born, worſe adviſed, and truly ignorant of virtue and honour, which they likewiſe bewray in their carriage, their idleneſs, their inpertinencies, their inſufficiencies, in their inſolencies, vanities, and barbarities.

14 *A compariſon of ſcience and wiſdom.*

To teach others, and to diſcover the fault of all this, we muſt make good two things; The one that Science and Wiſdom are things very different; and that Wiſdom is more worth then all the Science or Art of the world; as Heaven exceeds the price of the Earth, gold of iron: The other, that they are not onely different, but that they ſeldom or never go together, that they commonly hinder one another; he that hath much knowledg or Art is ſeldom wiſe, and he that is wiſe hath not much knowledg. Some exceptions there are herein, but they are very rare, and of great, rich, and happy ſpirits. Some there have been in times paſt, but in theſe dayes there are no more to be found.

15 *The definition of ſcience and wiſdom.*

The better to perform this, we muſt firſt know what ſcience and wiſdom is. Science is a great heap, or accumulation and proviſion of the good of another; that is, a collection of all that a man hath ſeen, heard & read in books, that is to ſay, of the excellent ſayings and doings of great perſonages that have been of al nations; now the garner or ſtorehouſe where this great proviſion remaineth and is kept, the treaſury of ſcience and all acquired good, is the memory. He that hath a good memory, the fault is his own if he want knowledg, becauſe he hath the mean. Wiſdom is a ſweet and regular managing of the ſoul. He is wiſe that governeth himſelf in his deſires, thoughts opinions, ſpeeches, actions, with meaſure and proportion. To be brief, and in a word, wiſdom is the rule of the ſoul: and that which manageth this rule is the judgement, which ſeeth, judgeth, eſteemeth all things: rangeth them as they ought, giving to every thing that which belongs unto it. Let us now ſee their differences, and how much wiſdom excels the other.

16

Science is a ſmall and barren good in reſpect of wiſdom, for it is not onely not neceſſary (for of three parts of the world, two and more have made little uſe thereof) but it brings with it ſmall profit, and ſerves to little purpoſe. 1. It is no way ſerviceable to the life of a man: How many people rich and poor, great and ſmall, live pleaſantly and happily, that have never heard any ſpeech of ſcience? There are many other things more commodious and ſerviceable to the life of man, and the maintenance of humane ſociety, as honour, glory, nobility, dignity, which nevertheleſs are not neceſſary:

2. Neither

2. Neither is it serviceable to things natural, which an ignorant sot may as well perform, as he that hath best knowledg : Nature is a sufficient mistriss for that. 3. Nor to honesty, and to make us better: *paucis est opus literis ad bonam mentem. Little learning is requisite for a good minde* : nay, it rather hindreth it. He that will mark it well, shall finde not onely more honest people, but also more excellent in all kinde of virtue amongst those that know little, then those that know most, witness *Rome*, which was more honest being young and ignorant, that when it was old, crafty and cunning. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solertem scientiam versa est* : *That simple and open virtue is turned into obscure and crafty knowledg.* Science serveth not for any thing, but to invent crafts and subtilties, artificial cunning devises, and whatsoever is an enemy to innocencie, which willingly lodgeth with simplicity and ignorance. Atheisme, errours, sects, and all the troubles of the world have risen from the order of these men of Art and knowledg. The first temptation of the devil, saith the Scripture, and the beginning of all evil, and the ruine of mankinde, was the opinion and the desire of knowledg: *Eritis sicut dii scientes bonum & malum: Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.* The Sirenes to deceive and intrap *Ulysses* within their snares, offered to him the gift of Science; and S. *Paul* adviseth you all to take heed, *ne quis vos seducat per philosophiam* : *let no man seduce you through their philosophy.* One of the sufficientest men of knowledg that ever was, spake of science, as of a thing not onely vain, but hurtful, painful, and tedious. To be brief, Science may make us more humane and courteous, but not more honest. 4. Again, it serveth nothing to the sweetning of our life, or the quitting us of those evils that oppress us in the world : but contrarily it increaseth and sharpneth them, witness children and fools, simple and ignorant persons, who measuring every thing by the present taste, run thorow them with the less grief, bear them with better content, then men of greatest learning and knowledg. Science anticipateth those evils that come upon us, in such sort that they are sooner in the soul of man by knowledg, then in nature. The wise man said, That he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow : Ignorance is a more fit remedie against all evils, *Iners malorum remedium ignorantia est: Ignorance is the idle remedy of evils.* From whence proceed those counsels of our friends; Think not of it, put it out of your head & memory. Is not this to cast us into the arms of ignorance, as into the best

Solomon in his Ecclesiast.

Ecclesiastes 1. 18.

and

and safest Sanctuary that may be? But this is but a mockery, for to remember and to forget is not in our power. But they would do as Chirurgions use to do, who not knowing how to heal a wound, yet set a good shew upon it by allaying the pain and bringing it asleep. They that counsel men to kill themselves in their extreme and remedilesse evils, do they not send a man to ignorance, stupiditie, insensibility? Wisdom is a necessary good, and universally commodious for all things: it governeth and ruleth all: there is not any thing that can hide, or quit it self of the jurisdiction or knowledg thereof: It beareth sway every where, in peace, in war, in publick, in private; it ruleth and moderateth even the insolent behaviours of men, their sports, their dances, their banquets, and is as a bridle unto them. To conclude, there is nothing that ought not to be done discreetly and wisely; and contrarily, without wisdom all things fall into trouble and confusion.

17 Secondly, Science is servile, base and mechanical, in respect of wisdom, and a thing borrowed with pain. A learned man is like a Crow deckt with the feathers that he hath stoln from other birds. He maketh a great shew in the world, but at the charge of another, and he had need to veil his bonnet often, as a testimony of that honour he gives to those from whom he hath borrowed his Art. A wise man is like him that lives upon his own revenewes; for wisdom is properly a mans own; it is a natural good well tilled and laboured.

18 Thirdly, the conditions are divers, the one more beautiful and more noble then the other. Learning or Science is fierce, presumptuous, arrogant, opinative, indiscreet, querulous, *Scientia inflat: Knowledg puffeth up.* 2. Science is talkative, desirous to shew it self, which nevertheless knows not how to do any thing, is not active, but onely fit to speak and to discourse: wisdom acteth and governeth all.

Learning, then and wisdom are things very different, and wisdom of the two the more excellent, more to be esteemed then science. For it is necessary, profitable to all, universal, active, noble, honest, gracious, cheerful. Science is particular, unnecessary, seldom profitable, not active, servil, mechanical, melancholick, opinative, presumptuous.

19 *Learning and wisdom meet not together.* We come now to the other point, and that is, that they are not alwaies together, but contrarily almost alwaies separated. The natural reason (as hath been said) is, that their temperatures are contrary.

trary. For that of science and memory is moist, and that of wisdom and judgement, dry. This also is signified unto us, in that which happened to our first parents, who as soon as they cast their eyes upon knowledg, they presently desired it, and so were robbed of that wisdom, wherewithal they were indued from the beginning; whereof we every day see the like in common experience. The most beautiful and flourishing States, Common-weales, Empires, antient and modern, have been, and are governed very wisely, both in peace and war, without Science. *Rome* the first five hundred years, wherein it flourished in virtue and valour, was without knowledg; and so soon as it began to be learned, it began to corrupt, trouble, and ruinate it self by civil wars. The most beautiful policie that ever was, the Lacedemonian built by *Lycurgus*, from whence have sprung the greatest personages of the world, made no profession of learning, and yet it was the school of virtue and wisdom, and was ever victorious over *Athens*, the most learned Citie of the world, the school of all science, the habitation of the Muses, the store-house of Philosophers. All those great and flourishing realms of the east and west Indies, have stood for many ages together without learning, without the knowledg of books or writings. In these dayes they learn many things, by the good leave and assistance of their new masters, at the expence of their own liberty, yea their vices and their subtilties too, whereof in former times they never heard speech. That great, and it may be the greatest and most flourishing Sate and Empire which is at this day in the world, is that of that great Lord, who like the Lyon of the whole earth, makes himself to be feared of all the Princes and Monarchs of the world; and even in this state, there is not any profession of Science, nor School, nor permission or allowance to read, or teach publickly, no not in matters of religion. What guideth and governeth, and maketh the State to prosper thus? It is wisdom, it is prudence. But come we to those States wherein learning and Sciences are in credit. Who do govern them? Doubtless not the learned. Let us take for example this our Realm, wherein learning and knowledg have greater honour then in all the world besides, and which seemeth to have succeeded Greece it self: The principal officers of this Crown, the Constable, Marshal, Admiral, the Secretaries of the State who dispatch all affairs, are commonly men altogether illiterate. And doubtless many great Lawyers, founders and Princes have banished science as the poyson and pestilence of a Common-

*wisdom without science.*

Common-wealth, *Licinius, Valentinian, Mahomet, Lycurgus.* And this we see what wisdom is without science. Let us now see what science is without wisdom, which is not hard to do. Let us look a little into those that make profession of learning, that come to Schools and Universities, and have their heads full of *Aristotle, Cicero, Bartolus.* Are there any people in the world more untoward, more sottish, more unfit for all things? From hence cometh that Proverb, that when a man would describe a fool, or an untowardly person, he calleth him Clerk, Pedant: And to expresse a thing ill done, it is the manner to say, It is Clerkely done. It should seem that learning doth intoxicate, and as it were hammer a mans brains, and makes him to turn sot and fool, as King *Agrippa* said to S. *Paul*; *Multæ te literæ ad insaniam adducunt: much learning maketh thee mad.* There are divers men, that had they been never trained up in schools and colledges, they had been far more wise: and their brethren that have never applyed themselves to learning, have proved the wiser men; *Ut melius fuisset non didicisse: nam postquam docti prodierunt, boni desiuunt: So that it had been better they had never been learned: for after they became learned they left off from being good.* Come to the practice: chuse me one of these learned scholars bring him to the common councel of a citie, or any publick assembly, wherein the affairs of State are consulted of, or matter of policy, or houshold husbandry, you never saw a man more astonished, he waxeth pale, blusheth, cougheth, and at last knows not what to say. And if he chance to speak, he entreth into a long discourse of definitions, and divisions of *Aristotle*: *ergo* pot-lead. Mark in the self-same councel, a Merchant, a Burgesse, that never heard speak of *Aristotle*, he will yield a better reason, give a sounder judgement, and more to purpose then these scholastical Doctors.

*Science without wisdom.*

Act. 26.

20 *The reason of this separation*

Now it is not enough to have said, that wisdom and learning seldom concur and meet together, unlesse we seek the reason and cause thereof, not doubting thereby but sufficiently to content and to satisfie those, that mislike what I have said, or think me perhaps an enemy to erudition and learning. The question therefore is, From whence it cometh that learning and wisdom do seldom encounter and meet together in one and the same man: And there is great reason, why we should move this question: for it is a strange thing, and against reason, that a man, the more learned he is, should not be the more wise, learning and knowledg being a proper means,

and

and instrument unto wisdom. Behold therefore two men, the one a student, the other none; he that hath studied, is, in some sort, bound to be far the wiser of the two, because he hath all that the other hath, that is, nature, reason, judgement, spirit; and besides these the counsels, discourses, judgements of all the greatest men of the world, by reading their books. Is there not then great reason, he should be much more wise, more dexterous, more honest then the other, since that with these proper and natural means, he attaineth so many extraordinary on every side? For as one saith well, the natural good cohering and concurring with the accidental, frameth an excellent composition: and yet nevertheless, we see the contrary, as hath been said.

21 *An answer to ill discipline.*

Now the true reason and answer to all this, is the evil and sinister manner of study and ill instruction. They learn out of books and schools excellent knowledg, but with ill means, and as bad successe. Whereby it comes to passe, that all their study profiteth them nothing at all, but they remain indigent and poor, in the midst of their plenty and riches, and like *Tantalus*, die for hunger in the midst of their dainties: the reason is, because whilest they pore upon their books, they respect nothing so much as to stuffe and furnish their memories with that which they read and understand, and presently they think themselves wise: like him that put his bread in his pocket, and not into his belly, when his pocket was full, died for hunger. And so with a memory fully stuffed, they continue fools; *Student non sibi & vitæ, sed aliis & scholæ: They study not for themselves, and for the benefit of their life, but for others, and for the schooles.* They prepare themselves to be reporters; *Cicero* hath said it, *Aristotle, Plato* hath left it in writing, &c. but they for their parts know nothing. These men commit a double fault; the one is that they apply not that which they learn, to themselves, that so they may form themselves unto virtue, wisdom, resolution, by which means their knowledg is unprofitable unto them; the other is, that during all that time, which with great pains and charge they employ, to the heaping together and pocketing up for another without any profit to themselves, whatsoever they can rob from other men, they suffer their own proper good to fall to the ground, and never put it in practice. They on the other side that studie not, having no recourse unto another, take a care to husband their natural gifts, and so prove many times

the

the better, the more wise, and resolute, though lesse learned, lesse gainers, lesse glorious. One there is that hath said as much, though otherwise and more briefly; That learning marreth weak wits and spirits, perfiteth the strong and natural.

*Good discipline.*

Now hearken to that counsel that I give hereupon; A man must not give himself to the gathering and keeping the opinions and knowledges of another, to the end he may afterwards make report of them, or use them for shew or ostentation, or some base and mercenary profit; but he must use them so, as that he may make them his own. He must not onely lodg them in his minde, but incorporate and transubstantiate them into himself. He must not onely water his minde with the dew of knowledg, but he must make it essentially better, wise, strong, good, couragious; otherwise to what end serveth study? *Non paranda nobis solùm, sed fruenda sapientia est: Wisdom is not onely to be gotten by us, but to be enjoyed.* He must not do as it is the manner of those that make garlands, who pick here and there whole flowers, and so carry them away to make nose-gayes, and afterwards presents, heap together out of that book, and out of this book, many good things, to make a fair and a goodly shew to others; but he must do as Bees use to do, who carry not away the flowers, but settle themselves upon them, like a hen that covereth her chickens, and draweth from them their spirit, force, virture, quintessence, and nourishing themselves, turn them into their own substance, and afterwards make good and sweet honey, which is all their own; and it is no more either thyme or sweet majorum. So must a man gather from books the marrow and spirit, (never enthralling himself so much as to retain the words by heart, as many use to do, much lesse the place, the book, the chapter; that is a sottish and vain superstition and vanity, and makes him lose the principal) and having sucked and drawn the good, feed his minde therewith, inform his judgment, instruct and direct his conscience and his opinion, rectifie his will; and in a word, fram unto himself a work wholly his own, that is to say, an honest man, wise, advised, resolute; *Non ad pompam, nec ad speciem, nec ut nomine magnifico sequi ocium velis, sed quo firmior adversus fortuita rempublicam capessas. Not for pomp or ostentation, nor to the end thou wouldest follow ease with a glorious name, but that thereby thou mayest more firmly take upon thee the goverment of the Common wealth against all accidents.*

Tacit.

23 And hereunto the chocie of sciences is necessary. Those that I commend

commend above all others, and that best serve to that end, which I purpose, and whereof I am to speak, are natural and moral, which teach us to live, and to live well, nature and virtue; that which we are and that which we should be: under the moral are comprehended, the Politicks, Oeconomicks, Histories. All the rest are vain and frothy, and we are not to dwell upon them, but to take them as passing by.

2. *The second advice touching the choice of science.*

This end of the instruction of youth and comparison of learning and wisdom, hath held me too long, by reason of the contestation. Let us now proceed to the other parts and advisements of this instruction. The means of instructions are divers, especially of two sorts: the one by word, that is to say, by precepts, instructions and lectures; or else by conference with honest and able men, filling and refining our wits against theirs, as iron is cleansed and beautified by the file; This means and manner is very pleasing and agreeable to Nature.

24

3. *The means to learn.*

*By word of mouth.*

The other by action, that is, example, which is gotten, not onely from good men by imitation, and similitude, but also wicked, by disagreement in opinions; for some there are that learn better by the opposition and horrour of that evil they see in another. It is a special use of Justice, to condemn one that he may serve for an example unto others. And old *Cato* was wont to say, That wise men may learn more of fools, then fools of wise men. The Lacedemonians the better to diswade their children from drunkennes, made their servants drunken before their faces, to the end that seeing how horrible a spectacle a drunken man was, they should the rather detest it.

25

*By example.*

Now this second means or manner by example, teacheth us with more ease and more delight. To learn by precepts is a long way, because it is a painful thing to understand well, and understanding to retain well, and retaining to use and practise well. And hardly can we promise our selves to reap that fruit which they promise unto us. But example and imitation teach us above the work or action it self, invite us with much more ardour, and promise unto us that glory which we learn to imitate.

*A comparison of these two.*

The seed that is cast into the earth, draweth unto it self in the end, the quality of that earth whereunto it is transported, and becomes like unto that which doth there naturally grow: So the spirits and manners of men conform themselves to those with whom they commonly converse.

26 *From the living.*

Now these two manners of profitting by speech and by example are like-wise twofold; for they are drawn from excellent parsonages, either living, by their sensible and outward frequentation and conference; or dead, by the reading of their books.

The first, that is the commerce with the living is more lively and more natural, it is a fruitful exercise of life, which was much in use amongst the ancients, yea the Greeks themselves, but it is casual depending on another, and rare: It is a difficult matter to meet with such people, and more difficult to make use of them. And this is practised either by keeping home, or by travelling and visiting strange countries, not to be fed with vanities, as the most do, but to carry with them the knowledg and consideration especially of the humours and customs of those nations.

This is a profitable exercise, the body is neither idle, nor tyred with labour, for this moderate agitation keeps a man in breath, the minde is in continual exercise, by marking things known and new.

There is not a better school to form the life of man, then to see the diversity of so many other lives, and to taste a perpetual variety of the forms of our nature.

27 *From the dead by books.*

The other commerce with the dead by the benefit of their books, is more sure, and more near unto us, more constant, and lesse chargeable. He that knows how to make use of them, receiveth thereby great pleasure, great comfort. It dischargeth us of the burthen of a tedious idleneese, it withdraweth us from fond imaginations, and other outward things, that vex and trouble us: It counselleth us, and comforteth us in our griefs and afflictions: but yet it is onely good for the minde, whereby the body remaineth without action, altereth and languisheth.

28 *4. To make the scholar to speak and to reason.*

We must now speak of that order of proceeding and formality which a teacher of youth must keep, that he may happily arrive to his proposed end. It hath many parts; we will touch some of them. First he must often examine his scholar, aske his judgement and opinion of whatsoever shall present it self unto him. This is quite contrary to the ordinary style, which is, that the master do alwaies speake and teach his child with authority, and worke into his head as into a vessel, whatsoever he will, insomuch that children are only Auditors and Receivers, which manner of teaching I cannot commend; *Obest plerunq; iis qui discere volunt, authoritas eorum qui docent: The authority of them which teach, hurteth for the the most part*

*part those which would learn.* Their spirits must be awakened and inflamed by demands, make them first to ask others, to enquire, and to open the way at their own will. If without questioning with them a man speak wholly unto them, it is a labour in a manner lost, the childe is not profited thereby, because he thinks it belongs not unto him, so long as he yields not an account thereof; he leads onely his ears and those coldly too; he sets not forward with so good a pase, as when he is a party in the businesse. Neither is it enough to make them give their judgment, but that they maintain it, and be able to give a reason of their saying, to the end that they speak not by roat, but that they be attentive, and careful of that they speak: and to give them the better incouragement thereunto, a man must not seem to neglect that they say, but commend at the least their good essay and endeavour. This form of teaching by questions and demands is excellently observed both by *Socrates* (the principal in this businesse) as we see every where in *Plato*, where by a long annexion and enfolding of demands wittily and dexterously made, he sweetly leadeth a man to the closet of verity; and also by the Doctour of verity in his Gospel. Now these questions must not be onely of things touching science and memory, as hath been said, but matter of judgement. For to this exercise all things may serve, even the least that are, as the follies of a Laquey, the malice of a Page, a discourse at table: for the work of judgment is not to handle and to understand great and high matters, but justly to weigh them, and consider of them whatsoever they be. Matth. 16. 12. Luk. 10. & 24.

Questions therefore must be moved touching the judgement of men and their actions, and by reason determined, to the end that thereby men may frame their judgement and their conscience. The tutor or instructor of *Cyrus* in *Xenophon* for a lecture proposed this questioned; A great youth having a little coat or cassock, gave it to one of his companions of a lesse stature, and took from him his cossock, which was the greater: upon which fact he demanded his judgement. *Cyrus* answered, that it was well, because both of them were thereby the better fitted. But his master reprehended him sharply for it, because he considered onely the fitnesse and conveniencie thereof, and not the justice, which should first and especially have been thought of, which was, that no man may be enforced in that which was his own. And this no doubt is an excellent manner of instruction. And though a man may recite authorities o utof

books, the saying of *Cicero*, or *Aristotle*, yet it is not onely to recite them, but to judg of them, and so to frame and fashion them to all uses, and to apply them to divers subjects. It is not enough to report as a history, that *Cato* killed himself at *Utique*, that he might not fall into the hands of *Cesar*; and that *Brutus* and *Cassius* were the authors of the death of *Cesar*; for this is the least: but I will that he proceed and judg, whether they did well herein, or no: whether they deserved well of the common-weal; whether they carried themselves therein according to wisdom, justice, valour, and wherein they did ill, wherein well. Finally and generally, in all these discourses, demands, answers, the conveniencie, order, verity, must be inquired into; a work of judgement and conscience. These things a man by any means must not dissemble, but ever presse them, and hold him subject unto them.

29 *5. An advisement touching honest curiosity*

Secondly, he must accustom and frame him to an honest curiosity to know all things, whereby he must first have his eyes upon every thing, the better to consider all that may be said, done or attempted concerning himself, and nothing must passe his hands, before it passe and repasse his judgment; and then he must make an enquiry into other matters, as well of right as of action. He that enquireth after nothing, knows nothing, saith one: He that busieth not his minde, suffereth it to rust, and becomes a fool; and therefore he must make profit of all, apply every thing to himself, take advice and counsel as well of what is past, the better to see the error he hath committed, as of that which is to come, the better to rule and direct himself. Children must not be suffered to be idle, to bring themselves asleep, to entertain themselves with their own prattle: for wanting sufficiencie to furnish themselves with good and worthy matter, they will feed upon vanities: they must therefore be alwaies busied in some employment, and kept in breath; and this curiosity must be ingendred in them, the better to awaken them, and to spur them forward, which being such as is said, shall be neither vain in it self, nor tedious to another.

30 *6. Advise.*

He must likewise fashion and mould his spirit to the general pattern and model of the world and of nature, make it universal, that is to say, represent unto him in all things, the universal face of nature: that the whole world may be his book: that of what subject soever a man talk, he cast his eye and this thought upon the large immensity of the world, upon so many different fashi-

ons,

ons and opinions, which have been, and are in the world touching that subject. The most excellent and noble mindes, are the more universal and more free; and by this means the mind is contented, learneth not to be astonished at any thing, is formed to a resolution and stedfast constancy. To be brief, such a man doth no more admire any thing, which is the highest and last point of wisdom. For whatsoever doth happen, or a man may report unto him, he easily findeth that there is nothing in the world either new or strang; that the condition of man is capable of all things; that they have come from others, and that elsewhere divers things passe more strange, more great. And in this sense it was that wise *Socrates* called himself a citizen of the world. And contrarily, there is not any thing that doth more deprave and enthral the minde of man, then to make him taste and understand but one certain opinion, belief, and manner of life. What greater folly or weakneſse can there be, then to think that all the world walketh, believeth, speaketh, doth, liveth, and dieth, according to the manner of his country? like those bard block-heads, who when they hear one recite the manners and opinions of forrein countries very different and contrary to theirs, they tremble for fear, and believe them not, or else do absurdly condem them as barbarors; so much are they enthralled and tyed to their cradell, a kinde of people brought up (as they say) in a bottle, that never saw any thing but therow a hole. Now this universal spirit must be attained by the diligence of the master or teacher, afterwards by travel, and communication with strangers, and the reading of books and the histories of all Nations,

Finally, he must teach him to take nothing upon credit and by authority, this is to make himself a beast, and to suffer himself to be led by the nose like an oxe; but to examine all things with reason, to propose all things, and then to give him leave to chuse. And if he know not how to chuse, but doubt, which perhaps is the better, sounder, and surer course; to teach him likewise to resolve of nothing of himself, but rather to distrust his own judgement. 31

After the minde comes the body, whereof there must likewise be a care taken, at one and the same instant with the spirit, not making two works thereof. Both of them make an entire man. Now a master must endeavour to keep his childe free from delicacy and pride in apparel, in sleeping, eating, drinking; he must bring him up hardly to labour and pains, accustom him to heat and cold, 32 *An advisement touching the body.*

winde and weather, yea and unto hazzards too; harden his muscles and his sinews, as well as his minde, to labour, and then to pain and grief too; For the first disposeth to the second: *Labor callum obducit dolori*: *Labour hardneth a man against grief.* To be brief, he must endeavour to make him lustie and vigorous, indifferent to all kinde of viands. All this serveth not onely for his health, but for publick affairs and services.

33 We come now to the third head, which concerneth manners, wherein both body and soul have a part,. This is two-fold; To hinder the evil, to ingraft and to nourish the good. The first is the more necessary, and therefore the greater care and heed must be taken. It must therefore be done in time, for there is no time too speedy, to hinder the birth and growth of all ill manners and conditions; especially these following, which are are to be feared in youth.

*3. An advisement touching manners.*

1 To lie, a base vice of servants and slaves, of a licentious and fearful minde, the cause whereof ariseth many times from bad and rude instruction.

*Evil manners.*

2 A sottish shame and weakness, whereby they seek to hide themselves, hold down their heads, blush at every question that is proposed, cannot endure a correction, or a sharp word without a strange alteration of countenance. Nature doth many times bear a great sway herein, but it must be corrected by studie.

3 All affection and singularity in habit, carriage, gate, speech, gesture, and all other things; this is a testimony of vanity and vain-glory, and marreth all the rest, even that which is good; *Licet sapere sine pompa, sine invidia: A man may be wise without pomp, without envie.*

4 But above all, choler, sullenness, obstnacy; and therefore it is very necessary that a childe never have his will by such froward means, and that he learn and finde that these qualities are altogether unprofitable and bootlesse, yea base and villanous; and for this cause he must never be flatered, for that marreth and corrupteth him, teacheth him to be sullen and froward, if he have not his will, and in the end maketh him insolent, that a man shall never work any good upon him; *Nihil magis reddit iracundos, quàm educatio mollis & blanda: Nothing more maketh one prone to anger, then soft and cockering education.*

34 By the self-same means a man must ingraft into him good and honest manners: And first to instruct him to fear and reverence God,

*Good manners.*

God, to tremble under that infinite and invisible majestie, to speak seldom and soberly of God, of his power, eternity, wisdom, will, and of his works; not indifferently and upon all occasions, but fearfully, with shame and reverence. Not to be over scrupulous in the mysteries and points of Religion, but to conform himself to Government and Discipline of the Church.

Secondly, to repleniſh and cheriſh his heart with ingenuity, 2
freedom, candor, integrity, and to teach him to be an honest man, out of an honourable and honest minde, not servilely and mechanically, for fear, or hope of any honour or profit, or other consideration, then virtue it self. These two are especially for himself.

For another and the company with whom he converseth, he must 3
work in him a sweet kinde of affabilitie to accommodate himself to all kinde of people, to all fashions; *Omnis Aristippum decuit, color, & status, & res: Every countenance, condition and gesture became Aristippus.* Herein *Alcibiades* was excellent. That he learn how to be able, and to know how to do all things, yea excesse and licentious behaviours, if need be; but that he love to do onely that which is good. That he refrain to do evil, not for want of courage, nor strength, nor knowledg, but will. *Multum interest utrum peccare quis nolit, aut nescit: There is great difference in not being willing to sin, and not being able.*

Modesty, whereby he contenteth not, nor tieth himself, either to 35
all, as to the greatest and most respective persons, or such as are his inferious, either in condion or sufficiency; nor defendeth any thing obstinately, with affirmative, resolute, commanding words, but sweet, submisse and moderate speeches. Hereof hath been spoken elsewhere. And thus the three heads of the duties of parents are dispatched. *See lib. 2. cap. 9.*

The fourth concerneth their affection and communication with 36
them, when they are great and capable of that whereunto they were instructed. We know that affection is reciprocal and natural betwixt parents and their children, but that of parents towards their children is far more strong and more natural, because it is given by nature to love those things that are comming on to the maintenance and continuance of the world, especially those in whom a man doth live when he is dead. That of children towards their parents is retrograde, and therefore it goeth not so strongly, not so naturally; and it seemeth rather to be the payment of a debt, and a *The fourth part touching the duty of parents.*

*The love of parents greater then the love of children.*

knowledgement of a benefit received, then a pure, free, simple, and naturall love. Moreover, he that giveth and doth good, loveth more then he that receiveth and is indebted: And therefore a father and every agent that doth good to another, loveth more then he is beloved. The reasons of this proposition are many. All love to be (which being is exercised and demonstrated in motion and action.) Now he that giveth and doth good to another, is after a sort in him that receiveth. He that giveth and doth good to another, doth that which is honest and honourable; he that receiveth doth none of this: honestie is for the first, profit for the second. Now honestie is far more worthy, firm, stable, amiable then profit, which in a moment vanisheth. Again, those things are most beloved that cost us most; that is deerest unto us, which we come more dearly by. Now to beget, to nourish, to bring up is a matter of greater charge, then to receive all these.

37 *The love of parents two-fold.*

This love of Parents is two-fold, though alwayes naturall, yet after a divers manner: the one is simply and universally naturall, and as a simple instinct which is common with beasts, according to which Parents love and cherish their children, though deformed, stammering, halting, milk-sops, and use them like moppets, or little apes. This love is not truly humane. Man endued with reason, must not servilely subject himself unto nature as beasts do, but follow it more nobly with discourse of reason. The other then is more humane and reasonable, whereby a man loveth his children more or lesse, according to that measure wherein he seeth the seeds and sparks of virtue, goodnesse, and towardlinesse to arise and spring up in them. Some there are who being besotted and carried with the former kind of affections, have but little of this, and never complaining of the charge so long as their children are but small, complain thereof when they come to their growth, and beginne to profit. It seemeth that they are in a sort offended and vexed to see them to grow and set forward in honest courses, that they may become honest men: these parents are brutish and inhumane.

38 *Of the true father'ly love in communicating with his children being come to years of discretion.*

Now according to this second, true, and fatherly love in the well governing thereof, parents should receive their childre[illegible] if they be capable, into their society and partnership in their goods, admit them to their counsel, intelligence, the knowledge and course of their domesticall affairs, as also to the communication of their designments, opinions and thoughts, yea consent and contribute to their honest recreations and pastimes, as the case shall require,

alwayes

alwayes reserving their rank and authoritie. For we condemn the austere, lord-like, and imperious countenance and carriage of those that never look upon their children, nor speak unto them but with authoritie, will not be called fathers but lords, though God himself refuse not this name of Father, never caring for the hearty love of their children, so they may be feared, reverenced, and adored. And for this cause, they give unto them sparingly, keep them in want, that they may the better keep them in aw, and obedience, ever threatning them some small pittance by their last Will, when they depart out of this life. Now this is a sottish, vain, and ridiculous foolery; It is to distrust their own proper, true, and naturall authoritie, to get an artificiall; and it is the way to deceive themselves, and to grow into contempt, which is clean contrary to that they pretend. It causeth their children to carry themselves cunningly with them, and to conspire and find means how to deceive them. For parents should in good time frame their minds to duty, by reason, and not have recourse to these means more tyrannous then fatherly.

*Errat longè meâ quidem sententiâ,*
*Qui imperium credit esse gravius aut stabilius*
*Vi quod sit quàm illud quod amicitiâ adjungitur.*
*In my opinion he is much amiss,*
*Who thinks more firm or grave that rule of his,*
*That's wrought by force, then What of friendship is.*

39 *The usage of them in their last wils according to the laws.*

In the last disposition of our goods, the best and surest way is to follow the laws and customes of the Countrey. The laws have better provided for it then we, and it is a safer course to suffer them to fail in something, then to adventure upon our own defects, in our own proper choice. It is to abuse that liberty we have therein, to serve our foolish phantasies and private passions, like those that suffer themselves to be carried by the unwonted officious actions and flatteries of those that are present, who make use of their last Wils and Testaments, either by gratifying or chastising the actions of those that pretend interest therein. A man must conform himself to reason and common custome herein, which is wiser then we are, and the surer way.

40 *Of the duty of children towards their parents.*

We come now to the duty of children towards their Parents, so naturall and so religious, and which ought to be done unto them, not as unto pure and simple men, but demi-gods, earthly, mortall, visible gods. And this is the reason why *Philo* the Jew said, that

that the Commandment touching the duty of children was written the one half in the first Table, which contained the Commandments that concern our duty towards God; and the other half in the second Table, wherein are the Commandments that concern our neighbour, as being half divine, and half humane. This duty likewise is so certain, so due and requisite, that it may not be dispensed withall by any other duty or love whatsoever, be it never so great.

For, if it shall happen that a man see his father and his sonne so indangered at one and the same instant, as that he cannot rescue and succour them both, he must forsake his sonne, and go to his father, though his love towards his sonne be greater, as before hath been said. And the reason is, because the duty of a sonne towards his father is more ancient, and hath the greater priviledge, and cannot be abrogated by any later duty.

41 *This duty consisteth in five points.*

Now this duty consisteth in five points, comprehended in this word; *Honour thy father and thy mother.* The first is reverence, not onely in outward gesture and countenance, but also inward; which is that high and holy opinion and esteem, that a child ought to have of his parents, as the authours and original causes of his being, and of his good: a quality that makes them resemble God himself.

2 Jerem. 35.

The second is obedience, even to the roughest and hardest commands of a father, according to the example of the *Rechabites*, who to obey the command of their father, never drank wine in all their lives.

Nay more then that, *Isaac* refused not to yield his neck to the sword of his father.

3

The third is to succour their parents in all their needs and necessities, to nourish them in their old age, their impotencie, and want, to give them their assistance in all their affairs.

We have an example and pattern hereof even in beasts.

In examer.

In the Stork, whose little ones (as Saint *Basil* affirmeth) feed and nourish their old dammes, cover them with their feathers, when they fall from them, and couple themselves together to carry them upon their backs. Love furnisheth them with this art;

This

This example is so lively and so significant, that the dutie of children towards their parents hath been signified by the qualitie of this creature, ἀντιπελαργεῖν, *reciconiare*. And the Hebrews call this bird, for this cause, *chasida*, that is to say, the debonair, the charitable bird. Levit.

We have likewise notable examples hereof amongst men.

*Cymon* the sonne of the great *Miltiades*, whose father dying in prison, as some say for debt, and not having wherewithall to bury his body, much lesse to redeem it being arrested for the debt whilest it was carryed to the buriall, according to the laws of the Countrey; *Cymon* sold himself and his libertie for money to provide for his funerall. He with his plentie and goods relieved not his father, but with his libertie; which is dearer then all goods, yea and life too. He helped not his father living and in necessitie, but dead, and being no more a father, nor a man. What had he done to succour his father living, wanting and requiring his help? This is an excellent precedent.

We have two the like examples, even in the weak and feeble sex of women, of two daughters which have nourished and given suck the one to the father, the other to her mother, being prisoners and condemned to die by famine, the ordinary punishment of the Ancients. It seemeth in some sort a thing against nature, that the mother should be nourished with the daughters milk, but this is truly according to nature, yea, those first lawes, that the daughter should nourish her mother.

The fourth is, not to do, to attempt, or enterprise any thing of weight or importance, without the advice, consent, and approbation of Parents, and especially in marriage. 4

The fifth is, mildly and gently to endure the vices, imperfections, and testie and impatient humours of Parents, their severitie and rigour. *Manlius* had made good proof hereof: for the Tribune *Pomponius* having accused the father of this *Manlius* in the presence of the people of many crimes; and amongst others, that he over-cruelly handled his sonne, enforcing him to till the earth: the sonne goeth to the Tribune and finding him in his bed, putting the point of his dagger to his throat, inforced him to swear, that he should desist from his pursuit he made against his father, de- 5

firing

firing rather to endure his fathers rigour, then to see him troubled for it.

A childe shall finde no difficulty in these five duties, if he consider how chargeable he hath been to his parents, and with what care and affection he hath been brought up. But he shall never know it well, until he have children of his own, as he that was found to ride upon a hobby-horse playing with his children, entreating him that so took him to hold his peace untill he were himself a father, reputing him till then no indifferent Judge in this action.

## CHAP. XV.

### *The duty of Masters and Servants.*

HEre commeth the third and last part of private and domestical justice, which is the duties of masters and servants. Touching which, it is necessary to know the distinction of servants: for they principally three sorts: That is to say, of slaves, whereof all the world hath been full in former time, and is at present, except a part of Europe, and no place more free then here about France; they have no power neither in their bodies nor goods, but are wholly their masters, who may give, lend, sell, resel, exchange, and use them as beasts of service. Of these hath been spoken of at large. There are inferiour servants and servants, free people, masters of their persons and goods, yea they cannot bargain, or otherwise do any thing to the prejudice of their own liberty. But they owe honour, obedience, and service until such times, and upon such conditions, as they have promised, and their masters have power to command, correct, and chastise them with moderation and discretion. There are also mercenaries, which are lesse subject, they owe no service nor obedience, but onely work and labour for money; and they have no authority in commanding or correcting them.

3 The duties of masters towards their servants, as well of slaves as inferiour servants, are not to handle them cruelly, remembring they are men, and of the same nature with us, but onely fortune hath put a difference, which is very variable and sporteth it self in making great men little, and little great. And therefore the difference is not so great, so much to contemn them. *Sunt homines, contubernales, humiles amici, conservi, æque fortunæ subjecti*: They are

Senec.

*are men, dwellers with thee, humble friends, fellow servants, equally the subjects of fortune.* To handle servants gently, seeking rather to be beloved then feared, is the testimonie of a good nature: to use them roughly and too severely, proceedeth from a crabbed and cruel mind, and that he beareth the same disposition towards all other men, but want of power hindereth the execution thereof. They ought to instruct them with godly and religious counsel, and those things that are requisite for their health and safety.

The duties of servants are, to honour and fear their masters whatsoever they be, and to yield them obedience and fidelitie, serving them not for gain, or onely outwardly and for countenance, but heartily, seriously, for conscience sake, and without dissimulation. We read of most worthy, noble, and generous services performed in former times by some towards their masters, even to engaging and hazzard of their lives, for their masters safegard and honour.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *The duty of Sovereigns and Subjects.*

OF Princes and Sovereigns, their descriptions, notes, humours, marks, and discommodities hath been discoursed in the first book, chapter 49. Their duty to govern the Common-wealth hath been spoken at large in this present book, chapter 2. and 3. which is of politick prudence: yet we will touch a little here the heads and generall points of their duty.

*The duty of Sovereigns.*

The Sovereign as the mean between God and the people, and debtor to these two, ought alwaies to remember that he is the lively image, the Officer and Lieutenant generall of the great God his Sovereign, and to the people a perfect mirrour, a bright beam, a clear looking glasse, and elevated theater for every one to behold, a fountain where all refresh themselves, a spurre to virtue, and who doth not any good, that is not famous, and put in the Register of perpetuall memory. He ought then first of all to fear and honour God, to be devout, religious, to observe piety not onely for himself and for conscience sake, as every other man, but for his state, and as he is a Sovereign. The piety which we here require in a Prince, is the care he ought to have, and to shew for the conservation of Religion and the ancient laws and ceremonies of the countrey, providing by laws, penalties and punishments that the Religion be neither

*To be religious.*

neither changed, troubled, nor innovated. This is a thing that highly redoundeth to his honour and security (for all do reverence, and more willingly obey, and more slowly attempt or enterprise any thing against him whom they see fear God, and believed to be in his protection and safegard: *Una custodia pietas: pium virum nec malus genius nec fatum devincit. Deus enim eripit eum ab omni malo. The onely safegard is piety: neither the evil genius nor fate can overcome a godly man: for God delivereth him out of all evil.*) And also to the good of the state, for as all the wisest have said, Religion is the band and cement of humane societie.

Mercur. Trism.

2 *To observe the laws of superiors.*

The Prince ought also to be subject, and inviolably to observe and cause to be observed the laws of God, and nature, which are not to be dispensed with: and he that infringeth them is not onely counted a tyrant, but a monster.

3. *To keep his promise.*

Concerning the people, he ought first to keep his covenants and promises, be it with subjects or others with whom he is interessed or hath to do. This equity is both naturall and universall. God himself keepeth his promise. Moreover, the Prince is the pledge and former warrant of the law and those naturall bargains of his subjects. He ought then above all to keep his faith, there being nothing more odious in a Prince then breach of promise and perjury; and therefore it was well said, that a man ought to put it among those casuall cases, if the Prince do abjure or revoke his promise, and that the contrary is not to be presumed. Yea, he ought to observe those promises and bargains of his predecessors, especially, if he be their heir, or if they be for the benefit and welfare of the Common-wealth. Also he may relieve himself of his unreasonable contracts and promises unadvisedly made, even as for the self same causes private men are relieved by the benefit of the Prince.

4 *To observe the laws.*

He ought also to remember, that although he be above the law (I mean the civil and humane) as the Creatour is above the creature (for the law is the work of the Prince, and which he may change and abrogate at his pleasure, it is the proper right of the sovereigntie) nevertheless though it be in force and authority, he ought to keep it, to live, to converse and judge according unto it: and it would be a dishonour and a very evil example to contradict it, and as it were falsifie it. Great *Augustus* having done something against the law, by his own proper act, would needs die for grief: *Lycurgus*, *Agesilaus*, *Seleucus*, have left three notable examples in this point, and to their cost.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, the Prince oweth justice to all his subjects; and he ought to measure his puissance and power by the rule of justice. This is the proper virtue of a Prince truly royall and Prince-like; whereof it was rightly said by an old man to King *Philip* that delayed him justice, saying he had no leisure, That he should then desist and leave off to be King. But *Demetrius* sped not so well, who was dispossest of his realm by his subjects, for casting from a bridge into the River many of their Petitions, without answer, or doing them justice. 5 *To do justice.*

Finally, the Prince ought to love, cherish, to be vigilant and carefull of his state, as the husband of the wife, the father of his children, the shepherd of his flock, having alwayes before his eyes the profit and quiet of his subjects. The prosperitie and welfare of the state is the end and contentment of a good Prince, *ut respub. opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloriâ ampla, virtute honesta sit: That the Common-wealth be strong in power, rich in plenty, abound in glory, honest in virtue.* The Prince that tieth himself to himself, abuseth himself: for he is not his own man, neither is the state his, but he is the states. He is a Lord, not to domineer, but to defend. *Cui non civium servitus tradita, sed tutela: To whom is committed not the servitude of citizens, but their safegard,* to attend, to watch, to the end his vigilancie may secure his sleeping subjects, his travell may give them rest, his providence may maintain their prosperitie, his industry may continue their delights, his businesse their leisure, their vacation, and that all his subjects may understand and know that he is as much for them, as he is above them. 6 *To take care and affect the common good.* Senec.

To be such, and to discharge his duty well, he ought to demean and carry himself as hath been said at large in the second and third Chapter of this book, that is to say, to furnish himself of good counsel, of treasure, and sufficient strength with his state to fortifie himself with alliance and forrein friends, to be ready, and to command both in peace and war; by this means he may be both loved and feared. 7

And to contain all in a few words, he must love God above all things, be advised in his enterprises, valiant in attempts, faithfull and firm in his word, wise in counsel, carefull of his subjects, helpfull to his friends, terrible to his enemies, pitifull to the afflicted, gentle and courteous to the good people, severe to the wicked, and just and upright towards all. 8

The duty of subjects consisteth in three points, to yield due honour 9 *The duty of subjects.*

nour to their princes, as to those that carry the Image of God, ordained aud established by him; therefore they are most wicked, who detract or slander; such were the seed of *Cham* and *Chanaan*.

Exod. 12. 2. To be obedient, under which is contained many duties, as to go to the wars, to pay tributes and imposts imposed upon them by their authority. 3. To wish them all prosperity and happinesse, and to pray for them.

10 *whether it be lawful to lay violent hands upon the person of a tyrant.* *A double tyrant.* *The entrance.*

But the question is, whether a man ought to yield these three duties general to all Princes, if they be wicked or tyrants. This controversie cannot be decided in a word, and therefore we must distinguish. The Prince is a tyrant and wicked, either in the intrance, or execution of his government. If in the entrance, that is to say, that he treacherously invadeth, and by his own force and powerful authority gains the soveraignty without any right, be he otherwise good or evil (for this cause he ought to be accounted a Tyrant) without all doubt we ought to resist him either by way of justice, if there be opportunitie and place, or by surprise: and the *Grecians*, saith *Cicero*, ordained in former times rewards and honours for those that delivered the common-wealth from servitude and oppression. Neither can it be said to be a resisting of the Prince, either by justice or surprise, since he is neither received nor acknowledged to be a Prince.

2 *In the execution three waies.* *Hereof see above Chap. 4. in chap. of tyranny and rebellion.*

If in the execution, that is to say, that his entrance be rightful and just, but that he carrieth himself imperiously, cruelly and wickedly, and according to the common saying, tyrannically; it is then also to be distinguished: for it may be so three waies, and every one requireth particular consideration. The one is in violating the laws of God, and nature, that is to say, against the Religion of the country, the commandment of God, enforcing and constraining their consciences. In this case he ought not to yield any duty or obedience, following those divine axiomes, That we ought rather to obey God then men, and fear him more that commandeth the intire man, then those that have have a power but over the least part Yet he ought not to oppose himself against him by violence of sinister means, which is another extremity, but to observe the middle way, which is either to flie or suffer, *fugere aut pati*; these two remedies named by the doctrine of veritie in the like extremities. 2. The other lesse evil, which concerneth not the consciencies, but onely the bodies and the goods, is an abuse to subjects, denying them justice, imprisoning their persons, and depriving them of their good,

good. In the which case he ought, with patience and acknowledgment of the wrath of God, yield these 3. duties following, honour, obedience, vows and prayers: and to be mindful of 3. things, that all power and authority is from God, and whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: *principi summum rerum judicium dii dederunt: Subditis obsequii gloria relicta est: bonos principes voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare.* Tacit. *God hath given the sovereign judgment of affairs to the Prince: The glory of dutiful service is left to the subjects: to desire by prayer good Princes, & to tollerate them whatsoever they be.* And he ought not to obey a superiour, because he is worthy and worthily commandeth, but because he is a superiour; not for that he is good, but because he is true and lawful. There is great difference between true and good, every one ought to obey the law, not because it is good and just, but simply, because it is the law. That God causeth an hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people, though he reserve him for a day of his furie; that the wicked Prince is the instrument of his justice, the which we ought to endure as other evils, which the heavens do send us; *quomodo sterilitatem aut nimios imbres & cætera naturæ mala, sic luxum & avaritiam dominantium tollerare:* Tacit. *As when we suffer sterility or unseasonable weather, and other evils of nature, so must we endure the riot and covetousnes of our rulers.* 3. The examples of *Saul, Nabuchadonosor*, of many Emperours before *Constantine*, and others since him as cruel tyrants as might be: towards whom nevertheless these three duties have been observed by good men, and enjoyned them by the Prophets and learned men of those daies, according to the oracle of the great Doctor of truth, which inferreth an obedience to them which sit in the seat of Government, notwithstanding they oppresse us with insupportable burthens, and their Goverment be evil.

The third concerneth the whole State, when he would change or ruinate, seeking to make it elective, hereditary; or of an Aristocracy, or Democracy, a Monarchy, or otherwise: And in this case he ought to withstand and hinder their proceedings, either by way of justice, or otherwise: for he is not master of the state, but onely a guardian and a surety. But these affairs belong not at all, but to the tutors and maintainers of the State, or those that are interessed therein, as electors of elective States; or Princes apparent in hereditary States; or States general, that have fundamental laws. And this is the onely case wherein it is lawful to resist a tyrant. And all this *l. Cogitationis ff. de pœn. L. Si quis non dicam c. de sacros. Eccles.*

is said of subjects, who are never permitted to attempt any thing against a sovereign Prince for what cause soever; and the laws say that he deserveth death, who attempteth, or giveth counsel, and which intendeth, or onely thinketh it. But it is honourable for a stranger, yea it is most noble and heroical in a Prince by warlike means to defend a people unjustly oppressed, and to free them from tyranny; as *Hercules* did, and after *Dion*, *Timoleon*, and *Tamberlain*, Prince of the Tartars, who overcame *Bajazeth* the Turkish Emperor, and besieged *Constantinople*.

12 *Examinations of sovereigns after their death.*

These are the duties of subjects towards their living sovereigns: But it is a point of justice to examine their life after they are dead. This is a custom just and very profitable, which benefiteth much those nations where it is observed, and which all good Princes do desire, who have cause to complain, that a man handleth the memory of the wicked as well as theirs. Sovereigns are companions if not masters of the laws; for seeing justice cannot touch their lives, there is reason, it taketh hold of their reputation, and the goods of their successours. We owe reverence and duty equally to all kings, in respect of their dignity and office, but inward estimation and affection to their virtue. We patiently endure them, though unworthy as they are: We conceal their vices; for their authority and publick order where we live, hath need of our common help: but after they are gone, their is no reason to reject justice, and the liberty of expresing our true thoughts; yea it is a very excellent and profitable example, that we manifest to the posterity faithfully to obey a Master or Lord, whose imperfections are well known. They who for some private duty commit a wicked Prince to memory, do private justice to the publick hurt. An excellent lesson for a successour if it were observed.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *The duty of Magistrates.*

1 *For what cause Magistrates are allowed of.*

GOod people in a common-wealth would love better to enjoy ease of contentment, which good and excellent spirits know how to give themselves in consideration of the goods of nature, and the effects of God, then to undertake publick charges, were it not that they fear to be ill governed, and by the wicked; and therefore they consent to be magistrates: but to hunt and follow publick charges, especially the judgement seat, is base and vile, and condemned

condemned by all good laws, yea even of the Heathen, witnesse the law *Julia de ambitu* : unworthy a person of honour, and a man cannot better expresse his insufficiency, then by seeking for it. But it is most base and vile by bribery or money to purchase them, and there is no merchandize more hateful and contemptible then it : for it necessarily followeth, that he which buyeth in grosse, selleth by retail : Whereupon the Emperour *Severus* speaking against the like inconveniencie, saith, That a man cannot justly condemn him which selleth that he bought. Lampid.

2 *How a Magistrate ought to prepare himself before he take the charge.*

Even as a man apparelleth himself, and putteth on his best habit before he departeth his house to appear in publick : so before a man undertake publick charges, he ought privately to examine himself, to learn to rule his passions, and wel to settle and establish his mind. A man bringeth not to the turney a raw unmanged horse, neither doth a man enter into affairs of importance, if he hath not been instructed and prepared for it before : so, before a man undertakes these affairs, and enters upon the stage and theater of this world, he ought to correct that imperfect and savage part in us, to bridle and restrain the liberty of affections, to learn the laws, the parts, and measures thereof, wherewith it ought to be handled in all occasions. But contrarily it is a very lamentable and absurd thing, as *Socrates* saith, that although no man undertaketh the profession of any mystery or mechanical Art, which formerly he hath not learned : yet in publick charges, in the skill to command and obey well, to govern the world, the deepest and difficultest mysterie of all, they are accepted, and undertake it, that know nothing at all.

3 *A general description of Magistrates.*

Magstrates are intermixed persons, placed between the sovereign and private men, and therefore it behoveth them to know how to command, and to obey, how to obey their sovereign, yield to the power of superiour Magistrates, honour their equals, command their inferiours, defend the weak, make head against the great, and be just to all : and therefore it was well said, That magistracy describeth a man being to play in publick so many parts.

4 *The duty of Magistrates as touching the sovereign.*

In regard of his sovereign, the Magistrate according to the diversity of the commands, ought diversly to govern, or readily, or not at all to obey, or surcease his obedience. First, in those commands which yield unto him acknowledgment and allowance, as are all the warrants of justice, and of all other, where this clause, or any equivalent unto it (if it appear unto you) or which are with-

out attribution of allowance, just and indifferent of themselves he ought to obey, and he may easily discharge himself without any scruple and danger.

2. In those commands which attribute unto him no acknowledgment, but onely the execution, as are warrants of command, if they be against right and civil justice, and that have in them causes derogatory, he ought simply to obey : for the Sovereign may derogate from the ordinary law, and this is properly that wherein Sovereignty consisteth.

3. To those which are contrary to right, and contain no derogatory clause, but are wholly prejudicial to the good and utility of the Common-wealth, what clause soever it hath, and though the Magistrate knoweth it to be false, and enforceth against right and by violence, he ought not to yield readily in these three clauses, but to hold them in suspence, and to make resistance once or twice, and at the second or third command to yield.

4. Touching those which are repugnant to the law of God and nature; he ought to dismisse and acquit himself of his office, yea to endure any thing, rather then obey or consent : and he need not say that the former commands may have some doubt in them : because natural Justice is more clear then the light of the Sun.

5 All this is good to be done in respect of the things themselves : But after they are once done by the Sovereign, how evil soever they be, it is better to dissemble them, and bury the memory of them, then to stir and lose all (as *Papinian* did) *Frustra niti, & nihil aliud nisi odium quærere, extremæ dementiæ est : It is extreme folly to labour to no purpose and to get nothing else but hatred.*

5 *As touching private men.*

In respect of private Subjects, Magistrates ought to remember that the authority which they have over them, they have but at a second hand, and hold it of the Sovereign, who alwayes remaineth absolute Lord, and their authority is limmited to a prefixed time.

The Magistrate ought to be of easie access, ready to hear and understand all complaints and suites, having his gate open to all, and himself alway at hand, considering he is not for himself, but for al, and servant of the Common-wealth. *Magna servitus, magna fortuna : Great fortune is a great servitude.* And for this cause the law of *Moses* provided, that Judges and the Judgement seats were held at the gates of the Cities, to the end every man might have easie accesse thereto,

Deut. 16.

He

He ought also indifferently to receive and hear all, great and little, rich and poor, being open to all; Therefore a wise man compareth him to an altar where to a man repaireth being oppressed and afflicted, to receive succour and comfort.

But he ought not to converse and be familiar with many; but with very few, and those very wise and advised, and that secretly: for it debaseth authority, it diminisheth and dissolveth the grace and reputation thereof. *Cleon* called to the Government of the Common-wealth, assembled all his friends, and there renounced and disclaimed all intimation or inward amity with them, as a thing incompatible with his charge; for *Cicero* saith, he depriveth himself of the person of a friend, that undertaketh that of a Judg.

His office is especially in two things, to uphold and defend the honour, the dignity, and the right of his Sovereign, and of the weal-publick which he representeh: *gerere personam civitatis, ejus dignitatem & decus sustinere; to represent the person of the Citie, to uphold the dignitie and glory thereof*, with authority and milde severity. Cic. lib. 2. Officior.

Then as a good and loyal interpreter and officer of the Prince, he ought exactly to see that his will be performed; that is to say, the law, of which he is the Minister, and it is his charge to see it diligently executed towards all therefore he is called the living law, the speaking law.

Although the Magistrate ought wisely to temper mildness with rigour, yet it is better for a Magistrate to be severe and cruel, then gentle, facil, and pitiful: And God forbiddeth to be pitiful in judgement. A severe Judg holdeth subjects in obedience of the laws: a milde and pitiful makes them to contemn the laws, the Magistrates, and the Prince, who made both. To be brief, to discharge well his office, there is required two things, honesty and courage. The first hath need of the second. The first preserveth the Magistrate free from avarice, respect of persons of bribes, which is the plague, and smoother of truth, (*Acceptatio munerum prævaricatio est veritatis: An accepting of gifts is a prevarication of the truth.*) From the corruption of justice, which *Plato* calleth an hallowed virgin: Also from passions, of hatred, of love, and others, all enemies to right and equity. But to carry himself well against the threatnings of great men, the importunate intreaties of his

friends, the lamentations and tears of the poor distressed, which are all violent and forcible things, and yet have some colour of reason and justice, and which maketh sometimes the most resolute to relent; he had need of courage: firm and inflexible constancy is a principal quality and virtue in a Magistrate, to the end he may not fear the great and mighty, and be not moved and mollified with the misery of another, though it carry with it some shew of goodness: But yet it is forbid to have pity of the poor in judgement.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *The duty of great and small.*

THe dutie of the great consisteth in two things, in endeavouring by all means to spend their blood and ability, for the defence and conservation of piety, justice, of the Prince, of the State, and generally for the welfare and good of the Common-wealth; of which they ought to be pillars and supporters; and after in defending and protecting the poor afflicted and oppressed, resisting the violence of the wicked: and like good blood to run to the wounded part, according to the Proverb; That good blood, that is to say, noble and generous, cannot lie, that is to say, deceive where is need. By this means *Moses* became the head of the Jewish nation, undertaking the defence of men injured and unjustly trode under foot. *Hercules* was deified for delivering the oppressed from the hands of tyrants. Those that have done the like, have been called Heroes and demi-gods and to the like all honours have been anciently ordained, that is, to such as deserved well of the Common-wealth, and were the deliverers of the oppressed. It is no greatnesse for a man to make himself to be feared, (except it be of his enemies) and to terrifie the world, as some have done, which also have procured them hate. *Oderint dum metuant: They hate whom they fear.* It is better to be beloved, then adored. This commeth of a natural pride, and inhumanity, to contemn and disdain other men as the ordure and excrements of the world, and as if they were not men; and from thence they grow cruel, and abuse both the bodies and goods of the weak, a thing wholly contrary to true greatnesse and honour, who ought to undertake the defence thereof.

Exod. 2

The duty of inferiours towards their superiours, consisteth in two points,

points, in honouring and reverencing them, not onely ceremoniously and in outward shew, which he must do as well to the good as the evil, but with love and affection, if they deserve it, and are lovers of the common-wealth. These are two things, to honour and to esteem, which are due to the good and truly great: to others to bend the knee, to bow the body, not the heart, which is to esteem and love. Moreover, to please them by humble and serviceable duties, and to insinuate into their favour.

*Principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est:*
*The praise is not the least,*
*To please men of the best.*

And to make himself capable of their protection, which if he cannot procure them to be his friends, yet at the least not to make them his enemies, which must be done with measure and discretion. For over greedily to avoid their indignation, or to seek their grace and favour, besides that it is a testimony of weakness it is silently to condemn them of injustice and cruelty: *Non ex professo cavere aut fugere: nam quem quis fugit, damnat; Not of set purpose to beware and avoid: for he whom any man shunneth, he condemneth:* or to stir up in them a desire to execute their fury, seeing so base and fearful a submission.

## *Of Fortitude the third virtue.*

### PREFACE.

THe two former precedent virtues rule and govern men in company, or with another: these two following rule him in himself: for himself respecting the two visages of fortune, the two heads and kindes of all accidents, Prosperity, and Adversity: for fortitude armeth a man against adversity, Temperance guideth him in prosperity: moderating the two brutish parts of our soul; fortitude ruleth the irascible, temperance the concupiscible: These two virtues may wholly be comprised and understood by this word Constancy, which is a right and equal stayednes of the minde, in all accidents and outward things, whereby he is not puffed up in prosperity, nor dejected in adversity. *Nec adversis frangitur, nec prosperis æstuat.*

## Chap. XIX.

### *Of Fortitude or Valour in general.*

1 *The description of valour.*

VAlour (for this virtue is more properly so called then fortitude) is a right and strong resolution, an equall and uniform staiednesse of the minde against all dangerous, difficult, and dolorous accidents: in such sort, that difficulty and danger is the object and matter wherein it is exercised: to be brief, it is all that which humane weakenesse feared. *Timendorum contemtrix, quæ terribilia, & sub jugum libertatem nostram mittentia, despicit, provocat, frangit: It contemneth things to be feared, despiseth, challengeth and destroyeth dreadful things, and bringeth our liberty into bondage.*

Senec.

2 *The praise thereof.*

Of all the virtues in greatest estimation and honour, this is most renowned, which for the prerogative thereof is is simply called a virtue. That is the more difficult, the more glorious, which produceth the greatest, famous and most excellent effects, it containeth magnanimity, patience, constancy, an invincible resolution, heroical virtues, whereupon many have sought the inconveniencies that belong thereunto, with greedinesse to attain so honourable imployment. This virtue is an impregnable bulwark, a compleat armour to encounter all accidents. *Munimentum imbecillitatis humanæ inexpugnabile: quod qui circumdedit sibi, securus in hac vitæ obsidione perdurat: An invincible fortresse of humane weakness, that whosoever armeth himself withal, continueth secure in this siege of life.*

Senec.

3 *Of imperfect or false valours.*

But because many do mistake, and in place of the onely true virtue conceive the false and bastardly valours; I will, in declaring more at large the nature and definition thereof, expel those popular errors that are here intruded. We will note then in this virtue four conditions; the first is generally and indifferently against all sorts of difficulties and dangers; wherefore they are deceived that think there is no other valour then the military, which onely they esteem, because it may be it is most renowned and glorious, and carrieth greatest reputation and honour, which is the tongue and trumpet of immortality; for to say truth, there is more fame and glory therein then pain and danger. Now this is but a small part and a little ray or light of the true, entire, perfect, and universal, whereby a man is one and the same, in company, in bed with his griefes, as in the field, as little fearing death in his house, as in the army.

*Military valour.*

This

This military valour is pure and natural in beasts : with whom is is as well in females as in males : in men it is often artificial, gotten by fear and the apprehension of captivity, of death, of grief, of poverty ; of which things beasts have no fear. Humane valour is a wise cowardlinesse, a fear accompanied with foresight to avoid one evil by another ; choler is the temper, and file thereof : beasts have it simply. In men also it is attained by use, institution, example, custome, and it is found in base and slavish mindes : of a servant or slave or a factor, or fellow trained up in merchandise, is made a good and valiant souldier, and often without any tincture or instruct of virtue and true philosophical valour.

4 *Temerity or stupidity.*

The second condition, it presupposeth knowledg as well of th difficulty, pain, and danger, which there is in the action that is presented, as of the beauty, honesty, justice, and duty required in the enterprise or support thereof. Wherefore they are deceived that make valour an inconsiderate temerity, or a senseless brutish stupidity : *Non est inconsulta temeritas, nec periculorum amor, nec formidabilium appetitio, diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo est : & eadem patientissima eorum quibus falsa species malorum est : It is not an inconsiderate rashnesse, nor a love of danger, nor a desire of dreadfull things ; but fortitude is most diligent in the safegard of a mans self, and most patient in those things wherein there is a false shew of evils.* Virtue cannot be without knowledg and apprehension, a man cannot truly contemn the danger which he knoweth not ; if a man will also acknowledg this virtue in beasts. And indeed they that ordinarily attempt without any fore-sight or knowledg, when they come to the point of execution ; the sense is their best intelligence. Senec.

5 *Bodily strength.*

The third condition ; this is a resolution and staiednesse of the minde, grounded upon the duty, and the honesty, and justice, of the enterprise ; which resolution never slacketh, whatsoever happeneth, until he have valiantly ended the enterprise, or his life. Many offend against this condition, first and more grosly, they that seek this virtue in the body, and in the power and strength of the limbs. Now valour is not a quality of the body, but of the minde ; a setled strength, not of the arms and legs, but of the courage. The estimation and valour of a man, consisteth in his heart and will : here lieth his true honour : and the onely advantage and true the victory over his enemy, is to terrifie him, and to arm himself against his constancy and virtue ; all other helps are strange and borrowed :

strength

strength of arms and legs is the quality of a porter: to make an enemy to stoop, to dazzel his eyes at the light of the sun, is an accident of fortune. He whose courage faileth not for any fear of death, quelleth not in his constancy and resolution: and though he fal, is not vanquished of his adversary, who perhaps may in effect be but a base fellow, but of fortune; and therefore he is to accuse his own unhappinesse, and not his negligence. The most valiant are oftentimes the most unfortunate. Moreover they are deceived, which disquiet themselves, and make account of those vain Thrasonical brags of such swaggering Braggadochios, who by their lofty looks, and brave words, would win credit of those that are valiant and hardy, if a man would do them so much favour as to believe them.

6 *Art and industry.*

Moreover, they that attribute valour to subtilty and craft, or to Art or industry, do much more profane it, and make it play a base and abject part. This is to disguise things, and to place a false stone for a true. The Lacedemonians permitted no Fencers nor master-wrestlers in their cities, to the end their youth might attain thereto by nature, and not by Art. We account it a bold and hardy thing to fight with a Lyon, a Bear, a wilde Bore, which incounter a man onely according to nature; but not with Waspes, for they use subtilty. *Alexander* would not contend in the Olympick games, saying, there was no equality; because a private man might overcome, and a king be vanquished. Moreover it is not fitting for a man of honour to try and adventure his valour in a thing, wherein a base fellow, instructed by rule, may gain the prise. For such victory cometh not of virtue, nor of courage, but of certain artificial tricks and inventions: wherein the basest will do that, which a valiant man knoweth not, neither should he regard to do it. Fencing is a trick of Art, which may be attained by base persons, and men of no account. And although infamous and ruffin-like fellows are apt to fight or do any thing in cities or towns, with the dexteritie of the sword; if they see an enemy, would they not run away? Even so is it in that, which is attained by long habit and custom, as builders, tumblers, mariners, who undertake dangerous things, and more difficult then the most valiant, being trained and instructed therein from their youth.

7 *Passion.*

Finally, they which consider not sufficiently the motive and circumstance of actions, wrongly attribute to valour and virtue, that which appertaineth and belongeth to passion or particular intent.

For

For as it is not properly virtue, nor justice to be loyal and officious towards some, which a man particularly loveth; nor temperance, to abstain from the carnal pleasure of his sister, or of his daughter; nor liberality towards his wife and children: so it is not true valour to adventure himself to any danger, for his own benefit and particular satisfaction. Wherefore if it be for gain, as spies, pioners, traitors, merchants on the sea, mercenary souldiers; if for ambition or reputation to be esteemed and accounted valiant, as the most part of our men of war, who say, being naturally carried thereunto, that if they thought they should lose their life, would not go; if weary of his life through pain and grief, as the souldier of *Antigonus*, who living in extreme torment by the means of a fistula he had, was hardy to attempt all dangers, being healed avoided them; if to prevent shame, captivity, or any other evil; if through fury and the heat of choler: to be brief, if by passion or particular consideration, as *Ajax*, *Cataline*, it is neither valour nor virtue; *Sicut non martyrem pœna, sic nec fortem pugna, sed causa facit: As the torment maketh not a martyr, so doth not the conflict make a valiant man, but the cause.*

8 *Indiscretion.*

The fourth condition. It ought to be in the execution thereof wise and discreet, whereby many false opinions are rejected in this matter, which are not to hide themselves from those evils and inconveniencies that threaten them: neither to fear lest they surprise us, nor to fly, yea not to feel the first blows as the noise of thunder or shot, or the fall of some great building. Now this is to understand amisse: for so that the minde remain firm and entire in its own place and discourse, without alteration, he may outwardly disquiet and make a stir. He may lawfully, yea it is honourable to overthrow, to undo, and to revenge himself of evils, by all means and honest endeavours: and where there is no remedy, to carry himself with a settled resolution *Mens immota manet; lachrymæ volvuntur inanes; Vain tears flow apace, but the minde remaineth immoveable.* *Socrates* mocked those that condemned flight: What, saith he, is it cowardlinesse to beat and vanquish them by giving them place? *Homer* commendeth in his *Ulysses* the skill to fly: the Lacedemonians professours of valour, in the journey of the Plateans, retired, the better to break and dissolve the Persian troop, which otherwise they could not do, and overcame them. This hath been practised by the most warlike people. In other places the Stoicks themselves allowed to wax pale, to tremble at the first sudden.

sudden encounter, so that it proceed no farther into minde and courage. And this is valour in grosse. There are things which are justly to be feared and flied, as shipwracks, lightnings, and those where there is no remedy, neither place of virtue, prudence, valour.

### *Of Fortitude and Valour in particular.*

*The proposition and division of this matter.*

TO divide the matter and discourse of that which is here to be said; this virtue is exercised and employed against all that which the world accounteth evil. Now this evil is two-fold, external and internal, the one proceedeth from without, it is called by divers names, adversity, affliction, injury, unhappinesse, evil and sinister accidents: The other is inward in the minde, but caused by that which is outward: These are hateful and hurtful passions, of fear, sadnesse, choler, and divers others. We must speak of them both; prescribe means and remedies to overcome, suppresse, and rule them. These are the arguments and counsels of our virtue, fortitude and valour. It consisteth then here of two parts, the one of evils or ill accidents, the other of passions, which proceed thereof. The general advice against all good and evil fortune hath been declared before: we will speak here more specially and particularly thereof.

## CHAP. XX.

### *The first part of outward evils.*

1 *The distinction and comparison of evils by their causis.*

WE will consider these outward evils three waies, in their causes, which shall be declared in this Chapter; afterward in their effects; lastly, in themselves distinctly and particularly every kind of them: and we will give advice and means in them all, by virtue to be armed against them.

The cause of evil and hateful accidents which happen to us all, are either common and general, which at the same instant they concern many, as pestilence famine, war, tyranny; And these evils are for the most part scourges sent of God, and from heaven, or at least the proper and neerest cause thereof we cannot properly know: Or particulars, and those that are known, that is to say, by the means of another. And so there are two sorts of evil; publike and private, Now the common evils, that is to say, proceeding of a publike cause, though they concern every one in particular,

are

are in divers kindes, more or lesse grievous, weighty and dangerous, then the private, whose causes are known. More grievous, for they come by flocks and troops, they assail more violently, with greater stir of vehemency and fury : they have a greater concourse and train : they are more tempestuous, they bring forth greater disorder and confusion. Lesse grievous : because generality and community seemeth to mitigate and lessen every mans evil. It is a kinde of comfort, not to be alone in misery : it is thought to be rather a common unhappines, where the course of the world, and the cause is natural, then personal affliction. And indeed those wrongs which a man doth us, torment us more, wound us to the quick, and much more alter us. Both these two have their remedies and comforts.

2 *The advice against publick evils.* *Providence.* *Destiny.*

Against publike evils, a man ought to consider from whom, and by whom they are sent, and to mark their cause. It is God, his providence, from whence cometh and dependeth an absolute necessity, which governeth and ruleth all, wherunto all things are subject. His providence, and destinie, or necessity, are not, to say the truth, two distinct laws in essence, πρόνοια καὶ ἀνάγκη, neither are they one. The diversity is onely in the consideration and different reason. Now to murmur and to be grieved at the contrary, is first of all such impiety, as the like is not elsewhere found : for all things do quietly obey, man onely torments himself. And again it is a folly, because it is vain and to no purpose. If a man will not follow this sovereign and absolute mistris willingly, it shall carry all by force ; *Ad hoc Sacramentum adacti sumus ferre mortalia, nec perturbare iis, quæ vitare nostræ potestatis non est : in regno nati sumus, Deo parere libertas est ; We are brought to this necessity, to suffer mortal things, and not to be troubled at those things which are not in our power to avoide : We are born in a kingdom, it is freedom to obey God.*

*Define fata deûm flecti sperare querendo :*
*Surcease to think that desteny.*
*Can by complaining be put by.*

There is no better remedy, then to apply our wills to the will thereof ; and according to the advice of wisdom to make a virtue of necessity, *Non est aliud effugium necessitatis, quâm velle quod ipsa cogat : There is no other avoiding of necessity, then to will that which it constraineth.* In seeking to contend or dispute against it, we do but sharpen and stir the evil ; *Lato animo ferre quicquid accideret,*

*eideret, quasi tibi volueris accidere, debuisses enim velle, si scisses ex decreto Dei fieri : To suffer with a cheerful minde whatsoever shall happen, as if thou wouldest have it happen unto thee for thou oughtest to be willing, if thou knowest it to be done by the decree of God.* Besides we shall better profit our selves, we shall do that which we ought to do, which is to follow our general and sovereign who hath so ordained it : *Optimum pati, quod emendare non possis ; & Deum, quo authore cuncta proveniunt, sine murmuratione comitari. Malus miles est qui imperatorem gemens sequitur : It is an excellent thing patiently to suffer what thou canst not remedy ; And to yield unto God without murmuring, from whom as authour all things proceed. He is an evil souldier that followeth his Commander with grudging.* And without contestation to allow for good whatsoever he will. It is magnanimity of courage to yield unto him. *Magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit : It is magnanimity to yeild himself unto God.* It is effeminacie and dastardlinsse to murmur or complain ; *pusillus & degener qui obluctatur, de ordine mundi male existimat, & emendare mavult Deum quàm se : He is base and ignoble that struggleth against him, he judgeth ill of the order of the world, and had rather amend God then himself.*

3 *The distinction of private evils.*

Against those private evils, which do proceed from the act of another, and which pierce us more, we ought first well to distinguish them, lest we mistake them. There is displeasure, there is offence. We often conceive ill of another, who notwithstanding hath not offended us neither in deed nor will, as when he hath either demanded, or refused any thing with reason, but yet was then hurtful unto : for such causes it is two great simplicity to be offended, since that they are not offences. Now there are two sorts of offences, the one crosseth our affairs against equity ; this is to wrong us : the others are applyed to the person, who is contemned by it, and handled otherwise then it ought, be it in deed or in word. These are more grievous and harder to be endured, then any other kinde of affliction.

4 *The advice against them in general.*

The first and general advice against all these sorts of evils, is to be firm and resolute, not to suffer himself to be led by common opinion but without passion to consider of what weight and importance things are, according to verity and reason. The world suffereth it self to be perswaded and led by impression. How many are there that make lesse account to receive a great wound, then a little blow? more account of a word, then of death? To be brief, all is mea-

sured

sured by opinion: and opinion offendeth more then the evil; and our impatience hurts us more, then those of whom we complain.

The other more particular counsels and remedies are drawn first from our selves, (and this is that we must first look into.) These pretended offences may arise of our own defects and weakness. This might be a folly grounded upon some defect, in our own person, which any one in derision would counterfeit. It is folly to grieve and vex himself for that which proceedeth not from his own fault. The way to prevent others in their scoffs, is first to speak, and to let them know, that you know as much as they can tell you: if it be that the injurie hath taken his beginning by our default, and that we have given the occasion of this abuse, why should we be offended therewith? for it is not an offence, but a correction, which he ought to receive, and make use of as a punishment; 3. But for the most part it proceedeth of our own proper weakness, which makes us melancholy. Now he ought to quit himself of all those tender delicacies, which make him live unquietly, but with a manly courage, strong and stoutly to contemn, and tread underfoot the indiscretions and follies of another. It is no sign that a man is sound, if he complain when one toucheth him. Never shalt thou be at rest if thou frame thy self to all that is presented.

5 *Particular advisements drawn from our selves.*

They are also drawn from the person that offendeth. We represent in general the manners and humours of those persons with whom we are to live in the world. The most part of men take no delight but to do evil, and measure their power by the disdain, and the injury of another. So few there are which take pleasure to do well. We ought then to make account that whithersoever we turn us, we shall finde those that will harm, and offend us. Whereso-ever we shall finde men, we shall finde injuries. This is so certain and necessary, that the Lawyers themselves, who rule the traffick and affaires of this world, have winked at, and permitted in distributive and communitative justice many escapes in Law. They have permitted deceit and hindrances even to the one half of the just price. This necessity to hurt and offend cometh first of the contrariety, and incompatibility of humours and wils, whereof it cometh that a man is offended without will to offend. Then from the concurrence and opposition of affairs, which inferreth that the pleasure, profit, and good of one is the displeasure, dammage, anp ill of others; and it cannot be otherwise, following this common and general picture of the world, if he who offendeth.

9 *Of those who offend.*

fendeth thee is insolent, a fool, and rash) as he is, for an honest man never wrongeth any) wherefore complainedst thou, since he is no more his own man, then as a mad man? You can well endure a furious man without complaint, yea, you will pitie him; an innocent, an infant, a woman, you will laugh at them: a fool, a drunken man, a cholerick, an indiscreet man in like sort. Wherefore when these people assail us with words, we ought not to answer them: we must hold our peace, and quit our selves of them. It is an excellent and worthy revenge, and grievous to a fool, not to make any account of him, for it is to take away that pleasure which he thinketh to have in vexing us, since our silence condemns his simplicity, and his own temerity is smothered in his own mouth: If a man answer him, he makes him his equal, and by esteeming him too much, he wrongs himself. *Malè loquuntur quia bene loqui nescìunt, faciunt quod sciunt & sciunt, malè quia mali, & secundùm se: They speak evil, because they know not how to speak well, they do what they are used to, and what they know, evilly because they are evil, and according to themselves.*

*The conclusion of these counsels with the rule of wisedom.*

7 Behold then for conclusion the advice and counsel of wisdom: we must have respect unto our selves, and unto him that offendeth us. As touching our selves we must take heed we do nothing unworthy and unbefitting our selves, that may give another advantage against us. An unwise man that distrusteth himself, growes into passion without cause, and thereby gives incouragement to another to contradict him. This is a weakness of the minde, not to know to contemn offence: an honest man is not subject to injury: he is inviolable: an inviolable thing is not onely this, that a man cannot be beat, but being beaten, neither receiveth wound nor hurt: This resolution is a more strong bulwark against all accidents; that we can receive no evil, but of our selves. If our judgement be as it ought, we are invulnerable. And therefore we alwaies say with wise *Socrates*, *Anitus*, and *Melitus* may well put me to death, but they shall never inforce me to do that I ought not. Moreover, an honest man, as he never giveth occasion of injury to any man, so he cannot endure to receive an injury; *Lædere enim lædi, conjunctum est. For to hurt, and to be hurt, are near neighbours.* This is a wall of brasse, which a man is not able to pierce; scoffes and injuries trouble him not. Touching him that hath offended us, if you hold him vain and unwise, handle him accordingly, and so leave him: if he be otherwise, excuse him; Imagine that he hath had

had occasion, and that it is not for malice, but by misconceit and negligence; he is vexation enough to himself, and he wisheth he had never done it. Moreover, I say, that like good husbands we must make profit and commodity of the injuries that are offered us. Which we may do at the least two wayes, which respect the offender, and the offended. The one, that they give us occasion to know those that wrong us, to the end we may the better fly them at another time. Such a man hath slandered thee, conclude presently that he is malicious, and trust him no more. The other, that they discover unto us our infirmity, and the means whereby we are easily beaten; to the end we should amend and repair our defects, lest another take occasion to say as much or more. What better revenge can a man take of his enemies, then to make profit of their injuries, & thereby better and more securely to manage our affaires?

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of outward evils considered in their effects and fruits*

AFter the causes of evill, we come to the effects and fruits thereof, where are also found true preservatives and remedies. The effects are many, are great, are generall and particular. The generall respect the good, maintenance and culture of the universall. First of all, the world would be extinguished, would perish, and be lost, if it were not changed, troubled, and renewed by these great accidents of pestilence, famine, warr, mortality, which season, perfect and purifie it, to the end to sweeten the rest, and give more liberty and ease to the whole. Without these a man could neither turn himself nor be settled. Moreover, besides the variety & interchangeable course, which they bring both to the beauty and ornament of the universe, also all parts of the world are benefited thereby. The rude and barbarous are hereby polished and refined, Arts and Sciences are dispersed and imparted unto all. This is as a great nursery, wherein certain trees are transplanted from other stocks, others pruned and pulled up by the root, all for the good and beauty of the Orchard. These good and generall considerations ought to remain and resolve every honest and reasonable mind, and to hinder the curious inquiry of men, into those great and turbulent accidents, so strange and wonderfull, since they are the works of God and nature, and that they do so notable a service in the generall course of the world. For we must think, that that

1 *Generall effects very profitable.*

which is a losse in one respect, is a gain in another; and to speak more plainly, nothing is lost, but such is the course of the world, so it changeth, and so it is accommodated. *Vir sapiens nihil indigentur sibi accipere, sciatq; illa ipsa quibus ladi videtur, ad conservationem universi pertinere, & ex his esse, quæ cursum mundi officiumq; consummant*: *Let a wise man disdain nothing that shall happen unto him, and let him know that those things that seem hurtfull unto him, pertain to the preservation of the Whole universe, and to be of the nature of those things that finish up the course and office of the world.*

2 *Particular effects divers. 1. Lib. of the three verities, cap. 11.*

The particular effects are divers, according to the divers spirits and states of those that receive them. For they exercise the good, relieve and amend the fallen, punish the wicked. Of every one a word; for hereof we have spoken else-where. These outward evils are, in those that are good, a very profitable exercise, and an excellent school, wherein (as Wrestlers and Fencers, Marriners in a tempest, Souldiers in dangers, Philosophers in their Academies, and in all other sorts of people in the serious exercise of their profession) they are instructed, made and formed unto virtue, constancy, valour, the victory of the world and of fortune. They learn to know themselves, to make tryall of themselves, and they see the measure of their valour, the uttermost of their strength; how far they may promise or hope of themselves, and then they encourage and strengthen themselves to what is best, accustome and harden themselves to all, become resolute and invincible; whereas contrarily, the long calme of prosperity mollifieth them, and maketh them wanton and effeminate. And therefore *Demetrius* was wont to say, That there were no people more miserable, then they that had never felt any crosses or afflictions, that had never been miserable, calling their life a dead sea.

3 *Medicine and chastisement.*

These outward evils, to such as are offenders, are a bridle to stay them, that they stumble not, or a gentle correction and fatherly rod after the fall, to put them in remembrance of themselves, to the end they make not a second revolt: They are a kinde of letting bloud, and medicine or preservative to divert faults and offences; or a purgation to void and purifie them.

4 *Punishment.*

To the wicked and forlorne they are a punishment, a sickle to cut them off, and to take them away, or to afflict them with a long and miserable languishment. And these are the wholesome and necessary effects, for which these outward evils are not onely to be esteemed

esteemed of, and quietly taken with patience and in good part, as the exploits of divine justice, but are to be embraced as tokens and instruments of the care, of the love and providence of God, and men are to make a profitable use of them, following the purpose & intention of him, who sendeth and disposeth them as pleaseth him.

### *Of outward evils in themselves and particularly.*

#### An Advertisement.

All these evils, which are many and divers, are privations of their contrary good, as likewise the name and nature of evill do signifie. And therefore as many heads as there are of good, so many are there of evils, which may all be reduced and comprehended in the number of seven; sickness, griefe, (I conclude these two in one) captivity, banishment, want, infamy, losse of friends, death; which are the privations of health, liberty, home dwelling, means or maintenance, honours, friends, life, whereof hath bee spoken before at large. We will here inquire into the proper and particular remedies and medicines against these seven heads of evils, and that briefly without discourse. *In the first book.*

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of sickness and griefe.*

We have said before that griefe is the greatest, and to say the truth, the only essentiall evill, which is most felt, and hath least remedies. Nevertheless behold some few that regard the reason, justice, utility, imitation and resemblance with the greatest and most excellent.

It is a common necessity to endure; there is no reason that for our sakes a miracle should be wrought; or that a man should be offended if that happen unto him, that may happen unto every man.

It is also a naturall thing; we are born thereunto, and desire to be exempted from it is injustice, we must quietly endure the laws of our own condition. We are made to be old, to be weak, to grieve, to be sick, and therefore we must learn to suffer that which we cannot avoid.

If it be long, it is a light and moderate, and therefore a shame to complain of it: if it be violent, it is shot, and speedy, ends either it self or the patient, which comes all to one end. *Confide, summus*

*non habet tempus dolor. Si gravis, brevis; Si longus, levis. Be bold of this, extreme pain hath no perpetuity: if it be grievous, it is soon gone; if long, then light.*

4 And again, it is the body that endureth: it is not our ſelves that are offended, for the offence diminiſheth the excellency and perfection of the thing; and ſickneſs or griefe is ſo far from diminiſhing, that contrarily it ſerveth for a ſubject and an occaſion of a commendable patience, much more then health doth: And where there is more occaſion of commendation, there is not leſſe occaſion of good. If the body be the inſtrument of the ſpirit, who will complain when the inſtrument is imployed to the ſervice of that whereunto it is deſtinated? The body is made to ſerve the ſoul: if the ſoul ſhould afflict it ſelf for any thing that hapneth to the body, the ſoul ſhould ſerve the body. Were not that man over-delicate and curious, that would cry out and afflict himſelf, becauſe ſome one or other had ſpoyled his apparell, ſome thorne had taken hold of it, or ſome man paſſing by had torn it? Some baſe Broker perhaps would be agrieved therewith, that would willingly make a commodity thereof: but a man of ability and reputation would rather langh at it, and account it as nothing in reſpect of that ſtate and abundance, that God hath beſtowed on him. Now this body is but a borrowed garment, to make our ſpirits for a time to appear upon this low and troubleſome ſtage; of which onely we ſhould make account, and procure the honour and peace thereof. For from whence commeth it, that a man ſuffereth griefe with ſuch impatiency? It is becauſe he accuſtometh not himſelf to ſeek his content in his ſoul; *non aſſuerunt animo eſſe contenti, nimium illis cum corpore fuit: they have not accuſtomed themſelves to be content in mind, their contentment was too much with the body.* Men have too great a commerce with their bodies, and it ſeemeth that griefe groweth proud, ſeeing us to tremble under the power thereof.

5 It teacheth us to diſtaſte that which we muſt needs leave, and to unwinde our ſelves from the vanity and deceit of this world, an excellent piece of ſervice.

6 The joy and pleaſure we receive by the recovery of our health, after that our griefe or ſickneſs hath taken his courſe, is a ſtrange enlightning unto us; in ſuch ſort, that it ſhould ſeem that nature hath given ſickneſs for the greater honour and ſervice of our pleaſure and delight.

Now then if the griefe be indifferent, the patience ſhall be eaſie.

if

if it be great, the glory ſhall be as great: if it ſeem over-hard, let us accuſe our delicacy and niceneſſe; and if there be but few that can endure it, let us be of the number of thoſe few. Let us not accuſe nature for having made us ſo weak, for that is nothing, but we are rather too delicate. If we flie it, it will follow us; if we cowardly yield unto it, and ſuffer our ſelves to be vanquiſhed, it wil handle us the more roughly, and the reproach will light upon our ſelves. It would make us afraid, and therefore it ſtandeth us upon to take heart, and that when it cometh it find us more reſolute then was imagined. Our yielding makes that more eager and more fierce, *Stare fidenter, non quia difficilia non audemus, ſed quia non audemus, difficilia ſunt. To ſtand confidently, We do not ſhrink at them becauſe they be difficult: but they are difficult to endure, becauſe we ſhrink at them.*

8 *Examples.*

But leſt theſe remedies ſhould ſeem but fair words and mere imaginations, and the practice of them altogether impoſſible, we have examples both frequent and rich, not onely of men, but of women and children, who have not onely a long time endured long and grievous ſickneſſes with ſuch conſtancie, that their grief hath rather given them life then courage; but have attended and born even with joy, yea, have ſought after the greateſt and moſt exquiſite torments. In Lacedemon little children whipped one another, yea, ſometimes to the death, without any ſhew in their countenance of any grief or ſmart that they felt, onely to accuſtom themſeves to ſuffer for their countrey. *Alexanders* Page ſuffered himſelf to be burnt with a cole, without cry or countenance of diſcontent, becauſe he would not interrupt the ſacrifice: and a lad of Laecedemon ſuffered a Fox to gnaw his guts out of his belly before he would diſcover his theft. *Pompey* being ſurpriſed by King *Gentius*, who would have conſtrained him to reveal the publick affairs of Rome, to make known that no torment ſhould make him to do it, did voluntarily put his finger into the fire, and ſuffered it to burn, until *Gentius* himſelf took it out. The like before that had *Mucius* done before another King, *Porſenna*: and that good old *Regulus* of Carthage endured more then al theſe: and yet more then *Regulus*, *Anaxarchus*, who being half pounded in a morter by the tyrant *Nicocreon*, would never confeſſe that his minde was touched with any torment; Beat and pound the ſack of *Anaxarchus* tillyou be glutted, as for himſelf you ſhall never touch him.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *Of captivity and impriſonment.*

THis affliction is no more then nothing, and in reſpect of ſickneſſe and grief it is an eaſie matter to vanquiſh it. For ſick folk are not without captivity in their beds in their houſes, for the time they lye in, yea, they ingroſſe as it were affliction above captivity; nevertheleſs a word or two thereof. There is nothing but the body, the cover, the priſon of thy ſoul that is captive; the ſoul it ſelf remaineth alwaies free and at liberty, in deſpight of all; and therefore how ſhould that man know or perceive that he is in priſon, who as freely, yea, and more freely too, may walk and wander whither he will then he that is abroad? The wals and dungeons of the priſon are not ſtrong enough to ſhut him up, the body that toucheth him and is joyned unto him, cannot hold nor ſtay him. He that knoweth how to maintain himſelf in his liberty, and to uſe and hold his own right, which is not to be ſhut up, no not in this world, will but laugh at theſe ſleight and childiſh embarments, *Chriſtianus etiam extra carcerem ſeculo renuntiavit: in carere etiam carceri: nihil intereſt ubi ſitis in ſeculo qui extra ſeculum eſtis; afferamus carceris nomen, ſeceſſum vocemus, & ſi corpus includitur, caro detinetur, omnia ſpiritui patent. totum hominem animus circumfert, & quo vult transfert. A Chriſtian man even out of priſon hath renounced the world: in priſon alſo he hath renounced the priſon: it mattereth nothing where thou art in the world: who art of the world: Let us take away the name of priſon, and call it a quiet retiring place, and if the body be included, the fleſh is priſoner, but the ſpirit is free to all things, the mind carrieth about the whole man, and whither he liſt it tranſporteth him.* Tertul.

The priſon hath gently received into the lap thereof many great and holy perſonages, it hath been the ſanctuary, the haven of health, and a fortreſs to divers that had been utterly undone if they had had their liberty, yea, that have had recourſe thereunto to be in liberty, have made choice thereof, and eſpouſed themſelves unto it, to the end they might live at reſt, and free themſelves from the cares of the world, *è carcere in cuſtodiarum tranſlati, Tranſlated from the priſon of affairs, to the quiet of 4 wals.* That which is ſhut up under lock and key is in ſafeſt cuſtody: and it is better to be under the ſafegard of a key, then to be bound and enthralled with thoſe fetters

ters and stocks, whereof the world is ful, that publick places and courts of great princes, and the tumultuous affairs of this world bring with them, as jealousies, envies, violent humours, and the like. *Si recogitemus ipsum magis mundum carcerem esse, exisse nos è carcere quàm in carcerem introisse intelligemus, majores tenebras habet mundus, quæ hominum præcordia excæcant, graviores catenas induit, quæ ipsas animas constringunt, pejores immunditias exspirat, libidines hominum, plures postremò reos continet, universum genus hominum:* *If we consider that the world it self is a prison, we shall understand that we are rather gone out of the world, then entred into prison; the world hath greater darknes, wherewith the inward cogitations of the hearts of men are blinded; it fettereth with more grievous irons wherewith mens very souls are shackled; it breatheth forth worser uncleannesses in the lusts and sensualities of men; it containeth more guilty persons, even whole Mankinde.* Tertul. Many have escaped the hands of their enemies, and other great dangers and miseries by the benefit of imprisonment. Some have there written books, and have there bettered their knowledg. *Plus in carcere spiritus acquirit quàm caro amittit: The spirit getteth more in prison, then the flesh loseth.* Divers there are, whom the prison having kept and preserved for a time, hath resent unto their former sovereign dignities, and mounted them to the highest places in the world; others it hath yielded up unto heaven, and hath not at any time received any that it restoreth not

## CHAP. XXIV.

### *Of banishment and exile.*

EXile is a change of place that brings no ill with it, but in opinion; it is a complaint and affliction wholly imaginary: for according to reason there is not any ill in it: In all places all is after one fashion, which is comprehended in two words, Nature and Virtue. *Duo quæ pulcherrima sunt, quocunque nos moveremus, sequentur, natura communis & propria virtus: There are two excellent things which will follow us whithersoever we go, common Nature, and mans own virtue.* 1.

In all places we finde the self same common nature, the same heavens, the same elements. In all places the heavens and the stars appear unto us in the same greatness, extent, and that is it which principally we are to consider, and not that which is under us, and which we trample under feet. Again, at a kenning 2. *Nature.*

we cannot see of the earth above ten or twelve leagues: *Angustus animus quem terrena delectant*: *The minde is narrow and strait, whom earthly things delight.* But the face of the great azured firmament, decked and counterpointed with so many beautiful and shining diamonds, doth alwaies shew it self unto us; and to the end we may wholly behold it, it continually whirleth about us. It sheweth it self all unto all, and in all respects, in a day and a night. The earth which with the sea and all that it containeth, is not the hundreth and sixty part of the greatnesse of the sun, sheweth not it self unto us but in that smal proportion that is about the place where we dwell: yea and that change of that earthly floor that is under us is nothing. What matter is it to be born in one place and to live in another? Our Mother might have layen in elsewhere, and it is a chance that we are born here or there. Again, all Countries bring forth and nourish men, and furnish them with whatsoever is necessary. All Countries have kindred: nature hath knit us altogether in blood and in charity. All have friends; there is no more to do but to make friends and to win them by virtu and wisedom. Every land is a wise mans countrey, or rather no land is his particular Countrey. For it were to wrong himself, and it were weakneſſe and baseneſſe of heart, to think to carry himself as a wrangler in any place. He must alwayes use his own right and liberty, and live in all places as with himself, and upon his own; *Omnes terras tanquam suas videre, & suas tanquam omnium*: *to see all lands as their own, and their own as the land of all.*

3 *Virtue.* Moreover what change or discommodity doth the diversity of the place bring with it? Do we not alwaies carry about us one & the same spirit and virtue? Who can forbid, saith *Brutus*, a banished man to carry with him his virtues? The spirit and virtue of a man is not shut up in any place; but it is every where equally and indifferently. An honest man is a citizen of the world, free, cheerful and content in all places, alwaies within himself, in his own quarter, and ever one and the same, though his case or scabbard be removed and carried hither and thither: *Animus sacer & aternus ubique est diis cognatus, omni mundo & evo par*: *The sacred and eternal soul is every where, of near affinity with God, alike to all the world, and to all ages.* A man in every place is in his own countrey where he is well. Now for a man to be well, it dependeth not upon the place, but himself.

4 *Examples.* How many are there that for divers considerations have willingly

ingly banished themselves? How many others banished by the violence of another, being afterwards called home, have refused to return, and have found their exile not onely tolerable, but pleasant and delightfull; yea, never thought they lived until the time of their banishment, as those noble Romans *Rutilius, Marcellus?* How many others have been led by the hand of good fortune out of their countrey, that they may grow great and puissant in a strange land.

## CHAP. XXV.

### *Of Poverty, Want, losse of goods.*

THis complaint is of the vulgar and miserable sottish sort of people, who place their sovereign good in the goods of fortune, and think that poverty is a very great evil. But to shew what it is, you must know that there is a two-fold poverty: the one extreme, which is the want of things necessary, and requisite unto nature; this doth seldom or never happen to any man, nature being so just, and having formed us in such a fashion, that few things are necessary, and those few are not wanting, but are found every where; *Parabile est quod natura desiderat, & expositum: That which nature desireth is ready and easie to be had*; yea in such a sufficiencie, as being moderately used, may suffice the condition of every one. *Ad manum est, quod sat est: That which sufficeth is ready and at hand.* If we will live according to nature and reason, the desire and rule thereof, we shall alwaies finde that which is sufficient. If we will live according to opinion, whilst we live we shall never finde it. *Si ad naturam vives, nunquam eris pauper, si ad opinionem, nunquam dives: exiguum natura desiderat, opinio immensum: If thou wilt live according to nature, thou shalt never be poor; if according to opinion, never rich: nature desireth little, opinion much and beyond measure.* And therefore, a man that hath an Art or science to stick unto, yea that hath but his arms at will, is it possible he should either fear or complain of poverty? 1

1 *Povery two-fold.*

1 *Want of things necessary.*

The other is the want of things that are more then sufficient, required for pomp, pleasure and delicacy. This is a kinde of mediocrity and frugality: and to say the truth, it is that which we fear, to lose our riches, our moveables, not to have our bed soft enough, our diet well dresst, to be deprived of these commodities, and in a word, it is delicatnesse that holdeth us, this is our true malady.

2 *Want of things superfluous.*

Now

Prov 30. Now this complaint is unjust; for such poverty is rather to be desired then feared: and therefore the wise men asked of God; *Mendicitatem nec divitias, sed necessaria: Neither poverty nor riches, but things necessary.* It is far more just, more rich, more peaceable and certain, then abundance,, which a man so much desireth. More just; for man came naked; *Nemo nascitur dives; No man is born rich*, and he returneth naked out of this world. Can a man term that truly his, that he neither bringeth nor carrieth with him? The goods of this world, they are as the moveables of an Inne. We are not to be discontented so long as we are here, that we have need of them. More rich; It is a large signory, a kingdome: *Magnæ divitiæ lege naturæ composita paupertas: magnus quæstus pietas cum sufficientia: Moderate and quiet poverty by the law of nature is great riches; Godliness is great gain with sufficiency.* More peaceable and assured; it feareth nothing, and can defend it self against the enemies thereof: *Etiam in obsessa via paupertas pax est: Poverty hath peace even in a besieged way.* A small body that may cover and gather it self under a buckler, is in better safety then a great, which lieth open unto every blow. It is never subject to great losses, nor charges of great labour and burthen. And therefore they that are in such an estate, are alwaies more cheerfull and comfortable, for they never have so much care, nor fear such tempests. Such kinde of poverty is free, cheerfull, assured, it maketh us truly masters of our own lives; whereof the affaires, complaints, contentions, that do necessarily accompany riches, carry away the better part. Alas! what goods are those, from whence proceed all our evills? They are the cause of all those injuries that we endure, that make us slaves; trouble the quiet of our souls, bring with them so many jealousies, suspicions, fears, frights, desires? He that vexeth himself for the losse of these goods, is a miserable man, for together with his goods he looseth his spirit too. The life of poor men is like unto those that sail neer the shore; that of the rich, like to those that cast themselves into the main Ocean. These cannot attain to land, though they desire nothing more, but they must attend the wind and the tide; the other come aboard, pass and repass, as often as they will.

*The praise of sufficiency.*

1 Tim. 6.

3. Finally, we must endeavour to imitate those great and generous personages, that have made themselves merry with such kinde of losses, yea have made advantage of them, and thanked God for them; as *Zenon*, after his shipwrack, *Fabricius*, *Seranus*, *Curius*. It should seem that poverty is some excellent and divine thing, since

since it agreeth with the gods who are imagined to be naked, since the wisest have embraced it, or at least have endured it with great contentment. And to conclude in a word, with such as are not over passionate it is commendable, with others insupportable.

## CHAP. XXVI.

### *Of Infamy.*

THis affliction is of divers kindes. If it be loss of honours and dignities, it is rather a gain then a loss: Dignities are but honourable servitudes, whereby a man by giving himself to the weal-publike, is deprived of himself. Honours are but the torches of envy, jealousie, and in the end exile and poverty. If a man shall call to minde the history of all antiquity, he shall finde that all they that have lived, and have carried themselves worthily and virtuously, have ended their course either by exile, or prison, or some other violent death: witness amongst the Greeks, *Aristides*, *Themistocle*, *Phocion*, *Socrates*; amongst the Romans, *Camillus*, *Scipio*, *Cicero*, *Papinian*; among the Hebrews the Prophets: In such sort, that it should seem to be the livery of the more honest men; for it is the ordinary recompence of a publique state to such kinde of people. And therefore a man of a gallant and generons spirit should contemn it, and make small account thereof; for he dishonoureth himself, and shewes how little he hath profited in the study of wisdome, that regardeth in any respect the censures, reports, and speeches of the people, be they good, or evill.

## CHAP. XXVII.

### *Of the loss of Friends.*

I. THere comprehend parents, children, and whatsoever is neer and dear unto a man. First we must know upon what this pretended complaint or affliction is grounded, whether upon the interest, or good of our friends or our own. Vpon that of our friends; I doubt we shall say yea to that, but yet we must not be too credulous to believe it. It is an ambitious faining of piety, whereby we make a shew of sorrow and grief for the hurt of another, or the hinderance of the weal publick: but if we shall withdraw the veil of dissimulation, and sound it to the quick, we shall finde that it is

our

our own particular good that is hid therein, that toucheth us nearest. We complain that our own candle burneth, and is consumed, or at least is in some danger: This is rather a kinde of envie, then true pietie; for that which we so much complain of touching the loss of our friends, their absence, distance from us, is their true and great good: *Mœrere hoc eventum invidi magis quàm amici est; to mourn for this event, is rather the part of an envious person then of a friend.* The true use of death is, to make an end of our miseries. God had made our life more miserable, if he had made it longer.

And therefore to say the truth, it is upon our own good that this complaint and affliction is grounded: now that becommeth us not; it is a kinde of injury to be grieved with the rest and quiet of those that love us, because we our selves are hurt thereby. *Suis incommodis angi, non amicum, sed seipsum amantis est: to be grieved for his own discommodities, sheweth a man not to love his friend, but himself.*

Again, there is a good remedie for this which fortune cannot take from us, and that is, that surviving our friends, we have means to make new friends. Friendship, as it is one of the greatest blessings of our life, so it is most easily gotten. God makes men, and men make friends. He that wanteth not virtue, shall never want friends. It is the instrument wherewith they are made, and wherewith, when he hath lost his old, he makes new. If fortune hath taken away our friendes, let us endeavour to make new; by this means we shall not lose them, but multiply them.

## *Of death.*

WE have spoken hereof so much at large and in all respects in the eleventh and last chapter of the second book, that there remaineth not any thing else to be spoken: and therefore to that place I refer the Reader.

## *The second part of inward evils, tedious and troublesome passions.*

### The Preface.

FRom all these above named evils, there spring and arise in us divers passions and cruel affections: for these being taken and considered

considered simply as they are, they breed fear which apprehendeth evils as yet to come, sorrow for present evils, and if they be in another, pitie and compassion. Being considered as coming and procured by the act of another, they stir up in us the passion of choler, hatred, envie, jealousie, despight, revenge, and all those that procure displeasure, or make us to look upon an other with an envious eye. Now this virtue of fortitude and valour, consisteth in the government and receit of these evils according to reason, in the resolute and courageous carriage of a man, and the keeping of himself free and cleer from all passions that spring thereof. But because they subsist not, but by these evils, if by the means and help of so many advisements and remedies before delivered, a man can vanquish and contemn them all, there can be no more place left unto these passions. And this is the true mean to free himself, and to come to the end; as the best way to put out a fire, is to withdraw the fuell that gives it nourishment. Nevertheless we will yet add some particular counsels against these passions, though they have been in such sort before deciphered, that it is a matter of no difficulty to bring them into hatred and detestation.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

### *Against Fear.*

LEt no man attend evils before they come, because it may be they will never come: our fears are as likely to deceive us, as our hopes; and it may be that those times that we think will bring most affliction with them, may bring greatest comfort. How many unexspected adventures may happen, that may defend a man from that blow we fear? Lightning is put by with the wind of a mans hat, and the fortunes of the greatest states with accidents of small moment. The turn of a wheel mounteth him that was of lowest degree, to the highest step of honour; and many times it falleth out that we are preserved by that, which we thought would have been our overthrow. There is nothing so easily deceived as humane foresight. That which it hopeth, it wanteth; that which it feareth, vanisheth; that which it exspecteth, hapneth not. God hath his counsell by himself: That which man determineth after one manner, he resolveth after another. Let us not therefore make our selves unfortunate before our time, nay when perhaps we are never likely to be so. Time to come which deceiveth

veth so many, will likewise deceive us as soon in our fears, as in our hopes. It is a maxime commonly received in physick, that in sharp maladies the predictions are never certain: and even so is it in the most furious threatnings of fortune; so long as there is life, there is hope, for hope continues as long in the body as the soul: *quamdiu spiro, spero.*

But forasmuch as this fear proceedeth not alwayes from the disposition of nature, but many times from an over-delicate education (for by the want of exercise and continuall travell and labour, even from our youth we many times apprehend things without reason) we must by a long practice accustome our selves unto that, which may most terrifie us, present unto our selves the most fearfull dangers that may light upon us, and with cheerfulness of heart attempt sometimes casuall adventures, the better to trie our courage, to prevent evill occurrents, and to seize upon the armes of fortune. It is a matter of lesse difficulty to resist fortune by assailing it, then by defending our selves against it. For then we have leasure to arm our selves, we take our advantages, we provide for a retrait; whereas when it assaulteth, it surprises us unawares, and handleth us at her own pleasure. We must then whilest we assaile fortune, learn to defend our selves, give unto our selves false alarums, by proposing unto us the dangers that other great personages have passed, call to mind that some have avoided the greatest, because they were not astonished at them; others have been overthrown by the least, for want of resolution.

## CHAP. XXIX.

### *Against Sorrow.*

THe remedies against sorrow (set down before as the most tedious, hurtfull, and unjust passion) are two-fold: some are direct or straight, others oblique. I call those direct which Philosophy teacheth, which concern the confronting and disdaining of evils, accounting them not evils, or at leastwise very small and light (though they be great and grievous) and that they are not worthy the least motion or alteration of our minds; and that to be sorry for them, or to complain of them, is a thing very unjust and ill befitting a man, to teach the *Stoickes*, *Peripateticks*, and *Platonists*. This manner of preserving a man from sorrow and melancholike passion, is as rare, as it is excellent, and belongs to spirits of the

the first rank. There is likewise another kinde of Philosophicall remedy, although it be not of so good a stamp, which is easie and much more in use, and it is oblique; this is by diverting a mans minde and thought to things pleasant and delightfull, or at least indifferent from that that procureth our sorrow: which is to deal cunningly, to decline and avoid an evill, to change the object. It is a remedy very common, and which is used almost in all evils, if a man mark it, as well of the body as of the minde. Physitians when they cannot purge a rheum, they turn it into some other part lesse dangerous. Such as passe by steep and precipitate deeps and downfals, that have need of lancings, fearing irons, or fire, shut their eyes, and turn their faces another way. Valiant men in warr do never taste nor consider of death, their minds being carried away by the desire of victory; in so much that divers have suffered death gladly, yea have procured it, and been their own executioners, either for the future glory of their name, as many Greeks and Romans; or for the hope of another life, as Martyrs, the disciples of *Hegesius*, and others after the reading of *Plato* his book to *Antiochus*, *De morte contemnenda*; or to avoid the miseries of this life; and for other reasons. All these are they not diversions? Few there are that consider evils in themselves, that relish them as *Socrates* did his death; and *Flavius* condemned by *Nero* to die by the hands of *Niger*. And therefore in sinister accidents and misadventures, and in all outward evils, we must divert our thoughts, and turn them another way. The vulgar sort can give this advice, Think not of it. Such as have the charge of those that are any way afflicted, should for their comfort furnish affrighted spirits with others objects. *Abducendus est animus ad alia studia, solicitudines, curas, negotia; loci denique mutatione sæpe curandus est. The minde is to be led away to other studies, cares, affaires; lastly by change of place it is often cured.*

## CHAP. XXX.

### *Against mercy and compassion.*

THere is a two-fold mercy, the one good and virtuous, which is in God and in his Saints, which is in will and in effect to succour the afflicted, not afflicting themselves, or diminishing any thing that concerneth honour or equity; the other is a kinde of feminine passionate pity, which proceedeth from too great a tenderness

derneſs and weakneſs of the minde, whereof hath been ſpoken before in the above-named paſſion. Again, this wiſdome teacheth us to ſuccour the afflicted, but not to yield and to ſuffer with him. So is God ſaid to be mercifull, as the Phyſician to his patient, the advocate to his client, affordeth all diligence and induſtry, but yet taketh not their evils and affaires to the heart; ſo doth a wiſe man, not entertaining any griefe, or darkning his ſpirit with the ſmoke thereof. God commandeth us to aid, and to have a care of the poor, to defend their cauſe; and in another place he forbids us to pity the poor in judgment.

## CHAP. XXXI.

### *Againſt Choler.*

THe remedies are many and divers, wherewith the minde muſt before hand be armed and defended, like thoſe that fear to be beſieged; for afterwards it is too late. They may be reduced to three heads; The firſt is to cut off the way, and to ſtop all the paſ-
1 *The firſt head* ſages unto choler. It is an eaſier matter to withſtand it, and to ſtay the paſſage thereof in the beginning, then when it hath ſeized upon a man to carry himſelf well and orderly. He muſt therefore quit himſelf from all the cauſes and occaſions of Choler, which heretofore have been produced in the deſcription thereof, that is to ſay. 1. weakneſs and tenderneſs; 2. malady of the minde in hardning it ſelf againſt whatſoever may happen; 3. too great delicateneſs; the love of certain things do accuſtome a man to facility, and ſimplicity, the mother of peace and quietneſs, *Ad omnia compoſiti ſimus: quæ bona et paratiora ſint nobis meliora et gratiora*; *Let us be ſettled to all things: let thoſe things which are good and ready at hand, be better and more acceptable to us.* It is the generall doctrine of the wiſe King *Cotys*, who having received for a preſent many beautifull and rich veſſels, yet frail and eaſie to be broken, brak them all, to the end he might not be ſtirred to choler and fury, when they ſhould happen to be broken. This was a diſtruſt in himſelf, and a baſe kind of fear that provoked him thereunto. 4. Curioſity according to the example of *Ceſar*, who being a Conquerour, and having recovered the letters, writings, and memorals of his enemies, burnt them all before he ſaw them. 5. Lightneſs of beliefe. 6. and above all, an opinion of being contemned, and wronged by another, which he muſt chaſe from him as unworthy a man of ſpirit:

for

for though it seem to be a glorious thing, and to proceed from too high esteem of himself (which nevertheless is a great voice) yet it commeth of baseness and imbecillity. For he that thinketh himself to be contemned by another, is in some sense his inferiour, judgeth himself, or fears that in truth he is so, or is so reputed, and distrusteth himself. *Nemo non eo à quo se contemtum judicat minor est*; *No man is lesser then he of whom he thinketh himself to be contemned.* A man must therefore think that it proceedeth rather from any thing then contempt, that is sottishness, indiscretion, want of good manners. If this supposed contempt proceed from his friends, it is too great familiarity: If from his subjects or servants, knowing that their master hath power to chasten them, it is not to be believed that they had any such thought: If from base and inferiour people, our honour, or dignity, or indignity, is not in the power of such people: *Indignus Cæsaris irâ*: *unworthy the wrath of Cesar.* *Agathocles* and *Antigonus* laughed at those that wronged them, and hurt them not having them in their power. *Cesar* excelled all in this point; and *Moses*, *David*, and all the greatest personages of the world have done the like. *Magnam fortunam magnus animus docet*; *A great mind becometh a great fortune.* The most glorious conquest is for a man to conquer himself, not to be moved by another. To be stirred to choler is to confesse the accusation. *Convitia si irascare agnita videntur, spreta exolescunt: Reproachfull speeches if thou be angry at them, seem acknowledged; if thou despise them they vanish to nothing.* He can never be great, that yieldeth himself to the offence of another: If we vanquish not our choler, that will vanquish us. *Injurias & offensiones supernè despicere*: *Highly to despise injuries and offences.*

The second head is of those remedies that a man must imploy when the occasions of choler are offered, and that there is a likelihood that we may be moved thereunto, which are first, to keep and contain our bodies in peace and quietness, without motion or agitation; which inflameth the blood and humours, and to keep himself silent and solitary. Secondly, delay in believing and resolving, and giving leasure to the judgment to consider. If we can once discover it, we shall easily stay the course of this Fever. A wise man counselled *Augustus* being in choler, not to be moved before he had pronounced the letters of the Alphabet. Whatsoever we say or do in the heat of our blood, ought to be suspected. *Nil tibi liceat dum iraseeris. Quare? Quia vis omnia licere.* *Nothing is law-* 2 *Head.*

*lawfull for thee whileſt thou art angry. Why? becauſe thou wilt then have all things lawfull for thee.* We muſt fear and be doubtfull of our ſelves, for ſo long as we are moved, we can do nothing to purpoſe. Reaſon when it is hindered by paſſions, ſerveth us no more then the wings of a bird being faſtened to his feet. We muſt therefore have recourſe unto our friends, and ſuffer our choler to die in the middeſt of our diſcourſe. And laſtly, diverſion to all pleaſant occaſions, as muſick, &c.

3. *Head.* The third head conſiſteth in thoſe beautifull conſiderations wherewith the mind muſt long before be ſeaſoned. Firſt, in the conſideration of the actions and motions of thoſe that are in choler, which ſhould breed in us a hatred thereof, ſo ill do they become a man. This was the manner of the wiſe, the better to diſſwade a man from this vice, to counſell him to behold himſelf in a glaſſe. Secondly, and contrarily, of the beauty which is a moderation; Let us conſider how much grace there is in a ſweet kind of mildneſs and clemency, how pleaſing and acceptable they are unto others, and commodious to our ſelves: It is the Adamant that draweth unto us the hearts and wils of men. This is principally required in thoſe whom fortune hath placed in high degree of honour, who ought to have their motions more remiſs and temperate, for as their actions are of greateſt importance, ſo their faults are more hardly repaired. Finally, in the conſideration of that eſteem and love which we ſhould bear to that wiſdome which we here ſtudy, which eſpecially ſheweth it ſelf in retaining and commanding it ſelf, in remaining conſtant and invincible; a man muſt mount his mind from the earth, and frame it to a diſpoſition, like to the higheſt region of the air, which is never over-ſhadowed with clouds, nor troubled with thunders, but in a perpetuall ſerenity; ſo our mind muſt not be darkned with ſorrow, nor moved with choler, but fly all precipitation, imitate the higheſt Planets, that of all others are carried more ſlowly. Now all this is to be underſtood of inward choler, and covered; which endureth being joyned with an ill affection, hatred, deſire of revenge: *quæ in ſinu ſtulti requieſcit, ut qui reponunt odia; quodq; ſævæ cogitationis indicium eſt, ſecreto ſuo ſatiantur*: *Which reſt in the boſome of a fool, as he that layeth up hatred; and which is a token of a cruell mind being inwardly glutted therewith*: For the outward and open choler is ſhort, a fire made of ſtraw, without ill affection, which is onely to make another to ſee his fault, whether in inferiours by reprehenſions

or

or in others by shewing the wrong and indiscretion they commit, it is a thing profitable, necessary, and very commendable. It is good and profitable, both for himself, and for another, sometimes to be moved to anger, but it must be with moderation and rule.

4 *To be angry when it is good and commodious.*

There are some that smother their choler within, to the end it break not forth, and that they may seem wise and moderate; but they fret themselves inwardly, and offer themselves a greater violence then the matter is worth. It is better to chide a little, and to vent the fire, to the end it be not over ardent and painfull within. A man incorporateth choler by hiding it. It is better that the point thereof should prick a little without, then that it should be turned against it self. *Omnia vitia in aperto leviora sunt, & tunc perniciosissima, cum simulatâ sanitate subsidunt: All diseases that appear openly are the lighter; and then are most dangerous when they rest hidden with a counterfeit health.*

*For himself.*

5 *For another. with conditions.*

Moreover, against those that understand not, or seldome suffer themselves to be led by reason, as against those kind of servants that do nothing but for fear, it is necessary that choler either true or dissembled put life into them, without which there can be no rule or government in a family. But yet it must be with these conditions: First, that it be not often, upon all, or light occasions. For being too common, it grows into contempt, and works no good effect. Secondly, not in the air, murmuring and railing behind their backs, or upon uncertainties, but be sure that he feel the smart that hath committed the offence. Thirdly, that it be speedily, to purpose and seriously, without any mixture of laughter, to the end it may be a profitable chastisement for what is past, and a warning for that which is to come. To conclude, it must be used as a medicine.

All these remedies may serve against the following passions.

## CHAP. XXXII.

### *Against Hatred.*

THat a man may the better defend himself against hatred, he must hold a rule that is true, that all things have two handles whereby he may take them: by the one they seem to be grievous and burdensome unto us, by the other easie and light. Let us then receive things by the good handle, and we shall find that there is

something good and to be loved, in whatsoever we accuse and hate. For there is nothing in the world that is not for the good of man. And in that which offendeth us, we have more cause to complain thereof, then to hate it: for it is the first offence, and receiveth the greatest dammage, because it loseth therein the use of reason, the greatest losse that may be. In such an accident then, let us turn our hate into pity, and let us endeavour to make those worthy to be beloved, which we would hate, as *Lycurgus* did unto him, that had put out his eye, whom he made, as a chastisement of that wrong, an honest, virtuous, and modest Citizen by his good instruction.

## CHAP. XXXIII.

### *Against Envie.*

AGainst this passion, we must consider that which we esteem and envie in another. We willingly envie in others riches, honours, favours, and the reason is, because we know not how dearly they have cost them. He that shall say, thou shalt have as much at the same price, we would rather refuse his offer, then thank him for it. For before a man can attain unto them, he must flatter, endure afflictions, injuries; to be brief, lose his liberty, satisfie and accommodate himself to the pleasures and passions of another. Man hath nothing for nothing in this world. To think to attain to goods, honours, states, offices, otherwise, and to pervert the law, or rather custome of the world, is to have the money and wares too. Thou therefore that makest profession of honour and of virthe, why dost thou afflict thy self if thou have not these goods, which are not gotten but by a shamefull patience? Do thou therefore rather pity others, then envie them. If it be a true good that is hapned to another, we should rejoyce thereat; for we should desire the good of another: To be pleased with another mans prosperity, is to increase our own.

## CHAP. XXXIV.

### *Against Revenge.*

AGainst this cruell passion, we must first remember that there is nothing so honourable, as to know how to pardon. Every man may prosecute the law to right that wrong that he hath received; but to give grace, to remit and forgive, belongeth to a soveraign

soveraign Prince. If then thou wilt be a King of kings they self and do an act that may become a king, pardon freely, be gracious towards him that hath offended thee.

Secondly, there is nothing so great and so victorious, as hardiness and a couragious insensibility in the suffering of injuries, whereby they return and rebound wholly upon the wrongers, as heavie blows upon a hard and steeled anvill, which do no other but wound and benum the hand and arm of the striker: To meditate revenge is to confesse himself wounded; to complain is to acknowledg himself guilty and inferiour. *Vltio doloris confessio est: non est magnus animus quem incurvat injuria: ingens animus & verus æstimator sui, non vindicat injuriam, quia non sentit: Revenge is a confession of griefe: a high and generous mind is not subject to injurie; magnanimity and true valour revengeth not an injury, because it feeleth it not.*

But some will object, that it is irksome and dishonourable to endure an offence. I agree thereunto, and I am of opinion not to suffer, but vanquish and master it; but yet after a fair and honourable fashion, by scorning it and him that offered it; nay, more then that, by doing good unto him. In both these *Cesar* was excellent. It is a glorious victory to conquer, and make the enemy to stoop, by benefits, and of an enemy, to make him a friend, be the injury never so great. Yea to think that by how much the greater the wrong is, by so much the more worthy it is to be pardoned; and by how much more just the revenge is, by so much the more commendable is clemency. 3

Again, it is no reason that a man should be Iudge and a party too, as he that revengeth is. He must commit the matter to a third person, or at least take counsell of his friends, and of the wiser sort, not giving credit unto himself. *Iupiter* might alone dart out his favourable lightnings; but when there grew a question of sending forth his revenging thunderbolts, he could not do it without the counsell and assistance of the twelve gods. This was a strange case that the greatest of the gods, who of himself had power to do good to the whole world, could not hurt a particular person, but after a solemn deliberation. The wisdome of *Iupiter* himself feareth to erre, when there is a question of revenge, and therefore he hath need of a counsell to detain him. 4

We must therefore form unto our selves a moderation of the mind; this is the virtue of clemency, which is a sweet mildnes and and graciousnes, which tempereth, retaineth, and represseth all 2 *Clemency.*

our motions. It armeth us with patience, it perswadeth us that we cannot be offended but with our selves; that of the wrongs of another nothing remaineth in us, but that which we will retain. It winneth unto us the love of the whole world, and furnisheth us with a modest carriage agreeable unto all.

## CHAP. XXXV.

### *Against Iealousie.*

THe onely mean to avoid it, is for a man to make himself worthy of that he desireth, for Iealousie is nothing else but a distrust of our selves, and a testimony of our little desert. The Emperour *Aurelius*, of whom *Faustine* his wife demanded, What he would do if his enemy *Cassius* should obtain the victory against him in battell, answered, I serve not the gods so slenderly, as that they will send me so hard a fortune. So they that have any part in the affection of another, if there happen any cause of fear to lose it, should say, I honour not so little his love, that he will deprive me of it. The confidence we have in our own merit, is a great gage of the will of another.

2 He that prosecuteth any thing with virtue, is eased by having a companion in the pursuit; for he serveth for a comfort, and a trumpet to his merit. Imbecility onely feareth the encounter, because it th'nketh that being compared to another, the imperfection thereof will presently appear. Take away emulation, you take away the glory and spurr of virtue.

3 My counsell to men against this malady, when it proceedeth from their wives, is, that they remember that the greatest part, and most gallant men of the world have fallen into this misfortune, and have been content to bear it without stirring and molestation: *Lucullus*, *Cesar*, *Pompey*, *Cato*, *Augustus*, *Antonius*, and divers others. But thou wilt say, the world knoweth and speaks of it: and of whom speak they not in this sense, from the great to the least? how many honest men do every day fall into the same reproach? and if a man stir therein, the women themselves make a jest of it: the frequency of this accident, should moderate the bitterness thereof. Finally, be thou such that men may complain of thy wrong, that thy virtue extinguish thy hard fortune, that honest men may account nevertheless of thee, but rather curse the occasion

As

As touching women; there is no counsell against this evill, for their nature is wholly composed of suspition, vanity, curiosity. It is true, that they cure themselves at the charge of their husbands, turning their evill upon them, and healing it with a greater. But if they were capable of counsell, a man would not advise them not to care for it, not to seem to perceive it: which is a sweet mediocrity between this foolish jealousie, and that other opposite custome practised in the Indies and other nations, where women labour to get friends, and women for their husbands seek above all things their honour and pleasure (for it is a testimony of the virtue, valour, and reputation of a man in those countries to have many wives.) So did *Livia* to *Augustus*, *Stratonice* to King *Deiotarus*; and for multiplication of stock, *Sara*, *Lea*, *Rachel*, to *Abraham* and *Iacob*. 4

## *Of temperance, the fourth virtue.*

### CHAP. XXXVI.

### *Of Temperance in generall.*

TEmperancie is taken two wayes, generally for a moderation and sweet temper in all things. And so it is not a speciall virtue, but generall and common, the seasoning sauce of all the rest; and it is perpetually required, especially in those affaires where there is controversie and contestation, troubles and divisions. For the preservation thereof, there is no better way, then to be free from particular phantasies and opinions, and simply to hold himself to his own devoir. All lawfull intentions and opinions are temperate; choler, hatred, are inferiour to duty, and to justice, and serve onely those that tie not themselves to heir duty by simple reason. 1 *Temperancie two fold.* *Generall.*

Specially, for a bridle and rule in things pleasant, delightfull, which tickle our senses and naturall appetites. *Habena voluptatis inter libidinem et stuporem naturæ posita, cujus duæ partes; verecundia in fuga turpium, honestas in observatione decori: The bridle of pleasure, is placed between desire and dulness of nature, of which there is two parts: shamefastness in the avoiding of filthy dishoneſt things: and honeſt in the observation of comelineſs and decency.* We will here take it more at large, for a rule and duty in all prosperity, as fortitude is the rule in all adversity, and it shall be the bridle, 2 *Speciall.*

as fortitude the ſpurr. With theſe two we ſhall tame this brutiſh, ſavage, untoward part of our paſſions which is in us, and we ſhall carry our ſelves well and wiſely in all fortunes and accidents, which is a high point of wiſdome.

3 *The deſcription of temperancy.*

Temperancie then hath for the ſubject and generall object there- of all proſperity, pleaſure and plauſible things, but eſpecially and properly pleaſure, whereof it is the razor and the rule; the razor to cut off ſtrange and vitious ſuperfluities; the rule of that which is naturall and neceſſary: *Voluptatibus imperat, alias odit & abigit, alias diſpenſat & ad ſanum modum redigit: nec unquam ad illas propter illas venit, ſcit optimum eſſe modum cupitorum, non quantum velis, ſed quantum debeas. It commandeth our pleaſures, ſome it hateth and chaſeth away, others it ſetteth in order and bringeth to a ſound mediocrity: neither doth it ever come unto them for them, it knoweth that the beſt mean of things to be deſired, is not ſo much as thou wouldeſt, but ſo much as thou oughteſt.* This is the authority and power of reaſon, over concupiſcence and violent affections, which carry our wils to delights and peaſures. It is the bridle of our ſoul, and the proper inſtrument to clear thoſe boyling tempeſts which ariſe in us by the heat and intemperancie of our blood, that the ſoul may be alwayes kept one, and appliant unto reaſon, that it apply not it ſelf to ſenſible objects, but that it rather accommodate them unto it ſelf, and make them ſerve it. By this we wean our ſoul from the ſweet milk of the pleaſures of this world, and we make it capable of a more ſolid and ſoveraign nouriſhment. It is a rule that ſweetly accommodateth all things unto nature, to neceſſity, ſimplicity, facility, health, conſtancy. Theſe are things that go willingly together, and they are the meaſures and bonds of wiſdome; as contrarily Arts, luſt, and ſuperfluity, variety, and multiplicity, difficulty, malady, and delicateneſs, keep company together following intemperancie and folly. *Simplici curæ conſtant neceſſaria, in delicijs laboratur. Ad parata nati ſumus; nos omnia nobis difficilia facilium faſtidio fecimus: There needs no great care for things neceſſary, the labour is in delicacies. We are born to things already prepared: but we have made all things that were eaſie, difficult unto us through lothſomneſs.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXXVII.

### *Of prosperity, and counsell thereupon.*

THat prosperity which sweetly fals upon us, by the common course and ordinary custome of the world, or by our own wisdome and discreet carriage, is far more firm and assured, and lesse envied, then that which commeth from heaven, with fame and renown, beyond and against the opinion of all, and the hope even of him that receiveth these bounties. 1

Prosperity is very dangerous: whatsoever there is that is vain and light in the soul of man, is raised and carried with the first favourable wind. There is nothing that makes a man so much to lose and forget himself, as great prosperity, as corn lodgeth by too great abundance, and boughs over-charged with fruit break asunder, and therefore it is necessary that a man look to himself, and take heed, as if he went in a slippery place, and especially of insolency, pride, and presumption. There be some that swim in a shallow water, and with the least favour of fortune are puffed up, forget themselves, become insupportable, which is the true picture of folly. 2

From thence it cometh that there is not any thing more frail, and that is of lesse continuance then an ill advised prosperity, which commonly changeth great and joyfull occurrents into heavy and lamentable, and fortune of a loving mother, is turned into a cruell step-dam. 3

Now the best counsell that I can give to a man, to carry himself herein, is, not to esteem too much of all sorts of prosperity and good fortunes, and in any sort not to desire them: If they shall happen to come, out of their good grace and favour, to receive them willingly and cheerfully: but as things strange and no way necessary, but such as without which a man may passe his life, and therefore there is no reason he should make account of them, or think himself the worse or better man for them; *Non est tuum, fortuna quod fecit tuum. Qui tutam vitam agere volet, ista viscata beneficia devitet, nil dignum putare quod speres. Quid dignum habet fortuna quod concupiscas? It is not thine, which fortune hath made thine. He that will lead a safe life, let him eschew those alluring benefits, and think nothing worthy that thou shouldest hope for. What worthy thing hath Fortune, that thou shouldest covet or desire?* 4

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXXVIII.

### *Of Pleasure, and advice thereupon.*

*The description and distinction of pleasure.*

PLeasure is an apprehension and sense of that which is agreeable to nature, it is a pleasant motion and tickling; as contrarily, grief or sorrow is, unwelcome and unpleasing to the senses; nevertheless, they that place it in the highest degree, and make it the soveraign good, as the Epicures, take it not so, but for a privation of evill and displeasure, in a word Indolence. According to their opinion, the not having of any evill, is the happiest estate that man can hope for in this life. *Nimium boni est cui nihil est mali: It is too much good which hath no evill.* This is as a mid-way or neutrality betwixt pleasure taken in the first and common sense, and grief; it is as sometime the bosome of *Abraham* was said to be, betwixt peradise, and the hell of the damned. This is a sweet and peaceable state and settling, a true, constant and staied pleasure, which resembleth, in some sort, the tranquillity of the soul, accounted by Philosophers the chief and soveraign good: the other first kind of pleasure is active and in motion. And so, there should be three estates, the two extreme opposites: Grief and Pleasure, which are not stable nor durable, and both of them sickly: and that in the middle, stable, firm, sound, whereunto the Epicures gave the name of pleasure (as indeed it is in regard of griefe and sorrow) making it the chiefe and soveraign good. This is that which hath so much defamed their school, as *Seneca* hath ingeniously acknowledged and said, that their evill was in the title and words, not in the substance, having never had either doctrine or life more sober, temperate, and enemy to wickedness and vice then theirs. And it is not altogether without reason, that they called this Indolence and peaceable state, Pleasure: for that trickling delight which seemeth to mount us above indolence, aimeth at nothing else but indolence, or want of grief, as its proper But; as for example, that appetite that ravisheth us with desire of women, seeketh nothing else but to fly that pain, that an ardent and furious desire to satisfie our last bringeth with it, to quit our selves of this fever, and to purchase our rest.

1 *Against it*

Pleasure diversly hath been spoken of, and more briefly and sparingly then was fit: some have denied it, others detested it as a monster, and tremble at the very word, taking it alwayes in the

the worser part. They that do wholly contemn it, say; First, it is short, a fire of straw, especially if it be lively and active. Secondly, frail and tender, easily and with nothing corrupted and ended, an ounce of sorrow marrs a whole Sea of pleasure: It is called a choaked piece of artillery. Third, base, shamefull, exercising it self by vile instruments, in hidden corners, at least for the most part, for there likewise are magnificent and pompous pleasures. Fourthly quickly subject to satiety. A man knows not how to continue long in his pleasures, he is impatient aswell in his delights, as his griefes, and it is not long ere repentance follow, which many times yields pernicious effects, the overthrow of men, families, commonweales. Fiftly, and above all, they alledg against it, that when it is in his greatest strength, it mastereth in such a manner, that reason can have no entertainment.

3 On the other side, it is said to be naturall, created and established of in the world, for the preservation and continuance thereof, as well by retail of the individuall parts, as in grosse of the speciall kinds. Nature the mother of pleasure, in those actions that are for our need and necessity, hath likewise mingled pleasure. Now to live well, is to consent unto nature. God, saith *Moses*, hath created pleasure, *Plantaverat Dominus paradisum voluptatis*: *The Lord planteth the paradise of pleasure*, hath placed and established man in a pleasant estate, place and condition of life: and in the end, what is the last and highest felicity, but certain and perpetuall pleasure? *Inebriabuntur ab ubertate domûs tuæ, & torrente voluptatis tuæ potabis eos. Suis contenta finibus, res est divina voluptas*: *They shall be made drunken with the plenty of thy house, and thou shalt make them drink in the streams of thy pleasure. Divine pleasure is a thing that is content with her bounds.* And to say the truth, the most regular Philosophers, and the greatest professours of virtue, *Zeno*, *Cato*, *Scipio*, *Epaminondas*, *Plato*, *Socrates* himself, have been in effect amorous, and drinkers, dancers, sporters, and have handled, spoken, written of love and other pleasures. *For it, See l. 2. cap. 6.*

4 And therefore this matter is not decided in a word, but we must distinguish, for pleasures are divers. There are naturall, and not naturall: This distinction as more important, we will presently better consider of. There are some that are glorious, arrogant and difficult; others that are obscure, mild, easie and ready. Though to say the truth, Pleasure is a quality not greatly ambitious; it is accounted rich enough of it self, without the addition of any thing *The distinction of pleasures.*

to

to the reputation thereof, and it is loved best in obscurity. They likewise that are so easie and ready, are cold and frozen, if there be no difficulty in them: which is as an inducement, a bait, a spur unto them. The ceremony, shame and difficulty that there is in the attainment of the last exploits of love, are the spurs and matches that give fire unto it, and increase the price thereof. There are spirituall pleasure and corporall, not (to say the truth) because they are separated: for they all belong to the entire man and the whole composed subject: and the one part of our selves hath not any so proper, but that the other hath a feeling thereof, so long as the mariage and amorous band of the soul and body continueth in this world. But yet there are some wherein the soul hath a better part then the body, and therefore they better agree with men, then beasts, and are more durable, as those that enter into us by the sense of seeing and hearing, which are the two gates of the soul, for having onely their passage by them, the soul receiveth them, concocteth and digesteth them, feedeth and delighteth it self a long time; the body feeleth little. Others there are wherein the body hath the greater part, as those which belong to the taste and touch, more grosse and materiall, wherein the beasts bear us company, such pleasures are handled, tried, used and ended in the body it self, the soul hath onely the assistance and company, and they are but short, like a fire of straw, soon in, soon out.

5 *Advisements. hereupon.*

The chief thing to be considered herein, is to know how we should carry and govern our selves in our pleasures, which wisdome will teach us, and it is the office of the virtue of temperauce. We must first make a great and notable difference between the naturall, and not naturall. By the not naturall, we do not onely understand those that are against nature, and the true use approved by the laws; but also the naturall themselves, if they degenerate into too great an excesse and superfluity, which is no part of nature, which contenteth it self with the supply of necessity; whereunto a man may likewise add decencie and common honesty. It is naturall pleasure to be covered with a house and garments against the rigour of the Elements, and the injuries of wicked men; but that they should be of gold and silver, of Iasper or Porphery, it is not naturall: Or if they come unto a man by other means then naturall, as if they be sought and procured by Art, by medicines, or other unnaturall means: Or if they be first forged in the mind, stirred by passion, and afterwards from thence come unto the body,

*Which are naturall.*

dy, which is a preposterous order : for the order of nature is, that pleasures enter into the body, and be desired by it, and so from thence ascend unto the mind. And even as that laughter that is procured by tickling the arme holes, is neither naturall nor pleasing, but rather a kind of convulsion ; so that pleasure that is either sought or kindled by the soul, is not naturall.

6 *The first and generall rule.*

Now the first rule of wisdome concerning pleasure is this, to chase away, and altogether to condemn the unnaturall, as vitious. bastardly (for as they that come to a banquet unbidden, are to be refused ; so those pleasures that without the invitation of nature present themselves, are to be rejected) to admit and receive the naturall ; but yet with rule and moderation : and this is the office of temperance in generall to drive away the unnaturall, to rule the naturall.

*Rules for the naturall.*

The rule of naturall pleasures consisteth in three points : First, that it be without the offence, scandall, dammage and prejudice of another.

Secondly, that it be without the prejudice of himself, his honour, his health, his leasure, his duty, his functions.

Thirdly, that it be with moderation, that he take them no more to the heart, then against the heart, neither cover them, nor fly from them, but take and receive them, as men do honey with the tip of the finger, not with a full hand, not to engage himself in them too far, nor to make them his principall business, and onely work ; much lesse to enthrall himself unto them, and of recreations make them necessities, for that is the greatest misery of all others. Pleasure should be but as an accessary, a recreation for the time, that he may the better return to his labour ; as sleep which strengthneth the body, and giveth us breath to return the more cheerfully to our work. To be short, a man must use them, not enjoy them. But above all, he must take heed of their treason : for some there are that whilest we give our selves unto them, and love them over dearly, return evill for good, and more displeasure then delight : but this is treacherously, for they go before to besot and deceive us, and hiding from us their tail, they tickle us and embrace us to strangle us. The pleasure of drinking goes before the pain of the head : such are the delights and pleasures of indiscreet and firy youth wherewith they are made drunken. We plunge our selves into them, but in our old age they forsake us as it were drowned & overwhelmed, as the Sea in his reflux over-runneth the sandybanks :

That

That sweetnes which we have swallowed so greedily, endeth with bitternes and repentance, and filleth our souls with a venomous humour that infecteth and corrupteth it.

8 *want of government in pleasure prejuditious.*

Now, as moderation and rule in pleasures is an excellent and profitable thing according unto God, nature, reason: so excesse and immoderate unrulines is of all others the most pernicious, both to the publick and private good. Pleasure ill valued, softneth and weakneth the vigour both of soul and body; *Debilitatem induxêre delitiæ, blandissima dowina: Delicacies have brought in debility, as a most alluring mistris*: it besotteth and effeminateth the best courages that are, witnes *Hannibal*: and therefore the Lacedemonians that made profession of contemning all pleasures were called men, and the Athenians soft and delicate women. *Xerxes* to punish the revolt of the Babylonians, and to assure himself of them in time to come, took from them their armes, forbidding all painfull and difficult exercise, and permitted all pleasures and delicacies whatsoever. Secondly, it banisheth and driveth away the principall virtues, which cannot continue under so idle and effeminate an Empire: *Maximas virtutes jacere oportet voluptate dominante: The chiefest virtues must be laid aside, when pleasure beareth all the sway.* Thirdly, it degenerateth very suddenly into the contrary thereof, which is grief, sorrow, repentance: for as the rivers of sweet water run their course to die in the salt sea, so the honey of pleasures endeth in the gall of griefe. *In præcipiti est, ad dolorem vergit, in contrarium abit, nisi modum teneat. Extrema gaudij luctus occupat. It is subject to sudden downfall, it inclineth towards grief, is converted into the contrary, unlesse there be kept a mean. Sorrow occupieth extremities of joy.* Finally, it is the seminarie of all evils, of all ruine. *Malorum esca voluptas: Pleasure is the bait of evill.* From it come those close and secret intelligences, then treasons, and in the end eversions and ruines of Common-weales. Now we will speak of pleasures in particular.

## CHAP. XXXIX.

### *Of eating and drinking, Abstinence and Sobriety.*

1 *The use of victuall.*

Victuals are for nourishment, to sustain and repair the infirmity of the body; the moderate, naturall, and pleasant use thereof entertaineth it, maketh it a fit and apt instrument for the soul; as contrarily

contrarily an unnaturall excesse weakneth it, bringeth great and loathsome diseases, which are the naturall punishments of intemperancy. *Simplex ex simplici causa valetudo ; multos morbos supplicia luxuriæ, multa fercula fecerunt : A simple health proceeds from a single cause ; many dishes have caused many diseases, the punishments of excesse.* A man complaineth of his brain for sending down so many rheums, the foundation of all dangerous maladies; but the brain may well answer him, *Desine fundere, & ego desinam fluere : Cease to pour in, and I will cease to pour out.* Be thou sober in pouring down, and I will be sparing in dropping down. But to what the excesse and provision, the multitude, diversity, and exquisite preparation of viands is come in request ; and it is our custome even in the greatest and most sumptuous superfluities, to crave pardon for not providing enough.

How prejudicate both to the mind and to the body a full diet, with diversity, curiosity, exquisite and artificiall preparation is, every man may find in himself. Gluttony and drunkenness are idle and undecent vices ; they bewray themselves sufficiently by the gestures and countenances of those that are therewith tainted ; whereof the best and more honest is, to be dull and drowsie, unprofitable and unfit for any good : for there was never man that loved his belly too well, that did ever perform any great work. Moreover, it is the vice of brutish men, and of no worth, especially drunkenness, which leadeth a man to all unworthy actions ; witness *Alexander*, otherwise a great Prince, being overcome with this vice killed his dearest friend *Clitus*, and being come to himself, would have kild himself for killing *Clitus*. To conclude, it wholly robbeth a man of his sense, and perverteth his understanding. *Vinum clavo caret, dementat sapientes, facit repueraſcere senes : Wine wanteth government, it maketh wise men fools, and old men become children again.*

3 *Sobriety commended.*

Sobriety though it be none of the greatest and more difficult virtues, and which is not painfull to any but fools and mad-men, yet it is a way and a kind of progresse to other virtues : It extinguisheth vice in the cradle, and stifleth it in the seed : It is the mother of health, and an assured medicine against all maladies, and that that lengthneth a mans life. *Socrates*, by sobriety had always a strong body and lived ever in health ; *Masinissa* the sobrest King of all the rest, got children at 86. years of age, and at 92. vanquished the Carthaginians ; whereas *Alexander* by his drunkenness died

died in the flowr of his age, though he were better born and of a ſounder conſtitution then them all. Many ſubject to gouts and other diſeaſes by phyſick incurable, have recovered their health by diet. Neither is it ſerviceable to the body onely, but to the mind too, which thereby is kept pure, capable of wiſdome and good counſell. *Salubrium conſiliorum parens ſobrietas: Sobriety is the mother of wholeſome counſels.* All the greateſt perſonages of the world have been ſober, not onely the profeſſors of ſingular virtue and auſterity of life, but all thoſe that have excelled in any thing, *Cyrus, Ceſer, Iulian* the Emperour, *Mahumet: Epicurus*, the great Doctor of pleaſure, herein excelled all men. The frugality of the Roman *Curij* and *Fabritij* is more extolled then their great victories: The Lacedemonians as valiant as they were, made expreſſe profeſſion of frugality and ſobriety.

4 But a man muſt in time and from his youth embrace this part of temperancy, and not ſtay till the infirmities of old age come upon him, leſt that he be utterly caſt down with variety of diſeaſes; as the Athenians, who were reproached for that they never demanded peace, but in their mourning garments, after they had loſt their kindreds and friends in warr, and were able to defend themſelves no longer. This is to aske counſell when it is too late; *Sera in fundo parſimonia; It is too late to ſpare when all is ſpent.* It is to play the good husband when there is nothing left but bare walls, to make his market when the fair is ended.

It is a good thing for a man not to accuſtome himſelf to a delicate diet, leſt when he ſhall happen to be deprived thereof, his body grow out of order, and his ſpirit languiſh and faint; and contrarily to uſe himſelf to a groſſer kind of ſuſtenance, both becauſe they make a man more ſtrong and healthfull, and becauſe they are more eaſil gotten.

## CHAP. XL

### *Of riot and exceſſe in apparell, and ornaments, and of frugality.*

1 IT hath been ſaid before that garments are not naturall, nor neceſſary to man; but artificiall, invented and uſed onely by him in the world. Now inaſmuch as they are artificiall, (for it is the manner of things artificiall to vary and multiply, without end and meaſure, ſimplicity being a friend unto nature) they are extended and multiplied

multiplied into so many inventions (for to what other end are there so many occupations and traffiques in the world, but for the covering and decking of our bodies? (dissolutions and corruptions, insomuch that it is no more an excuse and covering of our defects and necessities, but a nest of all manner of devices, *vexillum superbiæ, nidus luxuriæ*; *The banner of pride, the nest of Luxurie*, the subject of riot and quarrels: for from hence did first begin the propriety of things, mine and thine; and in the greatest communities or fellowships that are, apparell is always proper, which is signified by this word, disrobe.

It is a vice very familiar and proper unto women (I mean excess in apparell) a true testimony of their weakness, being glad to win credit and commendations by these small and slender accidents, because they know themselves to be too weak and unable to purchase credit and reputation by better means: for such as are virtuous, care least for such vanities. By the laws of the Lacedemonians, it was not permitted for any to wear garments of rich and costly colours, but to common women: That was their part, as virtue and honour belonged unto others.

Now the true and lawfull use of apparell, is to cover our selves against wind and weather, and the rigour of the air, and should never be used to other end; and therefore as they should not be excessive nor sumptuous, so should they not be too base and beggerly. *Nec affectatæ sordes, nec exquisitæ munditiæ*: *Neither affected uncleanness, nor exquisite pickedness*, *Caligula* was as a laughing stock to all that beheld him, by reason of the dissolute fashion of his apparell. *Augustus* was commended for his modesty.

## CHAP. XLI.

### *Carnall pleasure, Chastitie, Continency.*

COntinency is a thing very difficult, and most have a carefull and a painfull guard: It is no easie matter wholly to resist nature, which in this is most strong and most ardent. 1 *See the cap. 24.*

And this is the greatest commendation that it hath, that there is difficulty in it; as for the rest it is without action and without fruit, it is a privation, a not doing, pain without profit, and therefore sterility is signified by virginity. I speake here of simple continency, and onely in it self, which is a thing altogether barren and unprofitable, and hardly commendable, no more then not to play the

glutton, not to be drunken; & not of Christian continency, which to make it a virtue hath two things in it, a deliberate purpose always to keep it, and that it be for Gods cause. *Non hoc in virginibus prædicamus, quod sint virginis, sed quod Deo dicata*; *We praise not this in Virgins, for that they be Virgins, but because they be dedicated unto God*: witness the Vestals, and the five foolish Virgins shut out of doores; and therefore it is a common error, and a vanity, to call continent women, honest women and honourable, as if it were a virtue, and there were an honour due unto him that doth no evill, doth nothing against his duty. Why should not continent men in like sort have the title of honesty and honour? There is no reason for it, because there is more difficulty, they are more hot, more hardy, they have more occasions, better means. So unlikely is it that honour should be due unto him that doth no evill, that it is not due unto him that doth good, but onely, as hath been said, to him that is profitable to the weale publike, and where there is labour, difficulty, danger. And how many continent persons are there stuft with other vices, or at least that are not touched with vain-glory and presumption, whereby tickling themselves with a good opinion of themselves, they are ready to judg and condemn others? And by experience we see in many women how dearly they sell it unto their husbands, for dislodging the devill from that place where they row, and establishing the point of honour as in its proper throne, they make it to mount more high, and to appear in the head, to make him believe that it is not any lower elsewhere. If nevertheless this flattering word, honour, serve to make them more carefull of their duty, I care not much if I allow of it. Vanity it self serves for some use, and simple incontinency and sole in it self is none of the greatest faults, no more then others that are purely corporall, and which nature committeth in her actions either by excess or defect without malice. That which discrediteth it, and makes it more dangerous, is, that it is almost never alone, but is commonly accompanied and followed with other greater faults, infected with the wicked and base circumstances of prohibited persons, times, places, practised by wicked means, lies, impostures, subornation, treasons, besides the losse of time, distractions, of those functions from whence it proceedeth by great and grievous scandals.

*S. August.*

*Lib. 1. Cap. 60.*

3 *An advisement*

And because this is a violent passion and likewise deceitfull, we must arm our selves against it, and be wary in descrying the baits thereof,

thereof, and the more it flattereth us, more distrust it: for it would willingly embrace us to strangle us; it pampereth us with honey, to glut us with gall; and therefore let us consider as much, that the beauty of another, is a thing that is without us, and that as soon it turneth to our evill as our good, that it is but a flower that passeth, a small thing and almost nothing but the colour of a body; and acknowledging in beauty the delicate hand of nature, we must prise it as the sun and moon, for the excellency that is in it: and coming to the fruition thereof by all honest means, always remember that the immoderate use of this pleasure consumeth the body, effeminateth the soul, weakneth the spirit, and that many by giving themselves overmuch thereunto, have lost, some their life, some their fortune, some their spirit: and contrarily, that there is greater pleasure and glory in vanquishing pleasure, then in possessing it: that the continency of *Alexander* and of *Scipio* hath been more highly commended, then the beautifull countenances of those young damosels that they took captives.

There are many kinds and degrees of continency and incontinency. The conjugall is that which importeth more then all the rest, which is most requisite and necessary, both for the publike and particular good, and therefore should be by all in greatest account. It must be kept and retained within the chaste breast of that party, whom the destinies have given for our companion. He that doth otherwise, doth not onely violate his own body, making it a vessell of ordure by all laws; the law of God, which commandeth chastity; of Nature, which forbiddeth that to be common, which is proper to one, and imposeth upon a man faith and constancy; of Countries, which have brought in marriages; of families, transferring unjustly the labour of another to a stranger; and lastly, Justice it self, bringing in uncertainties, jealousies, and brawles amongst kindred, depriving children of the love of their parents, and parents of the piety and duty of their children.

## CHAP. XLII.

### *Of Glory and Ambition.*

AMbition, the desire of glory and honour (whereof we have already spoken) is not altogether and in all respects to be condemned. First, it is very profitable to the weal-publike, as the world goeth, for it is from whence the greatest of our honourable actions doth rise, that hartneth men to dangerous attempts, as

we may see by the greatest part of our ancient heroicall men, who have not all been led by a philosophicall spirit, as *Socrates*, *Phocion*, *Aristides*, *Epaminondas*, *Cato* and *Scipio*, by the onely true and lively image of virtue; for many, yea the greatest number have been stirred thereunto by the spirit of *Themistocles*, *Alexander*, *Cæsar*: and although these honourable atchievements and glorious exploits have not been with their authors and actors, true works of virtue, but ambition; nevertheless their effects have been very beneficiall to the publike state. Besides this consideration, according to the opinion of the wisest, it is excusable and allowable in two cases: the one in good and profitable things, but which are inferiour unto virtue, and common both to the good and to the evill, as Arts and Sciences: *Honos alit artes: incenduntur omnes ad studia gloriæ: Honour nourisheth the Arts: all are inflamed through glory to study*: inventions, industry, military valour. The other in continuing the good will and opinion of another. The wise do teach, not to rule our actions by the opinion of another, except it be for the avoiding of such inconveniences, as may happen by their contempt of the approbation and judgment of another.

2 But that a man should be virtuous, and do good for glory, as if that were the salary and recompence thereof, is a false and vain opinion. Much where the state of virtue to be pitied, if she should fetch her commendations and prise from the opinion of another, this coine were but counterfeit, and this pay too base for virtue; She is too noble to beg such recompence. A man must settle his soul, and in such sort compose his actions, that the brightness of honour dazell not his reason, and strengthen his mind with brave resolutions, which serve him as bariers against the assaults of ambition.

3 He must therefore perswade himself, that virtue seeketh not a more ample and more rich Theater to shew it self then her own conscience: The higher the Sun is, the lesser shadow doth it make: The greater the virtue is, the less glory doth it seek. Glory is truly compared to a shadow which followeth those that fly it, and flieth those that follow it. Again, he must never forget that man commeth into this world as to a Comedy, where he chuseth not the part that he is to play, but onely bethinks himself how to play that part well that is given unto him: or as a banquet, wherein a man feeds upon that that is before him, not reaching to the far side of the table, or snatching the dishes from the master of the feast. If a

man

man commit a charge unto us, which we are capable of, let us accept of it modestly, and exercise it sincerely; making account that God hath placed us there to stand sentinell, to the end that others may rest in safety under our care. Let us seek no other recompence of our travell, then our own conscience to witness our well doing, and desire that the witness be rather of credit in the Court of our fellow citizens, then in the front of our publike actions. To be short; let us hold it for a maxime that the fruit of our honourable actions, is to have acted them. Virtue cannot find without it self, a recompence worthy it self. To refuse and contemn greatness, is not so great a miracle, it is an attempt of no difficulty. He that loves himself, and judgeth soundly, is content with an indifferent fortune. Magistracies very active and passive are painfull, and are not desired but by feeble and sick spirits. *Otanes* one of the seven that had title to the soveraignty of *Persia*, gave over unto his companions his right, upon condition that he and his, might live in that Empire free from all subjection and Magistracie, except that which the ancient laws did impose. being impatient to command, and to be commanded. *Diocletian* renounced the Empire, *Celestinus* the Popedome.

## CHAP. XLIII.

### *Of Temperance in speech, and of Eloquence.*

THis is a great point of wisdome: he that ruleth his tongue well, in a word, is wise. *Qui in verbo non offendit, hic perfectus est*: The reason hereof is, because the tongue is all the world, in it is both good and evill, life and death, as hath been said before. Let us now see what advice is to be given to rule it well.

The first rule is, that speech be sober and seldome: To know how to be silent, is a great advantage to speake well; and he that knows not well how to do the one, knows not the other. 1 *Rules of Speech*

To speake well and much is not the work of one man; and the best men are they that speake least, saith a wise man.

They that abound in words, are barren in good speech and good actions; like those trees that are full of leaves and yield little fruit, much chaffe and little corn.

The Lacedemonians, great professors of virtue and valour, did likewise profess silence, and were enemies to much speech: And therefore hath it ever been commendable to be sparing in speech, to

keep a bridle at the mouth : *Pone Domine cuſtodiam crimeo : O Lord, ſet a watch on my mouth.* And in the law of *Moſes* that veſſell that had not his covering faſtened to it, was unclean. By ſpeech a man is known and diſcerned : The wiſe man hath his tongue in his heart, the fool his heart in his tongue.

The ſecond, that it be true : The uſe of ſpeech is to aſſiſt the truth, and to carry the torch before it, to make it appear; and contrarily, to diſcover and reject lying. Inſomuch, that ſpeech is the inſtrument whereby we commvnicate our wills and our thoughts; It had need be true and faithfull, ſince that our underſtanding is directed by the onely means of ſpeech. He that falſifieth it, betrayeth publick ſociety; and if this mean fail us and deceive us, there is an end of all, there is no living in the world. But of living we have already ſpoken. *Eba. 10.*

3 The third, that it be naturall, modeſt and chaſte: not accompanied with vehemency and contention, whereby it may ſeem to proceed from paſſion; not artificiall nor affected; not wicked, immodeſt, licentious.

4 The fourth, that it be ſerious and profitable, not vain and unprofitable. A man muſt not be too attentive in relating what hath hapned in the market place or theater, or repeating of ſonnets and merriments, it bewraies too great and unprofitable leaſure, *otio abutentis, & abundantis : Of one abounding with eaſe, and abuſing it.* Neither is it good to enter into any large diſcourſe of his own actions and fortunes, for others take not ſo much pleaſure to hear them as to relate them.

5 But above all, it muſt never be offenſive, for ſpeech is the inſtrument and fore-runner of Charity, & therefore to uſe it againſt it is, to abuſe it, contrary to the purpoſe of nature. All kind of foul ſpeech detraction, mockery, is unworthy a man of wiſdome and honour.

6 The ſixt, to be gentle and pleaſing, not crabbed, harſh, and envious; and therefore in common ſpeech acute and ſubtile queſtions muſt be avoided, which reſemble crafiſhes, where there is more picking work then meat to eat, and their end is nothing elſe but brawls and contentions.

7 Laſtly, that it be conſtant, ſtrong, and generous, not looſe, effeminate, languiſhing, whereby we avoid the manner of ſpeech of Pedanties, pleaders, women.

8 To this point of Temperancie belongeth ſecrecy (whereof we have ſpoken in the Chapter of faith or fidelity) not only that which *Chap. 8.*

is

is committed unto us, and given us to keep, but that which wisdome and discretion telleth us ought to be suppressed.

Now as speech makes a man more excellent then a beast, so eloquence makes the professors thereof more excellent then other men. For this is the profession or art of speech, it is a more exquisite communication of discourse and of reason, the stern or roother of our souls, which disposeth the hearts and affection, like certain notes to make a melodious harmony. 9 *Of Eloquence and the commendation thereof.*

Eloquence is not only a purity and elegancy of speech, a discreet choise of words properly applied, ended in a true and a just fall, but it must likewise be full of ornaments, graces, motions, the world must be lively, first, by a cleer and a distinct voice, raising it self, and falling by little and little; Afterwards by a grave and naturall action, wherein a man may see the visage, hands, and members of the Oratour to speak with his month, follow with their motion that of the mind, and represent the affections: for an Oratour must first put on these passions which he would stir up in others. As *Brasidas* drew from his own wound the dart wherewith he slew his enemy: So passion being conceived in our heart, is incontinently formed into our speech, and by it proceeding from us, entereth into another, and there giveth the like impression which we our selves have, by a subtill and lively contagion. Hereby we see that a sweet and a mild nature is not so fit for eloquence, because it cannot conceive strong and couragious passions, such as it ought, to give life unto the Oration; in such sort, that when he should display the master sail of eloquence in a great and vehemenr action, he cometh far short thereof; as *Cicero* knew well how to reproach *Callidius*, who accused *Gallus* with a cold and over-mild voice and action, *Tu nisi fingeres, sic ageres? Thou thy self, wouldest do so, if thou diddest not counterfeit?* But being likewise vigorous, and furnished as hath been said, it hath not lesse force and violence then the commands of tyrants environed with their guards and halberds; It doth not onely lead the hearer. but intangle him, it reigneth over the people, and establisheth a violent Empire over our souls. 10 *The description*

A man may say against Eloquence, that truth is sufficiently maintained and defended by it self, and that there is nothing more eloquent then it self: which I confesse is true, where the mind of men is pure, and free from passions: but the greatest part of the world, either by nature, or art, and ill instruction, is preoccupated, and ill disposed unto virtue and verity, whereby it is necessary that 11 *Objections answered.*

men be handled like iron, which a man may ſoften with fire, before he temper it with water : So by the fiery motions of Eloquence, they muſt be made ſupple and maniable, apt to take the temper of verity. This is that whereunto Eloquence eſpecially tendeth; and the true fruit thereof is to arme virtue againſt vice. truth againſt lying and calumnies. The Orator, ſaith *Theophraſtus*, is the true Phyſitian of the ſoul, to whom it belongeth to cure the biting of Serpents by the Muſick of the Pipe, that is, the calumnies of wicked men by the harmony of reaſon. Now ſince no man can hinder, but that ſome there are that ſeaze upon eloquence, to the end they may execute their pernicious deſignments, how can a man do leſſe then defend himſelf with the ſame armes; for if we preſent our ſelves naked to the combat, do we not betray virtue and verity? But many have abuſed eloquence to wicked purpoſes, and the ruine of their countrey : It is true, but that is no reaſon why eloquence ſhould be diſpiſed, for that is common to it, with all the excellent things of the world, to be uſed or abuſed, well or ill applyed, according to the good and bad diſpoſition of thoſe that poſſeſſe them : Moſt men abuſe underſtanding, but yet we muſt not therefore conclude that underſtanding is not neceſſary.

FINIS.

AN

# AN Alphabeticall TABLE of all the principall matters contained in this BOOK.


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FINIS.

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